Background: There is increasing evidence to support the efficacy of transcranial direct current stimulation applications in cognitive augmentation and rehabilitation. Neuromodulation achieved with tDCS may further regulate regional cerebral perfusion affiliated through the neurovascular unit; however, components of cerebral perfusion decrease across aging. A novel neuroimaging approach, functional near-infrared spectroscopy, can aid in quantifying these regional perfusional changes. To date, the interaction of the effects of tDCS on cognitive performance across the lifespan and obtained fNIRS hemodynamic responses remain unknown.Objective: This (...) review aims to examine the effects of tDCS on cognitive performance and fNIRS hemodynamic responses within the context of cognitive aging.Methods: Six databases were searched for studies. Quality appraisal and data extraction were conducted by two independent reviewers. Meta-analysis was carried out to determine overall and subgroup effect sizes.Results: Eight studies met inclusion criteria. The overall effect size demonstrates that tDCS can alter cognitive performance and fNIRS signals, with aging being a potential intermediary in tDCS efficacy.Conclusion: From the studies included, the effects of tDCS on cognitive performance and fNIRS metrics are most prominent in young healthy adults and appear to become less robust with increasing age. Given the small number of studies included in this review further investigation is recommended. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 215 Seiten: 1-42.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi ed. by Kim-chong ChongLuyao Li (bio)Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi. Edited by Kim-chong Chong. Dordrecht: Springer, 2022. Pp. 835. Hardcover US $133.15, isbn 978-3-030-92330-3.Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi, edited by Kim-chong Chong, is the sixteenth volume in the Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy series. This volume includes a total of 34 chapters and is (...) divided into six parts: "Authorship and Commentary" (Part I), "Concepts" (Part II), "Language and Metaphor" (Part III), "Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy" (Part IV), "Ethical, Social, and Epistemic Issues" (Part V), and "The Zhuangzi and Western Philosophy" (Part VI). These six parts not only provide students or non-specialists with a clear overview of the various possible aspects and approaches to Zhuangzi studies, but also present the latest discussions and diverse perspectives on crucial issues in the Zhuangzi, making the volume a valuable resource for experts in this field.Each part of the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi extensively explores diverse research perspectives on a specific theme in Zhuangzi studies. Part IV, "Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy," serves as an exemplary illustration of this approach. Considering the possibility that Laozi and the Logicians may have influenced the thought in the Zhuangzi to some extent, this part is comprised of two chapters that respectively examine the connections and distinctions between Zhuangzi and Laozi, and Zhuangzi and the Logicians. Regarding scholars who may have lived after Zhuangzi, Angel On Ki TING envisions Zhuangzi's response to Xunzi's criticism, exploring their respective attitudes towards rites (li 禮) through examining the motivation for action. Additionally, there are chapters that discuss the influence of Zhuangzi's thoughts after the Warring States period, on Neo-Daoism, Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism, as well as on inner alchemy and religious Daoism.In Part II, however, such extensive exploration proves to be less satisfactory. Here, some crucial concepts in the Zhuangzi are illustrated, including heaven (tian 天) and human (ren 人), transformation (hua 化), vast or big (da 大) and minute (xiao 小), true person (zhen ren 真人) and true knowledge (zhen zhi 真知), no-emotion (wu qing 无情), and ming 命 (fate, destiny, mandate and command). It is unclear why certain concepts are chosen, whereas the central concepts of Dao (道) and de (德) are not focused on. It would perhaps be worthwhile to look closer into more of the above listed concepts, and the [End Page 1] relevance of Dao and de, particularly in terms of Dao and de's relationships to closely connected notions like heaven (tian 天) and ming (命).Furthermore, clear distinctions of themes in various parts of this edited volume overlook the connections among them. Certain terms and issues are addressed in chapters of different parts, with little or no communication between them. For example, the true person is the main concern in a number of chapters: "The True Person and True Knowledge in the Zhuangzi" (Part II, pp. 179-198); "Those Who Fly Without Wings: Depictions of the Supreme Idea Figure in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi" (Part III, pp. 305-376); and "Zhuangzi's Notion of the True Master and Wittgenstein's Grammatical Investigation" (Part VI, pp.807-824). Such exploration of various perspectives on a particular theme is noteworthy. It is regrettable, however, that there is a lack of correspondence between those perspectives. Some discussion on interactions among relevant chapters would certainly enhance the volume.In addition to presenting an extensive range of studies on the Zhuangzi, the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi also makes contributions to specific issues, which will be appealing to specialists in this field. I will elaborate on three of these contributions drawing on various parts of the volume.First, this work contributes to discussions on the issue of authorship. The traditional viewpoint attributes the Inner Chapters, or at least their main part, to the historical figure Zhuang Zhou, and assumes that they were written in the Warring States period and composed earlier than other chapters. Therefore, the Inner Chapters are prioritized in studies of the Zhuangzi. Esther Klein has previously challenged the view that the Inner... (shrink)

