This article expands Kandiyoti's concept of patriarchal bargaining to include men's negotiations. It analyzes how marginalized groups within a dominant sociocultural knowledge regime strategize to advance change while trying to maximize security and optimize their life options. The case study analyzes primaries held within kin-based groupings— hamulas among Palestinian Arabs in Israel—to determine the candidates for municipal elections. Based on interviews and analysis of newspaper articles, the authors claim that the turn to primaries by hamulas was an attempt to resolve (...) disputes that were undermining the patriarchal system. The primaries provided entry to those of lower ranking in the hierarchy of hamula political leadership, while retaining the exclusion of women from the political sphere. Thus, while bargaining with patriarchy, gender identities and hierarchies are contested, re/produced, and negotiated as both a political means and an anchor for social identities. (shrink)

The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for money and that can be enjoyed mostly or exclusively in the context of work. Drawing on empirical research and various philosophical traditions of thinking about work we identify four goods of work: 1) attaining various types of (...) excellence; 2) making a social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition. Our account of the goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful. The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today’s labour markets. (shrink)

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...) subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance. (shrink)

I argue that there is moral luck, i.e., that factors beyond our control can affect how laudable or culpable we are.

This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant's Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring these two serious problems for the B Deduction, we also (...) discover some deeply important and perhaps surprising philosophical facts about Kant's theory of cognition and his metaphysics. (shrink)

One hundred sixty subjects acted as members of a hypothetical Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and evaluated five proposals in which animals were to be used for research or educational purposes. They were asked to approve or reject the proposals and to indicate what factors were important in reaching their ethical decisions. Gender and differences in personal moral philosophy were related to approval decisions. The reasons given for the decisions fell into three main categories: metacognitive statements, factors related to (...) the animal, and factors related to the design of the experiment. (shrink)

? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith.

Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.

Moral and legal philosophy are too entangled: moral philosophy is prone to model interpersonal moral relationships on a juridical image, and legal philosophy often proceeds as if the criminal law is an institutional reflection of juridically imagined interpersonal moral relationships. This article challenges this alignment and in so doing argues that the function of the criminal law lies not fundamentally in moral blame, but in regulation of harmful conduct. The upshot is that, in contrast to interpersonal relationships, the criminal law (...) cannot lose its standing to blame through institutional analogues of hypocrisy, complicity, and meddling. Rather, certain forms of structural and severe historical and contemporary injustice point to the question of the overall legitimacy of state authority. (shrink)

Most anti-paternalists claim that informed and competent self-regarding choices are protected by autonomy, while ill-informed or impaired self-regarding choices are not. Joel Feinberg, among many others, argues that we can in this way distinguish impermissible “hard” paternalism from permissible “soft” paternalism. I argue that this view confronts two related problems in its treatment of ill-informed decision-makers. First, it faces a dilemma when applied to decision-makers who are responsible for their ignorance: it either permits too much, or else too little, intervention (...) to satisfy its proponents. Second, the most promising rationales in favor of the view ignore the distinction between an agent’s voluntarily bringing about some state of affairs, on the one hand, and an agent’s voluntarily assuming a risk, on the other. I conclude that a decision-maker’s ignorance is irrelevant to the permissibility of intervention on her behalf. If it is permissible to intervene in a given ill-informed choice, it would be permissible to intervene in an otherwise similar but informed choice, at least provided that intervention would produce similar benefits in both cases. This shows that we should sometimes accept straightforwardly paternalistic rationales. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).

This article presents Edith Stein's vision of womanhood, from the point of view of theology, pedagogy, and psychology. Edith Stein means to offer the most complete vision possible on the question of womanhood, one that will be faithful to the scope of its dimensions: social, political, anthropological, philosophical, ecclesiastic, canonical, and even theological.

In this paper, we are interested in how a company can enhance stakeholder involvement in its information-sharing practices. We start by looking at the current information-sharing practices in a case where Europe’s second largest pulp producer Metsä-Botnia was caught in the middle of a heated debate between two countries when building a pulp mill in South America. We examine the content of the company’s press releases in terms of the degree of stakeholder involvement. On the basis of our analysis, we (...) discuss the problems and possibilities of enhancing stakeholder involvement through information sharing by introducing a discursive understanding to stakeholder dialogue. (shrink)

In academic science, the study of religiosity has a long history. It was given considerable attention by Soviet-era religious scientists. The study of religiosity was especially relevant during the independence of Ukraine. However, it should be noted that in the scientific literature there is still a one-sided, even arbitrary, interpretation of the concept of "religiosity", which is considered in terms of individual studies, and general philosophical achievements are sometimes ignored.

