Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...) cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. (shrink)

Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a “mutuality” between agents and their environments – that they have a complementary nature and should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point – enactivists claiming that ecological psychologists over-emphasise the environment, while the complementary criticism, of agent-centred constructivism, is levelled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two (...) approaches is the complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of analysis. Cognitive science has not theorised the relationship between these different forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way to map the complex territory of agency. (shrink)

This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. (...) Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism. (shrink)

In this paper I present the Ingardenian distinction between inseparability and dependence. My considerations are both historical and systematic. The historical part of the paper accomplishes two goals. First, I show that in the Brentanian tradition the problem of existential conditioning was entangled into parts—whole theories. The best examples of such an approach are Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of the object and Edmund Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. Second, I exhibit the context within which Ingarden distinguished inseparability and dependence. Moreover, (...) Ingarden’s motivations are presented: the problem of understanding the Husserlian concept of “immanent transcendence,” the issue of the existence of purely intentional objects, and finally the problem of the relationship between individual objects and ideas. The systematic part deals with the ambiguity of Ingarden’s definition of inseparability. I seek to improve this definition by reference to the distinction between absolute and summative wholes. I also present some divisions of inseparability and dependence and investigate whether these types of existential conditioning are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Microfinance is often assumed to be an ethically progressive industry, but in recent years it has been the target of much ethical criticism. Microfinance institutions have been accused of using exploitative lending techniques and charging usurious interest rates; and critics even question the ability of microfinance to alleviate poverty. This article reviews recent research on the microfinance sector that addresses these ethical issues. We show how this research is relevant to a number of theoretical issues, such as how to define (...) poverty, how to understand exploitation, and how to balance financial and social goals in commercial organizations. We conclude by identifying a critical agenda for future research. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the most controversial thesis of Aristotelian substantialism, namely, that substances cannot be composed of other substances. I call this position the Mereological Limitation Thesis (MLT). I find MLT valid and defend it. My argument for MLT is a version of the argument from the unicity of substantial form. Every substance can have only one substantial form, thus, if some substances compose the objectO, then what binds them is only a set of their accidental forms (relations) (...) and in the result thereofOis not a substance (Ois not informed by a substantial form). I argue against the relativization of the substantiality of forms to the level of composition by showing that substantial forms must be absolutely identity-independent. In the last section I specify the ontological status of parts of substances and argue that they are spatially distributed bundles of accidents of a compound substance itself. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss the problem of the nature of the relationship between objects and their properties. There are three contexts of the problem: of comparison, of change and of interaction. Philosophical explanations of facts indicated in the three contexts need reference to properties and to a proper understanding of a relationship between them and their bearers. My aim is to get closer to this understanding with the use of some models but previously I present the substantialist theory of (...) object and shortly argue for its main theses. The two models enabling us the understanding of the subject–properties structure are: the plastic stuff model and the functional model. On the ground of the first a subject is compared to a piece of plastic stuff which is informed by different shapes. Properties are ways how a subject is, they “give” some “figure” to a subject. The core idea of the second model is that essences (performing the role of subjects) are immanent functional laws governing correlations of properties. As such they are similar to mathematical functions which are saturated by values. The relationship between a subject and properties can be grasped by analogy to such a saturation. (shrink)

In this article the author analyzes the problem stated by Ingarden in his ontology: under what conditions can the subject−properties structure and the whole−parts structure coexist in one object? After the presentation of Ingarden’s doctrines concerning both structures, the author argues that for Ingarden a whole is nothing over and above a plurality of objects linked by relations. However, Ingarden was convinced that a compound object is not identical with a whole which is associated with it. Then the author analyzes (...) the difference between the two types of compound objects: higher-order objects and compound, primarily individual objects. The former are founded on parts while the latter are such that their parts are founded on them. Finally, the author considers Ingarden’s theory as an answer to the one–many problem. The author argues that Ingarden’s conception of a higher-order object cannot solve this problem, and he also points to some difficulties concerning primarily individual compound objects. (shrink)

This paper addresses the fairness of microcredit interest rates. Since microfinance institutions provide credit for the poor at relatively high prices, the fairness of their interest rates has been repeatedly debated. We first apply Rawls' principles of justice to the case of microcredit interest rates and suggest some limitations related to the hypothesis of rationality of the borrowers and the level of inequality. We then suggest another framework based on the analysis of the distribution of the benefits generated by the (...) transaction to assess the fairness of interest rates. We conceptualize this as the distribution of the bargaining range between the borrowers' and the institutions' reservation price and discuss what these reservation prices could be in the context of microfinance. (shrink)

