The calcium signals regulate the production and secretion of many signaling molecules like inositol trisphosphate ( $$IP_{3}$$ ) and adenosine triphosphate (ATP) in various cells including pancreatic $$\beta$$ -cells. The calcium signaling mechanisms regulating $$IP_{3}$$, ATP and insulin responsible for various functions of $$\beta$$ -cells are still not well understood. Any disturbance in these mechanisms can alter the functions of $$\beta$$ -cells leading to diabetes and metabolic disorders. Therefore, a mathematical model is proposed by incorporating the reaction-diffusion equation for calcium (...) dynamics and a system of first-order differential equations for $$IP_{3}$$, ATP-production and insulin secretion with initial and boundary conditions. The model incorporates the temporal dependence of $$IP_{3}$$ -production and degradation, ATP production and insulin secretion on calcium dynamics in a $$\beta$$ -cell. The piecewise linear finite element method has been used for the spatial dimension and the Crank-Nicolson scheme for the temporal dimension to obtain numerical results. The effect of changes in source influxes and buffers on calcium dynamics and production of $$IP_{3}$$, ATP and insulin levels in a $$\beta$$ -cell has been analyzed. It is concluded that the dysfunction of source influx and buffers can cause significant variations in calcium levels and dysregulation of $$IP_{3}$$, ATP and insulin production, which can lead to various metabolic disorders, diabetes, obesity, etc. The proposed model provides crucial information about the changes in mechanisms of calcium dynamics causing proportionate disturbances in $$IP_3$$, ATP and insulin levels in pancreatic cells, which can be helpful for devising protocols for diagnosis and treatment of various metabolic diseases. (shrink)

Propertarian justifications of intellectual property postulate the appropriation of various entities, often called patterns, designs, or technologies. These must be immaterial and should not be confused with material structures that embody them. Hence two classes of objects are distinguished. It is convenient to refer to them as types and tokens. The type must involve a condition defining which material structures should be considered its tokens. For an IP regime to be economically meaningful one must necessarily appropriate types in a way (...) which restricts access to wide classes of similar, non-identical material structures. Therefore, type conditions must be general. They must define, with a margin of tolerance, only certain aspects of the structure, leaving others unspecified. Consequently, the relationship between such types and tokens is of many-to-many variety. The recognition of these facts leads to four problems in justifying intellectual property on propertarian grounds. The first problem is to demonstrate possession of the type in the pre-legal situation. The second one is to explain, why boundaries of an appropriated type should be placed in a particular location. The third problem is to avoid claim deadlocks resulting from conflicts of rights generated by separate overlapping types. The fourth problem is to justify why ownership of the type should entail the control over other separate entities—that is tokens. In the propertarian framework grounded in the pre-legal state of nature, satisfactory solutions do not seem to have been proposed for any of these four problems. (shrink)

Connected to the jurisprudence surrounding the copyrightability of a factual compilation, this book locates the footprints of the standard envisaged in a US Supreme court decision (Feist) in Europe. In particular, it observes the extent of similarity of such jurisprudence to the standard adopted and deliberated in the European Union. Many a times the reasons behind law making goes unnoticed. The compelling situations and the history existing prior to an enactment helps in understanding the balance that exists in a particular (...) legislation. While looking at the process of enacting the Database Directive (96/9/EC), this book reflects upon the concern that was expressed with the outcome of Feist decision in Europe. (shrink)

The commentators have raised many pertinent points that allow us to refine and clarify our view. We classify our response comments into seven sections: automaticity; developmental and educational questions; priming; multiple representations or multiple access(?); terminology; methodological advances; and simulated cognition and numerical cognition. We conclude that the default numerical representations are not abstract.

Although the push to get universities to accumulate IP by commercializing their scientific research was a conscious movement, dealing with the blowback in the form of contracts over the transfer of research tools and inputs, called materials transfer agreements (MTAs), was greeted by universities as an afterthought. Faculty often regarded them as an irritant, and TTOs were not much more welcoming. One reason universities could initially ignore the obvious connection between the pursuit of patents and the prior promulgation of MTAs (...) was a legalistic distinction made between intellectual property and contract law, which of course is of direct concern to a lawyer, but should be less compelling for anyone trying to understand the big picture surrounding the commercialization of academic science. However, as a subset of scientists were increasingly drawn into the commercial sphere, they tended to attach MTAs to research inputs requested by other academics; and this began a tidal wave of MTAs which shows no sign of abating. Furthermore, many IP-related restrictions have been loaded into individual MTAs, including the stipulation that the existence and content of MTAs themselves be treated as secret and proprietary. The paper closes by looking at recent arguments that the growth of MTAs has not actually harmed the research process, and rejects them. (shrink)

