La vie, la voix, la pensée, le combat de Vladimir Jankélévitch (1903-1985) qui marquèrent le siècle, en philosophie, en musique, en politique, ne pouvaient pas mieux ressortir que dans un "éblouissement". Ce fut celui de Guy Suarès (1932-1996), homme de théâtre, de radio et de télévision, qui s'est particulièrement attaché, par ses traductions et ses mises en scène, à mieux faire connaître la culture hispanique (Lorca, Neruda, Bergamin...) et a dirigé la Comédie de la Loire à Tours à l'invitation d'André (...) Malraux, à qui il a consacré deux ouvrages. Une relation, lumineuse, face aux mystères de la vie et de la mort ; et dont les voix portent encore. (shrink)

How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor -- the robustness of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome -- influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustness. In the first (...) experiment, the robustness manipulation also raises the probability of the effect given the action. Experiments 2 and 3 control for probability-raising, and show that robustness still affects judgments of causal responsibility. In particular, Experiment 3 introduces an Ellsberg type of scenario to manipulate robustness, while keeping the conditional probability and the skill deployed in the action fixed. Experiment 4, replicates the results of Experiment 3, while contrasting between judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility. The results show that in all cases, the perceived degree of responsibility increases with the robustness of the action-outcome causal chain. (shrink)

BackgroundMoral case deliberation as a form of clinical ethics support is usually implemented in health care institutions and educational programs. While there is no previous research on the use of clinical ethics support on the level of health care regulation, employees of regulatory bodies are regularly confronted with moral challenges. This pilot study describes and evaluates the use of MCD at the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate.The objective of this pilot study is to investigate: 1) the current way of dealing with (...) moral issues at the IGZ; 2) experience with and evaluation of MCD as clinical ethics support, and 3) future preferences and needs regarding clinical ethics support for dealing with moral questions at the IGZ.MethodsWe performed an explorative pilot study. The research questions were assessed by means of: 1) interviews with MCD participants during four focus groups; and 2) interviews with six key stakeholders at the IGZ. De qualitative data is illustrated by data from questionnaires on MCD outcomes, perspective taking and MCD evaluation.ResultsProfessionals do not always recognize moral issues. Employees report a need for regular and structured moral support in health care regulation. The MCD meetings are evaluated positively. The most important outcomes of MCD are feeling secure and learning from others. Additional support is needed to successfully implement MCD at the Inspectorate.ConclusionWe conclude that the respondents perceive moral case deliberation as a useful form of clinical ethics support for dealing with moral questions and issues in health care regulation. (shrink)

Betr. Diltheys Professur an der Universität Basel 1867-1868.

Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we (...) were able to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems. (shrink)

Each story is presented as a narrative, so readers can ponder: What would I do if this happened to me? When they've finished the book, they'll feel prepared with an array of theoretical and practical approaches for thinking on their feet.

The method of positron emission tomography illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, (...) componential accounts. (shrink)

Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel (...) formulation of physicalism. Although physicalism has been traditionally understood to be a metaphysical thesis, Elpidorou and Dove argue that there is an alternative and indeed preferable understanding of physicalism that both renders physicalism a scientifically informed explanatory project and allows us to make important progress in addressing the ontological problem of consciousness. Physicalism, Elpidorou and Dove hold, is best viewed not as a thesis (metaphysical or otherwise) but as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to compositionally explain all natural phenomena that are central to our understanding of our place in nature. Consciousness and Physicalism is replete with philosophical arguments and informed, through and through, by findings in many areas of scientific research. It advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness. It will interest students and scholars in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science. And it will challenge both foes and friends of physicalism. -/- . (shrink)

Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in the idea that natural language enhances and extends our cognitive capabilities. Supporters of embodied cognition have been particularly interested in the way in which language may provide a solution to the problem of abstract concepts. Toward this end, some have emphasized the way in which language may act as form of cognitive scaffolding and others have emphasized the potential importance of language-based distributional information. This essay defends a version of the (...) cognitive enhancement thesis that integrates and builds on both of these proposals. I argue that the embodied representations associated with language processing serve as a supplementary medium for conceptual processing. The acquisition of a natural language provides a means of extending our cognitive reach by giving us access to an internalized combinatorial symbol system that augments and supports the context-sensitive embodied representational systems that exist independently of language. (shrink)

Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly farfetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn‘t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue (...) that reflection on this possibility should lead us to revise our understanding of the debate between realists and antirealists. It is not only that the realist‘s semantic claim is insufficient for realism to be true, as Mackie argued; it‘s not even necessary. Robust metaethical realism is best understood as making a purely metaphysical claim. It is thus not enough for antirealists to show that our discourse is antirealist. They must directly attack the realist‘s metaphysical claim. (shrink)

This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...) a buck-passing fashion (§II). The second are the buck-passing analyses of good for proposed by John Skorupski (§III), Henry Sidgwick (§IV), and Stephen Darwall (§V). Along the way the paper shows that Michael Smith’s and Peter Railton’s analyses of other concepts—analyses that could be (and have been) taken to be analyses of good for —are similarly unsuitable as analyses of it. The paper concludes by suggesting that the fact that none of the buck-passing accounts of good for considered here is satisfactory, coupled with an appreciation of the various problems that a buck-passing analysis of good for would have to avoid, suggests that we should be sceptical about the prospects of finding such an analysis and should look for one of a different type. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that personalization technologies used by Google for the purpose of tailoring search results for individual users create filter bubbles, which reinforce users’ political views. Surprisingly, empirical evidence for a personalization-induced filter bubble has not been forthcoming. Here, we investigate whether filter bubbles may result instead from a searcher’s choice of search queries. In the first experiment, participants rated the left-right leaning of 48 queries (search strings), 6 for each of 8 topics (abortion, benefits, climate change, sex (...) equality, immigration, nuclear family, Islam, and taxation). An independent sample of participants were then asked to select one of these queries for each of the 8 topics. With the exception of the topic of Islam, participants were significantly more likely to select a query corresponding to their own political leaning, compared to other queries, explaining between 12% and 39% of the variance. A second experiment investigated the effect of the political leaning of the same queries on the overall political leaning of Search Engine Result Pages (SERPs) in Google Search. The top six results of each SERP were rated collectively by a third group of participants, explaining 36.3% of the variance across all 48 search terms (p < .00001). That is, (1) participants in our experiments tended to select own-side search queries, and (2) using those queries tended to yield own-side search results when using the Google search engine. Our results are consistent with the notion of a self-imposed filter bubble in which query selection plays a salient role. (shrink)

Evidence from neurophysiological and psychological studies is coming together to shed light on how we represent and recognize objects. This review describes evidence supporting two major hypotheses: the first is that objects are represented in a mosaic-like form in which objects are encoded by combinations of complex, reusable features, rather than two-dimensional templates, or three-dimensional models. The second hypothesis is that transform-invariant representations of objects are learnt through experience, and that this learning is affected by the temporal sequence in which (...) different views of the objects are seen, as well as by their physical appearance. (shrink)

Comment l'idéologie nazie a-t-elle imprégné et corrompu jusqu'au plus intime de la pensée et du langage? Jargon de l'authenticité est l'une des charges les plus féroces écrites contre Heidegger et son jargon. Qu'est-ce que le jargon? C'est un maniement de la langue qui vise à exercer un charme magique sur les lecteurs grâce à une sacralisation du langage et à un pathos de l'authenticité. Nationalisme, repli sur soi, mépris de la réalité sociale sont dès lors autant de voies pour perdre (...) l'objet, le monde, les choses. Un livre qui mérite d'être confronté à la célèbre étude de Klemperer, LTI, qui porte sur le langage totalitaire sous le IIIe Reich. (shrink)

