“Congealing” is a word that evokes senses of unpleasantness where perhaps something inviting had once been. It also implies that things are becoming less fluid and more rigid. As we began organizing ETHICOMP 2018, we wanted a theme that reflected the impact of technologies on human cultures, practices and lives. Our initial draft of the theme was “Creating, Changing, and Congealing Ways of Life with Technologies.” And while we were eventually persuaded to use a more congenial way of putting the (...) idea (it became “Creating, Changing, and Coalescing Ways of Life with Technologies”), in some ways, it remains true for us that “congealing,” and its connotations of something less pleasant, gets at the original idea. As we incorporate technologies into our practices, much attention is paid to how they change our ways of doing things. But technologies can also help ways of life set-up and harden like yesterday’s leftovers – not appealing, yet difficult to budge and sometimes quite unhealthy. Once a particular process is built around a piece of technology, it can become entrenched and increasingly difficult to change. For a historical example, consider how difficult it was to adapt records and software on the eve of the 21st century in response to the so-called “Y2K” problem. In early software development, efficient use of memory was an important design consideration. It had become a standard practice to use a 2-digit field for the year, which would roll to from “99” to “00” in the year 2000, causing problems for datedependent functions. Technologies can also reflect and reinforce existing cultural tendencies. For a recent example, consider the human resources software created by Amazon that used its existing hiring data to train a machine-learning system to rate applicants. The resulting system turned out to be biased against women applicants, downranking resumes that included the word “woman” or “women’s.” Amazon ended up scrapping the project altogether. Because of these kinds of effects, we wanted to encourage people to think beyond well-worn paradigms like “technologies are disruptive” to consider other kinds of effects they can have. As it happened, the imagery of “congealing” proved distasteful enough that the steering committee opted for a more neutral term. But even with the less-dramatic wording the conference ended up attracting a rich and diverse range of papers that examined technological issues from a variety of angles, exactly as we had hoped. (shrink)

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)

The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary, rather than opposite, and by claiming this, the article presents a discussion with Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. It is claimed that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of a phenomenological method, one has to take into consideration especially Husserl’s B III 10 signature manuscripts. By referring to the manuscripts, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both ways of inquiry. Moreover, the author (...) claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method steams from Husserl’s inquiries into the concept of consciousness as defined in Ideas I. (shrink)

1. Phenomenology is first and foremost about intentionality. As Husserl puts it, “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology”.1 Broadly understood, the phen...

La compréhension de la raison humaine a été déterminante pour la phénoménologie de Husserl. Des Recherches logiques à la Krisis , le problème de la raison semble l'un de ses principaux thèmes de réflexion. Husserl aborde la question sous plusieurs angles distincts, évoquant les concepts de monde, de temps et de responsabilité. Ses découvertes l'ont conduit à identifier la crise de la culture. Les commentateurs doivent aujourd'hui mettre en question le concept husserlien de raison, s'ils veulent comprendre pleinement cette thèse. (...) Cet article fait valoir que le concept de raison de Husserl est élaboré en corrélation avec celui de non-raison, conduisant les phénoménologues à adopter une division binaire entre rationalité et irrationalité. Par contraste avec les commentateurs qui accentuent le caractère rationnel de la phénoménologie husserlienne, cet article affirme que l'introduction du concept d'irrationalité dans l'investigation phénoménologique élargit significativement la compréhension initiale de la phénoménologie telle qu'elle est définie dans les Recherches . Husserl fut confronté à cette question par ses propres recherches. En conséquence, on affirme ici que la phénoménologie a connu un développement immanent menant de la thèse de la raison objective à celle de la corrélation entre raison et non-raison. (shrink)