Many people, communities and countries are in favour of abortion as a healthcare right, arguing that women have a right to receive an abortion upon request. Some contexts place ethical constraints on this right, typically based on the age of the preborn child, the mother’s safety, or the circumstances of the mother (and her conceiving of her child) more generally. At the same time, intersex pediatric surgery (IPS) is being increasingly ethically challenged with many countries banning healthcare facilities from performing (...) IPS. At first, there appears to be no relation between these two ethical issues. However, modern biotechnology such as the assistive reproductive technology (ART), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), makes it possible to screen for intersex conditions in utero, opening the possibility of intersex-selective abortion (ISA), a sub-set or instance of sex-selective abortion (SSA). What emerges is the realization that if IPS is wrong because, as its critics have argued, it wrongfully discriminates against and harms intersex lives, then ISA is much more wrong because instead of misvaluing intersex lives, it devalues intersex lives altogether. In other words, IPS might, as some have argued, discriminate by implying that an intersex child is better off being male or female but not intersex, but ISA discriminates by implying that an intersex child is better off not existing at all. Some have recognized this connection and have vainly tried to maintain both their pro-abortion commitments and their anti-IPS commitments. This has proved at best duplicitous, and at worst conceptually impossible. While it is known that a strong stance against IPS results in an inability to morally condemn ISA, with one notable exception in moral theology, this connection has not been generally appreciated. (shrink)

Many people alive today grew up during the so-called Cold War and even more experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Cold War can be taken as the name of the order of international relations during four decades of the twentieth century. In the following, I want first to comment on the concept of world order and the related one of institution (law). Then I shall deal with the relation between these concepts and various schools in international politics. Next, (...) I will pay attention to the ethical dimensions of those schools. And finally, I want to reflect on the place of theology in the ethics of international relations. My thesis is (1) that theological ethics has an important role to play in understanding contemporary international politics (IP); (2) that if theological ethics takes a Lutheran starting point, it will endorse elements both in the liberal and the realist tradition of international relations theory. As I regard Kant and Kissinger as representatives of the two schools, I hope that explains my somewhat provocative title. (shrink)

Many believe that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is not compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true. I argue that this ‘incompatibility problem’ (IP) is grounded in a ‘naturalistic assumption’ (NA), that is, the assumption that every subject, including religion, should be treated without taking into account that a super‐natural being may exist and reveal to us an unexpected way to deal with our experience. I then argue that in matters of religion, NA (...) is untenable and that its very opposite, which I call ‘super‐naturalistic assumption’ (SA), should be adopted. My thesis is that, once SA is adopted, IP can be dismissed and that it is plausible to maintain that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true. (shrink)

A chance‐credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non‐modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance‐credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's New Principle (...) (NP); the second is Ismael's General Recipe (IP). Thus, the question arises: Should we adopt NP or IP or both? In this paper, I argue that IP has unacceptable consequences when coupled with reductionism, so we must accept NP alone. (shrink)

[T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...) not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Some properties and relations take time to be instantiated. They are not instantiated at a time, but through a temporal interval. Cognitive properties and relations such as understanding and thinking are like this, but also many biological, chemical, and microphysical properties and relations such as absorbing, freezing, radiating, and decaying. In this paper, I make a case for taking seriously such temporally extended properties (TEPs). I argue that they are ubiquitous and that our current theories of persistence would do well (...) to make room for them in their ontology. The focus here is on fourdimensionalism and different ways it can accommodate TEPs. I explore four different ways of dealing with TEPs within a fourdimensionalist framework. These are: (a) to make the objects that bear apparent TEPs temporally more extended or “chunky”, while giving TEPs a reductive or eliminativist treatment in favor of instantaneous properties (IPs); (b) to make a series of objects the bearer of TEP predicates, while, again, holding only to IPs; (c) to endorse TEPs in their own right and take them to be temporally extended in a literal sense; and (d) to hold on to TEPs as atemporal properties and make the exemplification relation temporally extended. I discuss each of these options and highlight the types of problems that a fourdimensionalist faces in attempting to accommodate TEPs. I conclude that fourdimensionalists do not yet have a satisfactory account of TEPs in their hands. (shrink)

