Der Vortrag zum Thema "Schmerzen", den der 100-jährige Hans-Georg Gadamer anläßlich des von der Orthopädischen Universitätsklinik Heidelberg am 11. November 2000 organisierten Symposions abhielt, war der letzte öffentliche Auftritt des großen Heidelberger Philosophen. In ihm formulierte Gadamer eine für das medizinische Kollegium ungeheure Provokation, indem er den Schmerz als eine lebenslange Aufgabe beschrieb, die, weit entfernt ein Makel oder gar Deformation des leidenden Individuums zu sein, sich vielmehr dem strukturell annähert, was Gadamer zeitlebens beschäftigt hat: der Hermeneutik. Der Akt des (...) Verstehens prägt auch das anschließende Gespräch zwischen Gadamer und dem Fachpublikum, in dem sich beide Seiten zögernd aufeinander zu bewegen. Das vorliegende Bändchen trägt dem in zweierlei Hinsicht Rechnung: Es gibt die freie, lebendige Rede Gadamers möglichst unverstellt wieder und flankiert die Anregungen Gadamers mit Überlegungen zum Phänomen "Schmerz" aus medizinischer und therapeutischer Sicht. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche has emerged as one of the most important and influential modern philosophers. For several decades, the book series Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary and international in orientation reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche, from philosophy to literary studies and political theory. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The (...) book series is led by an international team of editors, whose work represents the full range of current Nietzsche scholarship. (shrink)

Le but de la vie chez Schopenhauer et chez Nietzsche.--Sur la sociologie des sens.--La notion de valeur.--Le christianisme et l'art.--Du réalisme dans l'art.--La philosophie de l'aventure.--La religion et les contrastes de la vie.--Métaphysique de la mort.--Sur le matérialisme historique.--De l'essence de la philosophie, etc.

The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct (...) and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions. (shrink)

During the 1890s William James and Carl Georg Lange's works on emotion were discussed in psychological journals under the heading of the “James–Lange theory” of emotion. Yet Lange's work is much less known because it was linked with James' theory and because later neurophysiological research demonstrated that Lange's proposed mechanism for processing emotion could not be correct. However, a reappraisal of his work is warranted for several reasons: For his attempt to ground the emotions in physiology at a time when (...) psychologists advocated a purely spiritual conception of emotions, for his insights in biological psychiatry, for postulating a neuroanatomical centre for processing emotion. Finally, in the light of contemporary research, because Lange deconstructed the emotions into combinations of components, which makes his work a precursor to component and appraisal theories of emotion. (shrink)

During the 1890s William James and Carl Georg Lange's works on emotion were discussed in psychological journals under the heading of the “James–Lange theory” of emotion. Yet Lange's work is much less known because it was linked with James' theory and because later neurophysiological research demonstrated that Lange's proposed mechanism for processing emotion could not be correct. However, a reappraisal of his work is warranted for several reasons: For his attempt to ground the emotions in physiology at a time when (...) psychologists advocated a purely spiritual conception of emotions, for his insights in biological psychiatry, for postulating a neuroanatomical centre for processing emotion. Finally, in the light of contemporary research, because Lange deconstructed the emotions into combinations of components, which makes his work a precursor to component and appraisal theories of emotion. (shrink)

De Frescobaldi, à l'édition musicale, en passant par l'histoire de l'interprétation, la grammaire baroque des affects et l'esthétique, ce livre rend hommage à la pensée d'Etienne Darbellay dans un recueil d'études qui captive par la variété et la rigueur des savoirs. From Frescobaldi to music editions, from the history of performance to the baroque language of affect and aesthetic, the present work in honour of Etienne Darbellay is a collection of essays remarkable for the breadth and depth of their scholarship.

