The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

As Classical Propositional Logic finds its algebraic counterpart in Boolean algebras, the logic of Quantum Mechanics, as outlined within G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann’s approach to Quantum Theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann in Ann Math 37:823–843, 1936) [see also (Husimi in I Proc Phys-Math Soc Japan 19:766–789, 1937)] finds its algebraic alter ego in orthomodular lattices. However, this logic does not incorporate time dimension although it is apparent that the propositions occurring in the logic of Quantum Mechanics are depending (...) on time. The aim of the present paper is to show that tense operators can be introduced in every logic based on a complete lattice, in particular in the logic of quantum mechanics based on a complete orthomodular lattice. If the time set is given together with a preference relation, we introduce tense operators in a purely algebraic way. We derive several important properties of such operators, in particular we show that they form dynamic pairs and, altogether, a dynamic algebra. We investigate connections of these operators with logical connectives conjunction and implication derived from Sasaki projections in an orthomodular lattice. Then we solve the converse problem, namely to find for given time set and given tense operators a time preference relation in order that the resulting time frame induces the given operators. We show that the given operators can be obtained as restrictions of operators induced by a suitable extended time frame. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)

Translations of Karl Jaspers' work into the English language have so far not been uniform in their choice of technical terminology. This scholarly renditionof Jaspers' ´Introduction´ to his seminal work "The Great Philosophers" stays to theoriginal German text as true possible by upholding its idiomatic cultural expressions, complex sentence structure, and nuanced particularities provided that clarity of communication can be maintained. The substantive contents and the significance of this text, whose principal topic is greatness, are outlined here. Communication with the (...) great philosophers can bring insight into their thought and can enable humans to transcend toward possible authentic Existenz. (shrink)

Due to the exponential growth of science and, recently, the explosive expansion of the extrascientific information of computerized 'Data' of all sorts, a New Cognitive Order of Society comes into existence. The invalidation of the 'Old Order' with its classical conditions for the production, processing, application and fairly equal social distribution of knowledge is a result of technological developments, especially of the rise of Information Technology. What may be called the Cognitive-Technological Complex is rapidly developing. This causes a fundamental change (...) of the situation of knowledge in the Information Society so-called. It confronts philosophy with the task, 'to climb up' the growing information mountains and to analyse its contents and structures, i.e., old and new sorts of knowledge in huge quantities and mixtures, with different rationality-structures, etc. This cannot be done without new theories of knowledge and rationality. What is practically needed, involves a new philosopher's comprehensive competence for handling the whole information stuff, ranging from classical theory-knowledge to modern data-knowledge. Technical competence for computers is not enough. Thus, information technology opens philosophy and philosophers an unexpected, perhaps undeserved chance to keep pace with the most progressive cognitive and technological developments. To take advantage of the new situation of knowledge and to explore the constitutive conditions of the New Cognitive Order is the first task of contemporary philosophy, in close cooperation with all cognitive sciences. (shrink)

A Kleene lattice is a distributive lattice equipped with an antitone involution and satisfying the so-called normality condition. These lattices were introduced by J. A. Kalman. We extended this concept also for posets with an antitone involution. In our recent paper (Chajda, Länger and Paseka, in: Proceeding of 2022 IEEE 52th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, Springer, 2022), we showed how to construct such Kleene lattices or Kleene posets from a given distributive lattice or poset and a fixed element of (...) this lattice or poset by using the so-called twist product construction, respectively. We extend this construction of Kleene lattices and Kleene posets by considering a fixed subset instead of a fixed element. Moreover, we show that in some cases, this generating poset can be embedded into the resulting Kleene poset. We investigate the question when a Kleene poset can be represented by a Kleene poset obtained by the mentioned construction. We show that a direct product of representable Kleene posets is again representable and hence a direct product of finite chains is representable. This does not hold in general for subdirect products, but we show some examples where it holds. We present large classes of representable and non-representable Kleene posets. Finally, we investigate two kinds of extensions of a distributive poset $${\textbf{A}}$$ A, namely its Dedekind-MacNeille completion $${{\,\mathrm{\textbf{DM}}\,}}({\textbf{A}})$$ DM ( A ) and a completion $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) which coincides with $${{\,\mathrm{\textbf{DM}}\,}}({\textbf{A}})$$ DM ( A ) provided $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is finite. In particular we prove that if $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is a Kleene poset then its extension $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) is also a Kleene lattice. If the subset X of principal order ideals of $${\textbf{A}}$$ A is involution-closed and doubly dense in $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) then it generates $$G({\textbf{A}})$$ G ( A ) and it is isomorphic to $${\textbf{A}}$$ A itself. (shrink)

