Nonmonotonic reasoning in its broadest sense is reasoning to conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. Given more information, previously drawn inferences may be retracted. Commonsense reasoning has a nonmonotonic component; it has been argued that almost all commonsense inferences are of this sort. From the end of the 1980s to the present there has been an explosion in research in nonmonotonic reasoning. It is now possible to understand more clearly the properties of the major formalisms from a metatheoretical point (...) of view, the relationships among the formalisms and their connection to independently developed proof methods. The goal of this monograph is to make this understanding more accessible. (shrink)

Schurz draws on modern alethic- deontic predicate logic to address the venerable yet enduring problem of whether what ought to be can be derived from what is. After two extensive introductory chapters supplying the background in philosophy and logic to readers unfamiliar with it, he examines such dimensions as the logical explication of Hume's thesis, the special Hume thesis, weakened versions of it, generalizations, some applications to ethical arguments, problems of identity and existence, whether there are analytic bridge principles, and (...) whether they are scientifically justifiable. The inquiry is expanded from Part II of his 1989 Relevant Deduction in Science and Ethics with a Case Study of the Is-Ought Problem. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can be (...) philosophically justified by an inference to the best explanation. We then ask whether the explanations provided by TCN are merely post-facto or have independently testable empirical content. To answer this question we develop a fine-grained axiomatization of TCN, including a distinction of different kinds of faithfulness. A number of theorems show that although the core axioms of TCN are empirically empty, extended versions of TCN have successively increasing empirical content. (shrink)

This paper has three goals. The first goal is to work out the difference between literal ceteris paribus laws in the sense of “all others being equal” and ceteris rectis “laws” in the sense of “all others being right”. While cp laws involve a universal quantification, cr generalizations involve an existential quantification over the values of the remainder variables Z. As a result, the two differ crucially in their confirmability and lawlikeness. The second goal is to provide a classification of (...) different kinds of cr generalizations, including certain transition cases between cr generalizations and cp laws. The third goal is to work out what cp laws and all kinds of cr assertions have in common: they figure as an information source for assertions of causal influence between variables. (shrink)

According to the comparative Bayesian concept of confirmation, rationalized versions of creationism come out as empirically confirmed. From a scientific viewpoint, however, they are pseudo-explanations because with their help all kinds of experiences are explainable in an ex-post fashion, by way of ad-hoc fitting of an empirically empty theoretical framework to the given evidence. An alternative concept of confirmation that attempts to capture this intuition is the use novelty criterion of confirmation. Serious objections have been raised against this criterion. In (...) this paper I suggest solutions to these objections. Based on them, I develop an account of genuine confirmation that unifies the UN-criterion with a refined probabilistic confirmation concept that is explicated in terms of the confirmation of evidence-transcending content parts of the hypothesis. (shrink)

An important distinction is that between selective abductions, which select an optimal candidate from given multitude of possible explanations, and creative abductions, which introduce new theoretical concepts and models. The article focuses on creative abductions, which are essential for scientific progress, although they are rarely discussed in the literature. Scientifically, fruitful creative abductions are demarcated from purely speculative abductions by means of three virtues which are possessed by the former but not by the latter: (i) providing unification, (ii) detecting common (...) causes and (iii) generating novel predictions by means of which they can be independently tested. Based on historical examples it is demonstrated that common cause abduction from correlated dispositions is the fundamental abductive operation by which new theoretical concepts and models are scientifically generated. Statistical factor analysis can be regarded as a statistical generalization of common cause abduction. (shrink)

Agrippa von Nettesheim gilt in der Literatur als Philosoph, der versucht hat, viele verschiedene philosophische Richtungen zu synthetisieren. Sehr interessant ist dabei seine Position zur Transmigration, die bisher in der Literatur nicht intensiver untersucht worden ist. Dieser Aufsatz geht der Frage nach der Position von Agrippa in Bezug auf die Transmigration nach. Durch die sehr verstreuten und widersprüchlichen Zitate von Agrippa zu diesem Thema gibt es bisher keine eindeutigen Aussagen in der Sekundärliteratur dazu, ob Agrippa die Lehre der Transmigration vertreten (...) hat oder nicht. Die These dieses Aufsatzes ist, dass Agrippa an Transmigration glaubte und am Ende steht diese Erkenntnis in Verbindung mit einer etwas eigenen Christologie, die man bis dahin so nicht findet. Agrippa glaubte, dass Christus die Lehre der Wiedervergeltung gelehrt hat, doch im Gegensatz zu den Gnostikern war Jesus für ihn nicht Mensch, sondern Sohn Gottes. Agrippa hat selbst darauf hingewiesen, dass nur der „einsichtige Leser“ seine verdeckte Methode entschlüsseln kann. Gerade bei der Transmigration hat Agrippa absichtlich diese verdeckte Methode eingesetzt, um sich vor der Verfolgung durch kirchliche Autoritäten zu schützen. (shrink)

Two key ideas of scientific explanation - explanations as causal information and explanation as unification - have frequently been set into mutual opposition. This paper proposes a "dialectical solution" to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal explanations because they lead to a higher degree of unification at the level of the explanation of statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets are justified because they give the best if not the only unifying (...) explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening off and linking up. Alternative explanation attempts are discussed and it is shown why they don't work. It is demonstrated that not the core of TC but extended versions of TC have empirical content, by means of which they can generate independently testable predictions. (shrink)

In this paper first order theories for nonmonotone inductive definitions are introduced, and a proof-theoretic analysis for such theories based on combined operator forms a la Richter with recursively inaccessible and Mahlo closure ordinals is given.

