Theories of Truth

In light of new textual evidence in a manuscript from Toledo (BCT, MS 19, 26), the present work intends to determine the scope of Nicholas de Cusa’s influence on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola around the problem of the unity of truth and the diversity of philosophies. In his Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), Ernst Cassirer held the capital role of Cusanus’ philosophy in the configuration of the philosophical turn in Florentine Humanism during the second half of (...) the Quattrocento. In the 1960s, historians of the stature of Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller objected Cassirer's assertions, going so far as to affirm that there was practically no influence by Cusanus on Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico. In the case of the latter, more recent studies tended to balance the issue, pointing out several possible links between both authors, particularly through the physician and bibliophile Pierleone da Spoleto, who owned many works by the German cardinal. Some sections of Pico's Oratio, Conclusiones and other texts will be analyzed in comparison with those treatises by Cusanus which he most likely knew. For both authors, it is the unity of the incomprehensible truth that brings forth the different modes of philosophizing in the plurality of thought traditions. Resumen: A la luz de nuevas evidencias textuales en un manuscrito de Toledo (BCT, MS 19, 26), el presente trabajo se propone investigar los alcances de la influencia de Nicolás de Cusa sobre Giovanni Pico della Mirandola en torno del problema de la unidad de la verdad y la diversidad de las filosofías. En su obra de 1927, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Ernst Cassirer sostenía el rol capital de la filosofía de Nicolás de Cusa en la configuración del humanismo filosófico florentino de la segunda mitad del Quattrocento. En la década del 60, historiadores de la talla de Eugenio Garin y Paul Oskar Kristeller matizaron las afirmaciones de Cassirer hasta afirmar una influencia prácticamente nula del Cusano sobre Marsilio Ficino y Giovanni Pico. En el caso de este último, estudios más recientes tendieron a equilibrar la cuestión, señalando varios posibles puntos de contacto entre ambos autores, particularmente por intermedio del médico y bibliófilo Pierleone da Spoleto, que poseía muchas obras del cardenal alemán. Se analizarán algunas secciones de la Oratio, de las Conclusiones y de otros textos de Pico en comparación con aquellos tratados del Cusano que muy probablemente haya conocido. Para ambos autores, es la unidad de la incomprensible verdad la que suscita los diversos modos del filosofar en la pluralidad de tradiciones de pensamiento. (shrink)

Per quanto la disprezziamo e condanniamo, la menzogna accompagna da sempre e inevitabilmente la nostra vita. Mentiamo sin da bambini e continuiamo a mentire da adulti. Mentiamo a tutti, alle persone più care come agli sconosciuti e ancor di più ai nostri nemici. Mentiamo persino a noi stessi. Mentiamo in mille modi: quando raccontiamo una bugia, quando illudiamo noi stessi e gli altri, quando truffiamo, imbrogliamo e fingiamo. Mentiamo a parole e gesti. Mentiamo per far del male ma anche a (...) fin di bene. La capacità di mentire, come la speculare capacità di riconoscere la menzogna, fanno parte integrante del nostro bagaglio cognitivo: senza di esse ci sarebbe impossibile condurre una normale vita sociale. Altrettanto utile, pervasiva, a volte invasiva e persino scomoda è la verità, necessaria controparte della menzogna. L’una non potrebbe esistere senza l’altra. Ma dove incomincia l’una e dove finisce l’altra? Come nelle loro precedenti opere, i due autori affrontano il problema dai loro singolari punti di vista, cercando di dare una risposta, che non sarà però mai definitiva. (shrink)

La vérité est le degré d’exactitude d’une représentation de la réalité. Nous postulons trois étapes cognitives : le psychon, produit par la perception ; le construit, produit par intellection; et l’acte de parole, produit par la communication. La vérité se trouve à la seconde étape; seuls les construits sont aléthiques. La vérité est une qualité qui vient en degrés. La certitude est le point d’aboutissement parfait et inaccessible de cette gradation ; il s’agit donc d’un concept idéal. Une thèse est (...) réputée vraie si son degré aléthique est acceptablement efficace, sinon la thèse est considérée comme fausse. En d’autres termes, nous jugeons vraie toute thèse n’ayant pas assez d’échecs pour qu’elle soit considérée fausse. (shrink)