In modern humanities, the notion of "new religiosity", as well as language constructs related to it - "unconventional religiosity", "new religions", "new religious consciousness", "new religious movements", etc., has become widespread. The phenomenon of unconventional religiosity is a characteristic feature of the spiritual life of society, which is understood to mean the spread of doctrines that are not related to traditional religions. In cultural studies, such doctrines have different names, namely: "extra-religious religiosity", "secular humanism", "esoteric culture", that is, intended for (...) the consecrated, "rebellious spiritual quest". However, not always these terms accurately reflect the essence of the phenomenon. (shrink)

The author has attempted to draw attention to major issues, methodological paradigm change, and the need for reconsideration of the facts obtained in the study of individual religious orthodox believer.

An absurd feature of modernity is the value-meaning vacuum that characterizes not only post-totalitarian countries but also developed countries of the world. That is why the search for spiritual dominance becomes an important feature of the postmodern era. This is especially necessary because social forms of life external to man often give the human existence a marginal, deviant orientation. In this context, the problem of spirituality arises not only as a problem of the survival of society, of civilization as a (...) whole, but also becomes personally relevant. (shrink)

In the article by Anna Kulagina-Stadnychenko "The forms of manifestation of individual religiosity and their typology in the context of Orthodoxy" an attempt is made to determine the constructive type of individual religiosity of an Orthodox believer through the synthesis of research works in the field of psychology of religion and religious philosophy.

The article explores the relationship between the dialogical way of existence of religion and social stability. The author argues that dialogue is becoming a way of existence of religion in societies with a high level of religious freedom. The author emphasizes constructive types of communication between religions, one of which is traditionally interreligious (interfaith) dialogue. The definition of religious dialogue as a broad communication phenomenon is considered, which, in particular, involves the interaction of not only religions with each other (interreligious, (...) interfaith dialogue), but also communication between religion and society (religious and social dialogue) on important issues of the present, and reactions to them. It is substantiated that the reluctance of a certain religious institution to engage in dialogue may be based on the theological position of the church caused by the phenomenon of «ambivalence of the sacred». Some ways to restore the dialogue of religions and overcome the conflict conditions of their interaction are proposed. In conclusion, it is noted that the «war of civilizations» launched by the Russian Federation in Ukraine brings the dialogue of religions to a new level, namely: requires a revision of certain theological theories, the formation of new theological visions; significantly actualizes the issues of justice, heroism, good and evil, the impossibility of violence, ethical problems and their reflection in theological thought; requires religions to take a civic stance, where it is no longer possible to speak of secularization in the sense of separation of religion from politics; sharpens and problematizes the attitude of religions to the national question as a result of the Russian Federation’s provoked terrorist methods of warfare, and thus the threat to humanity of genocide on a national basis; raises the issue of universal values, the humanistic paradigm and personal responsibility, which brings all religious systems too close together; meta-anthropologizes religion, absolutizes humanism as a value when a believer «goes beyond» mere existence to approach eternal truths, where the concept of «salvation» loses its narrowly individualistic characteristic. (shrink)

It is nowadays a commonplace of Kant-interpretation that Kant's response to Hume in the Analogies of Experience is not strictly speaking a refutation of Hume but in fact only an extended critical response to Hume's skeptical accounts of object-identity and causation, that also accepts many of Hume's working assumptions. But this approach can significantly underestimate the extent to which Kant's conception of the representational mind is radically distinct from Hume's. In particular, Kant's conception of the human mind's innately-specified spontaneous actions (...) as ultimate sources of the veridical representation of both logical and metaphysical necessity in the world of objective experience, if correct, entails a flat-out rejection of Hume's conception of the human mind's merely projectivist abilities and activities. This in turn entails that, to this extent, the Analogies contain not only a critical response to Hume, but also a flat-out refutation of Hume. (shrink)

In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call "praxial realism", which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.

In this brief reply to Anne Margaret Baxley’s comments on my paper, “Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature,” I respond to her two critical worries about my thesis that there is an unbridgeable gap between Kant’s political theory, which is classically liberal, and his ethics/theory of enlightenment/moral theology, which is anarchist: that Kant’s strong moral epistemic skepticism in the Groundwork about knowing the true motives of our choices and actions, requires coercive State intervention in order to ensure (...) that we heed mutual relations of external freedom and do our juridical duties, and that the overall crookedness of the human timber, i.e., our almost inevitable empirical tendency to fall short of autocracy, requires the very same State interventions for the very same moral-political straightening purposes. I argue that Kant isn’t the moral epistemic skeptic he’s standardly taken to be—on the contrary, we have veridical, direct, occurrent, essentially non-conceptual, non-empirical awareness of autonomous choices and actions, via The Fact of Reason, and that coercing people to be morally good necessarily undermines the moral worth of their choices and actions and turns them into nothing but well-oiled, law-abiding robots of the State—so we must exit the State in order to belong to an ethical community instead, i.e., Kantian anarchism; hence my unbridgeable-gap thesis still stands. I end by self-advertising for existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism. (shrink)

