Wychodząc od metaforycznego (figuralnego) ujęcia problemu zła, w oparciu o wybrane przemyślenia Leszka Kołakowskiego, rozważania składające się na artykuł zmierzają do namysłu nad „złem w polityce” w sensie niedomagań i nadużyć wolności: pokus władzy autokratycznej i totalitarnej. Dotyczą antropologicznego i politycznego przekraczania granic wolności kosztem (aż do zniesienia) wolności innych. Evil Politics or Trouble with the Devil. Reflections on the Political Demonology of Leszek Kołakowski Proceeding from a metaphorical (figurative) account of the problem of evil, and based on (...) class='Hi'>Leszek Kołakowski’s selected thoughts, this paper’s considerations aim to deliberate on “evil in politics” in the spirit of the shortcomings and excesses of freedom: namely, the lure of autocratic and totalitarian power. At issue is how the bounds of freedom are anthropologically and politically transgressed at the expense (to the point of abolishing) the freedom of others. (shrink)

We show, under the assumption that factoring is hard, that a model of PV exists in which the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse to the linear hierarchy; that a model of S21 exists in which NP is not in the second level of the linear hierarchy; and that a model of S21 exists in which the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the linear hierarchy. Our methods are model-theoretic. We use the assumption about factoring to get a model in which the weak (...) pigeonhole principle fails in a certain way, and then work with this failure to obtain our results. As a corollary of one of the proofs, we also show that in S21 the failure of WPHP (for Σb1 definable relations) implies that the strict version of PH does not collapse to a finite level. (shrink)

Leszek Kolakowski delves into some of the most intellectually vigorous questions of our time in this remarkable collection of essays garnished with his characteristic wit. Ten of the essays have never appeared before in English. "Exemplary.

The current heated debate on the deteriorating status of the university raises a range of pertinent questions, including: What role can the humanities play in culture today in the face of the crisis of higher education? To answer this question, the authors begin by problematizing the relationship between culture, the humanities, and education. In the second part of the paper, they examine the changing role of the humanities in conjunction with the understandings of culture, and outline three salient ways in (...) which culture is conceived of today. Subsequently, they focus on the loss of the dominant status that culture suffered when everyday life was discovered in modernity. In the third part, they argue that everyday life, or rather social representations of everyday life and its practices, are currently becoming the chief criterion for assessing culture, the humanities, and education. However, everyday life remains complex both in theoretical conceptualizations and in research observations. For example, everyday life harbors a range of risks and anxieties which are veiled by its own obviousness and reinforced by socialization. The authors conclude that, given this, everyday life in democratic societies calls for the work of understanding, support, affirmation, and criticism, in which the humanities can retain their superior status. In the fourth part, the authors discuss non-consensual democracy, critical community, and the pedagogy of asylum as the forms of organization and action that promote an auspicious interconnection of culture, the humanities, and education. (shrink)

The problem of idealization in empirical sciences is very rarely taken up in works concerned with the methodology of those sciences. It seems to be common knowledge that in advanced natural sciences references are made to concepts such as “perfectly rigid body,” “material point,” “perfect gas,” etc., but it remains a fact that the most important methodological concepts, concepts which have determined the present-day form of the philosophy of science, have been advanced without regard to the peculiarities of the procedure (...) mentioned above. And yet a moment's consideration suffices to raise doubts as to Carnap's physicalism and/or Popper's falsificationism if we just realize the trivial and commonly known truth that empirical sciences resort to idealizationism. For how are we to imagine a reduction of idealizational concepts to observation terms? And how are we to imagine that theorems which include idealizational concepts imply observation statements which refute, or at least are at variance with, those theorems? But it is a fact that such doubts have neither been raised by the authors of the conceptions mentioned above, nor have they been raised against them. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of a Minkowskian Branching Structure ("MBS" for short). Then we prove some results concerning the phenomenon of funny business in its finitary and infinitary variants.

