Emerging evidence is now challenging the view that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia experience a selective deficit in their sense of agency. Additional disturbances seem to exist in their sense of body ownership. However, the factors underlying this disturbance in body ownership remain elusive. Knowledge of these factors, and increased understanding of how body ownership is related to other abnormalities seen in schizophrenia, could ultimately advance development of new treatments. Research on body ownership in schizophrenia has mainly been investigated with the (...) rubber hand illusion (RHI). Schizophrenia patients show higher susceptibility to the RHI, which may be explained by a stronger reliance on multisensory information over weaker stored body representations. This review shows that a coherent sense of body ownership arises from the integration of both bottom-up sensory processes and higher order, top-down bodily- and perceptual representations. Multisensory integration, temporal binding, anticipation, intention and efferent signals all partly modulate the complex experience of body ownership. Specifically, we propose that patients with schizophrenia have weaker stored body representations, and rely to a greater extent on external stimuli, such as visual information, due to imprecise or highly variable internal predictions on the consequences of action. Moreover, the reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia may additionally contribute to the disturbed sense of body ownership, as evidence from healthy participants suggests that agency and body ownership are interrelated. Vice versa, a reduced sense of body ownership may also contribute to a reduced sense of agency. Future studies should explicitly target the precise relation between the two in schizophrenia. (shrink)

The attentional blink (AB) is an impairment of attention, which occurs when subjects have to report a target stimulus (T2) following a previous target (T1) with a short delay (up to 600 ms). Theories explaining the AB assume that processing of T2 is more vulnerable to decay or substitution, as long as attention is allocated to T1. Existing models of the AB, however, do not account for the fact that T2 detection accuracy reaches the minimum when T2 is presented after (...) about 300 ms and not immediately following T1. Therefore, a new model is suggested, which is based on chronometrical considerations together with recent neurophysiological findings concerning the relation between the P3 event-related potential and the AB, the interaction between P3 and gamma oscillations, and the significance of the early evoked gamma band response. We hypothesize that suppression of the early gamma response to T2, accompanying the P3 related to T1, causes the AB. (shrink)

This article aims to initiate a discussion on the demarcation of the ethics of care. This discussion is necessary because the ethics of care evolves by making use of insights from varying disciplines. As this involves the risk of contamination of the care ethical discipline, the challenge for care ethical scholars is to ensure to retain a distinct care ethical perspective. This may be supported by an open and critical debate on the criteria and boundaries of the ethics of care. (...) As a contribution, this article proposes a tentative outline of the care ethical discipline. What is characteristic of this outline is the emphasis on relational programming, situation-specific and context-bound judgments, a political–ethical perspective, and empirical groundedness. It is argued that the ethics of care is best developed further by means of an intradisciplinary approach. Two intradisciplinary examples show how within the frame of one discipline, other disciplines are absorbed, both with their body of knowledge and their research methodology. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to shape a theoretical framework of attentiveness in care, which may function as a background to study attentiveness in a health care setting empirically. More insight into the functions, forms, and aspects of attentiveness in a particular health care setting is important, as there is a lack of indicators and criteria that enable a sharp picture of the caring side of health provision. The concept of attentiveness and its relation to care have seldom been (...) examined thoroughly and broadly. This article argues that attentiveness is constitutive for good care, as it can create a space in which a relationship may arise. (shrink)

With the turning of wilderness areas into wildlife parks and the returning of developed areas of land to the forces of nature, intermediate hybrid realms surface in which wild and managed nature become increasingly entangled. A partitioning of environmental philosophy into ecoethics and animal welfare ethics leaves these mixed territories relatively uncharted—the first dealing with wild (animals), the second with the welfare of captive or domestic animals. In this article, we explore an environmental philosophy that considers explicitly these mixed situations. (...) We examine a recent Dutch policy of introducing domesticated and semi-wild large herbivores in newly developed nature areas. Larger issues are at stake, such as the intertwinement of nature and culture, the dynamic character of de-domestication processes, and the relation between concepts of authenticity and the wild. We sketch a pluralistic, dynamic, and pragmatic environmental philosophy that is capable of dealing with the complicated ethicalproblems concerning creatures and land caught between domestication and the wild. (shrink)