This chapter draws a connection between Herzog’s falsified epigraph to Lessons of Darkness and Kellyanne Conway’s claim that there are “alternative facts”. Philosophers have a commitment to the truth, but in cases like Herzog’s quote or Trump’s inauguration it’s very easy to fact-check. Being a good citizen may require that from us, but doing so leaves little to resolve philosophically. Thus, if Herzog raises a question about finding truth in an age of “alt-facts” and “fake news”, then it must be (...) about something other than finding “just the facts” or reporting “real news”. To uncover the more interesting question Herzog raises, I situate his role in the film as an unreliable narrator against Jean Baudrillard’s work to show how all of our interactions with the media put us into relationships with narratives and agendas that go beyond a commitment to the facts. The question then becomes: How can we respond to the uncertainty inherent in the claims and narratives developed by the media? To address the question, I argue that we should not fall victim to either resignation or self-serving cynicism. Instead, by turning to Gilles Deleuze’s politics of affirmation we can see that our exposure to media is less about getting facts per se than in developing relationships with media where we can have some degree of trust. By looking at interviews with Herzog, I claim that his understanding of “ecstatic truth” vs. the “accountant’s truth” suggests that he would support an affirmation of truth beyond the facts rather than a return to a mythical time of “just the facts.” . (shrink)

Truth is the degree of accuracy when representing reality. We postulate three cognitive stages: the psychon, produced by perception; the construct, produced by intellection; and the speech act, produced by communication. Truth lies in the second; only constructs are alethic. Truth is a quality which takes place in degrees. Certainty is the unreachable perfect tip of this gradation, so it is an ideal concept. A thesis is deemed true if its alethical degree is acceptably efficacious, otherwise the thesis is deemed (...) false. Put in other words, we deem true any thesis not having enough fails to deem it false. (shrink)

The infinitary function of the truth predicate consists in its ability to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. A transparency principle for truth states the equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication; it requires an introduction principle---which allows the inference from "snow is white" to "the sentence 'snow is white' is true"---and an elimination principle---which allows the inference from "the sentence 'snow is white' is true" to "snow is white". It is commonly assumed that a theory of truth needs to (...) satisfy a transparency principle to fulfil the infinitary function. Picollo and Schindler (Erkenntnis 83:899--928, 2017) argue against this idea. They prove that, given certain assumptions, an elimination principle is sufficient for the purpose. Then, they pose a challenge: to show why we should incorporate introduction principles to our theory of truth. In this essay I take on the challenge. I show that, given the authors' assumptions, an introduction principle is also sufficient to perform the infinitary function. (shrink)

Las afirmaciones verdaderas reciben su justificación de creencias que tienen al conocimiento como base, por lo que para su formulación y comprensión se necesita asumir una posición fundacionalista. En este artículo se propone un fundacionalismo confiabilista, inspirado en Goldman, aunque con cambios importantes respecto a su teoría. A diferencia de Goldman, considero que no todas las creencias tienen que ser verdaderas, ni toda justificación de las creencias requiere de la verdad. Adicionalmente, las creencias verdaderas, expresadas mediante oraciones asertóricas, estarían fundadas (...) en creencias aún más básicas, cuya justificación proviene del uso del lenguaje. (shrink)

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify (...) the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon. (shrink)

This essay explores the notion of truth and how it is relative to the available facts.

[Abstract drawn from the development of these ideas in John Dewey and Moral Imagination (2003, ch. 3): To present the pragmatic turn from transcendental reason to engaged intelligence in a way that emphasizes the magnitude of their break from the philosophic tradition while correcting standing prejudices, it is helpful to turn the spotlight on James. This essay sketches several interrelated claims about James's notions of reason and truth: Reason is embodied, evolving, and practical, and as such it is subject to (...) physical, conceptual, and historical constraints. Further, reasoning is contingent upon perspectives and is characterized by an educated aesthetic response that can emerge from trust in a situation's potentialities. (shrink)