Author: Płotka Witold Title: AT ORIGINS OF THE CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF COGNITION IN THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (U źródeł krytyki teorii poznania w szkole frankfurckiej) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 769-790 Keywords: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL, ADORNO, HUSSERL, THEORY OF COGNITION, CRITIQUE OF TECHNIQUES, CRISIS OF CULTURE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The author argues that the Frankfurt School’s critique of phenomenology as the theory of cognition (as (...) defined by Theodore W. Adorno) is unjustified. The article is divided into five main parts. In the first part, historical, as well as theoretical relations between the two philosophical currents are reconstructed. In the second part, Adorno’s critique of the theory of cognition is defined with regard to Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. The third part of the article analyses why Adorno’s critique seems to be unjustified. The author shows that Husserl denied the theses which Adorno criticized. In the fourth part, the author enlarges the argument by showing that Husserl’s critique of scientific rationality is similar with Adorno’s proposition. Nonetheless, in the fifth part the author stresses main differences between the two critiques of rationality. (shrink)

This important new book provides a philosophical and historical analysis of the subject, looking at a review of sociological and political theories concerning ...

The Republic of the Ukraine has a huge prison population and a large prison health care system. Like all other public services in that country it is lacking in sufficient funds to operate adequately and with due respect to the human rights of the prisoners and its health care employees. This report and observations are based on my knowledge of the Ukrainian health care system and a visit to a Ukrainian prison hospital. It includes some ethical reflections stemming from this (...) experience. Although problem-solving exercises can often help to point to areas of potential intervention that could ameliorate a troublesome situation, in this case prison health care conditions cannot be substituted for economic growth, political stability or increased awareness of societal moral obligations. (shrink)

The paper critically examines the thesis, popular in the literature, that Leopold Blaustein’s aesthetics is first and foremost a phenomenological discipline. I argue that the “phenomenological” nature of Blaustein’s philosophy follows from Brentano and Twardowski, rather than from Husserl. I therefore claim that Blaustein’s aesthetics is determined by two equally important themes: (1) a descriptive-psychological and (2) a “phenomenological” one. The article is structured as follows. The introduction situates Blaustein’s aesthetics within classical aesthetics. Section 1 reconstructs the Brentanian background of (...) Blaustein’s aesthetics. Section 2 contains a discussion of Blaustein’s assessment of Twardowski’s theory of presentations, which is followed, in Section 3, by an analysis of Blaustein’s example descriptions of aesthetic experiences. These descriptions are discussed in Section 4, which also reconstructs the main elements of Blaustein’s phenomenology of aesthetic experiences. Against this background, the question of the alleged psychologism of Blaustein’s aesthetics is addressed in Conclusions. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest Tomasza z Akwinu koncepcja radości, której źródłem jest cierpienie innych osób (Schadenfreude). Pierwsza część obejmuje opis starożytnych źródeł Schadenfreude, którymi inspirował się Akwinata. Druga część dotyczy koncepcji nienawiści, która stanowi podstawę dla Schadenfreude. W trzeciej zaś części jest przedstawiona Tomaszowa próba rozróżnienia rozmaitych przypadków występowania Schadenfreude oraz ich częściowego moralnego usprawiedliwienia.

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)

The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily (...) point to basic intuitions that justify thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism. (shrink)

This book presents the origins of Central and Eastern European phenomenology. It features chapters that explore the movement's development, its most important thinkers, and its theoretical and historical context. This collection examines such topics as the realism-idealism controversy, the status of descriptive psychology, the question of the phenomenological method, and the problem of the world. The chapters span the first decades of the development of phenomenology in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia before World War II. The contributors track the (...) Brentanian heritage of the development. They show how this tradition inspired influential thinkers like Celms, Špet, Ingarden, Frank, Twardowski, Patočka, and others. The book also puts forward original investigations. Moreover it elaborates new accounts of the foundations of phenomenology. While the volume begins with the Brentanian heritage, it situates phenomenology in a dialogue with other important schools of thought of that time, including the Prague School and Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic. This collection highlights thinkers whose writings have had only a limited reception outside their home countries due to political and historical circumstances. It will help readers gain a better understanding of how the phenomenological movement developed beyond its start in Germany. Readers will also come to see how the phenomenological method resonated in different countries and led to new philosophical developments in ontology, epistemology, psychology, philosophy of culture, and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Artykuł jest dyskusją z wybranymi elementami interpretacji pracy Witolda Płotki pt. Studia z fenomenologii poznania. Transcendentalna filozofia Edmunda Husserla a problem wiedzy, którą sformułował Michał Piekarski. W artykule pyta się o relację metody fenomenologicznej do szeroko pojętego postępowania analitycznego, wskazując na podobieństwa i różnice pomiędzy oboma podejściami. Ponadto autor przybliża rozumienie języka przez Husserla, zwłaszcza w kontekście analizy noematu.