Dans son effort pour ébranler la dichotomie entre la raison calculatrice et le domaine de l'irrationnel, Ch. Perelman s'inspire de la rhétorique ancienne et, entre autres, de Platon. Il utilise celui-ci pour illustrer le mépris des philosophes à l'égard de la rhétorique, pour indiquer la voie d'une rhétorique différente, et pour caractériser la forme du dialogue. On montre que cette condamnation de la rhétorique est beaucoup plus systématique, chez Platon, que ne le laisse entendre Perelman; que la "rhétorique digne des (...) dieux" de Platon n'a rien à voir avec la nouvelle rhétorique; et que le dialogue platonicien n'est pas un dialogue au sens de cette dernière. Bref, Platon est un anti-modèle, et c'est en prenant conscience de leur hétérogénéité radicale que l'on pourra le mieux apprécier l'originalité de ces deux conceptions de la philosophie. (shrink)

A intenção deste artigo é primàriamente exegética. Não pretende chegar a conclusães filosóficas substanciais nem fazer uma apreciação crítica. Pretende simplesmente esclarecer a versão de Russell quanto ao atomismo lógico, apresentando a sua teoria do juízo empírico num contexto histórico. A maior parte dos comentários contemporâneos falham neste ponto; contudo, afigura-se impossível compreender perfeitamente a teoria de Russell aeerca do conhecimento, bem como a Teoria das Descrições, como parte integrante daquela teoria, se não for encarada como uma tentativa para evitar (...) as consequencias de certas teorias alternativas do juízo. Pensa o autor que muitas críticas contemporâneas da Teoria das Descrições estão deslocadas, simplesmente por não conseguirem apreender o papel que aquela teoria devia desempenhar na análise russelliana do juízo empírico. A título de exemplo tenta o autor mostrar como as críticas de P. F. Strawson a respeito da Teoria das Descrições, como foram formuladas no seu artigo On Referring, não vêm a propósito (cf. Secção VT). A principal comparação histórica aqui apresentada refere-se à teoria idealista do juízo de F. H. Bradley. Contudo, parece também importante salientar o acordo que existe entre Russell e Bradley quanto a rejeitar como inadequado o tipo de análise do juízo apresentado por Leibniz e, numa primeira etapa da sua carreira, por G. E. Moore. Leibniz e Moore apresentaram, em moldes diversos, aquilo a que podíamos chamar teorias 'essencialmente genéricas' do juízo. Para Leibniz uma proposição é uma conexão analitica de conceitos, para Moore uma proposição é uma conexão sintética de conceitos. Tanto Russell como Bradley afirmam que é impossível formular uma teoria do juízo satisfatória, se concebermos a relação entre uma mente e uma proposição, implicada no juízo, como uma simples conexao de conceitos. O juízo deve ser apresentado como algo que implica experiência imediata pré-conceitual, experiência essa que, embora em si mesma não seja capaz de verdade ou falsidade, está pressuposta na própria possibilidade de qualquer juízo, verdadeiro ou falso, acerca da realidade. Dum modo geral, podíamos dizer que um juízo, cujo conteúdo é conceitual, é em virtude da experiência imediata que 'atinge a realidade' ('reaches right up to reality'). Contudo, embora Russell e Bradley concordem neste ponto, a análise da experiência imediata apresentada pelo primeiro é muito diferente da do segundo. Na medida em que se pode falar duma tese exegética positiva neste artigo, dir-se-ia que a análise russelliana da experiência imediata, contida na sua doutrina do 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, é formulada especificamente (a) para ser compatível com a existência dum universo pluralista de particulares externamente relacionados e (b) para permitir uma versão da teoria de correspondência da verdade. Por outras palavras, a análise russelliana do juízo empírico, implicando necessàriamente um 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, foi formulada especìficamente para evitar as consequências que, tanto Bradley como Russell, viram seeguir-se da análise idealista do juízo. Isto ilustra uma diferença fundamental entre o método filosófico de Russell e o de Bradley. Bradley aceita o monismo, a irrealidade das relações externas, e a teoria de coerência da verdade como consequência da sua teoria inicial do juízo. Russell, por outro lado, pensa que estas consequências se tornaram inaceitáveis perante a prática e as descobertas da ciência empírica; e tenta, por isso, construir uma teoria do juízo compatível com o tipo de metafísica e com a teoria da verdade, que lhe parece serem exigidos pela ciência empírica. (Resumo do Autor. Trad. A. M.). (shrink)