My Ph.D. dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Tomasz Placek at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. In one of its most basic and informal shapes, the principle of the common cause states that any surprising correlation between two factors which are believed not to directly influence one another is due to their common cause. Here we will be concerned with a version od this idea which possesses a purely probabilistic formulation. It was introduced, in (...) the form of a general principle, by Hans Reichenbach in his posthumously published book "The Direction of Time". The central notion of the principle in Reichenbach's formulation, and of the current essay, is that of screening off: two correlated events are screened off by a third event if conditioning on the third event makes them probabilistically independent. Reichenbach's principle marks also the beginning of a new field of philosophy: namely, that of ``probabilistic causality''. For the most part, the current essay can be seen as an effort at checking how far one can go with the purely statistical notions revolving around Reichenbach's idea of common cause. In short, the answer is ``surprisingly far''; in some classes of probability spaces all correlations between ``interesting'' events possess explanations of such sort. However, this fact lends itself to opposing interpretations; more on that in the conclusion. Chapters 6 and 7 contain mathematical results concerning these issues. The screening-off condition requires an equality of a probabilistic nature to hold; chapter 8 is a short discussion of slightly weakened versions of the condition, which hold if the sides of the above mentioned equality differ to a small degree. In chapter 2, after some mathematical preliminaries, we study the various formulations of the principle which might be said to stem from the original idea of Reichenbach. We also examine a few of the most salient counterarguments, which undermine at least some of the formulations. Chapter 3 is of a formal nature, dealing with various probabilistic notions which can be thought of as generalizations of Reichenbach's concept of common cause. The next chapter concerns the relationship between the idea of common causal explanation and the Bell inequalities. In chapter 5 we briefly present the form of Reichenbach's principle which can be found in the field of representing causal structures by means of directed acyclic graphs. (shrink)

For over a century, philosophers have argued that philosophy is impossible or useless, or both. Although the basic notion dates back to the days of Socrates, there is still heated disagreement about the nature of truth, reality, knowledge, the good, and God. This may make little practical difference to our lives, but it leaves us with a feeling of radical uncertainty, a feeling described by Kolakowski as "metaphysical horror." "The horror is this," he says, "if nothing truly exists except the (...) Absolute, the Absolute is nothing if nothing truly exists except myself, I am nothing." The aim of this book, for Kolakowski, is finding a way out of this seeming dead end. In a trenchant analysis that serves as an introduction to nearly all of Western philosophy, Kolakowski confronts these dilemmas head on through examinations of several prominent philosophers including Descartes, Spinoza, Husserl, and many of the Neo-Platonists. He finds that philosophy may not provide definitive answers to the fundamental questions, yet the quest itself transforms our lives. It may undermine most of our certainties, yet it still leaves room for our spiritual yearnings and religious beliefs. The final sentence of the book captures the hopefulness that has survived the horror of nothingness when Kolakowski asks: "Is it not reasonable to suspect that if existence were pointless and the universe devoid of meaning, we would never have achieved not only the ability to imagine otherwise, but even the ability to entertain this very thought--to wit, that existence is pointless and the universe devoid of meaning?" The answer, of course, is clear. Now it is up to readers to take up the challenge of his arguments. (shrink)

The article deals with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdjaev, which he formulated between The Philosophy of Inequality and The New Middle-Ages. Berdjaev’s philosophy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The other point of reference is the crisis of culture and civilisation, which affected the West in the inter-war period. Berdjaev’s position has been interpreted in view of the archetypal myth of the struggle of the two principles, the principle of order and the (...) forces of destruction. This myth is tied to the millenialist world view. Berdjaev took an anti-utopian stance. He juxtaposed the utopian-revolutionary principle with the hierarchical-creative one. From this position he criticized among others democracy, liberalism and socialism. In the midst of the crisis of the 1920s he remarked the possibility of spiritual rejuvenation putting forward the concept of the New Middle-Ages. One can say that at that time Berdjaev’s philosophy evolved within the conservative-creative framework, from the utopia of conservatism to the utopia of ‘free creativity’. (shrink)

Podjęta w artykule problematyka dotyczy słynnej figury Wielkiego Inkwizytora, z którą spotykamy się w filozoficznych rozważaniach Józefa Tischnera; oczywiście, figury wprost zaczerpniętej z kart powieści Fiodora Dostojewskiego. Nie są to zresztą jedyne nawiązania myśli Tischnera do „imaginarium filozoficznego” twórcy Braci Karamazow. Warto zatem przyjrzeć się bliżej temu, co kryje się w „cieniu”, jaki roztacza wokół siebie Wielki Inkwizytor. Rozważania, nolens volens, muszą zatem dotyczyć „darów” Wielkiego Inkwizytora: pozornego dobra i pozornej wolności. Innymi słowy: zapytamy o postać Wielkiego Inkwizytora jako – (...) niepokojącą, wciąż groźną – „centralną postać nowożytnej filozofii władzy”. I Dostojewski, i Tischner przywołują bowiem pytania, które nie dają się prostym sposobem odsunąć i gestem tym niejako unieważnić, nadal stawiają nas przed niebezpieczeństwem „iluzji” politycznej, w której stawką pozostają najwyższe wartości. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia poglądy oryginalnego polskiego filozofa z pierwszej połowy XX stulecia – Jana Stachniuka. Wyróżniającymi elementami tej koncepcji z zakresu filozofii społecznej są jego rozważania dotyczące kultury, swoistej,,wspakultury”, historiozofii, roli mitów w społecznym bycie.

