Despite having faced severe criticism in the past, mereological approaches to group ontology, which argue that groups are wholes and that groups members are parts, have recently managed a comeback. Authors such as Katherine Ritchie and Paul Sheehy have applied neo-Aristotelian mereology to groups, and Katherine Hawley has defended mereological approaches against the standard objections in the literature. The present paper develops the mereological approaches to group ontology further and proposes an analysis of group membership as (...) parthood plus further restrictions. While all mereological accounts agree that group members are parts of the group, it has become clear that this analysis is insufficient. I discuss three proposals to develop the mereological analysis of group membership and then put forward a combined solution to the puzzle. According to my proposal, the members of a reading group are agents who are part of the group and have been designated to contribute to the group. (shrink)

This is how A. John Simmons sets the scene for his discussion of political obligation in his book Moral Principles and Political Obligations, one of the best known contemporary philosophical treatments of the subject.

Group interaction is an essential way of social interaction and plays an important role in our social development. It has been found that when individuals participate in group interactions, the group identity of the interaction partner affects the mental processing and behavioral decision-making of subjects. However, little is known about how deaf college students, who are labeled distinctly different from normal hearing college students, will react when facing proposers from different groups in the ultimatum game and its (...) time course. In this study, we recruited 29 deaf college students who played the UG in which they received extremely unfair, moderately unfair, or fair offers from either outgroup members or ingroup members, while their brain potentials were recorded. The behavioral results showed that group membership did not impact the acceptance rate of deaf college students. But, event-related potential analysis demonstrated an enhanced feedback-related negativity elicited by ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Importantly, we found that under fairness conditions, deaf college students induced more positive P2 and P3 facing ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Our results demonstrated that group membership may modulate the performance of deaf college students in the UG and the existence of ingroup bias among deaf college students. This provides some evidence for the fairness characteristics of special populations, so that to improve the educational integration of colleges and universities. (shrink)

The question of why group-differentiated rights might be a requirement of justice has been a central focus of identity politics in recent decades. I attempt to bring some clarity to this discussion by proposing a typology to track the various ways in which individuals can be harmed or benefited as a consequence of their membership in social groups. It is the well-being of individuals that group-differentiated rights should be understood as protecting, and so clarity on the relationship (...) between group membership and well-being is vital. One of the problems with the way in which such justifications have often been formulated in the past has been that they inadvertently position the group as a handicap to be overcome, rather than a value to be protected. I seek to overcome this limitation by clearly specifying the circumstances under which group membership is a liability, and the circumstances under which it has value. While this distinction is important, in both cases there is a relevant interest at stake, and thus the groundwork can be laid for a defence of group-differentiated rights. (shrink)

This article is divided into two main sections. The first discusses “Female Inheritance and the Male Retention Hypothesis.” Permanent groups (groups with no inherent limit on group longevity) exist in several species because over generations members share important interests. Considering the association between cooperation and degree of relatedness, it seems to follow that a collective interest is more likely to be achieved when members show a higher degree of relatedness. I argue that if membership is inherited by only (...) one sex, and this is the female sex, this results in a higher degree of relatedness between group members than when membership is inherited by both sexes, or by males only. Indeed, this is found in the overwhelming majority of species of insects, fish, birds, and mammals living in permanent groups. The (few) exceptions to the rule are briefly discussed. Humans are of special interest because human preindustrial societies tend to show either male or female inheritance. The second section asks, “Do Moralizing Gods Raise Paternity Confidence?” Since males inherit valuable membership in patrilocal/lineal societies, they are expected to be more concerned about the probability of paternity than males in matrilocal/lineal societies. Moral rules, and specifically belief in moralizing gods, are expected to reflect this difference. An analysis of cross-cultural data of preindustrial societies does not refute the hypothesis that moralizing gods are more often found in patrilocal/lineal societies, nor is this hypothesis unambiguously supported. (shrink)

