ABSTRACT This article addresses the prospects of applied naturalistic metaphysics from both a global and a local perspective. Adopting a broad Sellarsian approach, I look into whether metaphysics has a place and role in the overall scientific image and assess whether it has its own subject matter as a first- or second- order discipline. After outlining the general argument in section 1, section 2 examines our construal of science and metaphysics, drawing some considerations for restating the question about the viability (...) of naturalistic metaphysics. Sections 3 and 4, in turn, suggest two styles of naturalistic metaphysics that can be respectively applied on a global and on a local basis. I briefly outline their respective goals, problems and categories. I argue, in particular, that globally applied naturalistic metaphysics deals with issues about the fundamental structure of reality, whereas locally applied naturalistic metaphysics tackles riddles arising from the examination of specific unobservable posits in the frontiers of scientific ontology. Section 5 closes with concluding remarks that put metaphysics within the scientific image. (shrink)

Popper has proposed a ?theory of situational rationality? as a basis for the social sciences. This theory of rational action is reconstructed and its methodological and substantial implications discussed. It is shown that methodologically Popper's idea of rational action leads to a version of theoretical instrumentalism which is incompatible with his general philosophy of science, and that substantially it implies an unacceptable theory of social institutions. Instrumentalism can be avoided by a more contentful theory of human action encompassing ?non?rational? or (...) ?irrational? kinds of action; Popper's theory of institutions might be improved through a more comprehensive theory of collective action. (shrink)

Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such as: “For every metal (...) there is a melting point.” All-and-some statements are both universally and existentially quantified in that order. Watkins argued that AS should be regarded as both nonfalsifiable and nonverifiable, for they partake in the logical fate of both universal and existential statements. This claim is subject to the proviso that the bound variables are “uncircumscribed” ; i.e., that the universe of discourse is infinite. (shrink)

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. (...) For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality, the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism. (shrink)

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. (...) For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality , the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism. (shrink)

This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, (...) the metaphysico-scientific link, was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy. (shrink)

Question: What is a (or the) scientific theory V based on a set B of syntactical L-formulas, interpreted according to the intended interpretations of the language L? What probably corresponds to the traditional candidate for V is found to be inadequate for use in deductively explaining experimental facts of a certain form. A second candidate for V, called a strong scientific theory (SST), does not suffer such an inadequacy because it is existentially strong, i.e., it has considerable existential import. It (...) even satisfies the particle physicist's dictum: WHAT IS NOT FORBIDDEN WILL HAPPEN. (shrink)

Discussions of Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science appear regularly in the recent literature on economic methodology. In this literature, there seem to be two fundamental points of agreement about Popper. First, most economists take Popper's falsificationist method of bold conjecture and severe test to be the correct characterization of scientific conduct in the physical sciences. Second, most economists admit that economic theory fails miserably when judged by these same falsificationist standards. As Latsis states, “the development of economic analysis would (...) look a dismal affair through falsificationist spectacles.”. (shrink)

Lakatos' MSRP is utilized to provide a response to Koertge's claim (in her ‘Does Social Science Really Need Metaphysics?’) that the heuristic significance of metaphysics has been vastly overrated. By outlining the hard cores and positive heuristics of the two major research programmes in economics (namely, the ‘orthodox’ and ‘Marxist’ research programmes), the paper demonstrates (in opposition to Koertge's claim) not only that the metaphysical statements in the respective hard cores are far from vague but also how these exert an (...) important regulative influence both on the theories and economic policy recommendations generated within the respective programmes. It also indicates how the adoption of the MSRP method of appraisal in economics would help to protect against the danger of entrenched metaphysical dogmatism with its implications not only for economic policy recommendations but also for moral and political recommendations. * We appreciate the assistance given by Professor N. Koertge, who provided us with translations of her articles, and the helpful comments of an anonymous referee. (shrink)

Discussions of Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science appear regularly in the recent literature on economic methodology. In this literature, there seem to be two fundamental points of agreement about Popper. First, most economists take Popper's falsificationist method of bold conjecture and severe test to be the correct characterization of scientific conduct in the physical sciences. Second, most economists admit that economic theory fails miserably when judged by these same falsificationist standards. As Latsis states, “the development of economic analysis would (...) look a dismal affair through falsificationist spectacles.”. (shrink)

The primary purpose of the paper is to try to prove that it is impossible to write or understand history without making epistemological and ontological assumptions, In particular assumptions about whether physical objects and processes are within or beyond the limits of what can be made empirical or conscious.