A German writer's aphoristic, poetic, and difficult reflections on Heidegger's Being and Time. There is a beyond of reason and unreason. It is the human psyche. —Positive Nihilism Like many German intellectuals, Hartmut Lange has long grappled with Heidegger. Positive Nihilism is the result of a lifetime of reading Being and Time and offers a series of reflections that are aphoristic, poetic, and (appropriately, considering his object of study) difficult. Lange begins with an abyss (“There is an abyss of the (...) finite. It is temporality”) and proceeds almost immediately to extremity: “The twentieth century was governed by psychopaths. They collapsed the boundaries of moral reason and refuted Kant's analysis of consciousness.” He reflects further: “But who shall punish whom? One man's virtue is another man's crime. Thus Hitler could feel unwaveringly, as he wiped out entire populations, the starry sky above him and the moral law within him, as stipulated by Kant.” He considers the concept of civilization (“misleading”; “how should one oppose the remedies of civilization to the egomania, the murderous appetites of such outright psychopaths as Stalin or Pol Pot?”), the act of thinking (a fata morgana), the psyche, and Heidegger's Dasein. Positive Nihilism can be considered a pocket companion to Being and Time. “Heidegger's understanding of Being is nihilistic,” Lange writes, and then explains his assertion. He draws on Kant, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Shakespeare's Othello for supporting arguments and illustrations. “Everyone is possessed of the courage to have angst about death. The question is whether this courage necessarily secures those vital advantages Heidegger alleges”–that “self-understanding [is] the mental anticipation of death.” Lange wrestles with Heidegger's position, calling on Tolstoy, Georg Trakl, Herman Bang, and Heinrich von Kleist to argue against it. (shrink)

Het joodse volk heeft in zijn lange diaspora de tekst van de Hebreeuwse bijbel en de commentaren daarop als huis op zijn rug meegedragen. Vanuit dit huis was een oversteek naar de universele Europese cultuur in de 19e en 20e eeuw niet moeilijk. Maar nationalistische en racistische krachten hebben dit proces belemmerd en voor een deel teniet gedaan. De staat Israël zelf verstikt door zijn nationalisme het voortleven van de joodse cultuur, die alleen als gast in een gastvrije wereld kan (...) blijven bloeien. (shrink)

Hegels Schrift "Über die Reichsverfassung" – beginnend mit dem Satz "Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr" – war ein Kind der bewegten Zeit unmittelbar vor und nach 1800, dem Siegeszug Napoleons im deutsch-französischen Krieg, und blieb lange ein Stiefkind der Forschung. Nicht nur, daß es bis 1998 keine kritische Edition gab, die die einzelnen Ausarbeitungen, Textstufen, Fragmente und Ergänzungen dokumentierte. Auch bezüglich der politischen Intentionen der Schrift, ihrer Adressaten, ihrer möglichen Auftraggeber sind wir bis heute in vieler Hinsicht auf Vermutungen bzw. (...) mehr oder minder schlüssige Interpretationen aus dem Text selbst angewiesen. Dabei ist die zu Lebzeiten Hegels nie veröffentlichte Schrift ein wahres Ideen-Laboratorium: eine Fülle von Elementen des Hegelschen Staats-, Rechts- und Geschichtsdenkens findet sich hier in verhältnismäßig lockerem Aggregatzustand – spielerisch entfaltet im Rahmen einer Flugschrift (oder Denkschrift) zu aktuellen politischen Fragen, die den jungen Hegel ebenso als Historiker, Juristen, Ökonomen, als Kenner der Verfassungs-, Militär- und Finanzgeschichte Deutschlands wie als Geschichtstheoretiker und Philosophen und nicht zuletzt als Publizisten und politischen Reformer zeigt. Die mustergültige Textgestalt der hiermit erstmalig vorgelegten Studienausgabe der Verfassungsschrift beruht auf der Edition in Band 5 der "Gesammelten Werke" ebenso der Bericht von Kurt Rainer Meist zur Textedition. Hans Maier stellt in seinem Nachwort die Entstehung der Schrift in deren historischen Kontext und beleuchtet ihren Ort in Hegels philosophischem Gesamtwerk. (shrink)

