Artykuł analizuje krytycznie pewne linie argumentacji stosowane przez wielu badaczy Nowego Testamentu na poparcie negatywnej oceny przekazów na temat wypowiedzi Jezusa i wydarzeń w Ewangeliach synoptycznych.

The aim of this paper is to present two arguments against the dialectical interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophy. This interpretation understands Nagarjuna's philosophy as a method of deconstruction, abstracting from Nagarjuna's own standpoint. The first argument refers to the metaphysical presuppositions of this method. The second argument refers to the positive statements asserted by Nagarjuna and focuses mainly on those concerning Buddhist practice. Furthermore, the conception of 'skilful means' and 'the two truths' will be discussed. The conclusion of this (...) paper is that Nagarjuna's philosophy is based upon determining the conditions of the possibility of the Buddhist practice rather than on a dialectic without any metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Medico-philosophical reflections were developed in the 19th and the 20th centuries by three consecutive generations of Polish physicians, active in what was later named the Polish School of Philosophy of Medicine. The second generation of this school published its own journal, Medical Critique [Krytika Lekarska], from 1897 to 1907. Medical Critique included numerous articles on the nature of medical knowledge, the reductionism versus holism debate in biology and medicine, the importance of teleologically-oriented approaches in medicine, the influence of theories (...) and of a priori ideas on clinical observations and on ‘clinical facts’, the problem of classification of diseases, the normative and ethical dimension of medicine, and the ion relationships between philosophy, history and medicine. The existence of a journal dealing specifically with theoretical reflections on medicine undoubtedly contributed to the propagation of original work in the philosophy of medicine in Poland. (shrink)

By emphasising the role of the social factor in the human life, the sophists created the foundations of European sociopolitical thought which arose from the spirit of criticism, pervading the Athenian democratic culture in the second half of the 5th century B.C. They gave rise to the first anthropological breakthrough in the history of our civilisation by treating philosophy, education and upbringing as preparation for life in a free civil society. They also had their share in depriving the laws (...) of their sacral status since they treated the state and the law as results of a social contract dictated by utilitarian reasons. Therefore they should be regarded as the inventors of legal-political conventionalism and utilitarianism which have formed the basis for today’s democracy. Protagoras was the author of the notion of social evolution. That notion was later to become the foundation of leftist, liberal and conservative sociopolitical attitudes. According to Protagoras, education is preparation for life in the society, and thus he might be called a patron of the modern „education for democracy”. Prodicus put forward the ideal of an individual sacrificing his interests for the sake of the community and showed the social function of work. He also regarded religion as a human invention, acquiring its shape in the course of history. Hippias and Antiphon created the notion of the law of nature and the idea of social egalitarianism, since they claimed that all human beings are naturally equal. Moreover, they formulated and contrasted the two notions: nature and legal convention. Later this opposition became a fundamental question of the European philosophy of law and politics. The sophists of the classical period, though they propagated relativism and epistemological sensualism, were far from preaching antisocial and immoral individualism. Their teachings were based on antihedonistic ethical restraint. They all recognised primacy of the community over an individual which was the most important foundation of the Greek political culture in that period. They were also forerunners of those tendencies in the modern pedagogy that aim at endowing the pupil or student first of all with social and professional efficiency. (shrink)

The paper contains a comment on the criticism of the author's book Początek jest wszędzie (Prószynski i S-ka, 2002) by Marek Lagosz ("Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria, 14, 2005, 121-133). The comment focuses on the following issues: (1) the conception of philosophy of physics; (2) some methodological questions, especially the role of models in physics; (3) some explanations concerning the model proposed by the present author and his coworkers. A few "ideological remarks" are also made.

