Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects. Husserl believes that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims are subject to error and open to modification. In this article, I develop a self-correcting account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation plays a critical role in both (...) challenging and improving upon the eidetic results in phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that the self-correcting account of eidetic variation 1) is consistent with Husserl’s own formulations of his eidetic methodology and epistemic principles; 2) captures the dual epistemic function of eidetic variation as means for both testing and intuitively validating eidetic claims; and 3) offers methodological support for contemporary attempts to integrate eidetic variation with non-eidetic methods and resources. To substantiate these claims, I first contrast the self-correcting account with the falsificationist interpretations of eidetic variation. Then, I turn to three applications of eidetic variation in order to examine how eidetic phenomenology could draw from real-life deviations, artificial variations, and critical–historical reflection. The goal is to lay the methodological groundwork for a self-correcting and integrative account of eidetic variation and illustrate its usefulness in research practice. (shrink)

A recent proposal by Quill Kukla and Mark Lance holds that surface appearances notwithstanding, gender ascriptions are closer to normative performatives than descriptions. As speech acts, they share more in common with pronouncing a marriage than a neutral description of a person, albeit this is not commonly recognized. This paper argues that the proposal faces a consistency problem. In order to affect social reality qua their illocutionary force, gender ascriptions must on average succeed. However, according to the authors most actual (...) second- and third person gender ascriptions in fact violate the success conditions of the speech act type, which include respect for the individual’s first-person gender ascriptions. Their main claim thus becomes that gender roles can be instituted as a series of misfires, though it is left open how this is possible. (shrink)

It is far from clear what is meant by logic or what should be meant by it. It is nevertheless reasonable to identify logic as the study of inferences and inferential relations. The obvious practical use of logic is in any case to help us to reason well, to draw good inferences. And the typical form the theory of any part of logic seems to be a set of rules of inference. This answer already introduces some structure into a discussion (...) of the nature of logic, for in an inference we can distinguish the input called a premise or premises from the output known as the conclusion. The transition from a premise or a number of premises to the conclusion is governed by a rule of inference. If the inference is in accordance with the appropriate rule, it is called valid. Rules of inference are often thought of as the alpha and omega of logic. Conceiving of logic as the study of inference is nevertheless only the first approximation to the title question, in that it prompts more questions than it answers. It is not clear what counts as an inference or what a theory of such inferences might look like. What are the rules of inference based on? Where do we find them? The ultimate end. (shrink)

The General Medical Council renewed its guidance on consent in 2020. In this essay, I argue that the 2020 guidance does not advance on the earlier, 2008 guidance in regard to treatments that doctors are obliged to offer to patients. In both, doctors are instructed to not provide treatments that are not in the overall benefit, or clinical interests, of the patient; although, patients are absolutely entitled to decline treatment. As such, consent has two aspects, and different standards apply to (...) each aspect. To explore this paradigm, I propose the reconceptualisation of consent as a person’s freedom to achieve treatment, using Amartya Sen’s approach. Sen explains that freedom has two aspects: process and opportunity. Accordingly, a patient’s freedom to achieve treatment would comprise a process for the identification of proper treatment, followed by an opportunity for the patient to accept or decline this treatment. As per Sen, the opportunity aspect is to be assessed by the standard of public reason, whereas the standard for the process aspect is variable and contingent on the task at hand. I then use this reconceptualised view of consent to analyse case law. I show that senior judges have conceived the patient’s opportunity to be encompassed in information, which is to be decided by public reason. On the other hand, the process aspect relies on the private reason of medical professionals. Given the nature of professionalism, this reliance is inescapable, and it is maintained in the case law that is cited in both guidances. (shrink)

The decision of the High Court in Bell v Tavistock has excited considerable discussion about lawful consent for puberty-blocking drug treatment for children with gender dysphoria. The present paper draws attention to a wider question that surfaces through this case: is informed decision-making an adequate practical tool for seeking and obtaining patients’ consent for medical treatment? Informed decision-making engages the premises of the rational choice theory: that people will have well-crystallised health goals; and, if they are provided with sufficient information (...) about medical treatments, then they will be able to choose the treatment that satisfies their goals. Whilst appealing, the informed decision-making paradigm is assailed by various fallacies, which apply not only to children but also to adults. In Bell v Tavistock, the High Court seems to have recognised such fallacies, and it rejected informed decision-making as an adequate tool for consent from children with gender dysphoria. Similar considerations apply to adults in various situations. Thus, Bell v Tavistock can be seen as an attempt to refine the views on the consent that were expressed by the Supreme Court in Montgomery. It can be inferred that the Supreme Court did recognise the limitations of informed decision-making, but it did not develop this point. Further work is required to formulate an adequate model of decision-making, and Bell v Tavistock serves as a useful reminder to rethink informed decision-making as the device for consent. (shrink)