Who should have a right to participate in a polity’s decision-making? Although the answers to this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘all (possibly) affected interests’-principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurprisingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting tourists and children from the franchise. (...) In this paper, I argue that their attempts fail. None of the proposed rationales can do the job without having unacceptable implications for the voting rights of other groups. I then develop a new specification of the affected interests-view, one that avoids such problems. According to my life plan-principle, a person is entitled to participate in a polity’s decision-making if and only if its decisions will actually affect her autonomously chosen life plans, or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind. I show that this principle straightforwardly avoids enfranchising tourists and children, and thus improves upon its two prominent rivals. The paper ends by considering and rejecting two objections to my new principle. (shrink)

Although contemporary Confucianists tend to view Western liberalism as pitting the individual against society, recent liberal scholarship has vigorously claimed that liberal polity is indeed grounded in the self-transformation that produces “liberal virtues.” To meet this challenge, this essay presents a sophisticated Confucian critique of liberalism by arguing that there is an appreciable contrast between liberal and Confucian self-transformation and between liberal and Confucian virtues. By contrasting Locke and Confucius, key representatives of each tradition, this essay shows that both liberalism (...) and Confucianism aim to reconstruct a society freed from antisocial passions entailing a vicious politics of resentment, and yet come to differing ethical and political resolutions. My key claim is that what makes Confucian self-cultivation so distinctive is the incorporation of ritual propriety ( li ) within it, whereas liberal self-transformation that relies heavily on a method of self-control comes back to the problem that it originally set out to overcome. (shrink)

Anthropogenic climate change is an existential threat to the people of sinking island states. When their territories inevitably disappear, what, if anything, do the world's remaining territorial st...

The main topic of this paper is the question of how supervenience can be understood as a relation between two families of properties each applicable to a distinct domain of individuals.

We propose that culture affects people through their perceptions of what is consensually believed. Whereas past research has examined whether cultural differences in social judgment are mediated by differences in individuals’ personal values and beliefs, we investigate whether they are mediated by differences in individuals’ perceptions of the views of people around them. We propose that individuals who perceive that traditional views are culturally consensual (e.g., Chinese participants who believe that most of their fellows hold collectivistic values) will themselves behave (...) and think in culturally typical ways. Four studies of previously well-established cultural differences found that cultural differences were mediated by participants’ perceived consensus as much as by participants’ personal views. This held true for cultural differences in the bases of compliance (Study 1), attributional foci (Study 2), and counterfactual thinking styles (Study 3). To tease apart the effect of consensus perception from other possibly associated individual differences, Study 4 experimentally manipulated which of two cultures was salient to bicultural participants and found that judgments were guided by their perception of the consensual view of the salient culture. (shrink)

Secession is again a hot political topic. Consider the recent events in Catalonia. In an illegal referendum in October 2017, amid large-scale demonstrations and violent interventions by the Spanish...

This essay sheds new light on Korean democracy after democratization. It examines how the notion of ‘transcendental collectivism’, associated with familial bonds and the concept of chŏng, led to an emphasis on citizen‐empowerment. This participatory perspective replaced the militant elite‐led activism of the transitional period, which was underpinned by a Confucian ‘transcendental individualism’ predicated on the concept of ren. The argument is based on a detailed case study of a recent episode of citizen action. The article shows how the search (...) for a new democratic citizenship that was capable of overcoming the parochial regionalism that has bedeviled Korean politics for decades, led ordinary (especially young) Korean citizens to come up with a new national democratic civic ethos that corresponded to the changed political environment. This new ethos was uri‐responsibility, a uniquely Korean view of collective moral responsibility. After examining uri‐responsibility and comparing it with Kantian‐liberal accounts of responsibility, its strong democratic implications for Korea are explored. (shrink)

