In this paper I present the Ingardenian distinction between inseparability and dependence. My considerations are both historical and systematic. The historical part of the paper accomplishes two goals. First, I show that in the Brentanian tradition the problem of existential conditioning was entangled into parts—whole theories. The best examples of such an approach are Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of the object and Edmund Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. Second, I exhibit the context within which Ingarden distinguished inseparability and dependence. Moreover, (...) Ingarden’s motivations are presented: the problem of understanding the Husserlian concept of “immanent transcendence,” the issue of the existence of purely intentional objects, and finally the problem of the relationship between individual objects and ideas. The systematic part deals with the ambiguity of Ingarden’s definition of inseparability. I seek to improve this definition by reference to the distinction between absolute and summative wholes. I also present some divisions of inseparability and dependence and investigate whether these types of existential conditioning are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the most controversial thesis of Aristotelian substantialism, namely, that substances cannot be composed of other substances. I call this position the Mereological Limitation Thesis (MLT). I find MLT valid and defend it. My argument for MLT is a version of the argument from the unicity of substantial form. Every substance can have only one substantial form, thus, if some substances compose the objectO, then what binds them is only a set of their accidental forms (relations) (...) and in the result thereofOis not a substance (Ois not informed by a substantial form). I argue against the relativization of the substantiality of forms to the level of composition by showing that substantial forms must be absolutely identity-independent. In the last section I specify the ontological status of parts of substances and argue that they are spatially distributed bundles of accidents of a compound substance itself. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss the problem of the nature of the relationship between objects and their properties. There are three contexts of the problem: of comparison, of change and of interaction. Philosophical explanations of facts indicated in the three contexts need reference to properties and to a proper understanding of a relationship between them and their bearers. My aim is to get closer to this understanding with the use of some models but previously I present the substantialist theory of (...) object and shortly argue for its main theses. The two models enabling us the understanding of the subject–properties structure are: the plastic stuff model and the functional model. On the ground of the first a subject is compared to a piece of plastic stuff which is informed by different shapes. Properties are ways how a subject is, they “give” some “figure” to a subject. The core idea of the second model is that essences (performing the role of subjects) are immanent functional laws governing correlations of properties. As such they are similar to mathematical functions which are saturated by values. The relationship between a subject and properties can be grasped by analogy to such a saturation. (shrink)

In this article the author analyzes the problem stated by Ingarden in his ontology: under what conditions can the subject−properties structure and the whole−parts structure coexist in one object? After the presentation of Ingarden’s doctrines concerning both structures, the author argues that for Ingarden a whole is nothing over and above a plurality of objects linked by relations. However, Ingarden was convinced that a compound object is not identical with a whole which is associated with it. Then the author analyzes (...) the difference between the two types of compound objects: higher-order objects and compound, primarily individual objects. The former are founded on parts while the latter are such that their parts are founded on them. Finally, the author considers Ingarden’s theory as an answer to the one–many problem. The author argues that Ingarden’s conception of a higher-order object cannot solve this problem, and he also points to some difficulties concerning primarily individual compound objects. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest problemowi możliwości analizy faktów istnienia. Fakty istnienia są specyficznymi stanami rzeczy. Stany rzeczy są ontycznymi odpowiednikami sądów. Fakty istnienia są korelatami sądów egzystencjalnych. Stany rzeczy różne od faktów istnienia dadzą się analizować jako złożenia z prostszych składników, np. podmiotu i własności. Są filozofowie, którzy uważają, że w analogiczny sposób da się analizować fakty istnienia. Według tej analizy polegają one na tym, że rzeczy posiadają istnienie, ale rozumiane w sensie zasady istnienia czy też aktu istnienia — niesamodzielnego składnika (...) rzeczy. Argumentuję przeciwko możliwości takiej analizy. Jeśli jest ona konsekwentnie przeprowadzona, to wiedzie do tezy, że istnienie-zasada jest całkiem zewnętrzne wobec rzeczy. Poza tym pokazuję, że niesamodzielność istnienia-zasady blokuje przypisywaną jej funkcję urealniania. Fakt istnienia uznaję za nieanalizowalny i w związku z tym odrzucam sensowność pytania o realną różnice między istotą a istnieniem. (shrink)

