The Logical Foundations of Social Theory describes Gert Mueller’s argument that physical, biological, social, moral, and cultural reality form an asymmetrical hierarchy of founding and controlling relationships that condition social reality rather than mechanically determining it. This book analyzes social stratification, the moral order, and culture systems.

Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's (...) epistemology as well as his more substantial comments regarding the natural sciences indeed result in a (sophisticated version of) scientific anti-realism which bears certain resemblances to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism; b) This scientific anti-realism can be defended against the two most common objections raised in the secondary literature; c) It is only by means of this sophisticated version of scientific anti-realism that phenomenology can circumvent the problem of ?scientific objectivism? (shrink)

Despite its enduring insights, Durkheim’s theory of suicide fails to account for a significant set of cases because of its overreliance on structural forces to the detriment of other possible factors. In this paper, we develop a new theoretical framework for thinking about the role of culture in vulnerability to suicide. We argue that by focusing on the cultural dynamics of excessive regulation, particularly at the meso level, a more robust sociological model for suicide could be offered that supplements structure-heavy (...) Durkheimian theory. In essence, we argue that the relevance of cultural regulation to suicide rests on the (1) degree to which culture is coherent in sociocultural places, (2) existence of directives related to prescribing or proscribing suicide, (3) degree to which these directives translate into internalized meanings affecting social psychological processes, and (4) degree to which the social space is bounded. We then illustrate how our new theory provides useful insights into three cases of suicide largely neglected within sociology: specifically, suicide clusters in high schools, suicide in the military, and suicides of “despair” among middle-aged white men. We conclude with implications for future sociological research on suicide and suicide prevention. (shrink)

State governments provide preprinted advance directive forms to the general public. However, many adults in the United States (US) lack the skills necessary to read and comprehend health care-related materials. In this study, we sought to determine the readability of state government-sponsored advance directive forms.

Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl’s late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl’s portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science. Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a historiographical shortcoming. On Ihde’s view, it is only (...) on the basis of a distorted picture of Galileo that Husserl can “create“ the division between Lifeworld and the “world of science“, a division that is indeed fundamental for Husserl’s overall position. Hence, if successful, Ihde’s argument effectively undermines Husserl’s late philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that Ihde’s criticism does not stand up to closer historical or philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

This paper keeps pace with my personal history as a researcher: starting from the eagerness for knowledge of the nuclear physics PhD student I once was, continuing with my search for social relevance in policy-preparatory research I subsequently performed as a sustainability scholar, it finally leads to the topics of interest for the hybrid philosophy-sociology researcher I am today. Following these traces, I first of all rethink my life as a physicist in terms of science as a necessarily situated and (...) engaged practice before laying bare the baleful scientisation of politics in sustainability discourse. Finally, I sketch the contours of a genuine politics of sustainability by repositioning the enigma of scientific production at the heart of its practice. (shrink)

Scientific progress is achieved not only by continuous accumulation of knowledge but also by paradigm shifts. These shifts are often necessitated by anomalous findings that cannot be incorporated in accepted models. Two important methodological principles regulate this process and complement each other: Ockham's Razor as the principle of parsimony and Plato's Life Boat as the principle of the necessity to 'save the appearances' and thus incorporate conflicting phenomenological data into theories. We review empirical data which are in conflict with some (...) presuppositions of accepted mainstream science: Clinical and experimental effects of prayer and healing intention, data from telepathy, psychokinesis experiments and precognition, and anecdotal reports of macro-psychokinesis. Taken together, the now well documented possibility of these events suggests that such phenomena are anomalies that challenge some widely held beliefs in mainstream science. On the other hand, scientists often fear that by accepting the reality of these phenomena they also have to subscribe to world-models invoking ontological dualism or idealism. We suggest accepting the phenomena as real, but without questionable ontologies commonly associated with them. We outline how this might work. (shrink)

