We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)

In this exciting Handbook, Ian Jarvie and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla have put together a wide-ranging and authoritative overview of the main philosophical currents and traditions at work in the social sciences today. Starting with the history of social scientific thought, this Handbook sets out to explore that core fundamentals of social science practice, from issues of ontology and epistemology to issues of practical method. Along the way it investigates such notions as paradigm, empiricism, postmodernism, naturalism, language, agency, power, culture, and causality.

Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from DGI grant (...) BEC2002-03715 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). 2 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from grants PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03656 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). (shrink)

Franz Huber’s (2008a) attempt to unify inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist intuitions on confirmation by means of a single measure are examined and compared with previous work on the theory of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. The idea of connecting ‘the logic of confirmation’ with ‘the logic of acceptability’ is also critically discussed, and it is argued that ‘acceptability’ takes necessarily into account some pragmatic criteria, and that at least two normative senses of ‘acceptability’ must be distinguished: ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being allowed (...) to accept’, and ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being obliged to accept’. Lastly, some connections of confirmation theory with naturalism, intertheoretic reduction, and explanation vs. understanding are explored. (shrink)

In this paper we articulate a characterization of the concept of disease as a social problem. We argue that, from a social ontology point of view, diseases are problems that are identified and addressed within the framework of concrete social institutions and practices (those that shape medicine). This approach allows us to overcome the classical distinction between naturalist and normativist approaches in the philosophy of medicine, taking into account both the material and the symbolic factors that shape the categories and (...) determine the practices of medicine. (shrink)

Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally.

Popper’s suggestion of taking methodological norms as conventions is examined from the point of view of game theory. The game of research is interpreted as a game of persuasion, in the sense that every scientists tries to advance claims, and that her winning the game consists in her colleagues accepting some of those claims as the conclusions of some arguments. Methodological norms are seen as elements in a contract established amongst researchers, that says what inferential moves are legitimate or compulsory (...) in that game. Norms are classified in three groups: rules of internal inference , entry norms , and exit norms . It is argued that the value of a set of norms depends on how efficient they are in leading a scientific community to accept claims ranking high in a consensuated scale of epistemic value, and in giving each member of the community a reasonable expectation of winning some games. (shrink)