One of the most important theses of Existential Thomism is that contingent things are composed of essence and existence. The thesis is immediately supplemented by a proviso that these components are not parts in the regular sense of the word. Essence and existence are not extended pieces of the thing which can be detached from it. They are inseparable aspects of the thing wherein inseparability is understood as a sort of dependence. In my paper I analyze the thesis of the (...) inseparability of existence. For me this is untenable. I argue that this inseparability blocks up the essential function ascribed by Thomists to existence: the function of making the thing real. Thus to save this function we are forced to export existence to outside the thing. It contradicts our deep belief that existence is the most intimate aspect of the thing. Therefore the Thomistic analysis of existence seems to be invalid. (shrink)

In the article I compare two theories of existence in time: Simons’s conception of continuants and occurrents and Ingarden’s ontology of temporally determined objects (i.e. objects enduring in time, processes and events). They can be regarded as different positions in the controversy over substantialism. The main problem of this controversy can be expressed by the question: what is the primary way of being in time—endurance or perdurance? Ingarden and Simons admit that there exist objects characterized by both ways of being (...) but for Simons, unlike for Ingarden, perdurants are the basic objects which the world is composed of. My aim is not to assess both ontologies but to use the comparison of them as the basis of a reconstruction of the principal problems contained in the controversy over substantialism. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to Kazimierz Twardowski's thesis that the unity of a compound object (a whole) can be ensured only by the relations between its parts and the object itself. Twardowski's idea of unity raises many difficulties, especially the threat of petitio principii: the whole is presupposed as furnishing the ground for the unification of its parts, and yet it also seems to be the result of this unification. To avoid these problems, Edmund Husserl sought to refute Twardowski's thesis, (...) and ascribed the role of a principle of unity to the foundational relationships which directly hold between the parts of a whole. Roman Ingarden then seemed to return to Twardowski's concept of unity, but employed it within a different theory of objects, according to which to be an object is to be a subject of properties. I seek to demonstrate that: (1) Twardowski's thesis is sound if a compound object is something over and above its parts; (2) with respect to Husserl's solution, it is not clear as to whether the whole is really something over and above its parts; (3) Ingarden's conception of the subject‐properties structure saves Twardowski's thesis; (4) Ingarden's theory of higher‐order objects is invalid. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the problem of relationship between processes and enduring objects. In the history of philosophy the enduring objects have been conceived as subjects of processes but it is rather unclear what has been seen as a subject of change in them and especially how being a subject of change is different from being a subject of properties. The author’s attempt to elucidate the relationship in question starts with an analysis of the commonsense view of processes and (...) enduring objects. He subsequently presents Roman Ingarden’s ontology of processes and enduring objects. The third part of the paper contains an analysis of main problems of this ontology. The author puts forward two theses: to be a subject of a process is not the same as to have some processual aspects; processes are special subjects of properties. (shrink)

In this article I try to answer the question whether the thesis that some being can create autonomous objects out of nothing is compatible with Roman Ingarden's ontology. In the first part of the paper I analyse Ingardenian concepts of moments of being and modes of being. Special attention is put on the existential autonomy. The second part is devoted to ontological relation of creation. It turns out that basic theses of Ingarden's ontology exclude possibility of "creatio ex nihilo" of (...) autonomous objects. (shrink)

In the paper I analyse some problems with the relation of properties to object. Such kind of relation is usually called “inherence,” “possessing” or “characterization.” I start with Lowe’s concept of inherence contained in his four-category ontology because I think it generates some very interested issues. Lowe thinks that inherence holds between modes and objects as well as between kinds and universal properties. I argue that there cannot be universal properties but only universals which are instantiated by entities which are (...) properties. Thus property-universals cannot inhere in anything. I also stress that we need a concept of explanatory dependence in order to correctly characterize inherence. Finally I draw attention to great importance of the problem of relationships of kinds to property-universals to the doctrine of substantialism. Key words E.J. LOWE, ONTOLOGY, INHERENCE. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Religia i prawda [Religion and Truth], by Piotr Moskal.

