La situación extrema de pobreza, marginalidad y todas las secuelas que derivan del actual orden histórico de la economía neoliberal globalizadora, es la principal característica que define a la sociedad moderna como injusta, a la vez que depredadora del hombre y de la naturaleza. Enfrentamos a..

El concepto de Sumak Kawsay ha sido introducido en la Constitución ecuatoriana de 2008, con referencia a la noción del ";vivir bien"; o ";Buen Vivir"; de los pueblos indígenas. Posteriormente fue retomado por el Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2009-2013. Se trata entonces de una idea central en la vida política del país. Por esta razón es importante analizar su contenido, su correspondencia eventual con la noción de ";Bien Común de la Humanidad"; desarrollado en el seno de la Organización (...) de las Naciones Unidas, y sus posibles aplicaciones en las prácticas internacionales. La pertinencia de esta referencia está reforzada por el conjunto de las crisis provocadas por el agotamiento del sistema capitalista. (shrink)

In the first English translation of his work, Laruelle explores the major European thinkers from Nietzsche to Derrida to define his own 'non-philosophical' ...

Conversational implicatures do not normally fall within the scope of operators because they arise at the speech act level, not at the level of sub-locutionary constituents. Yet in some cases they do, or so it seems. My aim in this paper is to compare different approaches to the problem raised by what I call 'embedded implicatures': seeming implicatures that arise locally, at a sub-locutionary level, without resulting from an inference in the narrow sense.

L'auteur consacre sa réflexion à l'amplification et à l'achèvement de la non-philosophie, en combinant science et philosophie qui sont considérées comme des variables définissant un espace ondulatoire et particulaire de l'opération de penser.

This paper is about the Descriptivism/Singularism debate, which has loomed large in 20-century philosophy of language and mind. My aim is to defend Singularism by showing, first, that it is a better and more promising view than even the most sophisticated versions of Descriptivism, and second, that the recent objections to Singularism (based on a dismissal of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought) miss their target.

François Recanati; IV*—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 57–74, h.

_A mood for Philosophy_ __ _ _ _In this dialogue with Francois Laruelle Anne-Françoise Schmidt suggests that Laruelle's non-philosophy, which begins with an indecision, could be conceived as something that in the history of painting has been called figura serpentinata, "serpentine line". This line, which produces a kind of music by the use of concepts, is visible according her trough his whole work: from his first book on Ravaisson, _Phenomenon and Difference,_ through to his last one, _The Last Humanity: A (...) New Ecological Science_, published in French in 2015 and expected to appear in English in 2018._. (shrink)

Review of Insensitive Semantics, by H. Cappelen and E. Lepore.

A defence of the 'pragmatic' theory of anaphora (which stresses the analogy between anaphora and deixis) against an argument put forward by Gareth Evans.

I distinguish, and discuss the relations between, five types of context-shift involving indexicals. For 'intentional' indexicals - indexicals whose value depends upon the speaker's intention - we can shift the context more or less 'at will', by manifesting one's intention to do so. For other indexicals we can shift the context through pretense. Following a number of authors, I distinguish two types of context-shifting pretense, corresponding to two sets of linguistic phenomena. The fourth type of case is that of expressions (...) which are not really indexical, but perspectival, and for which we do not need to appeal to the notion of context-shift in order to account for their shifty behaviour. The fifth category I introduce and discuss is that of 'shiftable indexicals'. Do we need it, given that we already have the other four categories? My answer is a qualified 'yes'. (shrink)

A historical overview, with an attempt to rebut Grice's argument against Contextualism.

The central notion in this article is ‘pluriform accommodation,’ a term that we have coined to defend two lines of thought. The first is a plea for inclusive and consequential neutrality; the second is a closely linked plea for reasonable accommodation. With ‘pluriform accommodation’ we emphasize that the multicultural recognition scope should be expanded. The need for inclusive and accommodative rules, laws, and practices is a matter of principle and as such cannot be reduced to the inclusion of people with (...) an immigration background who bring with them all kinds of ethnocultural and religious practices, convictions, and traditions. Furthermore, the enshrined freedom of religion does not provide the needed protection for the multiplicity of conscientious identifications, convictions, and strong allegiances that might be central to one’s sense of self. We argue that we should not engage in (top down) debates about the rights of individuals and groups of different types and think in terms of identity hierarchies, but instead should consider the various claims being made (bottom up), aiming for common standards and criteria to assess the validity of these claims and the reasonableness of the associated accommodations. (shrink)

Are the things of this world given to thought? Are things really meant to be known, to be taken as the objective manifestations of a transcendental conditioning power? The Western philosophical tradition, according to François Laruelle, presupposes just this transcendental constitution of the real--a presupposition that exalts philosophy itself as the designated recipient of the transcendental gift. Philosophy knows what things really are because things--all things--are given to philosophy to be known. Laruelle's trenchant essays show how this presupposition controls even (...) the ostensibly radical critiques of the philosophical tradition that have proliferated in the postmodern aftermath of Nietzsche and Heidegger. For these critiques persist in assuming that the disruptive other is in some way given to their own discourse--which shows itself thereby to be still philosophical. An effective critique of philosophy must be non-philosophical. It must, according to Laruelle, suspend the presupposition that otherness is given to be known, that thought has a fundamentally differential structure. Non-philosophy begins not with difference, not with subject and object, but with the positing of the One. From this axiomatic starting point, non-philosophy takes as its material philosophy, rethought according to the One. The non-philosophy project does not, like so much postmodern philosophy, herald the end of philosophy. It takes philosophy as an occasion to raise the question of another kind of thought--one that, instead of differentially relating to the world that it presupposes, asserts that it is ultimately, in the flesh, at One with what it can never know. Publisher's note. (shrink)