Natural resources are infinite. This is possible because humans can create theories whose potential goes beyond the limited imaginative capacity of the inventor. For instance, no number of people can work out all the economic potential of quantum theory. Economic Resources are created by an interaction of Karl Popper's Worlds 1, 2 and 3, the worlds of physics, psychology and the abstract products of the human mind, such as scientific theories. Knowledge such as scientific theories has unfathomable information content, is (...) universally applicable, and infinitely copyable. The point can be made with technological knowledge such as that embodied in the wheel. The theory of the wheel has un- bounded potential to be embodied in unforeseeable new technologies, is useful on the Moon as on Earth, and can be infinitely copied. Unlike a piece of land (using fixed factors), such knowledge shows increasing returns. This helps to explain Julian Simon's observation that "natural" resources are now less scarce than they used to be and why an increasing population can increase resources in the long-run. It was Simon's breakthrough to elaborate on the abstract character of "natural" resources. I further explore this abstract character and thereby explain why natural resources are infinitely expandable. Economic growth and the creation of natural resources depends on the rate of invention. F. Machlup's suggestion (Machlup 1962) that the opportunity for new inventions increases geometrically with the number of inventions at hand is acknowledged for its suggestiveness, but criticised for its conservative position. Frank Tipler's fascinating argument for indefinite economic growth (Tipler 1994), is reinforced by my argument by making a distinction between information in the engineer's sense and the infinite potential "information" in our scientific knowledge based on Popper's notion of information content. (shrink)

This thesis intends to address one type of approach to evolutionary theory that seeks to criticise the neo-Darwinist account of evolution and individuation, that of symbiosis. This thesis will begin by examining current evolutionary theory through Darwin to neo-Darwinism, with a view to discerning which types of mechanisms neo- Darwinism rules out, and which it allows. This will be achieved by using a methodology which treats groups of related scientific theories or practices as research programmes. This methodological approach will allow (...) comparison between competing research programmes, and it will be possible to determine whether or not a competing research programme is really a challenge to neo-Darwinism, or simply a sub- programme which shares some of the same metaphysical commitments and mechanisms as neo-Darwinism. The second half of the thesis will assess the ‘symbiosis’ challenge to neo-Darwinism on these terms. This section will conclude that symbiosis as it is usually formulated by its proponents is not a separate research programme that rejects neo-Darwinism in any significant way, but rather it is a sub-programme of neo- Darwinism. But I will also argue that there are aspects of this programme, if they were to be made more prominent, would in fact constitute an alternative research programme which could not only be treated as a separate research programme, but a research programme that is incompatible with neo-Darwinism. Bacteria in particular are organisms which function through symbiosis and their functioning problematises neo-Darwinism’s account of individuation on a fundamental level. It will be concluded that neo-Darwinism is either a theory of very limited scope, or one which can be made into a general theory, but this can only be achieved through fundamental changes to neo-Darwinism itself. (shrink)

No presente artigo, procuramos mostrar, por intermédio de numerosos exemplos, que a distinção lógica operada por Pierre Duhem entre a física e a metafísica não impossibilita que, do ponto de vista histórico, o autor reconheça a existência de um entrosamento profícuo a cingir as duas áreas do saber. Distinguimos três níveis possíveis de interação entre a física e a metafísica, porque acreditamos que ele aceita (a) que o físico trabalha constantemente movido por ambições metafísicas não autorizadas pela rigorosa lógica, (b) (...) que os sistemas metafísicos contribuíram para muitos dos progressos das teorias físicas, em especial, para o nascimento da ciência moderna e (c) que podemos identificar tradições metafísicas de pesquisa duradouras que se mostraram mais férteis do que algumas tradições positivas. In this article, we aim to show, by means of several examples, that Pierre Duhem's logical distinction operated by Pierre Duhem between physics and metaphysics does not prevent him, from a historical perspective, recognizing that there can be a fruitful interplay between the two fields of knowledge. We distinguish three possible levels of interaction that we believe Duhem accepts between physics and metaphysics: (a) that the physicist works constantly moved by metaphysical ambitions not authorized by rigorous logic; (b) that the metaphysical systems have contributed to the progress of many physical theories and, especially, to the birth of modern science, and; (c) that we can identify long-lasting metaphysical traditions of research which have shown themselves to be more fertile than the positivist traditions. (shrink)