En el ámbito del derecho procesal penal, particularmente en el contexto del tránsito, existe una carencia de disposiciones legales que regulen el aspecto probatorio para demostrar infracciones por parte de las autoridades competentes. Específicamente, la falta de regulación sobre el uso de fotografías o videos como evidencia dificulta el proceso de aplicación de la ley, ya que ni el COIP ni la LOTTTSV ni sus reglamentos abordan adecuadamente cómo deben obtenerse pruebas mediante medios digitales. Esta laguna normativa plantea interrogantes sobre (...) qué aspectos pueden capturarse en contenido digital, cómo llevar a cabo dicho proceso y qué requisitos deben cumplir los dispositivos utilizados. Ante esta situación, se justifica la necesidad de realizar una investigación exhaustiva para determinar qué aspectos deben incorporarse en la normativa de tránsito con el fin de garantizar un debido proceso. El objetivo principal de esta investigación fue identificar las deficiencias en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito, así como proponer recomendaciones para mejorar el marco normativo existente. Se buscó determinar qué aspectos deben ser incorporados en la normativa de tránsito para garantizar un debido proceso y una aplicación justa de la ley. Para abordar esta problemática, se llevó a cabo una investigación cualitativa con un enfoque descriptivo. Se empleó el método dogmático-jurídico analítico-sintético para analizar en detalle la legislación existente y las lagunas normativas relacionadas con la obtención de pruebas digitales en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Además, se realizaron entrevistas a expertos en derecho procesal penal y se recopiló información de jurisprudencia relevante. Este enfoque metodológico permitió una comprensión profunda de los desafíos y las posibles soluciones en este ámbito. Los resultados de la investigación revelaron importantes lagunas en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Se identificaron problemas relacionados con la falta de claridad en los procedimientos de obtención de pruebas digitales y la ausencia de criterios específicos para la admisibilidad de dichas pruebas en los procesos legales. Además, se destacó la necesidad de establecer estándares claros y procedimientos adecuados para garantizar la integridad y fiabilidad de la evidencia digital en el contexto del tránsito. Esta investigación resalta la importancia de abordar las deficiencias en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Se recomienda la implementación de medidas específicas para mejorar la recopilación y admisibilidad de pruebas digitales, así como la revisión y actualización de la normativa existente. Esto contribuirá a garantizar un proceso legal justo y transparente en el ámbito del tránsito, fortaleciendo así el Estado de derecho y la confianza en el sistema judicial. (shrink)

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination grounds a prima (...) facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions – but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc. – justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions – viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles – is too steep to pay. (shrink)

Many political theorists argue that immigration restrictions are unjust and defend broadly open borders. In this paper, I examine the implications of this view for individual conduct. In particular, I argue that the citizens of states that enforce unjust immigration restrictions have duties to disobey certain immigration laws. States conscript their citizens to help enforce immigration law by imposing legal duties on these citizens to monitor, report, and refrain from interacting with unauthorized migrants. If an ideal of open borders is (...) true, these laws are unjust. Furthermore, if citizens comply with their legal duties, they contribute to violating the rights of migrants. We are obligated to refrain from contributing to rights-violations. So, citizens are obligated to disobey immigration laws. I defend the moral requirement to disobey immigration laws against the objection that disobedience to the law is excessively risky and the objection that citizens have political obligations to obey the law. (shrink)

Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events. Yet some critics, particularly Mark Johnston, have raised powerful objections to Parfit’s reductionism. In this paper, I defend reductionism against Johnston. In particular, I defend a radical form of reductionism that Buddhist philosophers developed. Buddhist reductionism can justify key features of Parfit’s position, such as the claims (...) that personal identity is not what matters and can also be indeterminate. Furthermore, Buddhist reductionism can avoid Johnston’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism. I conclude that reductionists have good reasons to favor Buddhist reductionism over Parfit’s version. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that (...) could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare. (shrink)

Several political theorists argue that states have rights to self-determination and these rights justify immigration restrictions. Call this: the self-determination argument for immigration restrictions. In this article, I develop an objection to the self-determination argument. I argue that if it is morally permissible for states to restrict immigration because they have rights to self-determination, then it can also be morally permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens. We can either accept that it is permissible for states to (...) deport and denationalize their own citizens or reject the self-determination argument. To avoid this implication, we should reject the self-determination argument. That is, we should also reject the conclusion that rights to self-determination can justify any significant immigration restrictions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople smugglers help transport migrants across international borders without authorization and in return for compensation. Many people object to people smuggling and believe that the smuggling of migrants is an evil trade. In this paper, I offer a qualified defense of people smuggling. In particular, I argue that people smuggling that assists refugees in escaping threats to their rights can be morally justified. I then rebut the objections that people smugglers exploit migrants, have defective motivations, and wrongly violate the law. (...) My conclusion is that people smuggling is sometimes a permissible way of helping refugees to evade unjust immigration restrictions and compelling states to bear their fair share of the global refugee population. (shrink)