This book deals with the metaphysics of Giordano Bruno. It is very controversial until today, whether Giordano Bruno is a Pantheist or not. There are even authors who believe that Bruno was an Atheist. Other authors like Frances Yates believes that Bruno was a representative of the Hermetic Tradition, but not in the sense of Ficino. This work tries to find out whether Giordano Bruno had a concept of god or not. Finally, there is a concept of god in Giordano (...) Bruno´s works. His concept of god is very similar to that of the Hermetic Tradition and that of neoplatonic philosophy. The reason why Bruno was burned in Rome was not that he was an Atheist, but Bruno denied that Jesus Christ was the son of god. (shrink)

Oft wird nur jenes anerkannt, was "wissenschaftlich beweisbar" ist. Ein solches Vorurteil vergisst, dass es auch andere Wirklichkeiten gibt. Ist unsere Welt ein Blick durch ein Kaleidoskop? Wie kann es sein, dass man eine mehr oder minder große Auswahl panoramenhafter Wirklichkeiten vor sich hat? Ist es möglich, solche Wirklichkeiten zu verlassen und in andere überzuwechseln? Anhand konkreter Beispiele wird dieser Wirklichkeits-Pluralismus beleuchtet. Das erste Beispiel, ein astronomisches, zeigt in aller Ausführlichkeit, auf welche Weise Wirklichkeit entstehen kann. Dann ist von anderen (...) naturwissenschaftlichen Wirklichkeiten die Rede, vom Licht und von der Farbe sowie von einer fremden heilkundlichen Wirklichkeit. Ein zentrales Anliegen von Gerhard Fasching ist ein Denken, welches in einen Wirklichkeitspluralismus mündet. Unser monokulturelles Wirklichkeitsverständnis hat nämlich schon viele Wirklichkeiten unserer eigenen Kultur und fremder Kulturen missachtet und dadurch verloren. Unser humanistisches Weltbild benötigt also ein breiteres Fundament. Das Buch findet zu einem überraschenden Ergebnis: Man selbst gehört nicht zur Wirklichkeit, sondern man steht stets außerhalb jeder Wirklichkeit. GERHARD FASCHING. Geb. 1933 in Wien, Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Dr. techn., 1966 Habilitation, seit 1970 Ordinarius an der Technischen Universität Wien, Österreich. Er hält Vorlesungen über Aufbau und Eigenschaften der Materie und über Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie. HANS-PETER DÜRR. Em. Univ.-Prof., Direktor em. am Max-Planck-Institut für Physik, München, Deutschland. Träger des Alternativen Nobelpreises. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universitèat Tèubingen, 1993.

This addendum presents results that confound some commonly made claims about the sorts of environments in which the performance of TTB exceeds that of Franklin's rule, and vice versa.

This paper deals with: (i) the theory $\mathrm{ID}^{\tt\#}_1$ which results from $\widehat{\mathrm{ID}}_1$ by restricting induction on the natural numbers to formulas which are positive in the fixed point constants, (ii) the theory $\mathrm{BON}(\mu)$ plus various forms of positive induction, and (iii) a subtheory of Peano arithmetic with ordinals in which induction on the natural numbers is restricted to formulas which are $\Sigma$ in the ordinals. We show that these systems have proof-theoretic strength $\varphi\omega 0$.

According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...) informational contents. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I look at two defenses of the coarse-grained conception of content. First, Stalnaker has claimed that the informativeness of necessary truths can be explained within a two-dimensional semantic framework, in which necessary truths have contingent metalinguistic contents. In Chapter 1, I argue that this metalinguistic approach misconstrues the content of mathematical truths. Second, Stalnaker has claimed that we have independent reason to adopt a coarse-grained conception of content since naturalistic views of content such as indicator views allow only for coarse-grained contents. In Chapter 2, I argue that both indicator and teleological views allow for more fine-grained contents and that, given certain assumptions, they even require them. Together, these arguments show that the best attempt to explain the informativeness of necessary truths in terms of coarse-grained entities fails, and that naturalism gives us no reason for thinking that some other attempt will succeed. Instead of explaining informativeness in terms of the elimination of real possibilities, I claim, we should explain it in terms of the elimination of more fine-grained epistemic possibilities. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I describe the characteristic features of epistemic possibilities. Chapter 3 clarifies the relevant sense of epistemic possibility by distinguishing it from related senses that have gone under the same name. I argue that P is epistemically possible for a thinker at a time just in case an operative belief that P is compatible with his operative beliefs at this time, where beliefs are called compatible, not if their contents are compatible, but if the beliefs themselves are compatible in the sense that it is possible to have them at the same time. Since epistemic possibility in this sense is a matter of what it is possible to believe, I call it epistemic possibility in the believability sense. ;In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of what sort of thing epistemic possibilities are. I argue that epistemic possibilities can be defined in terms of, but not identified with, a certain kind of fine-grained content. (shrink)

Even after the concept of ‘origin’ has been called into question, a troubling wish to speak of origins persists, especially in the narrative act of accounting for one's own origins in confessional discourse. Here, the self encounters the limits of its narratibility, even as it interrogates how, in the Nietzschean sense, it became what it is. This essay explores the question of troubled origins by placing Nietzsche's Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is and Derrida's Monolingualism of the Other; (...) or, the Prosthesis of Origin in syntactical relation with Didier Eribon's Returning to Reims and Botho Strauß's Herkunft. The essay meditates on the ways in which a world-oriented longing for identification persists long after the ideas of identity and self-identity have been bid farewell. If there is a kind of survival to be espied in textual acts of confronting one's troubled origins, such survival would have to travel through a language that unfolds on the far side of any conventional identity-thinking. By the same token, this language could never simply resist the conceptual and rhetorical temptation powerfully exerted by the seductive processes of identification. Derrida, Strauß, and Eribon, each in their own idiomatic way, implore us to question just what such textual acts of commemorative survival imply for a thinking to come. (shrink)