[T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...) not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...) exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Objective: Illness perceptions are important predictors of emotional and behavioral responses in many diseases. The current study aims to investigate the COVID-19-related IP throughout Europe. The specific goals are to understand the temporal development, identify predictors and examine the impacts of IP on perceived stress and preventive behaviors.Methods: This was a time-series-cross-section study of 7,032 participants from 16 European countries using multilevel modeling from April to June 2020. IP were measured with the Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire. Temporal patterns were observed (...) considering the date of participation and the date recoded to account the epidemiological evolution of each country. The outcomes considered were perceived stress and COVID-19 preventive behaviors.Results: There were significant trends, over time, for several IP, suggesting a small decrease in negativity in the perception of COVID-19 in the community. Age, gender, and education level related to some, but not all, IP. Considering the self-regulation model, perceptions consistently predicted general stress and were less consistently related to preventive behaviors. Country showed no effect in the predictive model, suggesting that national differences may have little relevance for IP, in this context.Conclusion: The present study provides a comprehensive picture of COVID-19 IP in Europe in an early stage of the pandemic. The results shed light on the process of IP formation with implications for health-related outcomes and their evolution. (shrink)

Since the 1980s in the US and the 1990s in Europe, patenting and licensing activities by universities have massively increased. This is strongly encouraged by governments throughout the Western world. Many regard academic patenting as essential to achieve ‘knowledge transfer’ from academia to industry. This trend has far-reaching consequences for access to the fruits of academic research and so the question arises whether the current policies are indeed promoting innovation or whether they are instead a symptom of a pro-intellectual property (...) (IP) culture which is blind to adverse effects. Addressing this question requires both empirical analysis (how real is the link between academic patenting and licensing and ‘development’ of academic research by industry?) and normative assessment (which justifications are given for the current policies and to what extent do they threaten important academic values?). After illustrating the major rise of academic patenting and licensing in the US and Europe and commenting on the increasing trend of ‘upstream’ patenting and the focus on exclusive as opposed to non-exclusive licences, this paper will discuss five negative effects of these trends. Subsequently, the question as to why policymakers seem to ignore these adverse effects will be addressed. Finally, a number of proposals for improving university policies will be made. (shrink)

Philosophical reflection on intellectual property (IP) is still very young. Whilst much has been written by lawyers on intellectual property, the vast majority of this writing is philosophically unsophisticated. This paper aims to at least partially remedy this philosophical deficit by examining what reflection on the ontology of intellectual property can add to our understanding of how to regulate IP. I argue that ontological reflection should bring us to an important basic fact, namely that ownership of intellectual property involves the (...) ownership of types rather than tokens. This difference in the ontological status of the objects owned makes a normative difference to how we should regulate ownership of intellectual property as compared to tangible property. The argument falls into three main parts. I begin by arguing that the type-token distinction is the best way to account for the ontology of intellectual property. I next argue that the realisation that we are dealing with ownership of types rather than tokens has important normative implications. In particular some of the standard arguments in favour of private ownership of physical property simply do not apply in the case of ownership of types, whilst some other arguments apply only in an attenuated way. The next section examines the limitations of ontology as a guide to the regulation of IP. I argue that whilst thinking through the normative implications of the type-token distinction is a necessary 1 condition for a sound regulatory approach to IP, it is certainly not sufficient. This is because many of the specific questions about the regulation of intellectual property that matter most in practice—such as how long the patent term should be, or how much someone should be able to quote from a book and it count as fair use—are not answerable by ontological reflection. Such questions concern the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits involved in the construction of public goods, rather than questions of ontology.. (shrink)

According to the widespread use of Web Services, composition of multiple services is becoming a main issue. BPEL was proposed as a Web Services workflow language in this context. Then, in many cases we need much interactions between a service requester and a BPEL process execution engine. However for the end user under the ubiquitous environment where the service is executed with a cellular phone or PDA, the interaction means simply a burden. The reason is: (1)it is hard to carry (...) out the operation manually, (2)a network connection is unstable, (3)a connection charge is relatively high. In this paper, we propose middle agents between ubiquitous users and Web Services. The agents analyze BPEL, extract the interaction which the ubiquitous users would need, then produce action operators. It makes a plan in order to achieve a service request from the user. Here the planning agent can reduce operations of the user by collecting the necessary information at the beginning which will be inputted during the IP execution. We show the architecture of the agents and an example regarding ATM service, then evaluate the number of inputs, the performance, and the quantity of data transmitted on network. Finally, we consider adaptability of this approach to generic BPEL flow. (shrink)