A large body of evidence suggests that the Personalized System of Instruction (PSI) improves learning. In courses that use PSI, the material is divided into units, students must pass a test on each unit before advancing to the next unit, there’s no group-level instruction, and students advance in the course at their own pace. While studies find that PSI improves learning outcomes in a wide range of settings, researchers haven’t studied the effectiveness of PSI in critical thinking classes. In this (...) paper, I argue that teaching critical thinking with PSI can effectively promote critical thinking skills. I describe a course that uses PSI to teach critical thinking and I present evidence from pre- and post-tests that indicates that students substantially improved their reasoning skills in this course. I also discuss the costs and drawbacks of using this method of instruction and consider ways of addressing these problems. (shrink)

Many people think that citizenship should not be for sale. On their view, it is morally wrong for states to sell citizenship to foreigners. In this article, I challenge this view. I argue that it is in principle permissible for states to sell citizenship. I contend that, if states can permissibly deny foreigners access to citizenship in some cases, then states can permissibly give foreigners the option of buying citizenship in these cases. Furthermore, I defend the permissibility of selling citizenship (...) against the objections that selling citizenship values citizenship in the wrong way, corrupts civic norms, and unfairly discriminates against poor foreigners. I conclude by noting that, although selling citizenship is not intrinsically wrong, it could still be wrong for states to sell citizenship in practice. If existent immigration restrictions are unjust, then it may be impermissible for states to sell citizenship in the real world. (shrink)

States have rights to unilaterally determine their own immigration policies under international law and few international institutions regulate states’ decision-making about immigration. As a result, states have extensive discretion over immigration policy. In this paper, I argue that states should join international migration institutions that would constrain their discretion over immigration. Immigration restrictions are morally risky. When states restrict immigration, they risk unjustly harming foreigners and restricting their freedom. Furthermore, biases and epistemic defects pervasively influence states’ decision-making about immigration policy. (...) States should transfer some of their decision-making authority over immigration to more reliable institutions in order to mitigate the risks that they will unjustly restrict immigration. International institutions that include the interests of potential immigrants would be more reliable with respect to immigration policy than unilateral state decision-making. Thus, states should subject their immigration policies to international control. (shrink)

El presente trabajo critica el rol constitutivo que tanto Gérard Genette como Jean-Marie Schaeffer le otorgan a la atención en la relación estética entre un sujeto y una obra literaria. A su vez, el análisis realizado es útil para resignificar el concepto de prefocalización criteriosa de Noël Carroll. A partir de análisis estructurales y narrativos de la obra de arte literaria, se argumenta que la atención estética no es necesaria en la relación estética. Por otra parte, se defiende que los (...) estados afectivos y estéticos generados por la lectura dependen de la relación entre el lector y ciertos elementos formales existentes en la obra. En concordancia, se propone una interpretación de la prefocalización criteriosa que resalta la importancia de la influencia de las elecciones del autor en la respuesta afectiva del lector. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)

This is a brief guide to learn about our environment, from front-page news to controversial topics such as euthanasia and surrogate motherhood, and other more thorny ones such as death, life, love or grief. Everything you will find in these pages, written by the professor of Ethics and Philosophy, focuses on a single maxim: learning to live in harmony with oneself and the environment, avoiding empty speculation and empty talk, something that can only be achieved if we learn to think (...) for ourselves. "Everyday life is complicated because we have divinized the means and impoverished the ends. We should love ourselves more and contemplate others as companions on the same journey, distancing ourselves from the deified power and imbecility that surrounds us," summarizes the philosopher, pointing out the lack of critical judgment and common sense that lead us to be permanently mediatized and deceived. (shrink)

Developments in biosemiotics and democratic theory enable renewed appreciation of the possibilities for ecological democracy. Semiotics is the study of sign processes in meaning-making and communication. Signs and meanings exist in all living systems, and all living systems are therefore semiotic systems. Ecological communication can involve abiotic and biotic communication, including human language, facilitating an integration of politics and ecology in the form of ecological democracy encompassing communicative networks in nature and human society.