The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA involved many leading game theorists from both sides of the Iron Curtain: Oskar Morgenstern, John von Neumann, Michael Intriligator, John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Steven Brams from the United States and Nikolay Vorob’ev, Leon A. Petrosyan, Elena B. Yanovskaya and Olga N. Bondareva from the Soviet Union. The formalization of game theory took place prior to the Cold War but the geopolitical confrontation hastened and shaped its evolution. In our article (...) we outline four similarities and differences between Western GT and Soviet GT: 1) the Iron Curtain resulted in a lagged evolution of GT in the Soviet Union; 2) Soviet GT focused more on operations research and issues of centralized planning; 3) the contemporary Western view on Soviet GT was biased and Soviet contributions, including works on dynamic stability, non-emptiness of the core and many refinements, suggest that Soviet GT was able to catch up to the Western level relatively fast; 4) international conferences, including Vilnius, 1971, fostered interaction between Soviet game theorists and their Western colleagues. In general, we consider the Cold War to be a positive environment for GT in the West and in the Soviet Union. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that scientific thought experiments and works of science fiction are highly suitable tools for facilitating and increasing understanding of science. After comparing one of Einstein’s most famous thought experiments with the science fiction novel “The Forever War”, I shall argue that both proceed similarly in making some of the more outlandish consequences of special relativity theory intelligible. However, as I will also point out, understanding in thought experiments and understanding in science fiction (...) differ in one important respect: While the former aim at what I shall call “physical understanding”, science fiction novels typically have “existential understanding” as their target. (shrink)

The paper consists of three parts. The aim of the first part is to depict the concept of science in the analytic philosophy of science to point out its characteristic defects. The second part shows how the constructive philosophy of science is able to avoid these defects by honouring not special modes of research but speicial modes of foundation of results in research with its criteria for science. The third part finally refutes the main counter-arguments of analytic philosophy of science (...) against the constructive. (shrink)

Sustainable development can be regarded as an attempt to bridge the gap between environmental concerns about the increasingly evident ecological consequences of human activities and socio-political concerns about human development issues. The idea that science is not responding adequately to the challenges of our times, and particularly, those posed by the quest for sustainable development is gaining increasing acceptance with scientists and policy-makers. Concurrently, a new kind of science is being called for. ‘Post-normal science’ and ‘Sustainability science’ are, besides others, (...) terms used to indicate a transition towards a new method for dealing with complex and value-laden sustainability issues. In this paper we want to assess both the need and possibility for such a new kind of science. My analysis will take a transcendental perspective by interpreting Kuhn’s paradigm as a necessary condition of possibility for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Temporally non-local measurements -- single measurements yielding information about the state of a system at different instances-- may provide a way to observe non-classical behaviour in mental systems. The signature for such behaviour is a violation of temporal Bell inequalities. We present such inequalities applicable to scenarios with two alternating mental states, such as in the perception of ambiguous figures. We indicate empirical options for testing temporal Bell inequalities, and speculate about possible explanations in case these inequalities are indeed violated.