Johann Gottlieb Fichte argues that one semantic presupposition of claims about our entitlements is the idea that others are capable of autonomy. Individuals cannot demand anything from others, even submission, unless they also presuppose—although perhaps without acknowledging this to themselves—that others are free agents. Thus, the autonomy of others is a pre-condition of our exercise of autonomy. Why do individuals and groups often try to justify their own entitlement to rights at the expense of the freedom of others, thereby simultaneously (...) assuming and denying their freedom? This paper investigates what constitution of group agency gives individual members of the group the best chance to develop and sustain a moral character consistent with the ideal of equal autonomy. I argue that liberalism fosters the sort of group agency that improves individuals’ chances to acquire epistemically reliable beliefs about the moral status of others. I apply my findings to the discussion of court decisions in Gaines, Brown, and the race nuisance cases. (shrink)

Johann Gottlieb Fichte argues that one semantic presupposition of claims about our entitlements is the idea that others are capable of autonomy. Individuals cannot demand anything from others, even submission, unless they also presuppose—although perhaps without acknowledging this to themselves—that others are free agents. Thus, the autonomy of others is a pre-condition of our exercise of autonomy. Why do individuals and groups often try to justify their own entitlement to rights at the expense of the freedom of others, thereby simultaneously (...) assuming and denying their freedom? This paper investigates what constitution of group agency gives individual members of the group the best chance to develop and sustain a moral character consistent with the ideal of equal autonomy. I argue that liberalism fosters the sort of group agency that improves individuals’ chances to acquire epistemically reliable beliefs about the moral status of others. I apply my findings to the discussion of court decisions in Gaines, Brown, and the race nuisance cases. (shrink)

In this commentary, I focus on several problems that the authors' understanding of group identity raises: the legality of avoiding background diversity, the problem of effectively unshareable knowledge, the practical quality of some outcomes arrived at by groups with homogeneous backgrounds, and moral issues about fairness. I note also that much recent research challenges the view that background diversity is more likely to be a detriment than a benefit.

As part of an article symposium on Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal’s “Narrow Identities”, Miriam Teschl reflects on the distinctive concept of identity liberal cosmopolitans have and how it may or may not be captured in economic models of identity choice.

Is there something special about group rights? Many would say "yes". For some, only certain kinds of groups---ones that are oppressed, or play a special role in well-being---may have rights. For others, the kind of group is not as important as the group's culture and internal structure. At the very least, many argue, group rights ought to be more restricted than individualistic ones. For these reasons, arguing the merits of a group right is often thought (...) to require a theory of groups or of group identity. If only certain kinds of groups may have rights then one has to identify the roles that various groups and/or identities play in personal well-being. If a group's culture or internal structure must meet certain standards then one must develop a theory of how culture or the internal organization of a minority influences people. ;I argue that it is a mistake to think that arguing a group right requires a theory of groups. This mistake reflects a tendency to think about group membership as a kind of good and to focus on its internal, psychological significance. But if one thinks about group membership as a vehicle of action, and focuses on the concrete effects it may have, it becomes apparent that arguing for a group right does not require a theory of groups, group identity or culture. For in the end, the issues that one must address in arguing a group rights are issues about groups. Rather, they are issues about political and moral authority, and about the extent to which moral and political norms ought to recognize and reinforce the ways that people depend upon one another. These are important issues and they raise pressing questions for political philosophy. But they are not about groups. (shrink)

It has been repeatedly stated that approach and avoidance reactions to emotional faces are triggered by the intention signalled by the emotion. This line of thought suggests that each emotion signals a specific intention triggering a specific behavioural reaction. However, empirical results examining this assumption are inconsistent, suggesting that it might be too short-sighted. We hypothesise that the same emotional expression can signal different social messages and, therefore, trigger different reactions; which social message is signalled by an emotional expression should (...) be influenced by moderating variables, such as the group membership of the expresser. In two experiments, we show that group membership influences approach and avoidance reactions to emotional expressions: Emotions (fear and happiness) expressed by in-group members elicited concordant behaviour, whereas emotions expressed by out-group members activated the reverse pattern. A third experiment, in which participants directly evaluated smiling and fearful individuals resembling in-group and out-group members supported this result. (shrink)

Reasoning about social groups and their associated markers was investigated as a particular case of human reasoning about cue-category relationships. Assertions that reasoning involving cues and associated categories elicits specific probabilistic assumptions are supported by the results of three experiments. This phenomenon remains intact across the use of categorical syllogisms, conditional syllogisms, and the use of social groups that vary in their perceived cohesiveness, or entitativity. Implications are discussed for various theories of reasoning, and additional aspects of social group/coalitional (...) reasoning are also discussed. (shrink)

