Discusses G. A. Widdershoven's hypothesis that contemporary hermeneutical philosophers believe that truth is neither absolute nor relative, which is based on the hermeneutical philosophies of Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Habermas. However, to be representative of the thought of hermeneutical philosophers, one would need to include M. Heidegger's notion of geworfenheit, since this notion is instrumental in viewing the impact of non-rational factors on human thinking and "truth." 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

The Beiträge zur Philosophie mandates a paradigm shift in Heidegger scholarship. In the face of (1) widespread disarray in the current model, the new paradigm (2) abandons Sein as a name for die Sache selbst, (3) understands Welt/Lichtung/Da as that which gives being, (4) interprets Dasein as apriori openedness rather than as being-there, (5) understands the Kehre as the interface of Geworfenheit and Entwurf, not as a shift in Heidegger's thinking, (6) interprets Ereignis as the opening of the Da (...) rather than as appropriation, and (7) understands human finitude as what gives all forms of being and all epochs in the history of being. The conclusion alludes to the function of Mitdasein (co-openness) as die Sache selbst. (shrink)

This essay traces the development of Levinas’s conception of Judaism from 1928 to1947 with an aim to reveal how Levinas’s postwar conceptions of Jewish election and anti-historicism derive from his early treatments of the Heideggerian themes of Geworfenheit (thrownness) and historicality. In the process, I show how the similarities that Levinas perceived between Heidegger and Rosenzweig allowed him to recast Heideggerian categories in Jewish terms. Finally the essay considers the potential political implications and tensions that follow from Levinas’s concern (...) after World War II to maintain Rosenzweig’s contention that Judaism stands outside of History. (shrink)

In his later writings, Althusser brings to light a repressed materialistic current in Western philosophy, ranging from Epicurus to Heidegger and Derrida. In this article, I argue that the comparison between Epicurus's conception of Nature and Heidegger's concepts of _Geworfenheit_ and _Es gibt_ allows Althusser to lay the foundation for a new notion of event. Through the analysis of this philosophical connection, Althusser aims both to think of Time and History in a non-teleological way and to create the conditions for (...) a political praxis that does not apply any kind of metaphysical principles to a constantly changing reality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Limits of Self-ConstitutionJames Phillips, MD (bio)I am in general agreement with the authors that a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic approach is a good response to simple pruning procedures. That said, however, I do have questions about how they develop their argument.I was surprised at the very notion of pruning, and quite surprised that it is as popular as the authors suggest. The idea that Pete should deal with his (...) inappropriate outbursts by erasing or pruning that aspect of his personality seems so ridiculous that it beggars belief. It leaves one wondering whether Pete, or anyone agreeing with this argument, is credulous enough to think you can just prune away an undesirable part of yourself.The authors write:Importantly, this expulsion is often thought to be a good thing not simply because the undesirable elements are morally wanting but because in some important sense, they are not really a part of the agent proper. This point many seem extravagantly wishful, but is intuitively plausible.Really, “intuitively plausible” that personality traits are not part of the agent? I can understand that the agent may not grasp his or her involvement in the undesirable trait, but to argue that the trait is in reality not part of agent is a very odd claim on the part of the authors.When the authors write that “It would be difficult to exaggerate the prominence of the pruning view of agential self-constitution in philosophy,” they are strongly connecting the notions of pruning and self-constitution. I am aware that self-constitution is a major theme for philosophers like Korsgaard. The authors strongly embrace this principle in drawing out their arguments.In a footnote to their article the authors claim that various notions of a “true self” imply a pruned self. For Winnicott, an originator of the “true self,” this note of pruning does not hold. Winnicott contrasts the true self, a sense of self based on spontaneous authentic experience and a feeling of being alive, with a false self, a defensive veneer without the vivacity of the true self. The notion of pruning simply does not belong in this discussion.What the authors and their supporting philosophers leave out are two limitations to self-constitution. For the first, let me invoke another philosopher, Martin Heidegger, and his notion of “thrownness”—Geworfenheit. We are “thrown” into the world in the particular circumstances of our birth. We do not self-constitute our beginnings; we are plunged into them. The question then becomes what we make of these beginnings. [End Page 209] If they are undesirable, we can brood over them, or we can attempt to overcome them. And as we all know, if the beginnings are bad enough, we may not be able to overcome them.The second limitation to self-constitution resides in the “self.” Does the individual constitute him or her self, or is it more a matter of the self developing out of dialogic relationship of self and other? Here I invoke another philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, who has addressed this issue from a number of perspectives. At a deictic level, the “I” or the self is a shifter that takes on a different meaning depending on its context. At the level of pragmatics, the individual is engaged in illocutionary speech that is addressed to another person, implying, in simple terms, that we live in dialogue. Still more pertinent to this discussion, Ricoeur notes that self-knowledge is not straightforward: “the self does not immediately know itself, but only knows itself indirectly by way of the detour through the cultural signs of all sorts that make us say that action is symbolically mediated” (Ricoeur, 2016, p. 240). And finally, Ricoeur argues for the priority of alterity over reflexivity. “Pushing further yet the primacy of alterity over reflexivity, some will emphasize the dependence of personal identities on identifications with... heroes, emblematic characters, models and teachers” (p. 248). To clarify this statement, Ricoeur is contrasting self-constitution through reflection with a self-other relationship in which the self needs the other to constitute itself—and, of course, he is making a case for the latter.Although I am questioning the authors’ concepts of... (shrink)

