L’« aristotélisme » est resté très largement étudié tout au long du XVIIe siècle, mais certainement pas de manière uniforme. Une rupture décisive est intervenue avec l’avènement du cartésianisme qui parvient à se poser en système rival suffisamment crédible pour obliger à une nouvelle donne, à la fois dans l’enseignement prodigué à l’université et dans la pratique philosophique en général. Cet article explique la nature de ces transformations imposées que l’aristotélisme a dû subir, puis examine les différentes façons dont, chacun (...) à leur manière bien spécifique, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche et Leibniz se sont situés par rapport à l’héritage et à la figure du Stagirite. Comment, en l’espace de quelques décennies seulement, l’aristotélisme qui avait tant dominé le paysage philosophique pendant des siècles s’est-il trouvé mis au rang de vestige de l’histoire? (shrink)

"L'autorité d'Aristote n'a pas grand poids pour moi" déclare Spinoza à Hugo Boxel. Mais cette défiance à l'égard d'une autorité déclinante n'empêche pas qu'Aristote se trouve être, après Descartes, le deuxième auteur le plus cité par Spinoza. La mise au jour de l'édition des Oeuvres complètes d'Aristote utilisée par Spinoza ayant, pour la première fois, permis de conclure à l'existence d'une lecture de première main, Frédéric Manzini montre avec cet outil la nécessité de réévaluer les rapports entre les deux (...) philosophes dans toute leur complexité par la confrontation systématique des deux systèmes. Depuis l'éthique jusqu'à la métaphysique en passant par la théorie de la connaissance, Aristote est un interlocuteur avec lequel Spinoza ne cesse de polémiquer. L'Ethique se présente ainsi comme la nouvelle Ethique à Nicomaque, que Spinoza espère rendre enfin universelle, première et vraie en la démontrant à partir de principes certains. (shrink)

Philosophical ability, so that the principles chosen for formalization are not trivial or absurd.

An argument opposing the unrestricted use of quantification in modal logic has been put forward by Quine. Central to this argument are the two phrases, The Morning Star, The Evening Star.One form of the argument is obtained by considering the following two statements: It is necessary that the Morning Star is identical with the Morning Star. It is not necessary that the Evening Star is identical with the Morning Star.

Si la forme est la condition de toute pensée et si la matière est informe, comment Plotin peut-il la penser ? Le recours à la négation accompagné d'une orientation du regard vers l'extériorité permet de faire signe vers l'informité de la matière ; cette négation cependant ne doit pas conduire à un nom vide, mais à un résidu ; l'image apparaît comme une aide qui évite l'évanouissement de la pensée dans le néant. Plotin développe en particulier l'image du miroir pour (...) donner à penser la matière ; comme elle, il est créateur d'illusions et impassible. Cependant, comme toute image, le miroir a ses limites pour illustrer le statut paradoxal de la matière. Proclus, lorsqu'il essaye de penser la participation, met en évidence ces limites : le miroir suppose l'extension, l'extraversion et l'altération de celui qui s'y mire. L'image ne demeure qu'une aide et doit donc rester subordonnée à la négation. If form is the condition of all thought and if matter has no form, how is it possible for Plotinus to think it ? Using negation and considering exteriority allows to lead to the formless nature of matter ; however, this negation must not lead up to an empty name, but to a residue ; the image appears as a help which saves thought from vanishing into nothingness. Plotinus uses especially the image of the mirror to help to think matter ; the mirror is, like matter, an illusion-maker and impassive. Nevertheless, like every image, the mirror has its limits to illustrate the paradoxical status of matter.Proclus, when he tries to think the participation, shows these limits : the mirror presupposes the expanse, extraversion and alteration of he who gazes at himself in it. The image is only a help and must be subordinated to negation. (shrink)

Most traditional systems of metaphysics do not seem to assert that there are such things as propositions. This appears to me to be a defect in such systems, especially as each such system is really itself a class of propositions or a single complex proposition.