Argumentation is a cognitive process of reconstruction that occurs in the discursive proximal space. Multimodal argumentation, from a cognitive-semiotic perspective, suggests that certain multimodal structures can lead audiences to an accurate mental representation of argumentation, depending on the knowledge possessed, codes and signs employed (modes), and context. It is not necessary to have a formal standardized and verbal structure. We are able to argue effectively with others without the need for verbal translation, taking into account the semiotic interpretation of the (...) message. (shrink)

Several noted economists and prominent international organizations have recently advocated for the implementation of guest worker programs in developed states. Their primary argument is that guest worker programs would serve as a powerful mechanism for reducing global poverty and inequality. For example, economist Dani Rodrik estimates that guest worker programs in wealthy states would generate $200 billion or more annually for poor countries. According to Rodrik, liberalizing the temporary movement of workers would “produce the largest possible gains for the world (...) economy and for poor countries in particular,” in comparison with other policies, such as trade liberalization. (shrink)

In this paper, we look at installation art through the lens provided by the notion of “affective artifact” (Piredda 2019). We argue that affective character is central to some works of installation art and that some of those works can expand our knowledge of our affective lives, while others can contribute to the construction of our identities. Sections (2), (3), and (4) set the stage for our discussion of affective installation artworks by, respectively, situating it within the debate on affective (...) artifacts, looking at some general issues concerning the affective character of artworks, and sketching out a view of the ontology of installation art. In section (5), we discuss the affective character of six works of installation art. In section (6), we show how those artworks can reveal aspects of who we are. Section (7) concludes. (shrink)

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the (...) factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Suppose that it was possible to teletransport. The teletransporter would destroy your old brain and body and construct an identical brain and body at a new location. Would you survive teletransportation? Many people think that teletransportation would kill you. On their view, the person that emerges from the teletransporter would be a replica of you, but it wouldn't be you. In contrast, I argue that there's no relevant difference between teletransportation and ordinary survival. So, if you survive ordinary life, then (...) you survive teletransportation. Yet my argument may also show that we have little prudential reason to care about our survival in general. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

Las procesiones de difuntos fueron un tema muy favorecido en la literatura mexicana de los siglos XIX y XX. Estas historias tienen sus orígenes en los relatos sobre una aparición de ultratumba que dentro del imaginario sobrenatural de Galicia es conocida como la Santa Compaña, la cual llegó a tierras novohispanas en el siglo XVI, como parte de las crónicas de las órdenes religiosas. No obstante, con el paso del tiempo la creencia se secularizó y adquirió tintes cada vez más (...) literarios, hasta tomar la forma de un relato tradicional con añadidos y supresiones que obedecen a elementos locales y a la idiosincrasia de los pueblos entre los que circula. (shrink)

I am very grateful to the five commentators for taking the time to respond to my article ‘The Active Recruitment of Health Workers: A Defense’.1 I have learned a great deal from each of their commentaries, and I am sorry to say that I will be unable to address all their important comments and criticisms in detail. In this response, I will focus on replying to the commentators’ major objections.In my paper, I suggested that the emigration of health workers from (...) poor countries might not have harmful effects on health outcomes in general, or may only have relatively small negative effects in a wide range of cases. Several commentators challenge my analysis. Carwyn Rhys Hooper suggests that it is prima facie plausible that the emigration of health workers causes harm, and that there is insufficient evidence to reject this claim.2 Gilian Brock3 and Iain Bassington4 argue that my paper failed to consider the full range of possible harms that the active recruitment of health workers brings about. These commentators are correct in that we need more evidence about the effects of migration, and that it may be too soon to arrive at the all-things-considered judgment that the emigration of health workers does not generally enable serious harm.Nonetheless, I believe that the active recruitment of health workers is still permissible. For one thing, I am less confident than Brock that the empirical research on skilled migration clearly establishes that the migration of skilled professionals causes harm to sending countries. There is a sizable body of empirical research that is inconsistent with many of Brock's claims. It is not obvious that the emigration of skilled workers depletes human capital in the sending country.5 ,6 In fact, there is evidence that the opportunity to emigrate …. (shrink)

In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation (...) is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish between different kinds of emergentism in the contemporary philosophical literature and show that they fail to support Buddhist Personalism. I thus conclude that Buddhist Personalism is untenable if it’s committed to emergentism about persons. This paper also indirectly defends Buddhist Reductionism by showing that it has crucial advantages over Buddhist Personalism. (shrink)

Las reflexiones transdisciplinares de este artículo estudian la relación entre naturaleza, ciencia y religión. Se dirigen a fenómenos complejos de nuestra realidad ontológica desde una perspectiva donde ciencia y religión se funden para dar paso a la filosofía cosmoderna. Como resultado, surge una ética global para reinventar lo sagrado como producto de la integración entre cosmovisiones religiosas y científicas. También se describe un diálogo interreligioso e intra-religioso donde la naturaleza y el cosmos constituyen el encuentro entre conocimiento científico y religioso. (...) En resumen, el enfoque cosmoderno sostiene que aprender a co-evolucionar conscientemente requiere el desarrollo de una ecología de saberes, donde el conocimiento físico externo y la sabiduría espiritual interna convergen y se complementan en diferentes niveles de nuestra experiencia. (shrink)