In the paper author discusses ideas of L. Wittgenstein who renounced formalism which was characteristic of the "Tractatus" epoch. The change is connected with the adoption of a different conception of language which refers, among other, problems to the new approach to "generality" (e.g. to generalized sentences). Wittgenstein rejected the proposition of analytical reductionism which is a conviction that it is possible to reduce and analyse "generality". He changed his opinion connected with the theory of meaning. The problems discussed above, (...) dealt with by earlier conceptions of Frege and Russell belong to important problems of the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Publikation wurde zum Jubiläumsjahr 2000 von Sozialwissenschaftlern am Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsgeschichte und Geschichte der Wirtschaftslehre der staatlichen Universität Łódz vorbereitet. Das Buch hat vor allem ein theoretisches Ziel. Die Autoren, ausschließlich Wissenschaftler die diesem Lehrstuhl angehören, wollen die logische Struktur der päpstlichen Lehre, ihre Methode, Prinzipien und letztlich ihr Verhältnis zur empirischen Realität beschreiben.

Die vorliegende Publikation wurde zum Jubiläumsjahr 2000 von Sozialwissenschaftlern am Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsgeschichte und Geschichte der Wirtschaftslehre der staatlichen Universität Łódz vorbereitet. Das Buch hat vor allem ein theoretisches Ziel. Die Autoren, ausschließlich Wissenschaftler die diesem Lehrstuhl angehören, wollen die logische Struktur der päpstlichen Lehre, ihre Methode, Prinzipien und letztlich ihr Verhältnis zur empirischen Realität beschreiben.

Bertrand Russell’s Critique of the Arguments for the Existence of God The paper presents Bertrand Russell’s critique of arguments for the existence of God. I divided the theistic arguments which Russell criticizes into three groups. The first group involves arguments concerning the relation between Universe and God: the First Cause argument, the Natural law argument and the argument from Design. The second group is related to the concept of God as a moral Lawmaker and it contains the argument from morality (...) and the argument from remedy for injustice. The last group of arguments pertains to the relation between God and human beings. Here, I consider Russell's reflections on the validity of the argument from religious experience and his approach to the issue of the foundation of religion. The aim of this article is to consider whether Russellian argumentation against evidence for God's existence is justified. Keywords: Bertrand Russell, existence of God, argument, philosophy of religion, evidence. (shrink)

CRITIQUE OF THE ARAB MIND. CONTEMPORARY ARAB THOUGHT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISSUES OF REASON AND COGNITION In this article I will present different stands of Arab scholars with respect to one of the key issues of Orientalism — the Arab mind. The assumption of individuality and invariable nature of Arab mind was one of the foundations of the oriental thought. With the development of postcolonial thought in the second half of the 20th century, some Arab scholars rejected this (...) assumption, while the others tried to redefine its essence. Hence, the study of such issues as reason and cognition was so important. According to Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri, what distinguishes Arab reason is the fact that in Islamic philosophy the connection between epistemology and ideology was much stronger than in the European culture. As a result, Islamic philosophy used epistemology and logic not for the sake of uncovering the ‘truth’, but in the defence of its own ideological claims. Al-Jabri argues that in order to understand contemporary Arab-Islamic thought it is necessary to study its beginning (VII–IX centuries AD), since instruments of reason established in that period have remained until today. Other philosophers, like Mohammed Arkoun place Arab reason in wider context of reason as such. The knowledge of the way of cognition within Arab culture seems to be the key to understanding of their world. (shrink)

