Source: "This book addresses the fundamentals of machine ethics. It discusses abilities required for ethical machine reasoning and the programming features that enable them. It connects ethics, psychological ethical processes, and machine implemented procedures. From a technical point of view, the book uses logic programming and evolutionary game theory to model and link the individual and collective moral realms. It also reports on the results of experiments performed using several model implementations. Opening specific and promising inroads into the terra incognita (...) of machine ethics, the authors define here new tools and describe a variety of program-tested moral applications and implemented systems. In addition, they provide alternative readings paths, allowing readers to best focus on their specific interests and to explore the concepts at different levels of detail. Mainly written for researchers in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, robotics, philosophy of technology and engineering of ethics, the book will also be of general interest to other academics, undergraduates in search of research topics, science journalists as well as science and society forums, legislators and military organizations concerned with machine ethics.". (shrink)

Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...) of those attitudes to be simultaneously knowledgeable. This alternative response explains what is wrong with akratic combinations of attitudes using commonly accepted epistemological theses. The paper still shows how this proposal is able to explain the badness of incoherent combinations involving the absence of attitudes, suspended judgment and credence. These explanations deploy the notions of knowledge and being in a position to know, instead of the notion of responding properly to the evidence. Finally, I suggest that this picture can be generalized to the realm of practical rationality as well. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.

Establecer una diferencia conceptual suele resultar muy útil en filosofía cuando sirve para demarcar ámbitos indispensables del uso significativo de nuestro lenguaje. Es este el caso del esfuerzo por conceptualizar la diferencia entre las perspectivas de primera y de tercera persona, o lo que también se acostumbra llamar el punto de vista subjetivo y el punto de vista objetivo. Entendida en relación con los difetentes vocabularios y usos significativos del lenguaje en los que se expresa o manifiesta cada uno de (...) estos dos puntos de vista, la diferencia entre ellos se ha considerado como una buena alternativa frente al cartesianismo, que tomaba la distinción entre lo subjetivo (e íntimo) y lo objetivo (y también público, externo) como el resultado de una doble constitución del mundo. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

Las edificaciones con valor patrimonial son un testimonio excepcional del progreso de una comunidad y representan ejemplos innegables de la transferencia de conocimientos a lo largo de las generaciones. Es inevitable caminar por centro consolidado de Pasaje y no reconocer el legado cultural de muchas edificaciones. Sin embargo, también resulta fácil observar las alteraciones erróneas que sea han realizado a estas edificaciones con el objetivo de responder a las “nuevas exigencias” de la actualidad. La conservación de los bienes patrimoniales resulta (...) necesaria para la preservación de la integridad e identidad de la ciudad. La presente investigación posibilita entender el nivel de susceptibilidad que presentan las edificaciones consideradas como bienes patrimoniales, debido a que estás viviendas poseen un valor cultural. El objetivo de la investigación es el de identificar la susceptibilidad sísmica a las que están expuestas, para esto se utilizaron métodos de matrices de evaluación sísmica para medir el nivel de susceptibilidad en las edificaciones patrimoniales. (shrink)

En primer término, el autor expone el proceso mediante el cual los conceptos "imagen" y "representación" han perdido su sentido originario en la historia de Occidente; a partir de allí se ha creado una situación de crisis, denominada por el autor "crisis de la representación". Ésta se caracteriza por los siguientes aspectos: 1) el cambio del estatuto óptico de la imagen; 2) la pérdida de todo paradigma visual, con lo cual la imagen ha dejado de servir como intermediaria de sentido; (...) 3) consecuencia de la anterior afirmación, las funciones metafórica y simbólica de la imagen han quedado inoperantes; 4) finalmente, se ha dado lugar a una saturación de imágenes. A partir de este diagnóstico, el autor sostiene que vivimos actualmente en una "culturafractal" u "orden de representación despótica", cuyos fenómenos afines son la estetización de los mundos de vida, la caída de la razón y de la historia. En segundo término, el autor analiza algunas obras del arte colombiano de los años noventa, en las cuales intenta mostrar el eco de la "crisis de la representación". (shrink)

I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.

This paper aims to reflect on the possibilities of approaching the phenomenon of memory in relation to space. In order to approach memory on “the side ofspace”, we will find our first decisive guidelines in M. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of habit developed in Phenomenology of Perception. Starting from there, we will then try to show in what way memory, in a way, can be said to belong to places. The final point of the discussion is Ricœur’s investigation of architecture and urbanism’s (...) analogies with narrative, as they allow us to consider a hermeneutic approach to the spatial fabric of time. (shrink)

Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on dynamical systems theory in the cognitive sciences, the same is not the case for neuroscience. This paper attempts to motivate increased discussion via a set of overlapping issues. The first aim is primarily historical and is to demonstrate that dynamical systems theory is currently experiencing a renaissance in neuroscience. Although dynamical concepts and methods are becoming increasingly popular in contemporary neuroscience, the general approach should not be viewed as something entirely new to (...) neuroscience. Instead, it is more appropriate to view the current developments as making central again approaches that facilitated some of neuroscience’s most significant early achievements, namely, the Hodgkin–Huxley and FitzHugh–Nagumo models. The second aim is primarily critical and defends a version of the “dynamical hypothesis” in neuroscience. Whereas the original version centered on defending a noncomputational and nonrepresentational account of cognition, the version I have in mind is broader and includes both cognition and the neural systems that realize it as well. In view of that, I discuss research on motor control as a paradigmatic example demonstrating that the concepts and methods of dynamical systems theory are increasingly and successfully being applied to neural systems in contemporary neuroscience. More significantly, such applications are motivating a stronger metaphysical claim, that is, understanding neural systems as being dynamical systems, which includes not requiring appeal to representations to explain or understand those phenomena. Taken together, the historical claim and the critical claim demonstrate that the dynamical hypothesis is undergoing a renaissance in contemporary neuroscience. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...) premise-based inferences in disguise. Next, I establish what kinds of true propositions can to a first approximation be known on the basis of pure reasoning. Finally, I argue that beliefs that are competently formed on the basis of suppositional reasoning satisfy both externalist and internalist criteria of justification. (shrink)

