The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)

Globalisation seems to be especially the Westernisation of the World. One of the crucial elements of (Western) European cultural identity is the reference to its scientific and philosophical inheritance. European culture is held to be rooted in ancient Greece, where a unique, historically inevitable and irreversible transition from myth to reason is thought to have taken place. I shall try to re-examine this still predominant view to clarify the elements of Western thought by comparing it with its historical predecessors in (...) ancient Greek mythology in order to discuss its Euro-centric elements. For this purpose, two questions have to be asked: What is so special about ancient Greek philosophy? And how and why did it come into being? The arguments given to solve the first question are hardly convincing. If we might not be able to give a satisfying answer, the search for the reasons to come up with something like Western philosophy are becoming more important. (shrink)

»Jedes Buch, das ich in einem Winkel sehe, was mir der alltäglichste Zufall mir in die Hände spielt, ist mir Orakel, schließt mir eine neue Ansicht auf, unterrichtet mich.« »Es realisieren sich Dinge, die vor zehn Jahren noch ins philosophische Narrenhaus verwiesen wurden.«.

Translations of Karl Jaspers' work into the English language have so far not been uniform in their choice of technical terminology. This scholarly renditionof Jaspers' ´Introduction´ to his seminal work "The Great Philosophers" stays to theoriginal German text as true possible by upholding its idiomatic cultural expressions, complex sentence structure, and nuanced particularities provided that clarity of communication can be maintained. The substantive contents and the significance of this text, whose principal topic is greatness, are outlined here. Communication with the (...) great philosophers can bring insight into their thought and can enable humans to transcend toward possible authentic Existenz. (shrink)

Due to the exponential growth of science and, recently, the explosive expansion of the extrascientific information of computerized 'Data' of all sorts, a New Cognitive Order of Society comes into existence. The invalidation of the 'Old Order' with its classical conditions for the production, processing, application and fairly equal social distribution of knowledge is a result of technological developments, especially of the rise of Information Technology. What may be called the Cognitive-Technological Complex is rapidly developing. This causes a fundamental change (...) of the situation of knowledge in the Information Society so-called. It confronts philosophy with the task, 'to climb up' the growing information mountains and to analyse its contents and structures, i.e., old and new sorts of knowledge in huge quantities and mixtures, with different rationality-structures, etc. This cannot be done without new theories of knowledge and rationality. What is practically needed, involves a new philosopher's comprehensive competence for handling the whole information stuff, ranging from classical theory-knowledge to modern data-knowledge. Technical competence for computers is not enough. Thus, information technology opens philosophy and philosophers an unexpected, perhaps undeserved chance to keep pace with the most progressive cognitive and technological developments. To take advantage of the new situation of knowledge and to explore the constitutive conditions of the New Cognitive Order is the first task of contemporary philosophy, in close cooperation with all cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The literature on Kierkegaard is often content to paraphrase. By contrast, Michael Theunissen articulates one of Kierkegaard's central ideas, his theory of despair, in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confronts it with alternatives. Understanding what Kierkegaard wrote on despair is vital not only because it illuminates his thought as a whole, but because his account of despair in The Sickness unto Death is the cornerstone of existentialism. Theunissen's book, published in German in 1993, is widely regarded as the best (...) treatment of the subject in any language. Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair is also one of the few works on Kierkegaard that bridge the gap between the Continental and analytic traditions in philosophy. Theunissen argues that for Kierkegaard, the fundamental characteristic of despair is the desire of the self "not to be what it is." He sorts through the apparently chaotic text of The Sickness unto Death to explain what Kierkegaard meant by the "self," how and why individuals want to flee their selves, and how he believed they could reconnect with their selves. According to Theunissen, Kierkegaard thought that individuals in despair seek to deny their authentic selves to flee particular aspects of their character, their past, or the world, or in order to deny their "mission." In addition to articulating and evaluating Kierkegaard's concept of despair, Theunissen relates Kierkegaard's ideas to those of Heidegger, Sartre, and other twentieth-century philosophers. (shrink)

The question is whether the message of early Christianity was revolutionary and aimed at a revolutionary change in history? Had this change already begun in the life of primitive Christianity in a way that is exemplary to all later life based on the message?