Some claim slavery did not harm the descendants of slaves since, without slavery, its descendants would never have been born and a life worth living, even one including the subsequent harms of past slavery, is preferable to never having been born at all. This creates a classic puzzle known as the non-identity argument, applied to reject the validity of claims for historic justice based on harms to descendants of victims of historic wrongs: since descendants are never harmed by historic wrongs, (...) they have no right to rectification. This conclusion is unintuitive. This article explains the nature of harm involved in historic injustice, overcoming the hurdle the non-identity argument poses to historic justice claims. Historic injustice and the harms it generates are best understood as group harms. Claims for historic justice can be grounded in harms currently living individuals suffer as a function of the harms their group or community currently suffers as a consequence of historic wrongs. One form of harm, constitutive harm, differs from the aggregative account of harm assumed by the non-identity argument and is immune to it. It is the type of harm people suffer as members of certain historically wronged groups and communities. Therefore, the constitutive harm people suffer in cases of historic injustice may serve as a basis for justifying claims for historic justice. (shrink)

A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights. Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously (...) yields the development of new group boundaries. Group membership is indeed a fundamental issue in political processes, for: “the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” – it is within the political community that power is being shared and, if possible, held back from non-members. In sum, it is appropriate to consider group membership a fundamental ingredient of politics and political theory. How group boundaries are drawn is then of only secondary importance. Indeed, Schmitt famously declared that “[e]very religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is suffciently strong to group human beings e#ectively according to friend and enemy”. Even though Schmitt’s idea of politics as being constituted by such antithetical groupings is debatable, it is plausible to consider politics among other things as a way of handling intergroup di#erences. Obviously, some of the group-constituting factors are more easily discernable from one’s appearance than others, like race, ethnicity, or gender. As a result, factors like skin color or sexual orientation sometimes carry much political weight even though individuals would rather con!ne these to their private lives and individual identity. Given the potential tension between the political reality of particular groupmembership defnitions and the – individual and political – struggles against those definitions and corresponding attitudes, citizenship and civic behavior becomes a complex issue. As Kymlicka points out, it implies for citizens an additional obligation to non-discrimination regarding those groups: “[t]his extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society is not just a shift in the scale of liberal norms, it also involves a radical extension in the obligations of liberal citizenship”. Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that political intolerance towards other groups “may be the more natural and ‘easy’ position to hold”. Indeed, since development of a virtue of civility or decency regarding other groups is not easy, as it often runs against deeply engrained stereotypes and prejudices, political care for matters like education is justified. Separate schools, for example, may erode children’s motivation to act as citizens, erode their capacity for it and!nally diminish their opportunities to experience transcending their particular group membership and behave as decent citizens. This chapter outlines a possible explanation for such consequences. That explanation will be found to be interdisciplinary in nature, combining insights from political theory and cognitive neuroscience. In doing so, it does not focus on collective action, even though that is a usual focus for political studies. For example, results pertaining to collective political action have demonstrated that the relation between attitudes and overt voting behavior or political participation is not as direct and strong as was hoped for. Several conditions, including the individual’s experiences, self-interest, and relevant social norms, turned out to interfere in the link between his or her attitude and behavior. Important as collective action is, this chapter is concerned with direct interaction between agents and the in$uence of group membership on such interaction – in particular joint action. Although politics does include many forms of action that require no such physical interaction, such physical interaction between individuals remains fundamental to politics – this is the reason why separate schooling may eventually undermine the citizenship of its isolated pupils. This chapter will focus on joint action, de!ned as: “any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment”. Cognitive neuroscienti!c evidence demonstrates that for such joint action to succeed, the agents have to integrate the actions and expected actions of the other person in their own action plans at several levels of speci!city. Although neuroscienti!c research is necessarily limited to simple forms of action, this concurs with a philosophical analysis of joint action, which I will discuss below. (shrink)

This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged . Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once . Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to (...) an individual that appeared distinct or distant from other group members than to an individual that was perceived to be similar or proximal to a cohesive group . This effect occurred for both human and nonhuman targets, and was driven by the perception of the target as an entitative group member rather than by the knowledge that the target was an entitative group member. (shrink)