Mental representations are based upon categories in which the state of a mental system is stable. Acategorial states, on the other hand, are distinguished by unstable behavior. A refined and compact terminology for the description of categorial and acategorial mental states and their stability properties is introduced within the framework of the theory of dynamical systems. The relevant concepts are illustrated by selected empirical observations in cognitive neuroscience. Alterations of the category of the first person singular and features of creative (...) activity will be discussed as examples for the phenomenology of acategorial states. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthält eine Sammlung von Beiträgen zum Problem der Wechselwirkung zwischen Geist und Materie, einem der zentralen Probleme europäischer Geistesgeschichte. Die Blickwinkel, die dabei eingenommen werden, sind vorrangig die der Physik und der Psychologie. Die Wechselwirkung dieser Gebiete wird so deutlich wie nie zuvor im Dialog zwischen zwei Forscherpersön lichkeiten dieses Jahrhunderts sichtbar: dem Physiker Wolfgang Pauli (1900- 1958) und dem Psychologen Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). In zahlreichen Brie fen und Manuskripten Paulis, die erst in den letzten Jahren (...) allgemein zugänglich wurden, finden sich bemerkenswerte und wichtige Beiträge zu diesem Dialog, die das Verständnis des Zusammenhanges von Geist und Materie in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lassen. Um den durch Pauli und Jung begonnenen Dialog fortzusetzen und weiter fruchtbar zu machen, ist das interdisziplinäre Gespräch zwischen Physikern und Psychologen nötig. Diesem Zweck diente eine von der Eidgenössischen Techni sehen Hochschule Zürich (der Hochschule, an der Pauli tätig war) und dem C.G.Jung-Institut Zürich (das Jung gegründet hat) gemeinsam veranstaltete Tagung im Centro Stefano Franscini (Monte Verita, Ascona) vom 13. bis 18. Juni 1993. Sie stand unter dem Thema Das Irrationale in den Naturwissenschaften: Wolf gang Paulis Begegnung mit dem Geist der Materie und wurde von Pier Luigi Luisi initiiert und organisiert. Als Berater fungierten Paul Brutsehe, Hans Primas und Eva Wertenschlag-Birkhäuser. Berichte und Kommentare zu dieser Tagung wurden in Heft 4/1993 der Zeitschrift Gaia veröffentlicht. (shrink)

In our daily lives we conceive of our surroundings as an objectively given reality. The world is perceived through our senses, and ~hese provide us, so we believe, with a faithful image of the world. But occ~ipnally we are forced to realize that our senses deceive us, e. g., by illusions. For a while it was believed that the sensation of color is directly r~lated to the frequency of light waves, until E. Land (the inventor of the polaroid camera) showed (...) in detailed experiments that our perception of, say, a colored spot depends on the colors of its surrounding. On the other hand, we may experience hallucinations or dreams as real. Quite evidently, the relationship between the "world" and our "brain" is intricate. Another strange problem is the way in which we perceive time or the "Now". Psychophysical experiments tell us that the psychological "Now" is an extended period of time in the sense of physics. The situation was made still more puzzling when, in the nineteen-twenties, Heisenberg and others realized that, by observing processes in the microscopic world of electrons and other elementary particles, we strongly interfere with that world. The outcome of experiments - at least in general - can only be predicted statistically. What is the nature ofthis strange relationship between "object" and "observer"? This is another crucial problem of the inside-outside or endo-exo dichotomy. (shrink)

The late 18th century is characterized by two crucial events: the rise of Goethe as a dominating literary figure and the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy and its productive reception not only in the philosophical but also literary discourse of the time. While the Tübingen School concreatively adopted Kant’s philosophy as a system of ideas, they also critically responded to its intellectualising impulse by positing the equiprimordiality of world and Self, of art and reason. Adhering to the self-critical impulse of (...) Kant’s philosophy by positing the equiprimordiality of both the empirical world and the intelligible subject, and trying to overcome the “chorismos” between them through the classicist model of aesthetic Bildung, they argued for the co-extensiveness of the reality of both philosophy and literature. The authors investigate how the latent antagonism between these divergent traditions of the so-called Goethezeit creates the thrust behind the intellectual firework of divergent literary and philosophical discourses from around 1800, throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. (shrink)

