Here, we provide an ethical analysis of discrimination in private insurance to guide the application of non-discriminatory algorithms for risk prediction in the insurance context. This addresses the need for ethical guidance of data-science experts, business managers, and regulators, proposing a framework of moral reasoning behind the choice of fairness goals for prediction-based decisions in the insurance domain. The reference to private insurance as a business practice is essential in our approach, because the consequences of discrimination and predictive inaccuracy in (...) underwriting are different from those of using predictive algorithms in other sectors. Here we focus on the trade-off in the extent to which one can pursue indirect non-discrimination versus predictive accuracy. The moral assessment of this trade-off is related to the context of application—to the consequences of inaccurate risk predictions in the insurance domain. (shrink)

Cognitive science began as a multidisciplinary endeavor to understand how the mind works. Since the beginning, cognitive scientists have been asking questions about the right methodologies and levels of explanation to pursue this goal, and make cognitive science a coherent science of the mind. Key questions include: Is there a privileged level of explanation in cognitive science? How do different levels of explanation fit together, or relate to one another? How should explanations at one level inform or constrain explanations at (...) some other level? Can the different approaches to the mind, brain, and culture be unified? The aim of this issue of topiCS is to provide a platform for discussing different answers to such questions and to facilitate a better understanding between the different strands of thinking about the right levels of explanation in cognitive science. (shrink)

Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates. -/- In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the name of “Dispositional Essentialism”. -/- In this paper, I show that, ironically, the (...) counterexamples dispositionalists have used against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates dispositionality and metaphysical necessity. -/- Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance is not unproblematic. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility in developing countries has recently received increasing attention, and scholars have pointed to the strong contextuality of CSR in the respective regions. Regarding the latter, however, sub-Saharan Africa has been scrutinized only marginally by academia. Moreover, empirical research on the impact of the institutional context has been scant, despite its attributed importance for CSR. Our article seeks to fill a part of this research gap by investigating CSR website reporting of 211 companies in seven sub-Saharan countries. The (...) study’s aim is twofold: First, we identify to what extent sub-Saharan companies report on CSR and which contents they disclose. Second, by building on institutional theory, we investigate how the socio-economic and political environments influence CSR reporting. For this purpose, we examine the impact of country-level and company-level determinants. We find that the sample African companies’ CSR efforts focus strongly on local philanthropy and therefore differ substantially from Western CSR approaches. Furthermore, we evidence that GDP and level of governance standard positively affect CSR reporting. Our study contributes to the literature by empirically evidencing the contextuality of CSR in Africa and by explaining how specific country- and company-level determinants contribute to or hamper the development of CSR in developing countries. (shrink)

This is the second paper in a three-part series on the state of the enhancement debate. We report current trends and give an overview of established positions in the field of neuroenhancement. Unlike a number of articles on the bioethics of enhancement, we try to highlight connections between the contemporary debate and established positions in philosophical ethics. This specific perspective inspired the breakdown of our three-part series into consequentialist, deontological and virtue-ethical arguments.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 3 Seiten: 406-417.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 73-112.

BackgroundPatients with chronic conditions are less physically active than the general population despite knowledge of positive effects on physical and mental health. There is a variety of reasons preventing people with disabilities from achieving levels of physical activities resulting in health benefits. However, less is known about potential facilitators and barriers for physical activity in people with severe movement impairments. The aim of this study was to identify obstacles and facilitators of PA in individuals with severe disabilities.Materials and methodsUsing a (...) qualitative approach to explore individuals’ subjective perspectives in depth, five community-dwelling adults living with chronic mobility impairments after stroke that restrict independent PA were interviewed. A semi structured topic guide based on the theoretical domains framework was utilized. The interview data was analyzed thematically, and the theoretical domains framework constructs were mapped onto the main and sub-categories.ResultsThe six main categories of facilitators and barriers along the capability, opportunity, motivation–behavior framework were: physical capabilities, psychological capabilities, motivation reflective, motivation automatic, opportunity physical, and opportunity social. The physical capabilities to independently perform PA were variable between participants but were not necessarily perceived as a barrier. Participants were highly motivated to maintain and/or increase their abilities to master their everyday lives as independently as possible. It became clear that a lack of physical opportunities, such as having access to adequate training facilities can present a barrier. Social opportunities in the form of social support, social norms, or comparisons with others can act as both facilitators and barriers.ConclusionWhile confirming known barriers and facilitators that impact the ability of individuals with functional limitations to be active, the findings highlight the need and opportunities for comprehensive service models based on interdisciplinary collaborations. (shrink)

Ethik hat es weder nur mit Grundlagenfragen noch allein mit konkreten Anwendungsproblemen zu tun. Sie ist vielmehr zusatzlich durch vermittelnde Gliederungselemente und -systeme bestimmt. Dieser Thematik wurde bisher kaum die notwendige systematische Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Das Handbuch widmet sich den drei historisch wirkmachtigsten Gliederungsschlusseln angewandter Ethik: den Geboten (in Gestalt des Dekalogs), den (Kardinal-)Tugenden und den Pflichtenkreisen. Den Abschluss bildet die Frage, welche Gliederungssysteme den sich immer starker nach Sachbereichen differenzierenden ethischen Diskurs der Gegenwart bestimmen.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 159-164.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 165-182.