Parsa-Parsi _et al_ assert that the International Code of Medical Ethics (ICoME) provides a professional standard that overrides conflicting national legal norms. 1 While this claim is made in the context of laws that require doctors to participate in ‘acts of torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices and punishments’ (para10 of ICoME), the underlying premise that medical ethics supersedes law requires scrutiny. It is clear that medical ethics and law are linked inextricably, but there is unresolved debate about (...) the sequence of this interaction: should ethics shape law; or is it the converse? Important principles, notably respect for patients’ autonomy, have arisen from case law and subsequently been adopted into medical ethics. As pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress, it is only ‘since the mid-1970s (that) the primary justification advanced for requirements of informed consent has been to protect autonomous choice’ (pg.118). 2 Whereas, the... (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between passivity and activity, and the problems of uniqueness (...) and persistence are better understood with Husserl’s analysis of person and its central concepts of position-taking, habitualities, and overall style. The embeddedness of self is elucidated by outlining how person is related to its environment, to other people, and to its past. This relational notion of self is both passively constituted and actively shaped: person mediates between minimal self characterized by perspectival ownership... (shrink)

Timothy Williamson famously argued that assertion is constituted either by the knowledge rule or some similar epistemic rule. If true, the proposal has important implications for criticism of assertions. If assertions are analogical to other rule-constituted kinds like games, we can criticize assertions either on external or internal grounds, depending on whether the criticism draws from the necessary norms of assertion or some contingent ones. More recently, authors like Goldberg and MacFarlane have argued against other theories of assertion on the (...) grounds that they cannot explain the possibility of internal criticism for assertions. This paper raises methodological problems with these arguments. The main idea is to show that alternative, non-normative accounts of assertion can also explain the apparent differences in grounds of criticism without assuming that assertion is necessarily governed by some epistemic norm. (shrink)

Cox and Fritz state the central problem as the absence of a framework for healthcare policy decisions; but, they overlook the theoretical underpinnings of public law. In response, they propose a two-step procedure to guide fair decision-making. The first step relies on Thomas Scanlon’s ‘contractualism’ for stakeholders to consider whether, or not, they could reasonably reject policy proposals made by others; then in the second step, John Rawls’s principles of justice are applied to these proposals; a fair policy requires to (...) pass both steps. I argue that Cox and Fritz misinterpret Rawls. His theory has two stages: first, public reason is used to generate principles of justice; second, public reason is used to interpret and apply these principles. The second stage requires that proposals are based on the principles of justice from the first stage, and these proposals have to be acceptable to reasonable persons. Thus, Rawls’s theory does not need Scanlonian supplementation. Moreover, the application of Rawls’s theory in Cox and Fritz’s model is confusing. In any case, the problems with applying Rawlsian justice to healthcare can be located elsewhere. First, Rawls’s theory would treat healthcare simply as a ‘primary good’ or resource. Social justice ought to, instead, consider healthcare as an opportunity, in the manner conceived by Amartya Sen. Second, Rawlsian justice rests, ultimately, on the conception of a reasonable person; until and unless the characteristics of reasonable stakeholders are clarified, any model of health justice will remain hostage to the unreasonable. (shrink)

The necessity of consent is widely justified on the basis of the principle of respect for autonomy. Also, it is widely believed that shared decision making (SDM) is the practical device to seek patients’ consent for medical treatment. In this essay, I argue that SDM, while necessary, is insufficient for consent; because, in the paradigm of evidence-based medicine, SDM is contingent upon other practices to identify appropriate treatments that form the subjects of SDM. Indeed, case law emphasises normative decision-making practices (...) that precede SDM. Furthermore, case law supplies a nuanced understanding of SDM, which includes not only exchange of information but also attention to human vulnerability that persists despite formal retention of decision-making capacity. In addition, the law marks out a space in which people with capacity are absolutely entitled to self-determination. Thus, a four-step framework of decision making can be induced from legal doctrine. This legal framework corresponds to a construct of respect for autonomy that draws upon feminist theory. Feminist scholars have objected to the focus on individuals in traditional theories of autonomy; instead, they insist that people have to be considered in the context of their social influences and relationships. Feminists separate out four ideas of autonomy, and these ideas can be used to construct a four-layered model of respect for autonomy, in which each layer corresponds sequentially to a step in the legal framework of decision making. This model of respect for autonomy provides both conceptual clarity and theoretically robust justification for doctors’ various obligations in decision-making practices for consent. (shrink)