A chance-credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non-modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance-credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's New Principle (...) (NP); the second is Ismael's General Recipe (IP). Thus, the question arises: Should we adopt NP or IP or both? In this paper, I argue that IP has unacceptable consequences when coupled with reductionism, so we must accept NP alone. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comments on “Moral Complicity in Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research”W. Malcolm Byrnes, Ph.D. and Edward J. FurtonIn his article titled “Moral Complicity in Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research,” Mark T. Brown (2009) unfortunately mischaracterizes my ethical analysis of the use of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells for replacement therapies, or treatments (Byrnes 2008). In my paper, which Brown cites, I argue that, just as it is ethically acceptable for (...) parents to allow their children and themselves to be immunized using vaccines produced by cell lines derived from human fetuses aborted in the past, it is also acceptable for persons in the future to benefit from treatments that use iPS cells validated using human embryonic stem (ES) cell lines [End Page 202] derived in the past. The assumption I make is that iPS cells would have to be shown to be functionally equivalent to human ES cells—i.e., validated—before they could be used for cell replacement treatments. (If it turns out that this assumption is incorrect, and primate or even mouse ES cells can be used for the validation, then all residual ethical problems will disappear and there will be no ethical problems whatsoever associated with iPS cells.) I wrote:... [I]n both cases, the origin of the treatment is in a one-time event: either the one-time use of aborted fetuses to obtain cell lines (e.g., MRC-5 and WI- 38) to grow weakened virus strains for vaccine production, or the one-time destruction of human embryos to validate iPS cells, which then effectively replace embryonic stem cells. In the latter case, if no additional embryonic stem cell lines are derived, then derivation of the existing lines could be considered a “one-time” event in the past, albeit an event that extended over a several-year period(Byrnes 2008, p. 287, emphasis added).Note the phrase “if no additional embryonic stem cell lines are derived.” The derivation of ES cell lines inherently involves destruction of embryos; indeed, that is why many people, including me, are opposed to human ES cell research. In my article, I am arguing that, if no additional ES cell lines are derived, then no additional human embryos will be destroyed, and the destruction of human embryos will lie in the past. In this case, embryo destruction could be considered a past event, just as the abortion of a human fetus from which vaccine-producing cell lines were derived is a past, albeit tragic, event.In the process of building his argument that proponents of iPS cell research are morally complicit in embryo destruction, Brown (2009, p. 15) casts me as being in favor of the “derivation of new embryonic stem [cell lines].” This is the exact opposite of my position. In fact, I am opposed to further destruction of human embryos. I believe that the hundreds of ES cell lines already in existence are more than sufficient to validate iPS cells and so no additional lines need to be derived. This means that no additional human embryos will need to be destroyed.Apparently based on the misperception that I support future destruction of human embryos, Brown concludes that “Byrnes’s endorsement of ongoing iPSC validation studies would seem to implicate him and those who follow his lead in formal and material complicity in what they perceive as moral evil” (p. 16). He writes that “explicit formal complicity would attach because he [Byrnes] knowingly and intentionally recommends that embryos be killed in order to facilitate a transition to a future in which no more embryos need be destroyed” (p. 16). Additionally, my “followers” and I would be guilty of “proximate material complicity” as well as “remote material complicity” (p. 16). Unfortunately, this broad condemnation is based on a misconception of my actual position.An additional problem involves Brown’s use of a quotation he attributes to me: [End Page 203]Once embryonic stem cells are used to successfully validate iPS cells, they will no longer be needed and their association with iPS cells will lie in the past. Is there not an element of sadness and resignation in accepting something (iPS cells) associated with an unjust act (destruction of an... (shrink)

In late Medieval Greek and many modern dialects, pronominal clitics are syntactically adjoined to an IP projection. In another set of dialects they have become syntactically adjoined to a verbal head. In the most innovating dialects (which include Standard Greek) they are agreement affixes. Extending the Fontana/Halpern clitic typology, we propose a trajectory of lexicalization from Xmax clitics via X0 clitics to lexical affixes. The evolution of clitic placement also reveals the rise of a composite functional projection ΣP.