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, (...) the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity. (shrink)

A common and driving assumption in agricultural research is that the introduction of research trials, new practices and innovative technologies will result in technology adoption, and will subsequently generate benefits for farmers and other stakeholders. In Lao PDR, the potential benefits of introduced technologies have not been fully realised by beneficiaries. We report on an analysis of a survey of 735 smallholder farmers in Southern Lao PDR who were questioned about factors that influenced their decisions to adopt new technologies. In (...) this study, we have constructed measures or states of adoption which identify key elements of an adoption decision-making nexus. Analysis was conducted to statistically group explanatory factors of adoption. The key explanatory factors represented attributes of the farmer, the factors considered when undertaking production decisions and elements of the agricultural value chain that present as opportunities or constraints. We describe the combination of farmer’s personal attributes, perceptions of the value chain, and the introduction of new technologies by external actors as an “agricultural research value chain”, where agricultural research activities intervene to derive greater benefits for local farmers. A generalised linear model, via Poisson regression analysis on the identified explanatory factors, was applied to explore how they influence adoption measures and we found several significant relationships. (shrink)

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...) objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs. (shrink)

This essay attempts a philosophical reflection of the Confucian ideal of “scholar-official” in Joseon Korea’s neo-Confucian context. It explores why this noble ideal of a Confucian public being had to suffer many moral-political problems in reality. It argues first that because the institution of Confucian scholar-official was actually a modus-operandi compromise between Confucianism and Legalism, the Confucian scholar-officials were torn between their ethical commitment to Confucianism and their political commitment to the state; and second, that because the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism vigorously (...) imported and indigenized by Joseon Koreans exalted the family over the state, Joseon neo-Confucian scholar-officials were torn between two competing moral obligations, filiality and loyalty. The essay concludes by discussing whether, given the problems with which the ideal of the Confucian scholar-official was frequently entangled, liberal individualism should be pursued as its normative alternative. (shrink)

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

This article discusses the resurgence of the term ‘patriarchy’ in digital culture and reflects on the everyday online meanings of the term in distinction to academic theorisations. In the 1960s–1980s, feminists theorised patriarchy as the systematic oppression of women, with differing approaches to how it worked. Criticisms that the concept was unable to account for intersectional experiences of oppression, alongside the ‘turn to culture’, resulted in a fall from academic grace. However, ‘patriarchy’ has found new life through Internet memes (humorous, (...) mutational images that circulate widely on social media). This article aims to investigate the resurgence of the term ‘patriarchy’ in digital culture. Based on an analysis of memes with the phrase ‘patriarchy’ and ‘smash the patriarchy’, we identify how patriarchy memes are used by two different online communities (feminists and anti-feminists) and consider what this means for the ongoing usefulness of the concept of patriarchy. We argue that, whilst performing important community-forming work, using the term is a risky strategy for feminists for two reasons: first, because memes are by their nature brief, there is little opportunity to address intersections of oppression; secondly, the underlying logic of feminism is omitted in favour of brevity, leaving it exposed to being undermined by the more mainstream logic of masculinism. (shrink)

This paper discusses what implications global luck egalitarianism (GLE) has for border control. Some authors suggest that an open‐borders policy follows from GLE. The idea is that various unchosen inequalities inevitably follow from differences in birthplace, such that GLE will always have principled reason to condemn closed borders. Others are skeptical of the assumption that GLE will have liberal implications for border control, because open borders may have other, adverse effects that outweigh the reductions in unjust inequality. Against such skeptics, (...) we argue that GLE will (typically) have quite liberal implications for border control. However, this connection is not a principled one: Whether (and to what extent) GLE favors opening or closing borders will depend upon empirical circumstances. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

A collection of photographs document the changing landscape of the manmade Salton Sea, from its beginnings formed by broken levees of the Colorado River, its heyday as a desert paradise, its overdevelopment and home to migrating birds, and its current state as an environmental battleground.

