This thesis attempts to show that Georg Lukacs' Marxist theory of realism is best understood, not as a self sufficient body of theory, but in the context of his pre- Marxist theory of literature and his,role in the Communist movement, A comparison of the theory expounded in "Die Seele and die Fonaen" and "Die Theorie des Romans" with the main positions of "Geschichte und Kiassenbewusstsein" reveals that it was remarkably easy for Lukacs to accommodate his literary theory within the newly-acquired (...) philosophy. An examination of Lukacs' career shows that his move to Marxism was motivated by a search for the practical instrument to implement the ideal which was the mainspring behind both his own life and, in his theory, all great literature, namely, the classical ideal of harmony. The resulting change in emphasis from aesthetics to political action led, in the thirties, to the attempt to synthesize both in a cultural campaign. Political pressure, combined with the genuine belief that the excesses of Stalinism were the acceptable price of resistance to the overriding threat of fascism, resulted in the employment of a rigid determinism, deplored ill others, which was incompatible with the core of his understanding of literary realism. The creation of realism was, however, for both the pre- Marxist and the Marxist Lukacs, ultimately inexplicable in materialist terms. (shrink)

Revisionist historians of the nuclear age have long argued that it was not necessary to have used the atomic bombs in August 1945 to bring the Second World War to an end, and that a more conciliatory approach by the Truman administration towards the Soviet Union—being franker with Stalin about the bomb and giving him an assurance that it would not be used—would have created a better chance of achieving a less confrontational postwar relationship between the two powers. They have (...) also challenged the “myth” that the reason for using the bombs was to save American lives. (shrink)

When philosophers put forward claims for or against 'property', it is often unclear whether they are talking about the same thing that lawyers mean by 'property'. Likewise, when lawyers appeal to 'justice' in interpreting or criticizing legal rules we do not know if they have in mind something that philosophers would recognize as 'justice'. J. W. Harris here examines the legal and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of property and offers a new analytical framework for understanding property and justice.