The main question of metasemantics, or foundational semantics, is why an expression token has the meaning (semantic value) that it in fact has. In his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, Saul Kripke presented a skeptical challenge that threatened to make the foundational question unanswerable. My first contention in this paper is that the skeptical challenge indeed poses an insoluble paradox, but only for a certain kind of metasemantic theory, against which the challenge effectively works as a reductio ad absurdum (...) argument. My second contention is that as a result of rejecting the theory which entails a paradoxical outcome, we will see that the foundational question essentially involves a temporal dimension. After arguing that the skeptical challenge gives us a strong reason to adopt a historical view of meaning, I shall further argue against certain authors who claim that meanings not only have histories but futures as well, or that the meaning of a word may change retroactively in time as a consequence of counterfactual change in its future use. The major aim of the paper is thus to bring together the arguably interrelated debates about the skeptical challenge and temporal externalism in philosophy of language. (shrink)

Integrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) into a for-profit organization’s business activities is fraught with tensions. This paper reports a case study of a construction company, exploring how different tensions emerged to challenge company-level aspirations for strategic CSR integration. The study identifies three types of persistent CSR tensions and four management practices, discussing how the management practices led the organization to navigate CSR tensions in both active and defensive ways. Furthermore, the study explicates why the case company succeeded in integrating CSR (...) into formal business strategy and shared attitudes but struggled with CSR integration in the domain of day-to-day operations. The paper contributes to the CSR literature by developing a tension-centric perspective on CSR development. It highlights the necessity of tension navigation at both the organizational and the action levels, the key role of active (as opposed to defensive) navigation of CSR tensions, and the importance of alignment between organizational and action levels in navigating tensions for sustaining strategic focus on CSR over time. (shrink)

While various strategic business issues related to product design have been explored by academicians and practitioners, one issue has largely been ignored: how do financial markets assess and evaluate companies’ product design? The purpose of this article is to examine this issue, especially when it comes to the assessments and evaluations made by the most essential actors of contemporary financial markets: investment analysts and institutional investors. I develop propositions concerning the product design-related evaluative schemes and heuristics used by the financial (...) market actors in evaluating companies as investment opportunities. I illustrate my propositions with examples from, e.g., the mobile phone industry as well as with interview excerpts from interviews with investment analysts and institutional investors. Propositions are provided both for assessments of companies’ individual end products (‘design as the end product’ perspective) and for assessments of companies’ design capabilities (‘design as a capability’ perspective). In essence, the propositions highlight that the evaluative schemes used by financial market actors are partly rational, yet involve biases and are likely to lead to overvaluation and undervaluation of certain kinds of product designs by certain kinds of companies. Thus, even from the perspective of profit-maximization, many of the evaluative schemes of the financial market actors are, at most, quasi-rational. Moreover, the evaluative schemes of the financial market actors may motivate company managers to pursue certain kinds of product design rather than others—and may even lead to self-reinforcing (vicious or virtuous) circles of certain kinds of product designs being advocated. (shrink)

Comparisons of rival explanations or theories often involve vague appeals to explanatory power. In this paper, we dissect this metaphor by distinguishing between different dimensions of the goodness of an explanation: non-sensitivity, cognitive salience, precision, factual accuracy and degree of integration. These dimensions are partially independent and often come into conflict. Our main contribution is to go beyond simple stipulation or description by explicating why these factors are taken to be explanatory virtues. We accomplish this by using the contrastive-counterfactual approach (...) to explanation and the view of understanding as an inferential ability. By combining these perspectives, we show how the explanatory power of an explanation in a given dimension can be assessed by showing the range of answers it provides to what-if-things-had-been-different questions and the theoretical and pragmatic importance of these questions. Our account also explains intuitions linking explanation to unification or to exhibition of a mechanism. (shrink)