We are concerned with modal logics in the class EM0 of extensions of M0 . G denotes re exive frames. MG the modal logic on G in the sense of Kripke. M is nite if M = MG for some nite G. Finite G's will be drawn as framed diagrams, e.g. G = ! ; G = ! ; the latter shorter denoted by . EM0 is a complete lattice with zero M0 and one M . If M M0 M0 (...) is a succ of M. An ip of M is an immediate predecessor of M. E.g. M ! and M are the only ip's of M in ES4. M[P] denotes the extension of M adding P as a \new axiom", e.g. S4 = M0 [p ! p]. M is nitely axiomatizable if M = M0 [P] for some formula P. One easily shows if M is f.a. then each predecessor is separated from M by an ip of M. It is known that each nite M is f.a. and has only nitely many succ's all of which are nite. (shrink)

As clinicians, this case1 raises both personal and professional challenges. A key issue is who carries legal parental responsibility for the difficult decisions that may be required around life-sustaining care in baby T. Medicolegally, we understand that the surrogate mother holds legal parental responsibility for baby T until this can be transferred to the intended parents.2 But this process can take many months to complete, after the birth of baby. As M is now critically ill and unable to engage in (...) any discussion around the care of her baby, who becomes the legal guardian of the baby, for complex decision making that involves either reorientation of care away from intensive care with the inevitable consequence of death in this extremely premature baby, or continuing this life-sustaining treatment with a high likelihood for major neonatal morbidity and longer term disability? Does it pass onto one of the IPs as the genetic father, or does this responsibility fall on the neonatal consultant managing the baby in intensive care? And if an antenatal surrogacy agreement had existed, is it legally binding for inclusion of the IPs perspectives in the decision-making, especially if our medical decision making turns out to be at discord with the beliefs and wishes of the IPs for baby T? Box 1 ### Current surrogacy proceedings in the UK.2 6–8 The Law Commission UK5 is currently reviewing the decision on whether legal parenthood to intended parents can be effected immediately at the time of birth of the baby. Parental orders. (shrink)

[T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...) not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Most scientists recognize the importance of sharing data online in an open fashion. Nonetheless, many studies have documented the concerns that accompany data sharing activities, including loss of credit or IP, misuse and the time needed to curate interoperable data. To this end, discussions around data sharing often identify incentives that could potentially ameliorate these disincentivising concerns. Nonetheless, current Open Data discussions often rely on evidence‐based studies to identify the disincentives to overcome. This results in highly specific and directed interventions. (...) In contrast, this paper offers a different interpretation of these concerns. To do so, it makes use of the Thomas Theorem which suggests that: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”. Using empirical evidence from sub‐Saharan African (bio)chemistry laboratories, this paper illustrates how individual perceptions of research environments – whether associated with evidence or not – are highly influential in shaping data sharing practices. It concludes with the suggestion that discussion on incentivising data sharing amongst scientific communities need to take a broader set of concerns into account and offer a more creative approach to ameliorating environmental disincentives. (shrink)

Linked data have the capability to open up and share materials, held in libraries, archives and museums, in ways that are restricted by many existing metadata standards. Specifically, LD interlinking can be used to enrich data and to improve data discoverability on the Web through interlinking related resources across datasets and institutions. However, there is currently a notable lack of interlinking across leading LD projects in LAMs, impacting upon the discoverability of their materials. This research describes the Novel Authoritative Interlinking (...) for Semantic Web Cataloguing in Libraries interlinking framework. Unlike existing interlinking frameworks, NAISC-L was designed specifically with the requirements of the LAM domain in mind. The framework was evaluated by Information Professionals, including librarians, archivists and metadata cataloguers, via three user-experiments including a think-aloud test, an online interlink creation test and a field test in a music archive. Across all experiments, participants achieved a high level of interlink accuracy, and usability measures indicated that IPs found NAISC-L to be useful and user-friendly. Overall, NAISC-L was shown to be an effective framework for engaging IPs in the process of LD interlinking, and for facilitating the creation of richer and more authoritative interlinks between LAM resources. NAISC-L supports the linking of related resource across datasets and institutions, thereby enabling richer and more varied search queries, and can thus be used to improve the discoverability of materials held in LAMs. (shrink)

Research in the area of intellectual property (IP) is increasingly relevant to the rapidly growing artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics industries, affecting the legal, business, manufacturing, and healthcare sectors. This contributed volume aims to develop our understanding of the legal and ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence and robotics technologies and the appropriate intellectual property based legal and regulatory responses. It provides a philosophical and legal framework for considering concepts and principles that relate to the development and use of such (...) technologies at the international, regional, and national levels. The legal discourse in IP concerns the ever-growing AI sector and how businesses can protect their IP and incorporate AI. Moral sentiments often take a back seat to market sentiments, even in shaping the direction of ethical business strategy. This anomaly persists despite growing interest in ethics and IP. Taking an interdisciplinary and diverse perspective, this book enriches the evolving definition and scope of IP literature by focusing on actors, products and regulation that shape the business sector. Considering the gap between theory and practice, this book bridges academic and professional knowledge in unpacking legal, ethical and governance issues in the intellectual property industry. In an effort to include as many viewpoints as possible, contributions have been gathered from diverse fields, including business, ethics, governance, law, philosophy and technology studies. This book will appeal to academics in the field of intellectual property, business ethics, AI, emerging technologies and strategic innovation, as well as practitioners and policy makers. (shrink)