We examine conceptual and methodological problems that arise in the course of the scientific study of possible influences of religious belief on the experience of physical pain. We start by attempting to identify a notion of religious belief that might enter into interesting psychological generalizations involving both religious belief and pain. We argue that it may be useful to think of religious belief as a complex dispositional property that relates believers to a sufficiently thick belief system that encompasses both cognitive (...) and non-cognitive elements. Such a conception of religious belief is more likely to correlate with psychological properties of believers that are both sufficiently shared and sufficiently unique to distinguish their psychology from believers in another religion or from non-believers. If the dispositional psychological property that constitutes religious belief does influence pain, then our analysis suggests that it doesn’t do so directly but rather through one of its occurrent manifestations. We offer a taxonomy of the different ways in which occurrent states of belief or experience may interact with physical pain, and we try to identify those that are more interesting or promising. We then proceed to employ the conceptual framework we developed to some of the existing evidence about the neural and psychological correlates of religious belief and experience, and about the cognitive modulation of physical pain. Finally we turn to analyse two experiments that directly investigated the relation between religious belief and pain. We draw attention to the limitations of existing evidence and end by suggesting directions for future conceptual and empirical inquiry. (shrink)

Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) conception of moral sin contains a fundamental element from Stoicism, which is the notion of “consent” (consensus). After the presentation of the essentials of that Abelardian theory, we return to the source of that same idea in ancient and imperial Stoicism. According to their main representatives, “consent” or “assent” (sugkata/qesij) has a determining function not only in ethics, but also in the process of knowledge as well. We emphasize in passing the resemblance between some important components of (...) Stoic epistemology and the theory expounded by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics on the origin of knowledge. Augustine represents without any doubt one of the main intermediaries through whom this notion of consent is transmitted up to the time of Abelard in the 12th century. Even if he was influenced by the Bishop of Hippo on moral questions in general, Abelard seems to distance himself from Augustine by considering that consent is more a rational matter than a volitional one. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)

Depuis que le structuralisme a franchi le seuil de Ia mode et que l'on parle maintenant volontiers d’ une ère post-structuraliste, le moment se prête davantage à une réflexion philosophique et critique sur ce type d'épistémè qui a pratiquement envahi tout le champ des sciences humaines. Quoique le structuralisme ait été une mode, et une mode qui a réussi, selon l'expression de Raymond Boudon,1 il reste toutefois encore difficile d'apprécier ses succès dans des travaux comme ceux de Foucault, d'Aithusser, de (...) Barthes ou de Lacan. Là où cependant le succès est le plus évident c'est du côté des sciences sociales, en particulier du côté de Ia linguistique et de l'anthropologie. (shrink)

The field of modern European Jewish history, as I hope to show, can be of great interest to those who deal with conceptual history in other contexts, just as much as the conceptual historical project may enrich the study of Jewish history. This article illuminates the transformation of the Jewish languages in Eastern Europe-Hebrew and Yiddish-from their complex place in traditional Jewish society to the modern and secular Jewish experience. It presents a few concrete examples for this process during the (...) nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The article then deals with the adaptation of Central and Western European languages within the internal Jewish discourse in these parts of Europe and presents examples from Germany, France, and Hungary. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose d'unifier les sciences de l'homme entre elles et avec la philosophie en les articulant grâce à trois concepts fondamentaux: forme, sens et historicité.