Le réalisme scientifique occupe une place centrale dans le système philosophique de Mario Bunge. Au cœur de cette thèse, on trouve l’affirmation selon laquelle nous pouvons connaître le monde partiellement. Il s’ensuit que les théories scientifiques ne sont pas totalement vraies ou totalement fausses, mais plutôt partiellement vraies et partiellement fausses. Ces énoncés sur la connaissance scientifique, à première vue plausible pour quiconque est familier avec la pratique scientifique, demandent néanmoins à être clarifiés, précisés et, ultimement, à être inclus dans (...) un cadre théorique plus large et rigoureux. Depuis ses toutes premières publications sur ces questions et jusqu’à récemment, Mario Bunge n’a cessé d’interpeller les philosophes afin qu’ils développent une théorie, au sens propre du terme, de la vérité partielle afin de clarifier les enjeux épistémologiques liés au réalisme scientifique. Bunge a lui-même proposé plusieurs parties de cette théorie au fil des années, mais aucune de ces propositions ne l’a satisfait pleinement et la construction de cette théorie demeure un problème entier. Dans ce texte, nous passerons rapidement en revue certaines des approches proposées par Bunge dans ses publications et nous esquisserons certaines pistes qui devraient servir à tout le moins de desiderata pour la construction d’une théorie de la vérité partielle. (shrink)

I present a defense of a refined Peircean conception of truth, as inspired by Wilfrid Sellars. Roughly, Sellars' view can be represented by the two following metascientific claims: An ideally adequate scientific theory is the limit towards which successive theories would converge by theoretical evolution; Reality would be what is represented by an ideally adequate scientific theory. My overall strategy involves a search for essential components of an argument showing theoretical progress in science. I assemble these components by considering several (...) objections to the Peircean conception which have been raised in the recent literature. In general I argue that these objections do not apply because they are based on a misunderstanding of the type of argument that Peircean conception embodies. Thus although I do not claim to offer an ultimate defense of this conception of truth, I nevertheless hope to clarify the structure of the argument. ;Roughly, the objections to the Peircean conception of truth fall into two categories. The first and more tenacious class of objections centers around the claim that scientific theories are incommensurable. The apparent consequence of the truth of this claim is that no argument can be constructed which shows progress in science. The second class of objections focuses on the concept of convergence. The claim is that even if theories may be compared, they are not converging in any non-metaphorical sense. ;I discuss several possible responses to these objections. In response to those in the first category, I argue that both the objections and many of the responses presuppose an inadequate theory of the meaning of scientific concepts--a theory in which a semantic concept has been forced into a causal explanatory role. I argue that one should distinguish a semantic account from a causal account, and only by doing so can one argue that scientific theories are continuous with common sense and hence are comparable. ;In response to the second category of objections, I argue that there is a nonmetaphorical sense in which theories could be converging. I diagnose the difficulty with this class of objections as a mistake involving treating the concept of an ideal limit as basic. The objectors claim that one cannot establish theoretical convergence on this basis. I urge that the concept of theoretical convergence is basic, that of ideality is derivative. In doing so, I argue that the convergence hypothesis is an empirical claim ultimately to be supported by a detailed examination of the history of science. Moreover if the concept of ideality is derivative, then this concept is a regulative ideal which defines the concepts of ultimate truth and reality. ;Finally I argue that the Peircean conception of truth as a Naturalized Epistemology does not provide a solution to traditional philosophical problems, but rather involves a reconception of the task of epistemology. I argue that the traditional search for an a priori foundation for empirical knowledge was a disguised search for a causal explanation of how beliefs are true of the world. Once again I suggest that this approach involves forcing a semantic concept into a causal explanatory role. A naturalized epistemology, on the other hand, features justification as a relation between propositions. I argue that there is an implicit distinction in the Peircean conception between justifying our claims to know and offering a causal explanation of the interaction between language users and the world. Although the causal explanation does not lay bare the foundations of knowledge in any traditional sense, it nevertheless has the consequence that empirical knowledge is not just arbitrary. (shrink)

Tribe, David When asked, we say we always speak the truth - in courts of law, the whole truth, nothing but the truth..

If L had a finite number of sentences ‘s1’, . . ., ‘sn’, he would have been happy to define s is true as s is ‘s1’ and s1, or ‘s2’ and s2 . . . or . . . or ‘sn’ and sn.

This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of totalities of knowledge and truth. The book includes explorations of new forms of the ancient and venerable paradox of the :Liar, applications and extensions of Kaplan and Montague's paradox of the Knower, generalizations of Godel's work on incompleteness, and new uses of Cantorian diagonalization. Throughout, the (...) concern is with metaphysical and epistemological implications of these results: what such results may have to teach us about knowledge, truth, and possibility. (shrink)