In this article, we hypothesize that leaders who display group-oriented values (i.e., values that focus on the welfare of the group rather than on the self-interest of the leader) will be evaluated more positively by their followers than leaders who do not display group-oriented values. Importantly, we expected these effects to be more pronounced for leaders who are ingroup members (i.e., stemming from the same social group as their followers) than for leaders who are outgroup members (...) (i.e., leaders stemming from a different social group than their followers). We tested our hypotheses in two studies. Results of a field study (N = 95) showed the expected relationship between leaders’ group-oriented values and followers’ identification with their leaders. A scenario study (N = 137) replicated the results and extended it to followers’ endorsement of their leaders. Overall, these findings suggest that displaying group-oriented values pays off more for ingroup than for outgroup leaders. (shrink)

We examined developmental changes in British children’s (8- to 10-year-olds) and adolescents’ (13- to 15-year-olds,N = 340; FemaleN = 171, 50.3%) indirect bystander reactions (i.e., judgments about whether to get help and from whom when witnessing social exclusion) and their social-moral reasoning regarding their reactions to social exclusion. We also explored, for the first time, how the group membership of the excluder and victim affect participants’ reactions. Participants read a hypothetical scenario in which they witnessed a peer being (...) excluded from a school club by another peer. We manipulated the group membership of the victim (either British or an immigrant) and the group membership of the excluder (either British or an immigrant). Participants’ likelihood of indirect bystander reactions decreased from childhood into adolescence. Children were more likely to get help from a teacher or an adult than getting help from a friend, whereas adolescents were more likely to get help from a friend than getting help from a teacher or an adult. For both indirect bystander reactions, children justified their likelihood of responding by referring to their trust in their teachers and friends. Adolescents were more likely to refer to group loyalty and dynamics, and psychological reasons. The findings support and extend the Social Reasoning Developmental (SRD) approach by showing the importance of group processes with age in shaping children’s judgments about how to respond indirectly by asking for help from others, when they are bystanders in a situation that involves exclusion. The findings have practical implications for combating social exclusion and promoting prosocial bystander behavior in schools. (shrink)

The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key (...) ideas for creating a theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a “molecular” approach to emotions fits into this picture, and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles of our proposed framework can be extended to accommodate further cases. (shrink)

Adults are skilled at using language to construct/negotiate identity and to signal affiliation with others, but little is known about how these abilities develop in children. Clearly, children mirror statistical patterns in their local environment (e.g., Canadian children using zed instead of zee), but do they flexibly adapt their linguistic choices on the fly in response to the choices of different peers? To address this question, we examined the effect of group membership on 7‐ to 9‐year‐olds' labeling of (...) objects in a trivia game, exploring whether they were more likely to use a particular label (e.g., sofa vs. couch) if members of their “team” also used that label. In a preregistered study, children (N = 72) were assigned to a team (red or green) and were asked during experimental trials to answer questions—which had multiple possible answers (e.g., blackboard or chalkboard)—after hearing two teammates and two opponents respond to the same question. Results showed that children were significantly more likely to produce labels less commonly used by the community (i.e., dispreferred labels) when their teammates had produced those labels. Crucially, this effect was tied to group membership, and could not be explained by children simply repeating the most recently used label. These findings demonstrate how social processes (i.e., group membership) can guide linguistic variation in children. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that we are entitled to see in Schütz’s article “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure” the proposal for a formal analysis of group membership understood as a kind of We-experience irreducible to pure We-relationships. First I argue that such an account defines the experience of group membership as a “situation definition process”. Then I show the relevance of this approach for the description of membership experiences and current (...) debates on Collective Intentionality. Finally, I point to its unclarified conceptual presuppositions—such as the at­tribution of situations to groups—, and propose an interpretative solution by drawing on the notions of “social situation” and community of relevances from The Structures of the Life-World. (shrink)