The nineteenth century saw the invention of the national hero. His main function was to serve as an ideal for the nation. Latvia, however, is an exception to this general rule: after it regained independence in 1990, the national hero simply disappeared and no heroic image emerged. On the contrary, it was now the victim that became the emblem of Latvia’s regained independence. The country, of course, did not lack “heroes,” for there were in fact many candidates for the creation (...) of a national hero, yet the hero as such no longer seemed to fit the new state. While the path Latvia had chosen of rejecting or refusing national heroes had an impact on its integration into Europe, it also contributed to ongoing frictions among its own ethnic communities. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 39-54.

Einer Welt ohne letzte Gründe bleibt, so scheint es, nur die Alternative zwischen Fundamentalismus und pragmatischer Indifferenz. Beides wird weder der Komplexität noch der ungebrochenen Notwendigkeit der Begründungssuche gerecht. Die Autoren denken Begründung konsequent als ein stets prekäres Unternehmen: Den Ungründen in Philosophie und Kunst nachzugehen meint nicht eine bloße Ablehnung von Gründen oder einen existenziell aufgeladenen Nihilismus. Im Unheimlichen, Unbegrifflichen oder Unbestimmten schwingt der Versuch (wie das Scheitern) der Entbergung, Konzeptionalisierung und Bestimmung immer mit. Genauso zeichnen sich Ungründe dadurch (...) aus, dass das Negierte als Negiertes stets mitgeführt wird und wirksam bleibt. Ungründe sind immer noch Gründe - aber es sind prekäre, prozessuale, endliche Gründe, die den Anspruch, einen "guten Grund" zu liefern, auf je spezifische Weise einlösen. (shrink)

Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...) of artificial systems and reviews their desiderata. We provide a model that explicitly spells out the main concepts and relations necessary to consider and investigate when evaluating, adjusting, choosing, and developing explainability approaches that aim to satisfy stakeholders' desiderata. This model can serve researchers from the variety of different disciplines involved in XAI as a common ground. It emphasizes where there is interdisciplinary potential in the evaluation and the development of explainability approaches. (shrink)

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers focus on the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g. in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: Robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment with 399 participants which explores the following three (...) questions: (i) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe intentions to deceive to artificial agents? (ii) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (iii) Do they blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than it presently attracts. (shrink)

In computational complexity theory, decision problems are divided into complexity classes based on the amount of computational resources it takes for algorithms to solve them. In theoretical computer science, it is commonly accepted that only functions for solving problems in the complexity class P, solvable by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, are considered to be tractable. In cognitive science and philosophy, this tractability result has been used to argue that only functions in P can feasibly work as computational (...) models of human cognitive capacities. One interesting area of computational complexity theory is descriptive complexity, which connects the expressive strength of systems of logic with the computational complexity classes. In descriptive complexity theory, it is established that only first-order systems are connected to P, or one of its subclasses. Consequently, second-order systems of logic are considered to be computationally intractable, and may therefore seem to be unfit to model human cognitive capacities. This would be problematic when we think of the role of logic as the foundations of mathematics. In order to express many important mathematical concepts and systematically prove theorems involving them, we need to have a system of logic stronger than classical first-order logic. But if such a system is considered to be intractable, it means that the logical foundation of mathematics can be prohibitively complex for human cognition. In this paper I will argue, however, that this problem is the result of an unjustified direct use of computational complexity classes in cognitive modelling. Placing my account in the recent literature on the topic, I argue that the problem can be solved by considering computational complexity for humanly relevant problem solving algorithms and input sizes. (shrink)

A major challenge with the increasing use of Artificial Intelligence applications is to manage the long-term societal impacts of this technology. Two central concerns that have emerged in this respect are that the optimized goals behind the data processing of AI applications usually remain opaque and the energy footprint of their data processing is growing quickly. This study thus explores how much people value the transparency and environmental sustainability of AI using the example of personal AI assistants. The results from (...) a choice-based conjoint analysis with a sample of more than 1.000 respondents from Germany indicate that people hardly care about the energy efficiency of AI; and while they do value transparency through explainable AI, this added value of an application is offset by minor costs. The findings shed light on what kinds of AI people are likely to demand and have important implications for policy and regulation. (shrink)

This article introduces an “ordonomic” approach to corporate citizenship. We believe that ordonomics offers a conceptual framework for analyzing both the social structure and the semantics of moral commitments. We claim that such an analysis can provide theoretical guidance for the changing role of business in society, especially in regard to the expectation and trend that businesses take a political role and act as corporate citizens. The systematicraison d'êtreof corporate citizenship is that business firms can and—judged by the criterion of (...) prudent self-interest—“should” take on an active role in rule-finding discourses and rule-setting processes with the intent of realizing a win-win outcome of the economic game. We identify—and illustrate—four ways that corporate citizens can employ moral commitments as a factor of production to enhance their processes of economic value creation. (shrink)

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend (...) a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism. (shrink)

This collection applies the characterisations of children and childhood made in Deleuze and Guattari's work to concerns that have shaped our idea of the child. Bringing together established and new voices, the authors consider aspects of children's lives such as time, language, gender, affect, religion, atmosphere and schooling.

This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity.Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue.I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their essential features, (...) for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do that job.My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many decades—namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—yet I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly. (shrink)