La presente ponencia se origina a partir de la siguiente pregunta: ¿«raza» (Rasse) y «sexo» (Geschlecht) son conceptos bajo los cuales es posible hallar una filosofía latente del cuerpo en Heidegger? En cuanto concierne al concepto de «raza», es patente el carácter ambiguo de dicha pregunta, si se toma en consideración la recepción que han tenido los Cuadernos negros, a saber, como el material a partir del cual cabría determinar hasta qué punto el antisemitismo «contaminaría» la filosofía de Heidegger. Y (...) ello porque la aproximación heideggeriana al concepto de lo «racial» (rassisch) consistirá precisamente en rechazar toda comprensión naturalista o biológica para transponerla de manera digamos «ontológica» en el concepto de lo «de buena casta» (rassig), el cual está fundamentado en el «ser-arrojado» (Geworfenheit) como constituyente del «pueblo» (Volk) en su carácter historial. Por otro lado, es de común acuerdo el carácter problemático tanto de la corporalidad como de la espacialidad en la ontología heideggeriana, en tanto parece otorgárseles un lugar meramente «óntico» que debe ser reconducido asimismo de manera ontológica al «corporar» (leiben) codeterminante del «ser-en-el-mundo». Dicha aproximación a la corporalidad, por ejemplo, en los Seminarios de Zollikon, que consiste en calificarla de «condición necesaria pero no suficiente», es la misma que caracteriza su posición crítica con respecto a la «raza», la cual consistiría en el gesto impropio de elevar «una condición al estatuto de lo incondicionado». Dicho gesto mostrará su aporía en tanto debe al mismo tiempo expulsar fuera de sí un «resto»: en el caso de la raza, un pueblo que rehúsa su carácter de «pueblo». Finalmente, se abordará un intento de pensar la «raza» en su materialidad a través del concepto de «mestizaje». (shrink)

"Heidegger's way of understanding the originary phenomenon of truth is to "make clear the mode of being of the cognition itself." His starting point is a proposition that is not based on intuition. Someone says with his or her back to the wall: this picture hangs askew. The proposition embodies the claim to have discovered the picture (as a being) in the "how" (the mode) of its being. The proposition displays this "how" of being in language. In the attempt to (...) verify the proposition by sensuous experience, the recognition, according to Heidegger, is directed only to the intended being (the picture) and not to the proposition. It is directed to the being itself (which is to be verified by perception) in its mode of uncoveredness (Entdeckt-heir), i.e., in its showing-itself. Confirmation (Bewährung) means this showing-itself of the being in the same way in which it is intended in the proposition. A true proposition shows the being in its mode of uncoveredness. The phenomenon of "originary truth" does not have the character of correspondence. It is the ground of the concept of truth in the sense of correspondence and propositional truth. By unfolding the meaning of alétheia Heidegger shows us a more originary sense of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). He wants to show that this concept coincides with the first and originary concept of truth in Greek thinking. In this primary sense only the discovering human Dasein can be "true" while it is Being-discovering (Entdeckend-Sein). On the other hand, beings (Seiendes) that we can find in the world can only "be" in a secondary mode, i.e., as being-discovered (Entdecktsein). They can only make a claim to uncoveredness. Their fundament is the Being-discovering of the human Dasein. The being-true of a discovered being is only possible as being discovered by human Dasein as being-in-the-world. The authentic Being of Dasein, the being-in-the truth, presupposes disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the world in states-of-mind (Befindlichkeiten), understanding, and discourse, i.e., the constitution of the being (Seinsverfassung) of human Dasein as thrownness (Geworfenheit) and project (Entwurf).. (shrink)

The article seeks a confrontation between phenomenology - in its husserlian and existential forms - with indian philosophy, Particularly the nyaya--Vaisesika, Samkhya--Vedanta and buddhist schools. Confrontation with husserlian phenomenology is carried through under three headings: (a) methodology, (b) theory of the 'eidos' and (c) the notion of transcendental subjectivity. Despite close affinities, Indian thought is found to lack the dialectics of intention and fulfillment and the supposed temporality and historicity of transcendental subjectivity. The existential concepts of 'sorge' and 'geworfenheit' (...) are set beside the indian concepts of 'duhkha' and 'samsara', The concepts of freedom and nothingness are contrasted, The notion of 'karma' evaluated. Some major trends of modern indian thought, Especially that of k.C. Bhattacharyya, Are then set in this entire context. (shrink)