The article exhibits the problem of God\'s action in the world as it is presented in process philosophy. Whitehead conceived actuality as heterogenical category within which we can distinguish two modes: actuality of being and actuality of becoming. The second one is the actuality in primary sense; there is ontological primacy of becoming over being. Being is, according to J. L. Nobo\'s interpretation, a product of becoming and not vice versa. Actuality of being depends on being-for-becoming. Actuality of becoming depends (...) on prehending being into subjective immediacy of internal process of concrescence. Because of subjective character of becoming, an entity which is still becoming, cannot be prehended. It means that entity cannot play any role in becoming of other entities. Only entity whose process of concrescence has completed, entity which is in fact being, can play such a role. If God is a main exemplification of becoming, as primary actual, He is imprehensible. He cannot be objectified and His actuality is only actuality of subjective arrested immediacy. He cannot influence the world. Many process philosophers tried to solve the dillema. One of them is Lewis S. Ford whose proposal depends on introducing the third mode of actuality: the future creativity. But Ford does not consider basis of that temporal paradigm of actuality and doesn\'t examine its justification. So what we need is a reconstruction of Whitehead\'s philosophy which will let us check his ontological, epistemological and methodological presuppositions and asses whether the temporal paradigm is justified, whether the God-world problem really arises and whether it is possible to solve it in terms of process theory of actuality. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Religia i prawda [Religion and Truth], by Piotr Moskal.

This paper is devoted to the late Leibnizian doctrine of vinculum substantiale. In the first section I sketch the old problem of possibility of composite substances. This possibility is refuted on the ground of Monadism (presented in section two). However Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses contains new thoughts concerning composite substances. A vinculum enters the stage as a real unifier, transforming aggregates of monads into genuine substances (section three). In the last section I give a systematic interpretation of a vinculum.I (...) start with the thesis that every composed thing, which is not a pure plurality of objects, must have two structures: the whole-parts structure and the subject-properties structure. In the case of substances the latter is ontologically prior over the former. A vinculum is a subject-of-properties (accidents) determining such a way of composition which makes a compound entity a true substance. Since Leibniz still thought a vinculum unifies independent (existentially and with regard to activity) substances he was inclined to separate a vinculum from the integrated monads and finally conceived it as an additional relatively independent monad-like substance. (shrink)

Jeden z zarzutów wobec nominalizmu tropowego głosi, że tropy, wbrew deklaracjom ich zwolenników, muszą być złożone, co otwiera drogę do regresu, który da się zatrzymać, tylko przyjmując jakieś powszechniki. Złożoność tropów ma wynikać z tego, że relacja podobieństwa i relacja różnicy numerycznej, które zachodzą między doskonale podobnymi tropami, muszą mieć osobne fundamenty, stanowiące składniki tropów. Te fundamenty znów stoją w relacjach podobieństwa i różnicy, co generuje regres. W niniejszym artykule przyglądam się temu problemowi i próbuję odpierać argumentację przeciwników nominalizmu tropowego. (...) Za punkt odniesienia czynię artykuł Pawła Rojka „Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciw nominalizmowi tropowemu”, który w oryginalny sposób łączy ze sobą rożne zarzuty przeciw nominalizmowi tropowemu. Struktura mojego tekstu jest następująca: najpierw krótko charakteryzuję nominalizm tropowy i wskazuję, co mnie łączy z tym stanowiskiem (nie mogę bez zastrzeżeń określić siebie jako zwolennika nominalizmu tropowego). Następnie podaję charakterystykę relacji, w szczególności relacji podobieństwa, a potem przedstawiam argument Pawła Rojka. W kolejnym paragrafie staram się pokazać, że argument za złożonością tropów zakłada zasadę identyczności nieodróżnialnych, którą nominalista tropowy odrzuca. W przedostatniej sekcji wskazuję, że jednostkowość nie jest składnikiem tropu, lecz sposobem, w jaki trop konstytuuje rzeczywistość. (shrink)

The author examines the so-called paradox of identity through time. As he argues, the paradox is often elaborated by enumeration of several theses which generate a contradiction. According to these conditions, change is paradoxical and even impossible because it seems that objects persist as unchanging, or that every change destroys an object and generates a new one . In the first part of the paper the author discusses Roxanne Marie Kurtz’s version of such a view. Subsequently he analyses typical attempts (...) to resolve the paradox. The third section is devoted to applicability of the relation “=” to the correct formulation of the problem of identity through time. He argues that analytic philosophers too hastily decided that identity through time is a strict logical identity holding between quite mysterious “object before change” and “object after change”. It seems that such a view follows from the unjustified presupposition that logic is prior to ontology, i.e. that logic provides a categorial basis for ontology. Apart from this, the exact ontological status of the states described by expressions “object before change” and “object after change” escape our knowledge. In the fourth section he examines the condition of a-temporal exemplification based on the condition of simple exemplification . He argues that the latter is equivocal because one can distinguish several kinds of dependence . Some of them do not have to imply the extrinsic character of the properties involved in change. Key words IDENTITY, TIME, PARADOX. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Religia i prawda [Religion and Truth], by Piotr Moskal.