Transitive inference (TI) plays a part in many aspects of reasoning, and is usually assessed using variants on a particular task dubbed the “IP-paradigm”. Advocates of this paradigm assume it ensures that subjects must use deduction to solve the inferential questions. The present task with 63 adults strengthened this claim by removing all possible perceptual cues and limiting as far as possible all cues from the training procedure itself. Response speed and accuracy were measured as premises were learned. Findings show (...) that when over-training and non-logical cues are avoided, adults nevertheless reach high levels of overall performance. However, key indexes of Lexical Marking, Relative-End-Anchoring, and Symbolic Distance are largely absent or in the opposite direction to the generally accepted view at the start of training, and are present only for response time (RT) at the end of training. The widely accepted strategy of retrieval from an integrated mental representation does emerge; but only after an initial associative process and a deductive process. Regarding three comparisons critical for demonstrating deductive TI, the inference was more demanding than its antecedents both in terms of accuracy and RT, and both after initial and final training. Existing theories of TI account for some of these findings, but what is required is a theory accommodating them all. (shrink)

This article helps to clarify and articulate the ideological, legal, and ethical attitudes regarding software as intellectual property (IP). Computer software can be viewed as IP from both ethical and legal perspectives. The size and growth of the software industry suggest that large profits are possible through the development and sale of software. The rapid growth of the open source movement, fueled by the development of the Linux operating system, suggests another model is possible. The large number of unauthorized copies (...) of software programs suggests that many people do not believe in laws regarding software copyright. There are many and varied views of software as IP, even within the information systems (IS) profession. In this article, four distinct subgroups of IS professionals are identified. The article describes the four subgroups and their respective ideological views on software ownership; it explores the subgroups' attitudes regarding software laws; and finally, it explains the ethical positions embraced by each subgroup. (shrink)

Cases of severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa (SEAN) rightly raise a great deal of concern around assessing capacity to refuse treatment (including artificial feeding). Commentators worry that the Court of Protection in England & Wales strays perilously close to a presumption of incapacity in such cases (Cave and Tan 2017, 16), with some especially bold (one might even say reckless) observers suggesting that the ordinary presumption in favor of capacity ought to be reversed in such cases (Ip 2019). -/- Those (...) of us who worry that such trends and proposals amount to (or at least pose a serious threat of) wrongful discrimination on the grounds of disability nevertheless feel the pull of judging many SEAN service users to be incapacitous with respect to decisions regarding (perhaps amongst other things) treatments involving feeding, artificial or otherwise. But it is difficult to get to grips with exactly what their incapacity consists in. Many such service users seem able to understand, retain, use and weigh information, and express a decision (i.e. they seem, prima facie, to satisfy the ‘MacArthur’ criteria). At the very least, they do not, generally. (shrink)

The current debate over the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines once again highlights the many shortcomings of the modern intellectual property system, especially when it comes to equitable access to medicines. This essay argues that the conceptual center of struggles over access to new pharmaceuticals rests in the IP system's colonial legacy, which perceives the world as uncharted territory that is ripe for discovery and ownership. This vision of the world as a blank canvas, or terra nullius, sets aside any (...) other models of ownership and devalues other traditional modes of relating to territory and nature. Several examples show the long-lasting exclusionary effects of this hidden legacy of colonial conquest in the field of public health, ranging from the spiraling price of insulin to the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the negotiation of sharing mechanisms for virus samples. In all of these cases, the continuing marginalization of other interests by the IP system can lead to exploitation, without either the “sources” of materials, such as those from whom the samples were taken, or the recipients of the eventual product having any say in matters of price and access. This legacy of fundamental exclusion needs to be recognized and addressed in order to arrive at more equitable solutions to public health emergencies such as the current pandemic. (shrink)