Nina Azari in her commentary on our article in this issue “Spirituality: The Legacy of Parapsychology” has raised the issue of what it actually takes for something to be called science. Does causality come into the picture? If so, how does causality relate to our non-local model that seems to explicitly eschew the question of causality? The answer lies in what one is willing to accept as causality. If causality can be conceived broader than just efficient-mechanistic causality then certainly our (...) model is causal. If one insists on efficient-mechanistic causality as the only and truly scientific notion of causality, it is not. But then, I would argue, this is a very restricted and also short sighted view which should be questioned, and eventually, disregarded. This is what we have set out to do. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Folk Psychology and the Psychological Background of Scientific ReasoningHarald Walach (bio)Keywordstheory of psychology, theory of science, psychology of science, mind-body problem, folk psychology, scientific world viewSome protagonists of science who are still married to a positivist model of how science functions see science as the pure pursuit of knowledge, free of any preconceptions, free of any personal interest, yielding clear and ideally everlasting truths beckoning humanity over from a (...) superstition ridden dark age of beliefs and would-be knowledge toward the dawn of rational insights that allow for the bettering of mankind’s problems. Scientists have followed such an implicit model since Francis Bacon’s Novum Organon, and the most recent reverberations we hear in popular science books like The God Delusion by Dawkins (2006) or in more scientific ones on how an eliminative materialist account of mental events such as Patricia Churchland’s might work (Churchland 1986). Here, it is explicitly stated that our folk-psychological accounts such as “I love Emma,” or “I have a nasty back ache” is nothing but sloppy speaking and will soon be replaced by a more scientific account, once we know the interior workings of our brains, such as “Neuron assembly xyz in my nucleus abc in brain areas efg is firing” or “Fast A1 fibers are transmitting stimuli from my lumbar region to the brain, where they override endorphin- and enkephalin-mediated inhibiting pathways, enabling the pain network to go crazy.” It has been more than twenty years now since the publication of that somewhat futuristic account, and a whole decade of the brain and countless papers have taught us that we are very far, in fact light years away, from such knowledge as eliminative and even less eliminative materialists would have us gained by now, or in another twenty years from now.Folk psychology is well and alive, and even more vital than ever, it seems. People go about having their beliefs and ideas about God, the mind, the soul, the world, and human beings in general just as well, eliminative materialists and neuroscience notwithstanding. The data presented by Fahrenberg speak a clear language: Students of different disciplines, but most prominently psychology students, adhere mostly to a dualist—ontological or methodological—world view that allows for some substantiality of consciousness. They suppose that some transcendent reality is active and about, they assume that paranormal events such as spiritual and distant healing can [End Page 209] happen, that telepathy is an option, to name but the more prominent statements to be gleaned by Fahrenberg’s tables.Sure, these are students at the beginning of their career, as they come from school, some of them in their second year, some of them mature after having done some other training. They have had contact with the scientific world view mostly through their schooling and private reading, and, of course, through our folk culture. It would be extremely interesting to see a longitudinal study, surveying the same students after four years of studies. Will they then be more conformist with the mainstream scientific notion? Will they then have changed their initial belief systems? Will they have integrated and absorbed the knowledge they were taught into their private lives and worldviews, or will they have kept them apart from each other? We do not have the answer to these questions, and surely, a next step would be to follow a cohort of students, albeit small, through their journey as they progress.Meanwhile, we can all take ourselves as an example to follow this thought along as a gedan-kenexperiment. Did we allow the knowledge we absorbed from studying to permeate our whole private life? How did we deal with any cognitive dissonance arising from information coming out of our studies conflicting with our private belief systems? Did we throw away our personal beliefs or did we organize our lives in two compartments, one for our private life, and one for our scientific knowledge?Fahrenberg’s data are unique in the sense that nobody bothers about folk psychology, and these data are the only ones that actually tap into the belief systems of those that will become scientists, teachers, therapists and trainers... (shrink)

The interview discusses the interdependence of the scientist's biography and the field, the relationship between sociology and the Holocaust, and the question of aesthetics and style in writing on sociological topics.