Istnieją przynajmniej dwa powody zajęcia się liberalizmem w pracy poświęconej zależnościom pomiędzy myślą a rzeczywistością. Centralnym problemem filozofii polityki jest najlepszy ustrój, który stanowi owoc spotkania ludzkiego umysłu z życiem społeczno-politycznym. To po pierwsze. Po drugie, liberalne ujecie związków teoria – praktyka stanowi jeden z wyznaczników doktryny liberalnej w ogóle. Liberalizm był i jest filozofią, która wywiera potężny wpływ na charakter nowoczesnych społeczeństw i nowożytnej myśli społecznej. Liczne hasła, które stanowiły kiedyś o jego odrębności, weszły na stałe do abecadła zachodniej (...) kultury (np. prawa człowieka, konstytucjonalizm, trójpodział władzy, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, tolerancja, rozdział Kościoła od państwa). Zarazem został on uznany za wroga przez wszystkie inne nurty filozofii polityki (konserwatystów, socjalistów, marksistów, anarchistów, feministki, komunitarystów, libertarian), można wręcz powiedzieć, że uzyskały one swą tożsamość przez opozycję wobec liberalizmu. Sytuacja ta jest szczególnie widoczna w Polsce, gdzie w wiedzy potocznej i dyskursie medialnym (a nierzadko i naukowym) głęboko zakorzeniła się definicja liberalizmu wywodząca się z propagandy antyliberalnej uprawianej przez środowiska ideowo zainteresowane krytyką tej filozofii . Nad Wisłą oznaczanie liberalizmu koncentrowało się na pomówieniach, wadach odmian skrajnych przy jednoczesnym lekceważeniu zalet podstawowych idei. Konsekwentnie liberalizm kojarzono z koncepcjami Thomasa Hobbesa, Jean Jacques Rousseau i prorynkowych myślicieli (neoliberałów, a nawet libertarian). Kładziono nacisk na skrajny leseferyzm i indywidualizm. Natomiast przemilczano wspólnotowe i socjalne wątki myśli liberalnej, utajano liberalne wysiłki prowadzące do minimalizacji napięcia między dobrem wspólnym i wolnością jednostki, wolnością indywidualną i wolnością polityczną, wolnością ekonomiczną a równością i sprawiedliwością. W ustach Polaka słowo „liberalizm” to wciąż obelga bądź straszak. Parafrazując powiedzenie Ludwiga von Misesa można powiedzieć, że nienawiść do liberalizmu jest jedyna rzeczą, co do której Polacy zgodzili się. Zanim zatem przejdziemy do prezentacji relacji między praxis a logos w myśli liberalnej rozwikłajmy problemy semantyczne narosłe wokół liberalizmu. (shrink)

The article elucidates and assesses the Marburg School’s account of the cognition. The characteristic feature of epistemology from this School is the rejection of the mirroring and acceptance of the cognitive transformation. The criticism of the mirroring theory is implicitly contained in Paul Natorp’s and Hermann Cohen’s cognitive relationism. Ernst Cassirer articulated this critical epistemology in his philosophy of the symbolic form and his conception of the symbolic representation. The historical bases of this criticism has been reconstructed as a (...) main purpose of this article. (shrink)

The title concepts of criticism, crisis, and wisdom are taken from the paradigm of Kantian philosophy and are characterised in the development given by the contemporary philosopher Odo Marquard. In this connection I present the relationship between wisdom and thinking in the Enlightenment usage. The call for philosophy to be self-understanding in the sense of the Enlightenment Bildung and the autonomy of science and wisdom sounds particularly strong here. I conclude that philosophy becomes stupidity when it turns (...) into a field that—because of some kind of philosophical fundamentalism—would like to become this one-sided attitude towards reality that eliminates and replaces other attitudes. (shrink)

This paper recalls a less known aspect of Hegelian philosophy of religion consisting in the radical critique of Christendom. Hegel criticized first of all Roman Catholic Church unlike Protestantism. Hegel underlined no biblical legitimization of church institution and therefore interpreted Christianity as a voluntary association but not as a mass institution. He also indicated negative implications of positive religion’s ethics. His views were characteristic for critical philosophy of religion developer since the 17th till the 19th century. Today Hegel’s (...) views may be relevant in debates on political secularization explaining genesis of important stream in Western Europe which questions meaning of authorities especially religious. (shrink)