Our prior research demonstrated that the right temporoparietal junction exerted a modulatory role in ingroup bias in emotional mimicry. In this study, two experiments were conducted to further explore whether the rTPJ is a neural region for emotional mimicry or for the modulation of emotional mimicry by group membership in a sham-controlled, double-blinded, between-subject design. Both experiments employed non-invasive transcranial direct current stimulation to temporarily change the cortical excitability over the rTPJ and facial electromyography to measure facial muscle (...) activations as an index of emotional mimicry. After the anodal or sham stimulation, participants in Experiment 1 passively viewed a series of happy clips, while participants in Experiment 2 viewed happy clips performed by ethnic ingroup and outgroup models. fEMG analyses revealed that participants in Experiment 1 showed the same degree of happy mimicry for both tDCS conditions and participants in Experiment 2 showed an ingroup bias in happy mimicry in the sham condition, which disappeared in the anodal condition. Taken together, the present study demonstrated that rTPJ plays a role in the modulation of emotional mimicry by group membership. (shrink)

Pietraszewski's model – though promising in many respects – needs to be extended so that it can explain the multitude of rich inferences that people draw from group membership. In this commentary, we highlight some facets of group thinking, especially from the field of developmental psychology, that cannot be unambiguously accounted for by a model that is built solely on relational cues.

Drawing from conflicts observed in online communities, I extend Pietraszewski's theory to accommodate phenomena dependent on the intersubjectivity of groups, where representations of group membership diverge. Doing so requires enriching representations to include other agents and their beliefs in a process of recursive mentalizing.

Self-monitoring theory explains the individual differences in using interpersonal adjustment techniques like self-control, self-regulation, and self-presentation. Self-monitoring plays a key role for understanding the social life. Therefore, it has been one of most popular research topics in social psychology. The aim of this study is to find out if there is a meaningful relationship between religious orientation and self-monitoring, and to determine the direction of the relationship if it exists. Besides, examining the effect of religious group membership on (...) self-monitoring is another aim of this study. In accordance with this purpose, Religious Orientation Scale and Revised Self-Monitoring Scale are applied to sample group which consists of 437 female and 369 male participants aged16 to 65+ living in Bursa. The results has revealed that there is a meaningful positive correlation between intrinsic religious orientation and self-monitoring. In addition, no meaningful relationship between religious group membership and self-monitoring has been confirmed.Summary: The adaptation process of the human being as a social creature starts in a mother's womb and becomes more complicated in consequence of coming into the world which is full of stimulus. In the beginning, this process has only a physical aspect, but with the inclusion of emotional, cognitive, and social factors over time turns into developmental tasks that people will struggle throughout their lives. The social development involves the process of becoming of the individual as an organic part of the society. As the individual realizes the existence of the other, he/she develops similar patterns of behavior that can be approved by the other. Because the meaningful relationships that form the backbone of social development constitute an important part of the self. Belonging is one of the main needs, that the individual shapes his emotions, actions, and decisions more or less in line with this need in order not to encounter the possibility of social exclusion. While belonging is a universal need for every healthy individual, there are differences between individuals in terms of directing the course of the relationship, role sharing, and using situational clues. Individual differences in how people construct interpersonal processes led Mark Snyder to systematize and theorize the concept of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is a concept that expresses individuals' control of self-presentation, expressive behavior, and non-verbal emotional expression and their regulation. Accordingly, individuals with a high tendency to shape their behavior according to the context are classified as high self-monitors and those with low tendency are classified as low self-monitors. It can be said that adherence to religion, which is one of the determinants of social behavior, is related to self-monitoring. In this context, the main subject of this study is the relationship between self-monitoring and religiosity. The study aims to examine the effect of intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity on individuals' self-monitoring levels. Besides, as a form of religiosity, to reveal whether religious group religiosity affects self-monitoring, the study examines also self-monitoring levels of individuals belonging to the religious group and those who are not.The sample of the study was selected by a simple random sampling method and it consists of 806 participants aged 16 to 65+ living in Bursa in 2017. 437 (54.2%) of the participants in the research are women and 369 (45.8%) are men. In this study, a relational screening model was used for determining the presence, direction, and degree of the relationship between the variables. The questionnaire technique was preferred as the method of gathering information. The questionnaire was arranged in a way that does not require asking the participant any other questions apart from the questions on the form. The questionnaire form used in this research consists of 43 items. At the beginning of the questionnaire, there is a 9-item personal information form that includes demographic items consisting of age, gender, educational status, marital status, occupation, place of residence, socio-economic status, levels of subjective religious involvement, and religious group membership. For the measurement of self-monitoring, a 12-item "Self-Monitoring Scale", which was developed by Mark Snyder, revised by Richard Lennox and Raymond Wolfe and adapted by İlknur Özalp Türetgen and Sevim Cesur to Turkish (α =.80) was used. For the measurement of religious orientation, a 22-item “Religious Orientation Scale” developed by Gordon Allport and Michael Ross and adapted to Turkish by Fatma Gül Cirhinlioğlu was used (α =.90). Data collected through scales were processed by One Way Variance Analysis (ANOVA), t-Test, Pearson Correlation Analysis, and Simple Linear Regression Analysis and turned into research findings.According to the results of the simple linear correlation analysis conducted to reveal whether there is a relationship between the self-monitoring scores of the participants and the intrinsic religious orientation scores, there is a positive and significant relationship between the variables (r = 0.102, p = 0.004 0.05). The result of the correlation analysis between self-monitoring and the level of subjective religious involvement shows that no significant relationship is found (r = 0.051, p = 0.146> 0.05).This research expected that there was a negative relationship between self-monitoring and intrinsic religious orientation. However, the analyses has not reported anticipated results as addressed in the previous research. Therefore, this study opens the door for asking new questions about the subject. Religious groups, by their very nature, can refer the individual to self-presentation control, obedience, to act as deemed appropriate by the group, to adapt to the group, to change behavior without attitude change, and therefore, to attitude-behavior inconsistency. It can be argued that not only religious groups but, by their nature, all social groups create harmony-oriented pressure on the individual. Therefore, it can be predicted that belonging to a group, in general, may have a significant effect on the level of self-monitoring. The high self-monitoring scores of the participants, whether religious or non-religious group members of this study may have reduced the observability of the difference between the two groups. Therefore, repeating the study on a different sample may produce different results. (shrink)