Artykuł jest próbą sformułowania fenomenologii solidarności jako zjawiska społecznego. Autor odróżnia solidaryzację subiektywną od intersubiektywnej, podkreślając, że w tym drugim przypadku ma się do czynienia z konstytucją grup. Artykuł jest podzielony na trzy zasadnicze części. W pierwszej z nich analizuje się tzw. problem mostu, czyli prezentuje się zasadność przejścia od analizy solidaryzacji subiektywnej do intersubiektywnej. Punktem wyjścia są przy tym teorie Ingardena i Tischnera. Następnie prezentuje się opis struktury i elementów solidarności jako aktu złożonego. Na tej podstawie autor formułuje zarys (...) alternatywnego ujęcia solidarności jako konstytucji grup i odniesienia się do świata jako wspólnego. (shrink)

Artykuł koncentruje się na trzech aspektach doświadczenia miłosnego pragnienia. Chcę pokazać, że po pierwsze średniowieczni autorzy mistyczni – Ryszard od św. Wiktora, Beatrycze z Nazaretu i inni – w analizie ludzkiej drogi do Boga przenieśli punkt ciężkości z zaspokojenia pragnienia Boga na sam akt pragnienia (Boga, tj. przedmiotu miłości). Po drugie dopuszczali oni możliwość, że doświadczenie duchowe może manifestować się w ciele, można go doświadczać zmysłowo i cieleśnie. I po trzecie zauważyli, że pragnieniu miłości często towarzyszyły cierpienie oraz ból. Z (...) ich rozważań wyłania się obraz dynamiki miłości i pragnienia: nieobecność przedmiotu, niezaspokojone pragnienie, cielesność i elementy cierpienia są ze sobą powiązane w ten sposób, że wszystkie tworzą aspekty doświadczenia afektywnego. Powyższe cechy są zatem aspektami jednego doświadczenia: pragnienie jest związane z nieobecnością przedmiotu, cielesne doświadczanie pragnienia często przybiera postać fizycznego bólu i cierpienia. Charakterystyka trzech wymienionych aspektów – nieobecności przedmiotu pragnienia, roli cielesności w pragnieniu oraz obecności cierpienia w pragnieniu miłosnym – zostanie przedstawiona w trzech kolejnych częściach niniejszego artykułu. (shrink)

Summary The article explores psychological motives in Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. Blaustein was educated in Lvov, Freiburg im Breisgau and Berlin. In his original explorations, he attempted to connect a phenomenological perspective with descriptive psychology. As trained by Twardowski, he took over some motives of understanding the method of philosophy (psychology), its objectives and aims. The author situates Blaustein also in a dialogue with Stumpf and next to the context of Dilthey’s humanistic psychology is examined. Finally, the article explores the influences (...) of Gestalt psychology on Blaustein. The ultimate thesis of the article is that Blaustein’s method can be grasped as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology. (shrink)