Dans cet article, après avoir rappelé ce qu’est un revenu de base comme un droit humain universel et fait une analyse des failles du système actuel de distribution de la richesse créée par le travail et de la redistribution par l’État d’aides sociales, l’auteur en déduit les mesures systémiques à prendre pour garantir ce droit humain universel à une vie digne avec une allocation universelle d’existence, protectrice et émancipatrice qui permette de se libérer à la fois de la charité publique (...) qui assujettit et d’un emploi de survie aliénant. (shrink)

Ontology is the study of what exists and the nature of the most fundamental categories into which those existents fall. Ontologists offer a map of reality, one divided into such broad, overlapping territories as physical and mental, concrete and abstract, universal and particular. Such a map provides the setting for further philosophical investigation. Ontologists of art seek to locate works of art in this wider terrain, to say where in our universe they fit in. Their governing question is, thus, “What (...) kind of thing is a work of art?”. (shrink)

Le concept d'androgynie a occupé une position stratégique dans les discussions féministes sur l'identité humaine, mais il est tout aussi ambigu que les notions de masculinité et de féminité dont il tente de subvertir l'opposition tranchée. Pour y voir plus clair, l'article construit un "champ définitionnel de l'androgynie" à partir de l'analyse de 15 définitions dont les éléments génériques et spécifiques, dissociés puis combinés systématiquement, permettent d'engendrer 56 conceptions distinctes et de préciser les enjeux qu'elles recouvrent. Après une discussion des (...) critiques de l'androgynie liées à ces enjeux, l'auteur dégage quatre type de valorisation affectant les concepts de masculinité et de féminité: l'androcentrisme, le gynocentrisme, l'androgynie et la "négandrogynie", celle-ci visant à contrer l'impact négatifs des critiques de l'androgynie tout en conservant son intuition essentielle. (shrink)

Selon Jean Ricardou, le concept "matérialiste" de production est censé rendre caduques les principales catégories de l'esthétique de la production: création, expression, inspiration, imitation. Par l'analyse d'une fiction témoin, cet article montre que la genèse de ce texte peut s'expliquer tans par la théorie de la production de Ricardou que par une approche plus classique. Refusant le dogmatisme et la dépréciation axiologique, il plaide pour une approche plurielle des phénomènes esthétiques.

Une certaine conception censément traditionnelle du signe le présente comme une entité binaire comportant un aspect sensible et un aspect intelligible. Selon Derrida, cette conception serait tributaire du logocentrisme et solidaire de la métaphysique de la présence. L'article passe en revue certaines caractérisations clefs du signe pour déconstruire l'opposition simple et simpliste entre un signifiant censément sensible et matériel, et un signifié censément intelligible et immatériel. Distinguant la conception factorielle du signe et sa conception constitutive, il conclut que "le signe (...) est peut-être moins un indice de la métaphysique occidentale que la soi-disant métaphysique occidentale ne serait l'indice d'une conception relativement rétrécie du signe". (shrink)

Pour caractériser la sémiologie, il faut distinguer les êtres qui participent au processus de signification et les moyens qu'ils emploient.Dans le premier cas, l'opposition de base se situe entre "tous les êtres" et "les êtres humains". Dans le second cas, il faut d'abord normaliser le vocabulaire, qui fluctue d'un auteur à l'autre. Si l'on caractérise le signe en général par la signification, on peut distinguer le signal, l'indice, le symbole et la marque. Dès lors, les principales tendances seront: tous les (...) signes chez tous les êtres; tous les signes chez les êtres humains; les signaux chez tous les émetteurs; les signaux chez les émetteurs humains; les signaux-marques chez tous les émetteurs; les signaux-marques chez les émetteurs humains.Le texte plaide en faveur de la première option et offre quelques suggestions pour une philosophie de la sémiologie. (shrink)