In this article, we hypothesize that leaders who display group-oriented values (i.e., values that focus on the welfare of the group rather than on the self-interest of the leader) will be evaluated more positively by their followers than leaders who do not display group-oriented values. Importantly, we expected these effects to be more pronounced for leaders who are ingroup members (i.e., stemming from the same social group as their followers) than for leaders who are outgroup members (...) (i.e., leaders stemming from a different social group than their followers). We tested our hypotheses in two studies. Results of a field study ( N = 95) showed the expected relationship between leaders’ group-oriented values and followers’ identification with their leaders. A scenario study ( N = 137) replicated the results and extended it to followers’ endorsement of their leaders. Overall, these findings suggest that displaying group-oriented values pays off more for ingroup than for outgroup leaders. (shrink)

Pietraszewski misrepresents both the nature of behaviour in conflict and the ability of psychology to theorise the relational properties of group designation. At the behavioural level, he focusses exclusively on “attack,” when consolation/care in conflict is equally present and important. At the theoretical level, he ignores existing psychological work on how group perception is shaped by the meta-contrast principle.

Justifications of group-differentiated rights commonly overlook a crucial practical consideration: if rights are to be allocated on the basis of group membership, how should we determine which individuals belong to which group? Assuming that social identities are fixed and transparent runs the risk of creating further injustices, whilst acknowledging that social groups are porous and heterogeneous runs the risk of rendering group-differentiated rights impracticable. In this paper, I develop a schema for determining group (...) class='Hi'>membership which avoids both horns of this dilemma. (shrink)

Much scientific research is characterized by a high degree of multidisciplinarity and interdependence between the experts. In these cases research may be described as a group activity, and as such analysed in terms of the intentions of the participants. In this paper I apply Bratman's notion of shared intentionality to explain the relations between social and epistemic elements in groups with a truth-oriented common goal. I argue that in truth-oriented activities the disposition to help – which is a constitutive (...) part of Bratman's notion of shared intentionality – takes the form of a commitment not to lie, and that mutual knowledge of this commitment gives the members an entitlement to rely on other members' testimonies. Thus, in truth-oriented group activities, common knowledge of the disposition toward mutual support gives epistemic relevance to cooperation. Scientific research is shaped by the coexistence of social and epistemic elements: social relations influence knowledge attributions, and the epistemic goal of the activity confers a particular character to these relations. (shrink)

In April 2015, an international team of researchers announced the measurement, for the first time, of the first ionization energy of lawrencium, a superheavy element of atomic number 103. The experimental result, published in the prestigious scientific journal Nature, led to the reopening of a long-standing debate that concerns the elements that should be part of group 3 of the periodic table. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new line of argumentation to elucidate this problem.