Artykuł prezentuje współczesną katolicką krytykę liberalizmu.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest krytyczna prezentacja głównych tez pewnej wersji współczesnego deizmu, zaproponowanej przez Roberta Corfe’a, autora książki Deism and Social Ethics: The Role of Religion in the Third Millennium. Nie jest to prosta kontynuacja osiemnastowiecznego angielskiego deizmu Jana Tolanda i Mateusza Tindala. Deizm Corfe’a jest refleksją filozoficzną, biorącą pod uwagę osiągnięcia współczesnych nauk przyrodniczych. Autor podejmuje taką refleksję w przekonaniu, że główne zagrożenie światowego pokoju wypływa z konfliktów między przedstawicielami religii monoteistycznych: chrześcijaństwa i islamu. Jego zdaniem głównym zadaniem współczesnego (...) deizmu jest budowanie porozumienia ponad religiami poprzez odwołanie się do racjonalnej perswazji, możliwej do przyjęcia przynajmniej przez niektórych przedstawicieli tych religii. Proponowana wersja deizmu miałaby być globalną etyką, odniesioną do nieosobowego kosmicznego Bóstwa (Dobra), zrywającą ze wszystkimi nadnaturalnymi religiami, które Corfe oskarża o kultywowanie irracjonalizmu, szkodliwego samego w sobie. Mimo że deizm Corfe’a nie przeradza się w ateizm, wbrew zapewnieniom autora Deism and Social Ethics nie stanowi skutecznej zapory przeciw temu ostatniemu. Autor niniejszego artykułu pokazuje, że koncepcja Corfe’a nie jest wewnętrznie spójna, jest niedopracowana teoretycznie i w znacznie mniejszym stopniu racjonalna, niż się Robertowi Corfe’owi wydaje. W istocie nie stanowi ona przekonującej alternatywy dla religii monoteistycznych takich jak chrześcijaństwo. (shrink)

The paper presents Ch. S. Peirce\'s attack on Cartesian epistemology as it was formulated in 1868 article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Peirce\'s arguments are analyzed in the context of possible Descartes\' responses. One conclusion of the paper is that Peirce uses two different notions of knowledge and science, and that the distance of his ideas from that of Descartes depends, among others, on which notion we take into account. Another conclusion is that although Peirce\'s general project of combining fallibilism (...) and anti-scepticism looks very attractive (especially in the light of what we now know about the development of science) it generates many problems that Descartes could have pointed out if he had a chance to talk to his two and a half century younger debater. Despite, however, the problems Peircean project generates, it may be regarerd as a forerunner of typical tendencies of 20th century philosophy such as e.g. fallibilism or antifoundationalism. (shrink)

The paper open with an outline of Roger Bacon’s linguistic interests. He claimed that the knowledge of languages is the propedeuctics of any knowledge because it is formulated in the Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic languages, and no translation can fully render the original text. There are also other reasons for which the knowledge of languages is necessary for the functioning of the Church, e.g. in the Liturgy or for missionary purposes. Bacon distinguished three stages of the command of a language, (...) and the second is the skill of translation postulated for each person that studies philosophical and theological texts. This programme was too idealistic and, if only for the scarcity of original texts, it could not be carried out on a broader scale in medieval universities doomed to use Latin translations. And these translations were so negatively evaluated by Roger Bacon. He referred to his knowledge of some details that showed the translators’ incompetence. Then the paper discusses Bacon’s opinions on medieval translators. It indicates Bacon’s chronological mistakes and his lack of information with reference to many facts about the translator’s movements. It provides some possible reasons for Bacon’s ignorance and his harsh evaluation of that movement. There were the following reasons for that: he distanced himself from some learned information due to the fact that Aristotle had for many decades been condemned in Paris, there were excessive expectations in relation to the alleged astronomic and astrological knowledge of Aristotle, and its lack was painful for this scholar. He failed to be aware of the vagueness of Aristotle’s original text due to, among other things, only a rudimentary knowledge of Greek that Roger Bacon had, and Greek original texts were inaccessible. One may also mention a tendency typical of Bacon to trace causes of mistakes and his fear of being rush in creating authorities. Bacon’s testimony concerning William of Moerbeke is discussed in detail. This was done with a view to show that Bacon conveys some information that is not true and some that can be regarded as trustworthy or hypothetical in further research on the life and literary work of this medieval translator. The unique piece of information is that William of Moerbeke decided to revise the ancient translations of Aristotle’s writings. Bacon’s negative opinion about William’s translator’s skills must be treated as unjust, although contemporary research shows that, despite his indisputable accomplishments, William’s translations have some drawbacks. Accordingly, we cannot completely reject Roger Bacon’s testimony. (shrink)