Niniejsza wypowiedź jest próbą ukazania wyższości intelektualnej jednostki wybitnej nad jednostkami przeciętnymi. Transgresja jest tutaj formą przejścia, przemiany artysty, negującego zastany porządek świata, pragnącego podłożyć podwaliny pod nową rzeczywistość widzianą oczami szalonego geniusza - Friedricha Nietzschego, do którego często się odwołuję. Jego pojęcie \"Nadczłowieka\" jest tożsame z pojęciem genialnego twórcy, jednostki wybitnej, niezrozumiałej przez pospólstwo, która swoimi horyzontami twórczymi wybiega daleko poza własną epokę\".

We extend a result by Gallow concerning the impossibility of following two epistemic masters, so that it covers a larger class of pooling methods. We also investigate a few ways of avoiding the issue, such as using non-convex pooling methods, employing the notion of imperfect trust or moving to higher-order probability spaces. Along the way we suggest a conceptual issue with the conditions used by Gallow: whenever two experts are considered, whether we can trust one of them is decided by (...) the features of the other! (shrink)

I claim that objective consequentialism faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts. I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC.

Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski is renowned worldwide for wrestling with serious philosophical conundrums with dazzling elegance. In this new book, he turns his characteristic wit to important themes of ordinary life, from the need for freedom to the wheel of fortune, from the nature of God to the ambiguities of betrayal. Extremely lucid and lacking in intellectual pretension, these essays speak in everyday language, spurring the reader’s own thoughts and providing a handle on which to debate and think about (...) the themes. The eighteen essays cover the following topics: power, fame, equality, lying, toleration, travel, virtue, collective responsibility, the wheel of fortune, betrayal, violence, boredom, freedom, luxury, God, respect for nature, superstition, and national stereotypes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper examines between democracy and a utopia of everydayness. The paper refers to the democratic system in Poland through the prism of everyday life and it shows the sources of the rise of populism in the feeling of losing control over our own lives. Therefore, the paper investigates the relationships between everyday life and politics and the complicated connections between everydayness and modernity. The next section is devoted to the emergence of the utopia of everydayness in Herbert Marcuse’s (...) psychoanalytic thought and its appropriation in the student movements of sixties. Finally, the categories of microphysics of emancipation and somapower are introduced and it is shown that these notions can be useful in the construction of the utopia of everydayness which would support the democratic system. (shrink)

The present paper is intended to take up the basic issue in Marxist epistemology: does the development of human cognition include mechanisms that ensure the attainment of, or approximation to, the absolute truth?But to take up this issue we have to define the concept of absolute truth. This is why the paper begins with comment on the assumptions we adopt. This is followed by explanations of the concept of the absolute truth and that of relative truth and some of derivative (...) concepts, too. Section 3 is concerned with the problem of whether the absolute truth is attainable, and with the role played in the process by the correspondence principle, which is reconstructed in a specified way. (shrink)

The article deals with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdjaev (1874–1948), which he formulated between The Philosophy of Inequality (written in 1918, but published in 1923) and The New Middle - Ages (1924). Berdjaev’s philosophy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The other point of reference is the crisis of culture and civilisation, which affected the West in the inter-war period. Berdjaev’s position has been interpreted in view of the archetypal myth of the (...) struggle of the two principles, the principle of order (cosmos) and the forces of destruction (chaos). This myth is tied to the millenialist world view. Berdjaev took an anti-utopian stance. He juxtaposed the utopian-revolutionary principle with the hierarchical-creative one. From this position he criticized among others democracy, liberalism and socialism. In the midst of the crisis of the 1920s he remarked the possibility of spiritual rejuvenation putting forward the concept of the New Middle-Ages. One can say that at that time Berdjaev’s philosophy evolved within the conservative-creative framework, from the utopia of conservatism to the utopia of ‘free creativity’. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what (...) we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver. So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis. (shrink)

We tackle two open questions from Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) regarding what the belief update framework described in that paper mandates as correct responses to two problems. One of them concerns credences in overlapping propositions and is known in the literature as the “simultaneous update problem”. The other is the well known “Judy Benjamin” problem concerning conditional credences. We argue that our results concerning the problems point to deficiencies of the framework. More generally, we observe that the method of minimizing (...) inverse relative entropy seems to work better than (or at least equally well as) its competitors in many situations. (shrink)