Rather than occurring abstractly (autonomously), ethical growth occurs in interpersonal relationships (IRs). It requires optimally functioning cognitive processes [attention, working memory (WM), episodic/autobiographical memory (AM), inhibition, flexibility, among others], emotional processes (physical contact, motivation, and empathy), processes surrounding ethical, intimacy, and identity issues, and other psychological processes (self-knowledge, integration, and the capacity for agency). Without intending to be reductionist, we believe that these aspects are essential for optimally engaging in IRs and for the personal constitution. While they are all integrated (...) into our daily life, in research and academic work, it is hard to see how they are integrated. Thus, we need better theoretical frameworks for studying them. That study and integration thereof are undertaken differently depending on different views of what it means to live as a human being. We rely on neuroscientific data to support the chosen theory to offer knowledge to understand human beings and interpersonal relational growth. We should of course note that to describe what makes up the uniqueness of being, acting, and growing as a human person involves something much more profound which requires too, a methodology that opens the way for a theory of the person that responds to the concerns of philosophy and philosophical anthropology from many disciplines and methods (Orón Semper, 2015;Polo, 2015), but this is outside the scope of this study. With these in mind, this article aims to introduce a new explanatory framework, called the Interprocessual-self (IPS), for the neuroscientific findings that allow for a holistic consideration of the previously mentioned processes. Contributing to the knowledge of personal growth and avoiding a reductionist view, we first offer a general description of the research that supports the interrelation between personal virtue in IRs and relevant cognitive, emotional, and ethic-moral processes. This reveals how relationships allow people to relate ethically and grow as persons. We include conceptualizations and descriptions of their neural bases. Secondly, with the IPS model, we explore neuroscientific findings regarding self-knowledge, integration, and agency, all psychological processes that stimulate inner exploration of the self concerning the other. We find that these fundamental conditions can be understood from IPS theory. Finally, we explore situations that involve the integration of two levels, namely the interpersonal one and the social contexts of relationships. (shrink)

The challenge of developing a business ethics in China in response to today's increasing demands of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is examined within the context of recent business scandals, food scare, labor issues, and environmental degradations the country is now experiencing. Two surveys on CSR are reported. This paper reports the recent CSR development in China and oudines the profile of a prospective business ethics for China. The formal constraints and substantive components of this business ethics are proposed against the (...) background of China's cultural and ideological heritage. (shrink)

In this book, Kevin Ip articulates and defends an egalitarian conception of global distributive justice grounded on the value of equality as a normative ideal of how human relations should be conducted. Arguing that relationships of equality, rather than those characterized by domination or exploitation, are a requirement for a just system, Ip spells out the real-world implications of this approach. Ip defends the ideal of equality against the diverse objections which have been brought to bear, and the responsibilities we (...) bear in our aspirations towards global justice. (shrink)

Since China's Reform Era began in 1979, corporations of all shapes and sizes mushroomed in the economic landscape. Among these companies, a few have distinguished themselves by their unique corporate cultures and financial performance. The Chinese state–owned enterprises (SOEs) are notorious for their inefficiency, conservatism, bloated bureaucracy, and obsoleteness. However, a few good SOEs stand out as corporations of excellence with commitment to business ethics. Very little study has been done on SOE corporate cultures and business ethics, especially in the (...) western literature. This paper provides an insight into one such organisation – the Double Star Group of Qingdao. This paper includes the results of an empirical survey on Double Star's employees’ perception of its corporate culture and business ethics. (shrink)

I show how the Taoist philosophy, as examplified by both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, is capable of providing a metaphysical foundation for environmental ethics. The Taoist concept of nature, the notions of ontological equality and axiological equality of beings, together with the doctrine of Wu Wei can fulfil, at least in a preliminary way, our purpose. The notion of a minimally coherent ethics is introduced and is shown to be pertinent to the construction of an ethics which bears a (...) close relationship to science. (shrink)

This article examines whether and to what extent Confucianism as a resilient Chinese cultural tradition can be used as a sound basis of business practice and management model for Chinese corporations in the twenty-first century. Using the core elements of Confucianism, the article constructs a notion of a Confucian Firm with its concepts of the moral person ( Junzi ), core human morality ( ren, yi, li ) and relationships ( guanxi ), as well as benign social structure (harmony), articulated (...) in corporate and organizational terms. The basic character of the Confucian Firm is described, and its philosophical and cultural foundation is critically assessed with respect to its moral legitimacy and relevant to today’s China. China’s recent Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) development is a high profile response to global business ethics concerns. Efforts have been made to emulate and develop good business practice fashioned in CSR norms and visions. The so-called “human-based” and “virtue-based” business practices rooted in local cultural heritage have been touted as a Chinese response to this problem. This investigation is particularly relevant in the context of the increasingly prominence of the Chinese corporations (China Inc.) in the wake of the rise of China as a global power. How relevant is Confucianism to the building of a modern Chinese corporation that is willing and able to practice reasonable norms of business ethics? The findings of this discussion, which include the organizational implications of the Confucian familial collectivism, have implications for other Chinese communities (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) where Confucian tradition is endorsed and practiced. (shrink)

