Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64 (2008)

Authors
Robert Hanna
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
Keywords Non-conceptual mental content  Spatial representation  Concepts  Consciousness  Kant
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space.Lucy Allais - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.
Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.

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