Philosophie als -sterben wollen- (Platon) bestimmt die Tradition bis hin zur -Geworfenheit zum Tode- (Heidegger). Die Welt fuhrt sich mit diesem Menschenbild entsprechend auf. Sich absolut setzende Wahrheiten blenden die Wahrnehmung aus, dass wir in einer falschen Welt mit falschem Bewusstsein leben. Der Poet Schiller mokiert sich in seinem Gedicht "Die Taten der Philosophen" (1795) hierzu. In der Schlusszeile spricht er die Krafte an, die aus dem Leben alle Wesen und in besonderer Weise den Menschen bestimmen: HUNGER und LIEBE. (...) Vorliegende Arbeit ist der Versuch einer Theorie des poetischen Menschen aus diesen Urkraften des Lebens. Es ist der Versuch der Wiedervereinigung von KUNST und Mensch und Absage an alle Wahrheits-Ideologien. Der poetische Mensch kennt nur Wahrheiten -auf Zeit-. Einzig im Willen zum Leben kann eine neue Welt gedichtet werden...". (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit, the Dasein, thrown in the world by Geworfenheit and relaunched by Entwurf (projection) into the future, experiences itself as a “Self”. This exercise of existence cannot escape the critique of solipsism. However, paragraph 29 — about the existentiale of Befindlichkeit — opens an access way to the Other, which later will be ceaselessly explored by Heidegger, after having found the Stimmungen of the Greek beginning in Holderlin’s poetry and the Grund Stimmungen of “the night of (...) the gods” and of the forgetfulness of being of our time. Not until the fifties and the mystical experience of the fourfold (das Geviert) will Heidegger find the possibility of transmuting the experience of the Other from a πόλεμος into a being-in-harmony (stimmen). This unique path of affectivity, asserted in paragraph 29 of Sein und Zeit, will enable Heidegger to reach an essential way of working out the question of Otherness, that only right now we may be starting to understand. (shrink)

This essay confronts Heidegger′s and Lukács′s thinking regarding several fundamental ontological questions. Some considerations are presented on the concepts of “In-der-Welt-Sein” and “das Ansichseiende” , on the role of labour in the evolution of mankind, on the importance of causality for both philosophers and – last but not least – on the relationship between science and philosophy. Special emphasis is given to the Heideggerian concept of “Geworfenheit” and also to Lukács′s critique of that concept. The opposition between Heidegger′s hermeneutics (...) and Lukács′s ontological-genetic method takes centre stage in this confrontation. (shrink)

In this article, the author narrates the story of the second English translation of Being and time. In the first part, the author describes both the personal history and the general cultural situation which led to the necessity of a new translation of Sein und Zeit. In the second part of the essay, the author discusses some of the Heideggerian terms as Da-sein, Wiederholung, Verfallen, Geworfenheit, Befindlichkeit, focusing on the meaning and the central role of temporality in the project (...) of existential analytic. (shrink)

Die Broschure enthalt den fur die Veroffentlichung durchgesehenen und an einigen Stellen erweiterten Text eines Briefes, der im Herbst 1946 an Jean Beaufret (Paris) geschrieben wurde. Die erste Veroffentlichung erfolgte 1947 zusammen mit Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit im Francke Verlag. Als selbststandige Schrift erschien der Text erstmals 1949 im Verlag Vittorio Klostermann. Die 11. Auflage ist wort- und seitengleich mit dem Abdruck des Textes in der 3., durchgesehenen Auflage der Einzelausgabe der Wegmarken sowie mit dem Abdruck in der 2., (...) durchgesehenen Auflage der Wegmarken als Band 9 der Gesamtausgabe. Sie enthalt damit auch die Randbemerkungen Heideggers aus seinen Handexemplaren. Das Wesen des Menschen besteht aber darin, dass er mehr ist als der blosse Mensch, insofern dieser als das vernunftige Lebewesen vorgestellt wird. [.] Das mehr bedeutet: ursprunglicher und darum im Wesen wesentlicher. Aber hier zeigt sich das Ratselhafte: der Mensch ist in der Geworfenheit. Das sagt: der Mensch ist als der ek-sistierende Gegenwurf des Seins insofern mehr denn das animal rationale, als er gerade weniger ist im Verhaltnis zum Menschen, der sich aus der Subjektivitat begreift. Der Mensch ist nicht der Herr des Seienden. Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins. In diesem weniger busst der Mensch nichts ein, sondern er gewinnt, indem er in die Wahrheit des Seins gelangt. Er gewinnt die wesenhafte Armut des Hirten, dessen Wurde darin beruht, vom Sein selbst in die Wahrnis seiner Wahrheit gerufen zu sein. Dieser Ruf kommt als der Wurf, dem die Geworfenheit des Daseins entstammt. Der Mensch ist in seinem seinsgeschichtlichen Wesen das Seiende, dessen Sein als Ek-sistenz darin besteht, dass es in der Nahe des Seins wohnt. Der Mensch ist der Nachbar des Seins. (shrink)