I argue that non-epistemic values are necessarily embedded in the measure of evidential strength of contrastive evidence. When evidence is contrastive, evidence is stronger the more it favours a hypothesis over a set of plausible, mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses. In such a contrastive epistemic setting, evidence has an effect not only on a particular hypothesis, but on the whole probability distribution over the set of alternative hypotheses. A natural way of analysing the incremental impact of new evidence on a set (...) of alternative hypotheses is in terms of uncertainty or ‘entropy’ reduction. There is no unique single measure of uncertainty/entropy, however, and, consequently, no single unique measure of uncertainty reduction. Finally, I argue that the ‘right’ measure of entropy reduction, and hence of evidential strength, depends on the pragmatic context and non-epistemic values. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is meaning essentially normative, and what does claiming that amount to? One popular interpretation is that in virtue of their nature meanings are capable of guiding subjects in their applications of concepts, for meaning is constituted by norms. However, the guidance view has been met with criticism to the effect that if semantic norms constitute facts about meaning, then they cannot simultaneously guide subjects in their applications. In response, some normativist authors have proposed that the key sense of ‘normative’ (...) in the claim that meaning is essentially normative is not ‘guidance’ but ‘assessment’. In this paper, I shall argue that switching from guidance to assessment offers no respite from the anti-normativist argument that normativity in the sense of prescriptivity emerges not from meaning as such but from the attitudes of subjects insofar as the normativist is unable to offer a plausible account of what makes assessment appropriate. (shrink)

Attachment theory proposes that the activation of the attachment system enacts emotion regulation (ER) to maintain security or cope with insecurity. However, the effects of ER on attachment states and their bidirectional influences remain poorly understood. In this ecological momentary assessment study, we examined the dynamics between attachment and ER. We hypothesised that attachment states and ER influence each other through time. Specifically, we hypothesised bidirectional short-term cycles between state attachment security and reappraisal, state attachment anxiety and rumination, and state (...) attachment avoidance and suppression. We also tested how trait attachment is related to state attachment and ER. One hundred twenty-two participants (Mage = 26.4) completed the Experiences in Close Relationship–Revised and reported state attachment and ER seven times daily for seven days. The results were only partly consistent with our cycle hypotheses yet revealed a cycle between low state attachment security and rumination that was attenuated by reappraisal. Moreover, rumination and suppression predicted increased insecure states, and reappraisal predicted increased secure and insecure states. Finally, trait attachment showed associations with state attachment and ER. Our study suggests regulatory dynamics between attachment and ER and opens important questions about their functional relationship in maintaining attachment-related behavioural patterns and emotional well-being. (shrink)

According to the causal-historical theory of reference, natural kind terms refer in virtue of complicated causal relations the speakers have to their environment. A common objection to the theory is that purely causal relations are insufficient to fix reference in a determinate fashion. The so-called hybrid view holds that what is also needed for successful fixing are true descriptions associated in the mind of the speaker with the referent. The main claim of this paper is that the objection fails: reference (...) fixing of natural kind terms can be purely causal. The main argument draws inspiration from recent theoretical advances made in metaphysics of kinds by Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi, and David Papineau. The main claim is that their notion of super-explanatory properties may explain how reference of many kind terms can be fixed purely causally. (shrink)

Makin argues that doctors1 should defer to each patient’s attitude to risk, over and above standard, utility-based and outcome-focussed medical decision-making models, in selecting treatment options for that patient.1 Although Makin articulates the problem as a dilemma of whether ‘to give the treatment or to withhold it’, it can be assumed that his question is whether the doctor should offer a certain treatment; because both the General Medical Council and law require doctors to engage patients in shared decision-making (SDM) and (...) to obtain consent before ‘giving’ any treatment. Yet, Makin is correct in asserting that doctors ‘make choices on behalf of their patients on a daily basis’ insofar that doctors do have to make certain a priori decisions. SDM requires a starting point—a range of clinically appropriate or reasonable options—on which patients and doctors can collaboratively deliberate in order to reach a treatment decision; and the doctor has to set out this starting point.2 Thus, Makin’s reductive claim is that doctors should take each patient’s risk attitude into account in setting out the starting points for SDM. In this commentary, I will explore UK case law in response to Makin’s proposal; because, ultimately, doctors have to work within the legal framework. Makin relies on the bioethical principles of respect …. (shrink)