Summary. We discuss a specific way in which the notion of complementarity can be based on the dynamics of the system considered. This approach rests on an epistemic representation of system states, reflecting our knowledge about a system in terms of coarse grainings (partitions) of its phase space. Within such an epistemic quantization of classical systems, compatible, comparable, commensurable, and complementary descriptions can be precisely characterized and distinguished from each other. Some tentative examples are indicated that, we suppose, would have (...) been of interest to Pauli. (shrink)

The relevance of the Cartesian cut as a conceptual tool to separate matter and mind in the tradition of a dualistic world view is addressed. Modern science has developed an increasing number of concepts requiring that such a cut be considered neither as a priori prescribed nor as impenetrable. Two important examples are the concepts of complexity and meaning. They are subjects of physics as the science of matter and cognitive science as the science of the mind, respectively. Their mutual (...) relationships are discussed to some detail, and certain elements of a `post-Cartesian' way of thinking are indicated. (shrink)

Technical change and evolving product complexity lead to a separation of practical and theoretical processes in design and to an increased use of drawings, in particular, scale drawings.1 In contrast to handicraft evolution, the use of drawings in "design-by-drawing,"2 in particular, scaled and dimensioned drawings, separates experiences from production. Design and manufacturing follow different paths. This separation in the case of manual drawing needs to be examined. I am well aware that informal drawings differ from scale or construction drawings. If (...) they contain unambiguous symbols, manual drawings can be regarded as a form of notation. Design-by-drawing can mean planning a notation, for... (shrink)

Patient participation in healthcare is highly promoted for democratic reasons. Older patients make up a large part of the hospital population but their voices are less easily heard by most patient participation instruments. The client council can be seen as an important medium to represent the interests of this increasing group of patients. Every Dutch healthcare institution is obliged to have a client council and its rights are legally established. This paper reports on a case study of a client council (...) in a hospital and shows how equality as the core democratic value manifests itself in practice and marginalizes the voices of older patients. Based on the work of Joan Tronto we show that sameness is the driving force behind the functioning of the client council which leads the council to operate as part of the hospital system. Consequently, important aspects of the hospital practice remain out of sight. To be of greater value for all patients we argue that successful patient participation requires not only equal opportunities but also ‘the condition of equal voice’. (shrink)

This contribution addresses major distinctions between the notions of determinism, causation, and prediction, as they are typically used in the sciences. Formally, this can be elegantly achieved by two ingredients: (i) the distinction of ontic and epistemic states of a system, and (ii) temporal symmetry breakings based on the mathematical concept of the affine time group. Key aspects of the theory of deterministically chaotic systems together with historical quotations from Laplace, Maxwell, and Poincare provide significant illustrations. An important point of (...) various discussions in consciousness studies (notably about 'mental causation' and 'free agency'), the alleged 'causal closure of the physical', will be analysed on the basis of the affine time group and the breakdown of its symmetries. (shrink)

The main theses of this paper are: assuming the possibility of what can reasonably be called “moral education”, its goal ought to be that people should become autonomous and responsible moral agents who take serious things seriously; the more fundamental elements of this goal cannot be brought about through educational procedures, and moral education, therefore, is to this extent impossible; the elements in question develop as the result of social growth and interaction; education can help to achieve some of the (...) less fundamental elements of the goal, and may, in the form of educational therapy, perhaps even to some degree stimulate the development of the more fundamental elements whose growth has been impaired through destructive experiences during childhood; self-education, i.e. rational and sensitive examination of important happenings and the way in which we react to them, can further, in a more or less indirect way, the fulfillment of the goal, especially during maturity. (shrink)

Utilitarian deliberation has a number of weak or open points where the agent's judgements tend to be influenced by psychological and sociological factors, e.g., by his prejudices, anxieties, insecurities or group-identifications. The most vulnerable points are: the formulation of the problem, the selection of alternatives, the calculation of consequences, the weighing of evidence, the selection of ultimate values and the comparison of different values towards each other.— The utilitarian vocabulary provides the chooser with misleading expressions such as "The action A1 (...) produces more value on the whole than A2" backing up his cpnviction of acting rationally. — In order to improve the situation, we must become aware of the delusiveness of such expressions and of society's and our own irrationality and try to develop more rational feelings and attitudes. (shrink)

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Sören Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. ? In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, (...) make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ?leap?, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge. ? A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between ?being within the ethical stage? and ?acting ethically rightly? the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules. ? This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of ?Equilibrium?, seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature. (shrink)