Zu den weiterreichenden transhumanistischen Zukunftsvisionen gehört Mind-Uploading: Wir werden dank wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Fortschritte in der Lage sein, Bewusstsein auf künstliche Körper oder digitale Strukturen zu transferieren, um sehr viel länger oder gar unendlich lange leben zu können. Im Kern handelt es sich also um die Vision, durch Technik den Tod zu überwinden. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich im Wesentlichen der Frage nach, welche Theorie des Bewusstseins bzw. welches Geist-Körper-Verhältnis im Mind-Uploading vorausgesetzt werden. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass das zugrunde (...) gelegte Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes problematisch ist, weil die Rolle des Eingebettet-Seins in einen lebendigen Körper unterschätzt wird. Mind-Uploading arbeitet mit einem stark verkürzten Begriff des Geistes, der den komplexen Bezügen zu den biologischen, psychischen und sozialen Dimensionen unserer Existenz nicht gerecht wird. (shrink)

Seit Schleiermacher und Hegel gehört es zur Tradition der deutschen Philosophie, dass die Geschichte der Philosophie ein wesentlicher Aspekt der theoretischen Philosophie selber ist. Insofern ist auch das Thema ‘Heidegger und die Geschichte der Philosophie’ in diesem Zusammenhang zu betrachten, und das heisst: es ist die Frage zu stellen, welche Besonderheiten innerhalb dieser Grundhaltung, die die deutsche Philosophie seit Hegel beherrscht, bei ihm zu bemerken sind. Es ist klar, welcher allgemeine Rahmen für diese Fragestellung gegeben ist; er ist durch das (...) Aufkommen des historischen Bewusstseins geschaffen worden. Darin wirkt sich das Erbe der deutschen Romantik aus, dass nicht nur die historische Forschung im Ganzen, sondern auch die Haltung der theoretischen Philosophie seitdem vom Problem der Geschichte affiziert ist. Vor diesem Zeitalter der Romantik gab es in dem für uns wesentlichen Sinne keine Geschichte der Philosophie. Was existierte, war lediglich eine registrierende Gelehramkeit. Das war mit der berühmten Doxographie, die Aristoteles in fester Lehrabsicht in seine Lehrvorlesungen eingebaut hat, noch anders—bevor dieselbe später zu einem ganzen Zweig gelehrter Arbeit in der antiken Schulwissenschaft wurde. Vollends war das Hegelsche Konzept einer Geschichte der Philosophie selber Philosophie, eine Sondersparte innerhalb der Philosophie der Geschichte, die ihrerseits die Vernunft auch in der Geschichte nachweisen will. Ja, Hegel nannte die Geschichte der Philosophie geradezu das Innerste der Weltgeschichte. Nun hat der konstruktive Anspruch der Hegelschen Geschichte der Philosophie, die Notwendigkeit in der Abfolge der philosophischen Gedankenbildungen zu begreifen und auf diese Weise die Vernunft in der Geschichte des Gedankens nachzuweisen, der Kritik der historischen Schule nicht lange standgehalten. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür ist die Haltung Wilhelm Diltheys, der geradezu als der Denker der historischen Schule gelten darf. Bei aller seiner, namentlich im Alter wachsenden, Offenheit für das Genie Hegels war er doch im Grunde der vorsichtige Schleiermachernachfolger. Teleologie in die Betrachtung der Geschichte des Gedankens einzubringen war nicht sein Fall. Er ordnete sich in die rein historische Betrachtungsweise ein. Die einzig philosophische Betrachtungsweise der Geschichte der Philosophie wurde daher die im Neukantianismus ausgebildete sogenannte Problemgeschichte. Sie war am Anfang dieses Jahrhunderts die herrschende. Wenn man schon nicht eine Notwendigkeit im Fortgang der Systementwürfe des Gedankens anerkennen konnte, suchte man doch eine Art Fortschritt und Fortgang in der Philosophie festzuhalten, indem man die Behandlung der philosophischen Grundprobleme zum philosophischen Massstab erhob. So war etwa das einflussreiche Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wilhelm Windelband konstruiert, keineswegs ohne eine historische Dimension, aber doch letztenendes auf der Konstanz der Probleme aufgebaut, auf die bei wechselnder geschichtlicher Konstellation wechselnde Antworten erfolgen. Ebenso betrieb der Marburger Neukantianismus die Geschichte der Philosophie als Problemgeschichte. (shrink)