The General Medical Council (GMC) instructs doctors to act ‘reasonably’ in obtaining consent from patients. However, the GMC does not explain what it means to be reasonable: it is left to doctors to figure out the substance of this instruction. The GMC relies on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board; and it can be assumed that the judges’ idea of reasonability is adopted. The aim of this paper is to flesh out this idea of reasonability. This (...) idea is commonly personified as the audience that has to be satisfied by the doctor’s justification for offering, or withholding, certain treatments and related information. In case law, this audience shifted from a reasonable doctor to a ‘reasonable person in the patient’s position’; and Montgomery expands the audience to include ‘particular’ patients, too. Senior judges have clarified that the reasonable person is a normative ideal, and not a sociological construct; but they do not set out the characteristics of this ideal. John Rawls has conceived the reasonable person-ideal as one that pursues fair terms of co-operation with other members of society. An alternative ideal can be inferred from the feminist ethic of care. However, the reasonable patient from Montgomery does not align with either theoretical ideal; but, instead, is an entirely rational being. Such a conception conflicts with both real-life constraints on rationality and the doctor’s duty to care for the patient, and it challenges the practice of medicine. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically examine the concept of semantic objectivity inherent in Robert Brandom`s works, most importantly Making It Explicit. Concerning Brandom`s theoretical aims, I shall argue that there is some discrepancy between his formal and informal characterisations of the criteria by which his account is to be judged as adequate. After expounding on the discrepancy, I shall propose to reconstruct a mostly implicit line of argument in MIE, highlighted by the more recent developments of Brandom`s (...) work, which I think suffices to smooth it over. (shrink)

Artikkeli käsittelee Saul Kripken Ludwig Wittgensteinin myöhemmistä töistä koostamaa merkityskeptistä haastetta, erityisesti niin kutsuttua äärellisyyden ongelmaa. Pääargumentti on, että skeptisen haasteen pääasiallinen vastaaja, semanttinen dispositionalismi, ei uusimmistakaan yrityksistä huolimatta ole kyennyt ratkaisemaan äärettömyyden ongelmaa. Ratkaistakseen ongelman dispositionalistin tulisi selittää, kuinka on mahdollista, että äärellinen puhuja voisi omata disposition käyttää jotain termiä äärettömässä määrässä tapauksia määrätyllä tavalla. Monet dispositionalistit esittävät, että ratkaisu löytyy niin kutsutuista ceteris paribus -ehdoista, joita vastaan Martin Kusch on argumentoinut. Jatkan Kuschin kritiikkiä ja osoitan ceteris paribus -strategian (...) keskeiset ongelmat, minkä lisäksi vastaan myös kahteen näistä ehdoista riippumattomaan dispositionalistiseen strategiaan. (shrink)

The basic ideas of game-theoretical semantics are implicit in logicians' and mathematicians' folklore but used only sporadically (e.g., game quantifiers, back-and-forth methods, partly ordered quantifiers). the general suggestions of this approach for natural languages are emphasized: the univocity of "is," the failure of compositionality, a reconstruction of aristotelian categories, limitations of generative grammars, unity of sentence and discourse semantics, a new treatment of tenses and other temporal notions, etc.

The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory.

As the title suggests, this paper is something of a leftover – or perhaps a new branch – to my "Meaning in Time: on temporal externalism and Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge". In that work I essayed to portray my understanding of the sceptical challenge uncovered by Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s later works in a nutshell as to its nature and resolution. Here, my task is to dig a little deeper into the key phrase of the earlier paper, namely the claim (...) that meanings, facts grounding meaning facts, and ascriptions of meaning have an important historical dimension to them. In particular, I explore the ideas that (i) the problem of finitude is fundamentally a logical and not a metaphysical problem and (ii) Devitt's development of Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference implies a natural explanation for how at least the meanings of some terms can have a historical dimension. (shrink)

The organisation of mammalian mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is more complex than usually assumed. Despite often being depicted as a simple circle, the topology of mtDNA can vary from supercoiled monomeric circles over catenanes and oligomers to complex multimeric networks. Replication of mtDNA is also not clear cut. Two different mechanisms of replication have been found in cultured cells and in most tissues: a strand‐asynchronous mode involving temporary RNA coverage of one strand, and a strand‐coupled mode rather resembling conventional nuclear DNA (...) replication. In addition, a recombination‐initiated replication mechanism is likely to be associated with the multimeric mtDNA networks found in human heart. Although an insight into the general principles and key factors of mtDNA organisation and maintenance has been gained over the last few years, there are many open questions regarding replication initiation, termination and physiological factors determining mtDNA organisation and replication mode. However, common themes in mtDNA maintenance across eukaryotic kingdoms can provide valuable lessons for future work. (shrink)