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we (...) witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved. (shrink)

Unlike most collections of essays by various writers, Essays in Kant's Aesthetics is unified by considerations not restricted merely to the subject denoted by the title of the book. Cohen and Guyer's Preface and Introduction make it clear that the essays have been chosen with some care and with an eye to certain thematic structures established by the editors. In consonance with this, the book falls into four parts. The first part, "Pleasure, Beauty, and Judgment," contains essays by Guyer, R. (...) Meerbote, R. E. Aquila, and A. Savile, all on Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. The second, "Art and Genius," contains essays by D. W. Crawford, T. Gould, and I. Stadler, on the implications of Kant's notion of artistic genius. The third part, "Beauty, Freedom, and Morality," with essays by Cohen and D. Henrich, explores the connection of the beautiful and the good in Kant. Part four, "Beauty and the World," containing essays by S. Cavell and J. E. Sobel, treats of ontological themes suggested by Kant's aesthetics. (shrink)

Two rather distinct and competing trends can be discerned in twentieth-century philosophy of language: the logical trend, found in the work of Frege, Russell and Tarski, with its focus on language-world connections and truth; the language-use trend, found in the work of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, with its focus on language as employed by speakers in ordinary conversational contexts. Vanderveken's aim here is to bring together both the logistic and language-use traditions by folding the analysis of language-world relations and the (...) formal semantics of truth into the theory of speech acts. This gives rise to a "general semantics" of language-use and language-understanding. Vanderveken claims that such a general semantics of speech acts will provide a transcendental analysis of the a priori forms of possible thought and experience of human speakers. It would therefore be a great mistake to treat this book as just another contribution to the now slightly dated "speech act industry." It is, in effect, an attempt to raise speech act theory to the level of philosophical grammar, or what seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers would have called grammaire générale et raisonné. (shrink)

I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. We can never sufficiently (...) reduce this risk because wrongful punishment is much worse than wrongful non-punishment and because punishment’s permissibility depends on the answers to a variety of difficult philosophical questions about which we’re fallible. (shrink)

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.

This article seeks to clarify the potential that Herbert Marcuse's and Theodor W. Adorno's psychoanalytic accounts may have with respect to the philosophy of education today. Marcuse and Adorno both share the view that psychoanalytic theory enables a deeper understanding of the social and biological dynamics of consciousness. For both thinkers, psychoanalytic theory provides conceptual tools for thinking through contradictions between the needs of an individual and those of the governing entity. In fleshing this out, I first explore Marcuse's radical (...) account of sublimation which seeks to demonstrate how the revision of instinctual energy makes it possible to establish a subjectivity which utilises the human potentiality to its fullest. I then turn to Adorno who emphasises the importance of understanding that exterior conditions transform our instinctual energies. After recapitulating Adorno's conception of natural, instinctual impulses and his use of psychoanalytic theory, I will explore the possibility of a critical rationality through a critique of rationality's current mode. From the perspective of Adorno's and Marcuse's theories, both rationality and sensuous desire play their respective roles in enabling critical rationality. In conclusion, the article reflects the different advantage points of Marcuse's and Adorno's accounts from the perspective of philosophy of education. Thus, education should provide individuals with the ability to recognise the subtle and invisible ways through which the calculating mode of rationality operates in late-capitalist society. Regarding education, Adorno's conception of non-identity could be developed in the direction of promoting ways of experiencing non-conformity within such a society. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and the sciences are related in an arbitrary and noncommital way. This has problematic consequences in terms of the disciplinary autonomy of the sciences, as shown in the example of the science of education. A new determination and definition of the relation between science and the philosophy of science demands, on the one hand, a greater willingness towards metatheoretical reflection and critique of the part of the individual sciences and, on the other hand, a reorientation within the (...) philosophy of science towards performing „service functions“ with regard to the metatheoretical selfdefinitions of the sciences. This can be achieved by a constructivist, pragmatic and historical theory of knowledge and science. A central factor in a changed relationship between science and the philosophy of science is the scientific discipline's determination of its field of enquiry. This is seen to be an integral part of the process of establishing a discipline as a science. (shrink)