Die historische Entwicklung von Theorijen führt häufig zu einer Umgestaltung derselben, insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer Grundbegriffe: Ist es überhaupt möglich, von einer über viele Jahrhunderte hinweg "gleichen" Theorie zu sprechen? Haben wir es in diesen Fällen nicht vielmehr mit losen Abfolgen unterschiedlicher Satzsysteme zu tun? -Der Begriff "Größe" bildet die Grundlage der klassischen geometrischen Theorie. Seine Änderung im Laufe der Zeit führt zu tiefgreifenden Umgestaltungen der Theorie. Er erweist sich als "unscharfer Begriff im Sinne Körners. "Neutrale Kandidaten" werden im Rahmen eines (...) langfristigen Prozesses dem Begriff als "positive Instanzen" zugeordnet. Dies geschieht nicht in zufälliger Weise, sondern entsprechend einer im Begriff angelegten Tendenz . Darin liegt der Grund für die Rede von einer über lange Zeit hinweg "gleichen" Theorie. (shrink)

Die historische Entwicklung von Theorijen führt häufig zu einer Umgestaltung derselben, insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer Grundbegriffe: Ist es überhaupt möglich, von einer über viele Jahrhunderte hinweg "gleichen" Theorie zu sprechen? Haben wir es in diesen Fällen nicht vielmehr mit losen Abfolgen unterschiedlicher Satzsysteme zu tun? -Der Begriff "Größe" bildet die Grundlage der klassischen geometrischen Theorie. Seine Änderung im Laufe der Zeit führt zu tiefgreifenden Umgestaltungen der Theorie. Er erweist sich als "unscharfer Begriff im Sinne Körners. "Neutrale Kandidaten" werden im Rahmen eines (...) langfristigen Prozesses dem Begriff als "positive Instanzen" zugeordnet. Dies geschieht nicht in zufälliger Weise, sondern entsprechend einer im Begriff angelegten Tendenz (Wunsch, Absicht, etc.). Darin liegt der Grund für die Rede von einer über lange Zeit hinweg "gleichen" Theorie. (shrink)

Die historische Entwicklung von Theorijen führt häufig zu einer Umgestaltung derselben, insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer Grundbegriffe: Ist es überhaupt möglich, von einer über viele Jahrhunderte hinweg "gleichen" Theorie zu sprechen? Haben wir es in diesen Fällen nicht vielmehr mit losen Abfolgen unterschiedlicher Satzsysteme zu tun? -Der Begriff "Größe" bildet die Grundlage der klassischen geometrischen Theorie. Seine Änderung im Laufe der Zeit führt zu tiefgreifenden Umgestaltungen der Theorie. Er erweist sich als "unscharfer Begriff im Sinne Körners. "Neutrale Kandidaten" werden im Rahmen eines (...) langfristigen Prozesses dem Begriff als "positive Instanzen" zugeordnet. Dies geschieht nicht in zufälliger Weise, sondern entsprechend einer im Begriff angelegten Tendenz (Wunsch, Absicht, etc.). Darin liegt der Grund für die Rede von einer über lange Zeit hinweg "gleichen" Theorie. (shrink)

According to what is now the standard account in the history of psychology, in the 1880s William James and the Danish physician Carl Georg Lange independently developed a strikingly new theory, commonly referred to as the ‘James–Lange’ theory of emotion. In this paper it is argued that this standard account is highly misleading. Lange's views on affect in his Om Sindsbevægelser were more cautious than James allowed, and not open to criticisms that have often been levelled against the theory of (...) emotion that James claimed he shared with Lange. In fact, Lange argued for distinctions that James did not mention in his discussion of Lange's work. Even with regard to the primary emotions, the two thinkers’ explanatory models diverged significantly. The contrast between James and Lange on affect is especially striking in their respective discussions of topics in aesthetics, as is established with reference to Lange's little-known Bidrag til Nydelsernes fysiologi som grundlag for en rationel æstetik. (shrink)

The book develops the current hermeneutic discourse concerning the notions of beauty and Being. It includes a discussion of melancholic beauty and its interconnection with the act of art’s creation. According to M. Hołda, the writings of both authors demonstrate a treatment of beauty based on ancient Greek thought, especially from the times of Plato and Aristotle. Gadamer reaffirms the intimate relationship between beauty and Being, which is also revealed in Woolf’s literary work. ---------------------- Received: 08/04/2022. Reviewed: 13/05/2022. Accepted: 14/06/2022.

