Depuis 1967, Donald Davidson defend l'idée qu'une théorie de la signification pour une langue naturelle doit prendre la forme d'une théorie tarskienne de la vérité. Je me propose ici d'exposer les grandes lignes de l a conception davidsonienne de la sémantique des langues naturelles et de chercher à préciser en quel sens une theorie tarskienne de la vérité pour une langue L constitue, selon Davidson, une théorié de la signification pour L. Je ferai pour cela abstraction des obstacles qu'il pourrait (...) y avoir à la réalisation du programme de Davidson. (shrink)

The now standard definition of logical consequence is model-theoretic. Many writers have tried to justify, or to criticise, the model-theoretic definition by arguing that it extensionally captures, or fails to capture, our intuitions about logical consequence, such as its modal character or its being truth-preservation in virtue of form. One popular means of comparing the extension of model-theoretic consequence with some intuitive notion proceeds by adapting Kreisel's squeezing argument. But these attempts get Kreisel wrong, and try to achieve more than (...) he ever intended. This suggests that the model-theoretic definition should be viewed quite differently as an explication of our intuitions about logical consequence. I introduce Kreisel's squeezing argument in Section 1. Then in Section 2, I show how it is adapted by two prominent writers on logical consequence, Etchemendy (1990) and Shapiro (2005). Finally, in Section 3, I argue that these adaptations fail. (shrink)