It is well-known that intuitionistic logics can be formalized by means of Heyting algebras, i.e. relatively pseudocomplemented semilattices. Within such algebras the logical connectives implication and conjunction are formalized as the relative pseudocomplement and the semilattice operation meet, respectively. If the Heyting algebra has a bottom element |$0$|⁠, then the relative pseudocomplement with respect to |$0$| is called the pseudocomplement and it is considered as the connective negation in this logic. Our idea is to consider an arbitrary meet-semilattice with |$0$| (...) satisfying only the Ascending Chain Condition (these assumptions are trivially satisfied in finite meet-semilattices) and introduce the operators formalizing the connectives negation |$x^{0}$| and implication |$x\rightarrow y$| as the set of all maximal elements |$z$| satisfying |$x\wedge z=0$| and as the set of all maximal elements |$z$| satisfying |$x\wedge z\leq y$|⁠, respectively. Such a negation and implication is ‘unsharp’ since it assigns to one entry |$x$| or to two entries |$x$| and |$y$| belonging to the semilattice, respectively, a subset instead of an element of the semilattice. Surprisingly, this kind of negation and implication still shares a number of properties of these connectives in intuitionistic logic, in particular the derivation rule Modus Ponens. Moreover, unsharp negation and unsharp implication can be characterized by means of five, respectively seven simple axioms. We present several examples. The concepts of a deductive system and of a filter are introduced as well as the congruence determined by such a filter. We finally describe certain relationships between these concepts. (shrink)

Le jugement dévalorisant sur la philosophie éclectique introduit par le cercle de l'idéalisme allemand et par la suite défini sous le terme »éclectisme«, a causé un préjudice sérieux à tout un courant de pensée du siècle des lumières allemand. Dans la première partie de l'anamnèse on a mis à jour l'origine du concept historiographique »éclectique« et la manière dont il a été employé ; la deuxième partie développe une critique de la philosophie classique et donne quelques éléments de l'auto-compréhension philosophique (...) de l'éclectique, en particulier chez Chr. Thomasius. (shrink)

In this essay I to do three things. First, I discuss a statement from the Tractatus which says that our free will consists in our ignorance of future actions: “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.” (5.1362) I think this statement might well be inspired by a claim Moore made in connection with free (...) will in his 1912 book Ethics: “We can hardly ever know for certain beforehand, which choice we actually shall make”. But I think Moore’s claim in favor of free will is not convincing. Second, I discuss a question raised in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein asks what remains if we “subtract” the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm, and he adds in brackets: “Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?” (621) This added reflection is a reaction to ideas put forward by William James. Wittgenstein opposes these ideas. He argues that we should not think of the will as a cause at all, kinaesthetic or not, but rather as something embedded in, and constituted by, certain contexts of learning, expectation, practice, and lack of surprise. This is a strong claim. He also returns to the question about the predictability of the future: “When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one’s own voluntary movements” (629). The question is whether Wittgenstein has solved, or dissolved, the problem of free will. Some think that this is the case. I doubt it is. This is the third point I wish to discuss. (shrink)