Johann Georg Sulzer gehorte zu den pragenden Gestalten der europaischen Aufklarung in den 1750er und 1760er Jahren, sowohl in der Philosophie als auch in einer Reihe von Einzelwissenschaften - wie der Mathematik und der Padagogik - sowie im Kontext literarischer und asthetischer Diskurse. Federfuhrend nahm er an den wichtigen Debatten, Kontroversen und Forschungsentwicklungen teil, die etwa in Berlin, in Leipzig oder in Paris die Aufklarung beschaftigte. Der vorliegende Band versammelt Studien von Philosophen, Literaturwissenschaftlern und Wissenschaftshistorikern zu allen Werkbereichen Sulzers, insbesondere (...) zur lange Zeit vernachlassigten Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie. Zugleich wird seine bislang weitgehend unbekannte praktische Philosophie diskutiert. Daruber hinaus werden auch Sulzers Sprach- und Kunsttheorie sowie seine Enzyklopadistik analysiert. MIT BEITRAGEN VON: Elisabeth Decultot, Werner Euler, Frank Grunert, Jutta Heinz, Marion Heinz, Dieter Huning, Heiner Klemme, Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Udo Roth, Gideon Stiening, Udo Thiel, Achim Vesper und Falk Wunderlich.". (shrink)

Die Arbeit macht den Versuch, alle Aspekte zu behandeln, unter denen Meiers Vernunftlehre und der im selben Jahr 1752 daraus entstandene Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (den Kant an die vierzig Jahre lang fur seine Logikvorlesungen benutzte) betrachtet werden konnen. Der erste Teil des Bandes ist dem geistigen Umfeld an der Universitat Halle im 18. Jahrhundert sowie der Entwicklungs-, Quellen-, Publikations- und Wirkungsgeschichte gewidmet. Die Vernunftlehre wird in der Regel ganz in die Tradition des Wolffianismus gestellt. Damit lassen sich jedoch (...) manche Zuge des Werkes, vor allem seine Einteilung in inventio, dispositio, elocutio und exercitatio, nur schwer erklaren. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass Meiers Vernunftlehre wesentlich von der rhetorischen Tradition bestimmt ist. Der zweite Teil beschaftigt sich mit der Einbettung der Vernunftlehre in das Gesamtwerk Meiers sowie mit der Analyse beider Texte, die auch Lehrstucke aus der Erkenntnistheorie, Asthetik, Poetik, Hermeneutik und Anthropologie enthalten. Die Arbeit geht uber eine blosse Spezialuntersuchung zu Meiers Logik hinaus - sie stellt das Meiersche Werk insgesamt dar. This work attempts to deal with all the aspects under which Meiers Vernunftlehre (Doctrine of Reason) and the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason), written in 1752, the same year, can be considered. Kant used the Excerpts for his lectures on logic for 40 years. The first part deals with the environment at the University of Halle as well as the history of the development, sources publication and impact. As a rule, the Vernunftlehre is seen as being completely in the tradition of Wolffianism. However this makes it difficult to explain some of the works features, above all his division into inventio, dispositio, elocutio and exercitatio. This work shows that Meiers Vernunftlehre was essentially defined by rhetorical tradition. The second part deals with its integration into Meiers complete works as well with the analysis of both texts, which also contain lessons from epistemology, aesthetics, poetics, hermeneutics and anthropology. This work is more than just a specialized study of Meiers logic, since it also presents Meiers work as a whole. (shrink)

