Le symbolisme du temple court d'un Testament à l'autre, non sans de profondes transformations. Dans toutes les religions, le sanctuaire est conçu comme le centre du cosmos, point de rencontre du ciel et de la terre, et sa construction reflète la cosmogenèse. Le Temple de Jérusalem, qui a pu subir l'influence des anciens cultes cananéens et des civilisations voisines, n'échappe pas à cette loi générale. Mais la perspective historique et eschatologique, qui caractérise la foi yahviste, recouvre les symbolismes cosmologiques. On (...) les reconnaît néanmoins dans des détails architecturaux, comme les chérubins, dans le mobilier du Temple, le voile, ou encore dans le vêtement du Grand-Prêtre.Le Nouveau Testament assume le langage symbolique de l'Ancien, bien déstabilisé, à l'époque où Jésus entre en scène, par les évolutions et les antagonismes des divers groupes religieux. Un processus de spiritualisation et d'intériorisation s'était mis en route dans les écrits apocalyptiques et qumrâniens. Le rapport mis par les évangiles entre Jésus et le Temple, joint à d'autres éléments narratifs, de la Passion notamment, fait pénétrer le symbolisme du Temple dans la figure messianique de Jésus. C'est lui qui est le Nouveau Temple dans les écrits johanniques, qui présentent quelques affinités avec ceux de Qumrân. Dans les écrits pauliniens, comme chez les chrétiens hellénistes de Jérusalem, c'est la communauté chrétienne, unie au Christ, qui est le Temple spirituel habité par l'Esprit Saint. Le symbolisme cosmologique trouve là son aboutissement.The symbolism of the temple runs from one Testament to the other, but not without profound transformations. In all religions the sanctuary is seen as the center of the cosmos, the point of encounter between heaven and earth, and its construction reflects the cosmogenesis. The Temple of Jerusalem, which could have undergone the influence of old Canaanite cults and the neighboring civilizations, does not escape from this general law. But the historical and eschatological perspective, whicb characterizes Yahvist faith, covers over the cosmological symbolisms. We recognize them, nevertheless, in architectural details, such as the cberubims, the furniture of the Temple, the veil, and the vestment of the Higb Priest.The New Testament assumes the symbolic language of the Old, whicb, at the time wben Jesus entered upon the scene, was unstabilized by the evolutions and antagonisms of diverse religious groups. A process of spiritualization and interiorization began witb apocalyptic literature and the writings of Qumran. The relationship that the Gospels set up between Jesus and the Temple, joined to other narrative elements, notably of the Passion, made the symbolism of the Temple enter into the messianic figure of Jesus. He is the New Temple in the writings of John, who presents some affinities with the writings of Qumran. In the Pauline writings, as with the Hellenist Cbristians of Jerusalem, it is the Christian community, united witb Christ, who is the spiritual Temple inhabited by the Holy Spirit. The cosmological symbolism finds there its completion. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

La Thyréatide, entre l'Argolide et la Laconie, à l'Est de la Tégéatide est un territoire convoité par tous ses voisins. La description de Pausanias est sans doute mutilée, rendant ainsi pendant longtemps la topographie de la région incompréhensible. Les découvertes archéologiques permettent cependant peu à peu d'en connaître l'occupation et de commencer à cerner les problèmes historiques. Il semble que l'on doive placer Anthana au Nord du Tanos et Eua à Hélleniko, à 600 m au-dessus de la plaine. Le troisième (...) site fortifié, au Sud de la plaine et au bord de la mer, serait alors la Méthana du Pseudo-Skylax, dont la mention aurait disparu du texte de Pausanias en même temps que celle de Thyréa. On suit encore mal l'histoire de la région au vie s. et au début du ve s. av. J.-G. Fortifiée durant la guerre du Péloponnèse, la région est donnée à Argos par Philippe de Macédoine. Renforcée à cette date, la cité d'Eua semble cependant connaître encore des jours mouvementés au ine et au 11e s. av. J.-G. malgré le silence des textes. Les tombes de l'époque romaine nous indiquent qu'elle était encore habitée au temps de Pausanias. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...) that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links. Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments. (shrink)

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

In his article, a unified brain-based determination of death is described by James Bernat (2024) as a permanent cessation of systemic circulation causing a permanent cessation of brain circulation...

Response to commentaries on keynote article.