Some bioethicists and political philosophers argue that rich states should restrict the immigration of health workers from poor countries in order to prevent harm to people in these countries. In this essay, I argue that restrictions on the immigration of health workers are unjust, even if this immigration results in bad health outcomes for people in poor countries. I contend that negative duties to refrain from interfering with the occupational liberties of health workers outweighs rich states' positive duties to prevent (...) harm to people in sending countries. Furthermore, I defend this claim against the objection that health workers in poor countries acquire special duties to their compatriots that render them liable to coercive interference. (shrink)

Trabajar por la construcción de la paz, promover una educación de calidad para todos, y conceder mayor atención a las necesidades especiales de los países en situaciones de conflicto y crisis, son tres de los diecisiete objetivos de la Agenda 2030 de la Unesco. Pero ¿Quién y cómo lo hará posible? Tenemos una tarea. Hoy, aquí, desde este escenario que promueve el libre pensamiento desde la filosofía teórica y práctica, estamos haciendo una parte de la tarea. Si no lo hacemos (...) nosotros o pensamos que no se puede hacer, alguien más lo hará. A través de la historia muchos han sido los pensadores, cuya inspiración ha trascendido en el tiempo, llamando nuestra atención, causando reflexión, y hasta molestia. El primero va dirigido a quienes somos conscientes de que la educación de calidad solo es posible en un entorno de paz, y, el segundo señala a quienes la paz les incomoda, el concepto de educación les es indiferente, pero el de turbulencia les suena más familiar. (shrink)

Formelle Bildung es el concepto de Hegel para determinar la función histórica del arte en el mundo moderno. Esta función contrasta con la inhaltliche o la substantielle Bildung que proporcionó el arte en el mundo oriental y el mundo clásico griego, y en general, con la función decisiva que desempeña el arte en el ethos de culturas donde el arte es inseparable de la religión, donde según Hegel, el arte opera según su determinación suprema. Pero si bien el arte en (...) la cultura moderna ya no puede ser Kunstreligion, religión de arte, ello no significa que haya perdido su función como factor de cultura, sino que sigue siendo imprescindible en ella, aunque ya no para que la comunidad se identifique con los contenidos que el arte le representa, sino para que los individuos se confronten con ellos de un modo crítico-reflexivo. En el mundo moderno el arte ya no es arte de una comunidad, sino de y para una sociedad, de modo que el Estado y la institucionalidad están de por medio. El arte ya es autónomo y no determina doctrinaria o ideológicamente el ethos, pero por la forma de proporcionarle sus intuiciones y sus representaciones a la reflexión, fomenta el ejercicio libre del juicio de los individuos. Según Hegel, el carácter "formal" de la cultura que proporciona el arte en el mundo moderno hace que el arte se convierta en asunto fundamental de política cultural, donde arte y público pasan al primer plano. (shrink)

El ser humano se ha debatido entre lo que ha creído, cree y seguirá creyendo; pero, particularmente sobre la existencia de Dios, lo hace a su conveniencia. Cuando observan la naturaleza o el universo pueden preguntarse si surgió de una explosión hace millones de años o es creación de Dios. Filósofos, científicos y personas del común siguen buscando respuestas a sus preguntas. Es “el hombre en busca de sentido como lo propone Víctor Frank, y agrega, que, … hay en él (...) [en el hombre] una espiritualidad inconsciente: la presencia ignorada de Dios”. Es el ser humano que ha decidido ignorar, poner en duda, o negar radicalmente, la existencia de Dios, más aún cuando el mal prevalece en el mundo. No se podría negar la existencia de algo, o de alguien, que no existe. “Nadie niega a Dios, sino aquel a quien no le conviene que Dios exista” (Agustín de Hipona). “Es un nuevo ateísmo enfrentando la fe y la razón” (Antonio Cruz). “La existencia de Dios es evidente en sí misma” (Tomas de Aquino). “Tiene que haber una causa inexorable de lo creado… y ese ser sería Dios” (Aristóteles). “Mi conciencia está ligada a la palabra de Dios” (Martin Lutero). “… desde la creación del mundo conocieron a Dios, pero no quisieron adorarlo como Dios ni darle gracias. En cambio, comenzaron a inventar ideas necias sobre Dios” (Romanos 1). “Yo Soy el que Soy” (Éxodo 3:14), así define Dios Su propia existencia, creíble y conveniente. (shrink)