Die Arbeit war von der Lykienforschung lange erwartet worden. Denn die wichtigen Entdeckungen lykischer Kirchen und Klöster durch M. R. Harrison in den 60er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhundert boten nur eine kursorische Dokumentation dieser Denkmäler, die noch viele Fragen offen ließ. Daher versprachen die 1976 und 1977 durchgeführten Surveys der beiden Autoren entscheidende „Nachbesserungen“ und neue Erkenntnisse. Leider blieb das Manuskript ganze 20 Jahre liegen, ehe es zum Druck gegeben wurde, der dann noch einmal sechs Jahre auf sich warten ließ. (...) Es fußt auf einem Forschungsstand von 1997. Damit konnte der in den letzten Jahren erfolgte Schub jüngerer Forschung zu frühbyzantinischen Denkmälern Lykiens nicht mehr berücksichtigt werden. Es sei daher hier jeweils auf die jüngsten relevanten Arbeiten verwiesen. (shrink)

Long description: Bereits Georg Simmel hat beobachtet, dass die sinnliche Wahrnehmung von den Dingen, Architekturen, Techniken und Ästhetiken abhängt, mit denen sich eine Gesellschaft ausstattet. Dennoch wurde die kulturelle Bedingtheit der Sinne in den Sozialwissenschaften lange Zeit ignoriert. Der Band begegnet diesem blinden Fleck und lotet den Zusammenhang von materieller Kultur und den Praktiken der Wahrnehmung theoretisch, methodologisch und empirisch aus. Dabei stehen vier Themenfelder im Vordergrund: Ästhetik innerhalb und außerhalb der Kunst, die affektive Macht der Dinge, räumliche Atmosphären sowie (...) sinnliche Expertisen. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von Regula Burri, Robert Gugutzer, Hans Peter Hahn, Gabriele Klein und Andreas Reckwitz. (shrink)

George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion (...) of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems.Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic.This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. (shrink)

A revision of George Kennedy's translation of, introdution to, and commentary on Aristotle's On Rhetoric. His translation is most accurate, his general introduction is the most thorough and insightful, and his brief introductions to sections of the work, along with his explanatory footnotes, are the most useful available.

<Hylas> It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, ...

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his response (...) to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes, and an index. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

Heidegger pertenece a la historia del lenguaje y de la literatura tanto como a la de la ontolog a, de la epistemolog a fenomenol gica o de la est tica (tal vez ...

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Early Modern German Philosophy (1690-1750) makes some of the key texts of early German thought available in English, in most cases for the first time. The translations range from texts by the most important figures of the period, including Christian Thomasius, Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius, and Georg Friedrich Meier, as well as texts by consequential but less familiar thinkers such as Dorothea Christiane Erxleben, Theodor Ludwig Lau, Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch, and Joachim Lange. The topics covered range across a number (...) of areas of theoretical philosophy, including metaphysics (the immortality of the soul, materialism and its refutation, the pre-established harmony), epistemology (the principle of sufficient reason, the limits of reason with respect to matters of faith), and logic (the role of prejudices in cognition and the doctrine of truth). (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. -/- There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his (...) response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. -/- This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosphers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth-century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philsophy of Marx.

In works of literary fiction, it is a part of the fiction that the words of the text are being recounted by some work-internal 'voice': the literary narrator. One can ask similarly whether the story in movies is told in sights and sounds by a work-internal subjectivity that orchestrates them: a cinematic narrator. George M. Wilson argues that movies do involve a fictional recounting (an audio-visual narration ) in terms of the movie's sound and image track. Viewers are usually (...) prompted to imagine seeing the items and events in the movie's fictional world and to imagine hearing the associated fictional sounds. However, it is much less clear that the cinematic narration must be imagined as the product of some kind of 'narrator' - of a work-internal agent of the narration. Wilson goes on to examine the further question whether viewers imagine seeing the fictional world face-to-face or whether they imagine seeing it through some kind of work-internal mediation . It is a key contention of this book that only the second of these alternatives allows one to give a coherent account of what we do and do not imagine about what we are seeing on the screen. Having provided a partial account of the foundations of film narration, the final chapters explore the ways in which certain complex strategies of cinematic narration are executed in three exemplary films: David Fincher's Fight Club , von Sternberg's The Scarlet Empress , and the Coen brothers' The Man Who Wasn't There. (shrink)