The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ingarden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a (...) student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is divided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic experience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to define the framework in which one can situate Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. The author focuses on the question of the method which is used by Blaustein and he situates it in the historical-philosophical context. The article defends the thesis that Blaustein uses a method which can be labelled as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology that is close to, though not identical with, Edmund Husserl’s project as formulated in the first edition of his Logical (...) Investigations and that is connected to Husserl’s 1925 lectures on the phenomenological psychology. The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author disputes the one-sided classifications of Blaustein’s philosophy either as a continuator of the analytical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, or as a mere repetition of Husserl’s achievements. In the next part, the author sketches an intellectual biography of Blaustein and on this basis he defines the context in which one has to situate this thought. In this regard, two further parts of the article are devoted to two sources of inspiration for Blaustein. In the third part, a selection of methods and concepts of descriptive psychology are examined, and in the last part of the article, references to Husserl’s phenomenology are explored. (shrink)

The article explores two phenomenologies of image consciousness that were formulated by Ingarden and Blaustein, both of whom were students of Husserl. Both philosophers analyze image consciousness in the context of the phenomenon of contemplating a painting. The article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 presents the historical background of Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s explorations. In Section 2, Ingarden’s description of a painting as different from an image is reconstructed. In Section 3, Ingarden’s analysis of Husserl’s image consciousness is discussed. (...) Section 4 concerns Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, which was formulated in a critical elaboration of Husserl’s philosophy. Section 5 discusses the detailed components of Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, i.e., his theory of psychic representations. This theory is then used in Section 6 in an analysis of Blaustein’s reading of § 111 of Husserl’s Ideas I. Section 7 summarizes both theories in order to draw parallels and differences between Ingarden and Blaustein. In this regard, it is argued that both philosophers refer to different theoretical contexts when discussing Husserl’s idea of image consciousness. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological (...) psychology. The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses. (shrink)

The article presents Paul’s of Worczyn theory of action. The article is divided into three parts: in the first one, Paul’s theory of action as a movement is presented. The second part concentrates on twofold division of action, practicaand praxis. The third part clarifies the problem of the principle of action. The article ends with a conclusion that Paul’s theoretical solutions within the theory of action are consistent with his anthropological stance accentuating the unity of the soul and its powers.

Niniejszy tom Studia Philosophiae Christianae zawiera część artykułów zaprezentowanych podczas międzynarodowej konferencji zorganizowanej w październiku 2015 r. na Uniwersytecie Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie dla upamiętnienia sześćsetnej rocznicy wystąpienia Pawła Włodkowica na Soborze Powszechnym w Konstancji. Wraz z polskim przekładem wystąpienia Michaela Walzera – gościa specjalnego konferencji – stanowią one próbkę rozważań dotyczących zaledwie kilku aspektów niezwykle rozległej problematyki łączącej się z teorią wojny sprawiedliwej. Mamy nadzieję, że staną się one inspiracją do dalszych badań w dziedzinie etyki wojny – zachowującej (...) wciąż, mimo upływu wieków, jak również próby ogłoszenia przed kilkudziesięciu laty epoki „końca historii”, swoją niezmienną aktualność. (shrink)

The article presents the transcendental reduction as a type of questioning, and by so doing formulates the problem of the structure and motivation of reduction. Transcendental questioning is presented as a permanent formulation and reformulation of questions, which, it is argued, make it possible to overcome the naïveté of the natural attitude. However, the phenomenologist does not overcome naïveté in the sense of excluding it; instead, he is conscious of it. It is argued that one should understand transcendental questioning as (...) a practical activity that makes the phenomenologist responsible for knowledge by leading toward the essence, which seems to be “unquestionable.”. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to define reduction as the beginning of philosophy. The author considers such questions as: What motivates a phenomenologist to do reduction? Can one speak of philosophy before reduction? What is the essence of reduction? To answer these questions the author refers to Husserl, Fink and, Patočka, and tries to show that reduction is to be understood as an unmotivated expression of philosopher’s will to overcome evidence inherent to natural attitude. The author argues that reduction enables (...) one a problematization of the world as such. Finally, reduction is defined as an attempt to take doing philosophy seriously. (shrink)

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl ; (...) Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie. (shrink)