Justice is illustrated by how humans treat others. Human society can no longer be considered just if it continues to treat animals instrumentally, disregarding the moral worth of each individual creature. Emile Durkheim's division of labor theory offers a groundwork for providing animals limited rights within a human-dominated society. Solidarity can be fostered between animals and humans by internalizing the principle that all organisms are interdependent. This principle is the foundation for granting animals moral status. By recognizing the role animals (...) play in our society, we can acknowledge our obligations to them. Utilizing a mechaorganic solidarity, humans can establish justification for moral treatment of animals. (shrink)

In recent years, membership has dropped in traditional voluntary associations such as Rotary Clubs, Jaycees, and bowling leagues. At the same time, concern is rising about the growth of paramilitary and hate groups. Scholars have warned that these trends are undermining civic society by creating a dangerous number of isolated, mistrustful individuals and organized, antisocial renegades. In this provocative book, however, Nancy Rosenblum takes a new, less narrowly political approach to the study of groups. And she reaches more optimistic (...) conclusions about the state of civil society. Rosenblum argues that we should judge associations not only by what they do for civic virtue, but also by what they do for individual members. She shows that groups of all kinds--among them religious groups, corporations, homeowner associations, secret societies, racial and cultural identity groups, prayer groups, and even paramilitary groups--fill deep psychological and moral needs. And she contends that the failure to recognize this has contributed to an alarmist view of their social impact. For example, she argues that, although extremist groups have obvious antisocial aims, they constrain individuals who would be even more dangerous as maladjusted loners. And she examines the rapid growth of small "support groups"--which are usually dismissed as politically irrelevant--and shows that the moral support people find in such places as prayer groups and self-help groups helps to cultivate the social trust some scholars say is disappearing. Rosenblum concludes that, for practical and principled reasons, American democracy should permit expansive freedom of association, illustrating her case with discussion of specific cases in law. Rosenblum recognizes, however, that freedom has a price. She reminds us that some groups have oppressive and even criminal tendencies, and she explores what liberal democracy should do to ensure that individuals also have freedom within associations and freedom to exit. Throughout, Rosenblum writes eloquently and with a powerful moral voice, drawing on law, practical politics, and psychology to produce an original political theory of the moral uses of pluralism. The book adds remarkable depth and subtlety to one of the leading subjects in contemporary social and political debate. (shrink)

The world’s elderly population is growing, and in Chile they represent 16.2% of the total population. In Chile, old age is marked by retirement, with a dramatic decrease in income that brings precariousness. Older adults are economically, socially, and psychologically vulnerable populations. This condition increases their likelihood of disengaging from their usual social environment, facilitating their isolation, sadness, and discomfort. From the perspective of social identity, well-being can be explained by two principles: social groups’ importance for health and people’s psychological (...) identification with those groups. This study analyzes the relationships between belonging to the neighborhood and extra-neighborhood groups and neighborhood social identification with WB. Urban or rural location and gender are measured, and the sample is 1,475 older Chilean adults of both sexes. The results show that the majority are not members of social groups, and the remaining 48% are members of one or two groups or organizations. Only 4.47% belong to three groups or organizations. Those who belong to groups obtain higher scores, emotional–mental WB, and positive emotions than older adults who do not belong to any organization. Urban and rural older adults have the same level of WB. Membership in close social organizations or distant ones causes different WB associations. Membership in neighborhood councils reduces gender differences in self-assessment of health. This result supports the idea that participation in heterogeneous groups with a shared sense of belonging to the neighborhood is associated with higher WB and lower perceived loneliness. Social identification with the neighborhood, rather than belonging to the group, had the most widespread impact on WB and health indicators. The variable social identification with the neighborhood was consistently associated with indicators of hedonic WB. (shrink)