"The desert opens up beyond the proliferation of big box chains, car dealerships, fast food joints, and the bland sprawl along California State Highway 62. Out there, where signs of familiar habitation seem to fade from view, a change occurs in the landscape: small, dusty, mostly abandoned cabins dot the arid flatland. The majority of the existing cabins, historically found throughout the larger region known as the Morongo Basin, lie east of Twentynine Palms in outlying Wonder Valley. The curious presence (...) of these structures signifies that you are entering one of the few remaining clusters of "jackrabbit" homesteads in the American West. The mostly derelict structures-many vacant, some inhabited-are the physical reminder of former occupants who were the last to form the U.S. government's Small Tract Act of 1938." "One of the many land acts designed to dispose of "useless" federal lands from the public domain, the Small Tract Act authorized citizens to lease up to five acres of desert for recreational purposes or for use as a home or business. When the applicant made the required improvements to his or her claim by constructing a small dwelling within the three-year lease, they could file for a patent-the federal government's form of a deed. This mid-century homestead movement reflects the quintessential American desire to claim territory and own a piece of land even when the property in question was deemed "worthless" from an economic and governmental perspective."--Jacket. (shrink)

Книга предназначена для исследователей, специалистов, преподавателей, аспирантов, студентов, а также всех тех, кто интересуется вопросами по данной тематике.

The authors assess the collaboration between the University of California, Berkeley’s Community Assessment of Renewable Energy and Sustainability program and the Pinoleville Pomo Nation, a small Native American tribal nation in northern California. The collaboration focused on creating culturally inspired, environmentally sustainable housing for tribal citizens using a codesign methodology developed at the university. The housing design process is evaluated in terms of both its contribution to Native American “cultural sovereignty,” as elaborated by Coffey and Tsosie, and as a potential (...) example of the democratization of scientific practice. (shrink)

Although many accept the Rawlsian distinction between ‘end-state’ and ‘transitional’ principles, theorists disagree strongly over which feasibility constraint to use when selecting the former. While ‘minimalists’ favor a scientific-laws-only constraint, ‘non-minimalists’ believe that end-state principles should also be constrained by what people could (empirically) accept after reasoned discussion. I argue that a theorist who follows ‘non-minimalism’ will devise end-state principles that cannot be realized (as end-state principles), or cannot be stabilized (as end-state principles), or are indistinguishable in content from those (...) she would have selected had she followed ‘minimalism.’ The paper ends by outlining the implications of my analysis for the broader methodological map of political philosophy. (shrink)

A prominent approach in the debate on territorial rights claims that a group may have jurisdictional rights over a particular land if that land has become a repository of value for the group. This justification relies on a premise which has remained largely unsubstantiated, namely that having jurisdictional rights should be our preferred means for ensuring the group’s retaining of the land’s embedded value. This article discusses a recent attempt to fill this gap. David Miller acknowledges that the value could (...) be retained by the group if it has private property rights. However, he argues that because such rights can be changed at will by the holder of jurisdictional rights the group’s retaining of value is unacceptably insecure. I argue that this attempt fails. Miller’s argument is briefly stated so I start with some reconstructive work. Most importantly, I suggest that the argument relies on a descriptive claim about empirical probabilities, namely that the group’s having jurisdictional rights (in international law) provides the largest feasible reduction of insecurity. I then provide some tentative suggestions about expected state behavior which challenge the validity of that descriptive claim; I argue that a reform of international law which confers internationally enforced property rights on the relevant groups—rather than jurisdiction—may provide a similar (or even relatively larger) reduction of insecurity. My tentative conclusion is that Miller’s appeal to insecurity fails to provide the “embedded value” approach (favored by him and others) with the needed bridge from property rights to rights of jurisdiction. (shrink)

American philosopher Josiah Royce is known for having concerned himself with the question of evil and experience of tragedy. In this essay, I focus not on the question of evil but rather on the associated problems of sin and tragedy, and the suffering that exists in their wakes. In particular, I take as my starting points Royce's claims that meaning is found and created only in the context of a community,2 that interpretation and a shared dedication to common goals unite (...) persons into a community,3 that these processes of interpretation and shared dedications create meaning in the community, and that human beings all crave meaningful lives. Given this framework, I argue that sins and tragic events are .. (shrink)

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.