The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition of (...) the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

Etudes de morale / par F. Rauh,...; recueillies et publiees par H. Daudin, M. David, G. Davy... [et al.]Date de l'edition originale: 1911Collection: Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaineCe livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres (...) faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k5622683z. (shrink)

In this book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so (...) often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists. (shrink)

This book is a unique introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints imposed upon us (...) by our attachments to others, Frederic Schick reveals that our thinking is often more subtle than standard theories of rationality allow. Only a theory that respects that subtlety can illumine what is otherwise puzzling. The book contains many examples drawn from history and literature dealing with subjects such as love, war, friendship, and crime. (shrink)

This is _the_ leading introduction 200to professional values and ethics in social work. Frederic G. Reamer provides social workers with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the most critical issues relating to professional values and ethics, including the nature of social work values, ethical dilemmas, and professional misconduct. Conceptually rich and attuned to the complexities of ethical decision making, _Social Work Values and Ethics_ is unique in striking the right balance between history, theory, and practical application. For the third edition, (...) Reamer has updated the content and strengthened the relevance of the case material. Also new to the third edition: o Discussion of the moral dialogue between practitioner and cliento Coverage of virtue ethicso Practical discussion of concepts underlying social work ethicso Expanded application of the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics to ethical dilemmas in the professiono A look at the historical evolution of ethical standards in social worko New vignettes, illustrating difficult ethical decisionso More guidance on informed consent and termination of serviceso Discussion questions at the end of each chaptero A section on how to conduct a social work ethics audit. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the problems facing a policy maker who observes inconsistent choices made by agents who are boundedly rational. We contrast a model-less and a model-based approach to welfare economics. We make the case for the model-based approach and examine its advantages as well as some problematic issues associated with it.

This is an important new book about human motivation, about the reasons people have for their actions. What is distinctively new about it is its focus on how people see or understand their situations, options, and prospects. By taking account of people's understandings, Professor Schick is able to expand the current theory of decision and action. The author provides a perspective on the topic by outlining its history. He defends his new theory against criticism, considers its formal structure, and shows (...) at length how it resolves many currently debated problems: the problems of conflict and weakness of will, Allais' problem, Kahneman and Tversky's problems, Newcomb's problem, and others. The book will be of special interest to philosophers, psychologists, and economists. (shrink)

At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...) in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness. (shrink)

The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has become an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we critically assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than 1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes. While we observed an increase in the number of publications in theoretical neuroethics (...) that mention putative DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative assumptions probablyin lieuof robust evidence. As such, this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite the low number of first-hand primary studies and large number of marginal and single case reports, potential postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients remain a critical ethical concern. We recommend further empirical research in order to enhance theoretical neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for the development of better instruments capable of capturing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS. (shrink)

Much has been written about the need for trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI), but the underlying meaning of trust and trustworthiness can vary or be used in confusing ways. It is not always clear whether individuals are speaking of a technology’s trustworthiness, a developer’s trustworthiness, or simply of gaining the trust of users by any means. In sociotechnical circles, trustworthiness is often used as a proxy for ‘the good’, illustrating the moral heights to which technologies and developers ought to aspire, at (...) times with a multitude of diverse requirements; or at other times, no specification at all. In philosophical circles, there is doubt that the concept of trust should be applied at all to technologies rather than their human creators. Nevertheless, people continue to intuitively reason about trust in technologies in their everyday language. This qualitative study employed an empirical ethics methodology to address how developers and users define and construct requirements for trust throughout development and use, through a series of interviews. We found that different accounts of trust (rational, affective, credentialist, norms based, relational) served as the basis for individual granting of trust in technologies and operators. Ultimately, the most significant requirement for user trust and assessment of trustworthiness was the accountability of AI developers for the outputs of AI systems, hinging on the identification of accountable moral agents and perceived value alignment between the user and developer’s interests. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)