Keinen Menschen der Antike kennen wir so gut wie Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 v.Chr.). Wir verdanken dies dem Umstand, dass ein großer Teil seiner Korrespondenz überliefert ist, im ganzen etwa 780 Briefe, davon gut die Hälfte an seinen Freund Titus Pomponius Atticus (110-32 v.Chr.) gerichtet. Die Atticus-Briefe sind insofern eine historische Quelle außerordentlichen Ranges, als Cicero sich in ihnen unbefangen und vorbehaltlos äußert. So folgen wir in zahlreichen Krisen seines Lebens zuweilen Tag für Tag den wechselnden Stimmungen, erleben den Kampf (...) um gesellschaftliche und politische Anerkennung, erkennen aber auch Ciceros heiße Vaterlandsliebe, erhalten Einblick in die privaten Verhältnisse, kurzum, alle Züge seines Wesens erscheinen in klarer Kontur wie in einem Spiegel. Die Atticus-Briefe vermitteln uns das Bild eines antiken Menschen, der zwar nicht der Weltgeschichte ihren Lauf gewiesen hat, der aber doch zu den bedeutendsten Persönlichkeiten einer Zeit gehörte, in der Weltgeschichte gemacht wurde, und der darüber zu berichten weiß. Darin liegt der nicht zu schätzende Wert der Sammlung. Mit Einführung, Erläuterungen, Registern und Zeittafel. (shrink)

Motivated by Drerup’s and Terhart’s stimulating contribution (Analyse & Kritik 1/80) to the notorious “Critical Rationalism and Contemporary Politics” -affair with its fatal repercussions on Popper’s original position. Part One of this paper discusses the development of Popperian philosophy of science and society from the hopeful beginnings to the rather unsatisfactory present state, with the main emphasis on the separate fate of his Social Philosophy in German speaking countries. A reconstruction and evaluation of this development is made in comparison to (...) Popper’s basic idea of an open-minded Social Philosophy and critical Social Science. The German mainstream development adds to Popper’s own radically liberal interpretation a positivistic, a normativistic and a conformistic phase, thus leading this degenerating research programme to the present philosophical stagnation and badly compensating political reideologization. The intellectual as well as the institutional causes and consequences of the deviant German case are analysed. − This exposition of the present state of reception is to be completed, in Part Two, by an analysis of the resulting state of problems with regard to the remaining chances for the realization of the original Popperian programme just-mentioned in contemporary rebuilding. (shrink)

According to psychoanalysis there is a relationship between gaining insight and therapeutic success. To clarify this relationship it is necessary to differentiate regions of psychoanalytic theory. On the one hand there are foundational theories - personality and aetiological theory - on the other hand there are technological theories: they explain the therapeutic process and generate rules for therapeutic intervention. The latter are supported by the former, but cannot be logically derived from them. The link between the mediation of self-knowledge and (...) the improvement of the state of the patient is a theoretical and practical issue of psychoanalysis: theoretically it is a hypothesis that has to be proved by empirical investigation. Practically it is an aim to be fulfilled. A therapeutic theory should list the conditions that are necessary for this. (shrink)

Von den Sachen und vom Widerspruch. Der eigene Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften -- Steinzeit. Das Erwachen der Vernunft. Judaismus -- Ockhams Willkürgott in der Schleuse des Widerspruchsprinzips. Miniaturen -- Ockham in der Geschichte. Wissenschaftstheorie und Bewusstsein -- Mythos und Evidenz. Ockhams Rekalzitranz -- Kausalität und Affektbezug. Die Annäherung an Gott -- Die Subtilität in den Materien der Philosophie. Gott, wir und die Welt -- Die Brücke vom Diesseits zum Jenseits, oder, Der Abstand der Neuzeit zum Mittelalter -- Der Sinn bei Begriffen (...) und Schlüssen. Der Scharfsinnige und der mehr als Scharfsinnige -- Satz und Satzgefüge. Der Beweis ohne Gegenständlichkeit -- Am Torweg. Der nicht unabänderliche Wille Gottes. (shrink)