Antiochos IV (175-164), dans la seconde partie de son règne, a diminué de moitié le poids du chalque, le portant à 4 g environ et instaurant entre l'argent monnayé et le bronze monnayé un rapport voisin de 1 à 50. Un peu plus tard Alexandre Bala (150-145), à Ecbatane, diminua de nouveau de moitié le poids du chalque, qui passa de 4 g à 2 g, si bien que le rapport argent monnayé/bronze monnayé s'établit autour de 1 à 25. (...) J'ai cherché à déterminer quelle pouvait être à cette époque la valeur commerciale du bronze (l'inscription d'Athènes IG³ 472 fournit à cet égard une précieuse indication), de façon à mieux apprécier la part de valeur fiduciaire qui entrait chez les Séleucides dans la valeur d'une monnaie de bronze. Je me suis interrogé aussi sur les raisons qui avaient pu inciter Antiochos IV à modifier le poids du chalque. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage rassemble cinq textes. L'introduction (Guy Bouchard) dénonce l'opprobre injustifiée qui entoure souvent l'utopie et plaide en faveur de son actualité. Le chapitre 1 (Laurent Giroux) thématise les rapports entre utopie et philosophie en suivant deux pistes, celle d'une philosophie de l'utopie et celle de l'utopie philosophique. Le chapitre 2 (Gilbert Leclerc) aborde l'éducation permanente dans la perspective de la portée existentielle de l'utopie et de son impact sociétal. Le chapitre 3 (G. B.) définit l'utopie comme une société idéalisée (...) dans le domaine de la fiction; elle voisine la para-utopie (société idéalisée dans un cadre théorique), l'une et l'autre constituant les deux volets de "l'hétéropolitique"; il est aussi question de la signification et des rôles de l'utopie, lesquels permettent de réfuter les principaux reproches qu'on lui adresse. La conclusion (G. B.) met en évidence le rôle historiogène de la pensée hétéropolitique. (shrink)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

A central theme in the scholarly literature on Enlightenment Europe concerns the increased focus on the role of reason in the development of European thought, especially in the development of the new science by the natural philosophers. As a consequence, there is a tendency in both philosophical scholarship and teaching to bind philosophy and science tightly together. While there is certainly much that is correct in this approach, one motivation for pluralizing philosophy’s past is that this story leaves out a (...) great deal that is important in Enlightenment views of reason. We argue, using as an example the work of figures like Margaret Cavendish, that reason was significantly broader in scope—and that developments in science were paralleled by equally important advances in music, art, literature, medicine, philosophy, and other areas. In recognizing the lack of a sharp boundary between these areas, an inclusive canon of Enlightenment philosophy gives us this richer notion of reason. Integrating figures such as Cavendish into the canon helps us to see that the narrow focus on the scientific version of reason within Enlightenment scholarship creates a false distinction between science and the humanities and misses out on the humanistic ends for which we engage in philosophy. (shrink)

To incorporate medical ethics into clinical practice, it must first be understood and valued by health care professionals. The recognition of this principle led to an expanding and continuing educational effort by the ethics committee of the Vancouver General Hospital. This paper reviews this venture, including some pitfalls and failures, as well as successes. Although we began with consultants, it quickly became apparent that education in medical ethics must reach all health care professionals—and medical students as well. Our greatest successes (...) came in the formative years of a medical career (ie, in medical school and residency training programmes), but other efforts were not wasted, particularly among nurses and other health care professionals.Although this is a personal review of the experience in one institution, the lessons learnt in Vancouver are applicable to the further development of medical ethics in the UK. (shrink)

This article explores children’s narrative identity formation and the impact of adult–child relationships on shaping a child’s narrative. The formation of identity in all children is vulnerable to a culture of ‘adultism’, wherein the authority wielded by adults can potentially subject children to abuse and neglect. Consequently, adultism has the aptitude to hinder the constructive development of a life-affirming identity in children. The primary objective of this article is to develop a childist narrative theology of praxis methodology, aimed at raising (...) consciousness and educating adults on both life-denying and life-giving ways of engaging in the process of children’s narrative identity formation.To achieve this goal, the methodology is developed by adapting Denise Ackermann’s ‘feminist theology of praxis’ to focus specifically on children. The application of feminist theory principles is deemed relevant to the social standing of children as it aligns with the broader goal of liberating oppressed groups, whether women or children. Additionally, John Wall’s work is employed to elucidate the terms ‘childist’ and ‘childism’ as interpretive frameworks. Positioned within the scientific domain of Practical Theology, this study seeks to transform conditions that impede human flourishing into opportunities for positive change.The research objectives determine that a literature review will be suitable to gather essential information for the formulation of a childist narrative theology of praxis. This review, characterised as explorative and descriptive, is conducted within the field of Practical Theology.Contribution: The significance of this study is underscored by its exploration and description of the pastoral functions of consciousness, awareness-raising, and education concerning adult–child relations. By scrutinising these pastoral functions, the emphasis is placed on the proactive, preventive, and universal aspects of pastoral care in the context of children, thereby contributing valuable insights to the discourse. (shrink)

The adjective ἱερός is a central term in Greek religion and is used in various contexts. Generally translated ‘sacred’, it indicates that an object has been conceded to the gods and is now in relation with them (relation of belonging, protection, etc.). It appears frequently in Greek inscriptions in the expression τὰ ἱερά, to designate sacred objects or, in a more abstract meaning, sacred matters.

This interview deals with the major themes in the work of Ruth Millikan. Her most fundamental idea is that the intentionality of inner and outer representations can be understood in analogy to biological functions. Another innovative feature is the view that thought and language stand parallel to each other. Thirdly, the basic ideas concerning the ontology and the epistemology of concepts are explained. Millikan aims at clarifying her position by contrasting it with Dretske, Fodor, Sellars, and Brandom. Finally, the interview (...) addresses topics that pose problems for her account as well as questions she does not treat in her work. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 205 Seiten: 261-276.

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)