We claim that the process of theoretical model refinement in economics is best characterised as robustness analysis: the systematic examination of the robustness of modelling results with respect to particular modelling assumptions. We argue that this practise has epistemic value by extending William Wimsatt's account of robustness analysis as triangulation via independent means of determination. For economists robustness analysis is a crucial methodological strategy because their models are often based on idealisations and abstractions, and it is usually difficult to tell (...) which idealisations are truly harmful. (shrink)

Legal texts are in the focus of both lawyers and translators. This paper discusses the binary opposition of these two views especially in the light of contract law. There is one crucial epistemic difference between the point of view of the translator and the lawyer when it comes to the interpretation of legal texts. In the translator’s view legal text is traditionally conceived as static as to its nature; something that already exists in the form of text. Traditionally, the translator (...) is interested in the text itself as it was written down in a document, i.e. the translator needs to go back to the frozen moment when a legal document was constructed and finalised. The lawyer, in contrast, is very much interested not only in the text of the legal document but also in the contextual surroundings of the text. In fact, for legal interpretation, sometimes the key-elements for the interpretation come from outside of the text itself. This paper concludes that legal translation is in many cases closer to transcreation than it is to traditionally understood translation. (shrink)

The article argues for the epistemic rationale of triangulation, namely, the use of multiple and independent sources of evidence. It claims that triangulation is to be understood as causal reasoning from data to phenomenon, and it rationalizes its epistemic value in terms of controlling for likely errors and biases of particular data-generating procedures. This perspective is employed to address objections against triangulation concerning the fallibility and scope of the inference, as well as problems of independence, incomparability, and discordance of evidence. (...) The debate on the existence of social preferences is used as an illustrative case. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess some recent critical realist constructive criticisms of Theodor Adorno, one of the leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory. I argue that while there are similarities between Adorno’s treatment of causality and the critical realist notion of powers, these connections should not be taken to imply that Adorno’s conception of critique requires a critical realist powers ontology. I show that Bhaskar’s transcendental realism is at odds with the basic commitments of Adorno’s historical (...) materialism. I go on to clarify such materialism and show that to Adorno, capital is the historical compulsion characteristic of modernity. (shrink)

Mammalian mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication and repair have been studied intensively for the last 50 years. Although recently advances in elucidating the molecular mechanisms of mtDNA maintenance and the proteins involved in these have been made, there are disturbing gaps between the existing theoretical models and experimental observations. Conflicting data and hypotheses exist about the role of RNA and ribonucleotides in mtDNA replication, but also about the priming of replication and the formation of pathological rearrangements. In the presented review, we (...) have attempted to match these loose ends and draft consensus where it can be found, while identifying outstanding issues for future research. (shrink)

Mammalian mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication and repair have been studied intensively for the last 50 years. Although recently advances in elucidating the molecular mechanisms of mtDNA maintenance and the proteins involved in these have been made, there are disturbing gaps between the existing theoretical models and experimental observations. Conflicting data and hypotheses exist about the role of RNA and ribonucleotides in mtDNA replication, but also about the priming of replication and the formation of pathological rearrangements. In the presented review, we (...) have attempted to match these loose ends and draft consensus where it can be found, while identifying outstanding issues for future research. (shrink)

We review the most prominent modeling approaches in social epistemology aimed at understand- ing the functioning of epistemic communities and provide a philosophy of science perspective on the use and interpretation of such simple toy models, thereby suggesting how they could be integrated with conceptual and empirical work. We highlight the need for better integration of such models with relevant findings from disciplines such as social psychology and organization studies.

This paper provides an inferentialist account of model-based understanding by combining a counterfactual account of explanation and an inferentialist account of representation with a view of modeling as extended cognition. This account makes it understandable how the manipulation of surrogate systems like models can provide genuinely new empirical understanding about the world. Similarly, the account provides an answer to the question how models, that always incorporate assumptions that are literally untrue of the model target, can still provide factive explanations. Finally, (...) the paper shows how the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation can provide tools for assessing the explanatory power of models. (shrink)

Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis is about assessing the reliability (...) of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden’s inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations. (shrink)