Discussion on financial ethics increasingly includes the problem of exclusion of the poorer segments of society from the financial system and access to credit. This paper explores the ethical dimensions surrounding the concept of a human right to credit. If access to credit is directly instrumental to economic development, poverty reduction and the improved welfare of all citizens, then one can proclaim, as Nobel Prize Laureate M. Yunus has done, that it is a moral necessity to establish credit as a (...) right. Arguments both supporting and opposing the concept of a right to credit are presented. While there may be general agreement that access to financial services may provide a pathway out of poverty, granting a universal right could induce perverse effects such as overindebtedness. Bearing in mind the ultimate goal of proponents of this right as well as the potential harmful consequences, this paper offers a new perspective on the question of access to credit based on a goal-right system. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest problemowi możliwości analizy faktów istnienia. Fakty istnienia są specyficznymi stanami rzeczy. Stany rzeczy są ontycznymi odpowiednikami sądów. Fakty istnienia są korelatami sądów egzystencjalnych. Stany rzeczy różne od faktów istnienia dadzą się analizować jako złożenia z prostszych składników, np. podmiotu i własności. Są filozofowie, którzy uważają, że w analogiczny sposób da się analizować fakty istnienia. Według tej analizy polegają one na tym, że rzeczy posiadają istnienie, ale rozumiane w sensie zasady istnienia czy też aktu istnienia — niesamodzielnego składnika (...) rzeczy. Argumentuję przeciwko możliwości takiej analizy. Jeśli jest ona konsekwentnie przeprowadzona, to wiedzie do tezy, że istnienie-zasada jest całkiem zewnętrzne wobec rzeczy. Poza tym pokazuję, że niesamodzielność istnienia-zasady blokuje przypisywaną jej funkcję urealniania. Fakt istnienia uznaję za nieanalizowalny i w związku z tym odrzucam sensowność pytania o realną różnice między istotą a istnieniem. (shrink)

Although microfinance organizations are generally considered as inherently ethical, recent events have challenged the legitimacy of the sector. High interest rates and the excessive profitability of some market leaders have raised the question of how to define a fair profit level for social enterprise. In this article, we construct a fair profit framework based on four dimensions: profitability, social mission, pricing, and surplus distribution. We then apply this framework using an empirical sample of 496 microfinance institutions. Results indicate that satisfying (...) all four criteria is a difficult, although not impossible, task. According to our framework, 24 MFIs emerge as true double bottom line organizations. These MFIs are characterized by higher outreach to women, lower portfolio risk, and higher productivity in high-density environments such as South Asia. We argue that excessive profits can be better understood relative to pricing, the outreach of the MFI, and organizational commitment to clients in the form of reduced interest rates. (shrink)

In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings. In the first part, I outline the main ideas (...) of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy. Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm. (shrink)

In the paper I analyse some problems with the relation of properties to object. Such kind of relation is usually called “inherence,” “possessing” or “characterization.” I start with Lowe’s concept of inherence contained in his four-category ontology because I think it generates some very interested issues. Lowe thinks that inherence holds between modes and objects as well as between kinds and universal properties. I argue that there cannot be universal properties but only universals which are instantiated by entities which are (...) properties. Thus property-universals cannot inhere in anything. I also stress that we need a concept of explanatory dependence in order to correctly characterize inherence. Finally I draw attention to great importance of the problem of relationships of kinds to property-universals to the doctrine of substantialism. Key words E.J. LOWE, ONTOLOGY, INHERENCE. (shrink)

One of the most important theses of Existential Thomism is that contingent things are composed of essence and existence. The thesis is immediately supplemented by a proviso that these components are not parts in the regular sense of the word. Essence and existence are not extended pieces of the thing which can be detached from it. They are inseparable aspects of the thing wherein inseparability is understood as a sort of dependence. In my paper I analyze the thesis of the (...) inseparability of existence. For me this is untenable. I argue that this inseparability blocks up the essential function ascribed by Thomists to existence: the function of making the thing real. Thus to save this function we are forced to export existence to outside the thing. It contradicts our deep belief that existence is the most intimate aspect of the thing. Therefore the Thomistic analysis of existence seems to be invalid. (shrink)

We formulate a cosmogonic indifference principle in cosmology in terms of a dynamical system theory. While the choice between generic and fine tuned initial condition for our Universe has a rather philosophical character, there is a very generic set of initial conditions which give rise to the concordance inflectional ΛCDM model which becomes in good agreement with astronomical observations.

In the article I compare two theories of existence in time: Simons’s conception of continuants and occurrents and Ingarden’s ontology of temporally determined objects (i.e. objects enduring in time, processes and events). They can be regarded as different positions in the controversy over substantialism. The main problem of this controversy can be expressed by the question: what is the primary way of being in time—endurance or perdurance? Ingarden and Simons admit that there exist objects characterized by both ways of being (...) but for Simons, unlike for Ingarden, perdurants are the basic objects which the world is composed of. My aim is not to assess both ontologies but to use the comparison of them as the basis of a reconstruction of the principal problems contained in the controversy over substantialism. (shrink)

The article focuses on the historical resources of the China’s model. Understanding the model is one of necessary preconditions of an analysis of China’s dynamic rise and development in recent decades. First, the article analyses the concept of historical development of multiple civilisations and modernities. It then examines the characteristics of China’s old civilisation and the associated model. It ends by showing how the historical Silk Road lives on in an updated modernised global version.

The current cosmological observations of distant supernovae type Ia suggest the existence of dark energy component with negative pressure. The most obvious candidate for this dark energy is the cosmological constant which raises several theoretical difficulties. The problem of dark energy, due to our Universe is accelerating at present in principle is open. We argue that this problem will dominate the cosmology in XXI century. From the philosophical point of view it is interesting to provide evidence and comments for the (...) key issues related to the dark energy models just at the moment before scientific revolution. (shrink)

We consider the problem of possible topology for our Universe. It is shown that due to algebraic topology we can strictly define the shape of physical space whereas observations of anisotropy of microwave background radiation gives us an answer to the question whether our Universe is finite or not?