This article is about caregivers being attentive to patients in healthcare. From earlier work on the understanding of the other, we know that it is impossible to completely understand the experiences of others. By the sharing of subjectivity—intersubjectivity—we may try to ‘grasp’ the other’s point of view. However, we can never assume that the same experience produces the same experience. Now, if it is principally impossible to understand the experience of one another, and if paying attention always implies an understanding (...) of what to pay attention to, then how is it possible to be attentive to the experiences of those who are entirely at the mercy of our care? How can caregivers perceive the impossibility of understanding the experiences of patients as an appeal to be attentive to their experiences? This is discussed in this article. It departs from the authors being confronted with inexplicabilities in the empirical study of attentiveness in healthcare. It presents two examples and discusses the meaning of these emergent properties. This leads to a discussion of the existent literature on the indefiniteness and openness of attentiveness. It becomes clear why, although we can understand and predict much of it, attentiveness will always be characterized by a certain uncontrollability as well. (shrink)

"Phenomenology on (the) Rocks" shows how an interest in the natural realm can be congruent with globalization if we conceive this globality in a vernacular way. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty first developed a tentative conceptual instrumentarium for this direction of thought. Through a broadening of traditional phenomenology as a philosophy of primordial constitution based upon intentionality of the subject, they began thinking in terms of co-constitution and operative intentionality. In the rest of the paper I mainly show how operant intentionality works (...) in and through the way we take up - or are taken up by - that which seems the most indifferent and impervious to us, namely - the world of stones. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 12.2 (2007) 128-130MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]The Future of Environmental PhilosophyIrene J. KlaverEnvironmental philosophy is invitational: it in-vites thinking into life as well as life into thinking. Life is vita in Latin—the same vita as in vital and in vitamins. An in-vita-tion leads to new connections, or a renewal of existing relations. This affects how we understand things. As Wittgenstein says, "understanding [...] consists in (...) the very fact that we 'see connections.'"1 This is the case for philosophy in general, it makes connections, reveals relations between entities, thoughts, and events, which elucidates our understanding. Environmental philosophy has (re-)opened certain realms of relevance to philosophical inquiry by foregrounding our connections to the non-human world. It accommodates the broadest invitation: of life itself, including our relation to the conditions of life.The future of environmental philosophy lies precisely in this broad invitation. That means that it needs to occupy a profoundly interdisciplinary place, at the node of multiple institutions and practices. It deals with global issues on a local level and with the effects of local issues on a global scale. This involves science, policy, economy, law, ethics, aesthetics, religion, history, etc. An environmental philosopher is a specific generalist, someone who can connect various relations, sees the multiple angles in a particular perspective, the world in a grain of sand.The evolved environmental philosopher is a translator, translating various concerns along multiple perspectives. Translation is crucial to an understanding of the viewpoints, positions, and situations of others. Environmental philosophy enlarges the category of the "other" with many more entities. This is not a politically correct move to bring so-called repressed voices to the fore, it is to evoke different modes of knowledge and experience, to enhance cultural imagination2, a crucial component to raising awareness about environmental concerns.In her 1962 book Silent Spring3, Rachel Carson connected pesticide DDT to the decline in some predatory bird populations and sparked the rise of the environmental movement. She triggered a powerful cultural imagination by invoking a future silent spring without the singing of birds. Hegel saw the owl of Minerva as the symbol of wisdom, spreading "its wings only with the falling of the dusk."4 That is, for Hegel understanding arises after the events, philosophy can never be prescriptive. [End Page 128] Environmental philosophy, on the contrary, is engaged thinking, its understanding arises out of the practices of the everyday. The albatross around our neck is of our own shooting. Environmental ethics and environmental justice might stake out basic prescriptive rules, but these are always born from knowledge of—if not a participation in—certain practices. Environmental philosophy's bird is the spotted owl of social-political engagement, the canary in the mineshaft, but also the sparrow in the backyard. Birds that fly from dawn to dusk, seeing and reporting in the light the practical connections that reveal understanding, possible action, communication needs, and suggest a lexicon for translation. In and through practical connections rises therefore translation and understanding.Understanding is a transformative process—it changes our interpretative frameworks. When we see connections we begin to understand how the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico is related to agriculture in the midwestern United States thousands of miles away, with watersheds within the Mississippi River Basin draining nitrogen fertilizers into the Mississippi, causing hypoxia in the Gulf.5 Environmental philosophy shows how wetlands are not just wastelands but take nitrogen and phosphorus out of the water, buffer "our" coasts, and feed the migrating birds along their long routes. By not seeing these connections, our wetlands are pumped dry; and by abusing our water, springs disappear, major rivers strand in sand, and dead zones emerge in oceans and seas. "These, too, were silent, deserted by all living things," Rachel Carson states, writing about streams.6 In the twenty first century it is no longer a "fable of tomorrow:" silent springs, silent rivers, silent seas.Environmental philosophy is empirical philosophy dealing with big issues such as global warming, biodiversity, and sustainability, but... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 103-116.