The essay aims to illuminate the current crisis, as it has been diagnosed by important currents of contemporary European thought, from the baroque remarkably the Hispanic perspective. The author argues that one of the fundamental figures of the Baroque is what he calls an infinite aporethic difference. According to this, Baroque understands the world as a set of differences that bind aporethically tending to infinity. This figure is, at the same time, shown as a critical operator with regard to reality, (...) which has lost its pre-modern configuration as Cosmos. The author also holds that in its present projection, the figure of the infinite aporethic difference takes the form of a new normativity, namely, that of the Chaosmos, which is particularly visible in post-structuralism and in the Ibero-American Neo-baroque. By its virtue, it is possible to distinguish two ways of coping with the current crisis. The chaosmotic one would be characteristic of a compromised strong trans-modernity, which contrasts with the evasive weak postmodernity. This problem is finally investigated from the point of view of the subtle baroque heroism and its shadow in the present. (shrink)

In our paper we aim to meditate on the concept of depth (profondeur) in the works of M. Merleau-Ponty, as it is a key notion to understand the French philosopher’s concept of space. Furthermore we will try to show that space plays a fundamental role in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, allowing us to understand important features both of his phenomenological readings and ontological project.

As we turn to the lived experience of memory, we are confronted with an eerie and enigmatic possibility: the possibility to remember what we ourselves never lived. How to explain phenomenologically this enigmatic but fundamental level of spatialized memory? I would like to come back to these issues in order to face yet another fundamental question: Does a phenomenology of spatialized memory require any onto-phenomenological concretizations?

It is usual to read Freud as a critic of Enlightenment, specialy of the kantian way of thinking moral autonomy. However, all Freud did was discover in human nature a great difficulty that enlightenes philosophy just cannot ignore. This difficulty, which directly affects conceptions about the age of majority, refers to certain heteronomy mechanisms which main characteristic is the skill to supplant the voice of moral autonomy: exactly the same as moral law in Kant, super-ego -once internalized during childhood and (...) once culture imperatives have been assumed as one's own - orders without promising anythig or threatening anything . So, the political project of enthroning reason as the top authorithy depends on the existence of a republican organization that guarantees a pedagogical program for which "age of majoriry" does not mean any more naming "ego" to ancient customs internalized but the capacity of being ruled by one's own reason .Es frecuente buscar en Freud a un crítico de la Ilustración y, en particular, del modo de pensar la moral heredero del planteamiento kantiano. Sin embargo, Freud se limita a descubrir en la naturaleza humana un importante obstáculo del que el proyecto ilustrado no se podrá ya desentender. Este obstáculo, que afecta de un modo decisivo al modo como entender el paso a la mayoría de edad, remite a la existencia de un determinado reino de la heteronomía cuyo rasgo más característico es su capacidad para suplantar la voz de la autonomía moral: al igual que la ley moral en Kant, el superyó -una vez ha interiorizado en la infancia y asumido como propios determinados contenidos de cultura - también ordena poderosamente sin prometer nada ni amenazar con nada . En estas condiciones, el proyecto de investir a la razón como autoridad suprema depende de la existencia de una organización republicana que garantice un programa pedagógico para el que "mayoría de edad" no signifique llamar "yo" a la cristalización interior de las costumbres de los ancestros sino a la capacidad efectiva de guiarse por la propia razón. (shrink)

El moderno tabú de la muerte se manifiesta en algunas residencias de ancianos mediante el ocultamiento de los fallecimientos producidos y la aparente eliminación de los ritos, el luto y el duelo. No obstante, del tabú surgirán prácticas proxémicas que derivarán en nuevos rituales funerarios. La pandemia exacerbará dichas prácticas.

The emergence of organic, metabolic, cognitive and cultural codes points us to the need for a new kind of explanatory causality, and a different kind of bio-logic— one dependent on, but different from, the deterministic logic derived from mechanical causality, and one which can account for the increase in semiotic freedom which is evident in the biological hierarchy. Building upon previous work (Bruni 2003), in this article I provide a stipulative definition of semiotic freedom and its relation to causality in (...) biological and cognitive systems. To do so, I will first discuss the close relation that triadic causality and semiotic freedom have to the notions of teleology and emergence, and how the latter two are interrelated in living systems. I pinpoint some of the reservations that these notions have encountered in the history of science (including evolutionary biology and cognitive science), but stress also their necessity in the study of any given biological and cognitive system. I draw a distinction between horizontal and vertical emergence in order to arrive at a notion of ‘second order emergence’ that affords us a more viable definition of semiotic freedom. I will then attempt to show that all of these concepts are of paramount importance when we come to study processes of sensing, perception andcognition at any level of a living system. Accordingly, these ideas are part of a framework-in-development to research the scale of thresholds of semiotic freedom, by assuming a top-down approach i.e., by starting from the highest levels of semiotic freedom and cognitive processes, and exploring how those processes disaggregate into lesser degrees of freedom. I thus hope to bridge the gap between those levels from above. (shrink)

Direct realism in one form or another is gaining traction as an approach to perception. With the hope of bolstering such positions, we offer a framework upon which to base an argument for direct realism in matters of perception. Better yet, we offer an empirically supported framework. The framework on offer is that of ecological psychology. With the framework in place, we then discuss how it can address visual illusions, one of the major challenges facing proponents of direct realism.