This book shows that environmental protection is a global concern that must enlist all of humanity’s cultural, religious, and moral resources. The nine essays in this volume explore the foundations of environmental ethics in the Western philosophical tradition as well as from the perspectives of Christianity, Islam, Daoism, and Buddhism and propose morally responsible attitudes towards nature and the environment.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly popular in advanced economies in the West. In contrast, CSR awareness in Asia is rather low, both on the corporate and state level. However, recent events have shown that the CSR is receiving more attention by corporations in Asia. Recent development in CSR in Taiwan is one example of such a trend. A 2005 survey on the 700 publicly listed companies in Taiwan on␣CSR has highlighted the current CSR situation. Concurrently, the numbers of (...) corporate scandals and corruption have dramatically increased over the past 6 years. Corporate CSR activities co-existing with pervasive corporate scandals create a phenomenon of contradictions. This article aims to report via the survey findings the current development of business ethics in corporate Taiwan; and to interpret the findings in context of Taiwan’s business ethos, especially its Confucian familism and crony capitalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe paper gives an analytical synopsis of the problem of developing medical ethics in the early half of the 1990s in China, as perceived by Chinese scholars and medical professionals interested in medical ethics. The views captured and analyzed here were expressed in one of the two major journals on medical ethics in China: Chinese Medical Ethics. The economic reform unleashed profound changes in Chinese society, including in the medical field, creating irregularities and improprieties in the profession. Furthermore, the market (...) reform also created new values that were in tension with existing values. In this transitional period, Chinese medical ethicists saw the need to rebuild medical morality for the new era. Using the code of conduct promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Health in 1989 as a basis, assessment and e ducation aspects of the institutionalization of medical ethics are dis‐ cussed. In addition to institutional problems of institutionalising ethics, there are philosophical and methodological issues that are not easy to solve. After all, to institutionalize medical ethics is no easy task for a country as old and as big as China. Chinese medical ethicists seem ready to confront these difficulties in their effort to develop medical ethics in Reform China. (shrink)

This book examines Mohism as a movement in early China. To analyze how the Mohists pursued power, the author analyzes nonviolence as a goal and strategy of the Mohist movement, the Mohists' creation of strategic knowledge, and their quest for a personhood that made their activism possible.

Those who bear the burdens of injustice and oppression are entitled to act in ways contrary to existing laws and institutions to secure their own entitlements and those of others. This article aims to articulate a Confucian perspective on resistance against injustice. There are reasons for thinking that the notion of resistance is fundamentally at odds with Confucian political thought. In this article, I move beyond this simple conflict/compatibility model and explore the complex relationships between resistance and Confucianism. On one (...) hand, some of Confucianism’s core commitments can be better attained in contemporary societies by allowing resistance; on the other, a Confucian perspective can offer insights into current discussions on the ethics of resistance. (shrink)

Those who bear the burdens of injustice and oppression are entitled to act in ways contrary to existing laws and institutions to secure their own entitlements and those of others. This article aims to articulate a Confucian perspective on resistance against injustice. There are reasons for thinking that the notion of resistance is fundamentally at odds with Confucian political thought. In this article, I move beyond this simple conflict/compatibility model and explore the complex relationships between resistance and Confucianism. On one (...) hand, some of Confucianism’s core commitments can be better attained in contemporary societies by allowing resistance; on the other, a Confucian perspective can offer insights into current discussions on the ethics of resistance. (shrink)

The ability to represent emotional experiences in a precise fashion with language, termed emotional granularity, is related to a number of beneficial outcomes. However, the emotion granularity construct and operationalization are rooted in the lens of so-called Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies that focus on emotions as a mental-state phenomena. Using evidence from multiple non-WEIRD societies, we illustrate that people's everyday vernacular often emphasizes bodily over, or in addition to, mental states. This suggests that granularity focused only (...) on mental state language may limit our ability to operationalize this construct in a culturally valid manner. To overcome this limitation, we propose capturing “experiential” granularity and a concept model on how it may link to regulation and health. (shrink)