Nanotechnology is an important platform technology which will add new features like improved biocompatibility, smaller size, and more sophisticated electronics to neuro-implants improving their therapeutic potential. Especially in view of possible advantages for patients, research and development of nanotechnologically improved neuro implants is a moral obligation. However, the development of brain implants by itself touches many ethical, social and legal issues, which also apply in a specific way to devices enabled or improved by nanotechnology. For researchers developing nanotechnology such issues (...) are rather distant from their daily work in the lab, but as soon as they use their materials or devices in medical applications such as therapy of brain diseases they have to be aware of and deal with them. This paper is intended to raise sensitivity for the ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) involved in applying nanotechnology in brain implants or other devices by highlighting the short term problems of testing and clinical trials within the existing regulatory frameworks (A), the short and medium-term questions of risks in the application of the devices (B) and the long-term perspectives related to problems of enhancement (C). To identify and address such issues properly nanotechnologists should involve ethical, legal and social experts and regulatory bodies in their research as early as possible. This will help to remove pressure from regulatory bodies, to settle public concern and to prevent non-acceptable developments for the benefit of the patients. (shrink)

Response to Carston's paper, 'How Many Pragmatic Systems Are There'?

Current philosophical accounts of causation suggest that the same causal assertion can have different meanings. Yet, in actual social-scientific practice, the possible meanings of some causal generalisations intended to support policy prescriptions are not always spelled out. In line with a standard referentialist approach to semantics, we propose and elaborate on four questions to systematically elucidate the meaning of causal generalisations. The analysis can be useful to a host of agents, including social scientists, policy-makers, and philosophers aiming at being socially (...) relevant. To illustrate our proposal, we analyse the complexities related to the meaning of causal generalisations in the context of a concrete case of economic research which is explicitly intended to guide public policy, namely, the OECD research on the causes of unemployment. (shrink)

Derrida often insists that ethics must be the experience and encounter of a certain impossible. A proposition all the more troubling, as it is proposed by Derrida in the context of a return precisely to the conditions of possibility of ethics. It will appear that returning to the possibilities of ethics implies a return to its limits, to its aporias, which are both constitutive and incapacitating, possibilizing and impossibilizing. The purpose of this paper is to begin exploring this aporetic structure (...) of ethics and to identify how it is tied to the impossible. I will pursue this inquiry by reconstituting how Derrida appropriates Heidegger's expression of "possibility of the impossible," and by reconstituting the aporias of the law, of moral decision, of responsibility, and of an ethics of hospitality as welcome of the event of otherness. (shrink)

Biological objects are often constructive dynamic systems whose structures evolve as a consequence of their internal dynamics, which in turn is affected by the overall structure. As very few tools are presently adapted to tackle constructive dynamic systems, they constitute fascinating challenges for modeling/simulation. In cell biology, the secretory process in eukaryotic cells corresponds to this type of system, as it appears to autonomously generate new structures as a result of its molecular dynamics. Here I briefly review the only documented (...) case of a membrane-bounded intracellular compartment whose very existence strictly depends on its continued functioning. Indeed, the Golgi apparatus of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae appears at steady-state as a continuously renewed set of transitory membrane-bounded structures that self-mature, rather than as a permanent entity. On the basis of this case and of recent advances in related molecular studies, a detailed model is proposed, that encompasses the birth of a yeast Golgi element and bridges its molecular and morphogenetic aspects. This model is extended to briefly outline three evolutionary inventions, from S. cerevisiae to another yeast, Pichia pastoris, on to plant, and on to animal cells: stacking, stabilizing and aggregating the primary Golgi elements. (shrink)

A number of distinct (though related) issues are raised in the debate over Contextualism in the philosophy of language. My aim in this chapter for the Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics is to disentangle them, so as to get a clearer view of the positions available (where a 'position' consists of a particular take on each of the relevant issues simultaneously).

ArgumentThis paper challenges the use of the notion of “culture” to describe a particular organization of mathematical knowledge, shared by a few mathematicians over a short period of time in the second half of the nineteenth century. This knowledge relates to “geometrical equations,” objects that proved crucial for the mechanisms of encounters between equation theory, substitution theory, and geometry at that time, although they were not well-defined mathematical objects. The description of the mathematical collective activities linked to “geometrical equations,” and (...) especially the technical aspects of these activities, is made on the basis of a sociological definition of “culture.” More precisely, after an examination of the social organization of the group of mathematicians, I argue that these activities form an intricate system of patterns, symbols, and values, for which I suggest a characterization as a “cultural system.”. (shrink)

What relevance does Foucault have, more than a decade after his death? Foucault was a sort of philosophical journalist - continually concerned with what is happening in the present. And it is here that we find one of the guiding threads of Foucault's ethics: we must be constantly vigilant in ensuring that the present does not become a mere repetition of the past. Philosophy must produce events that can act to disrupt this repetition. This is the task of judgment, confronted (...) by the question of power. We can recognize four points on which Foucault has continuing relevance. First, Foucault diagnosed the end of revolution, the consequences of which we are now living. Further, Foucault's work on truth-telling and norms and measures, the heart of the question of justice, is still significant. Foucault's work on medicine, and in particular ancient Greek medicine, will also play a critical role if we are to successfully navigate the myriad problems posed by a new form of medicine, genetic medicine - a medicine of predispositions rather than therapy, similar to the medicine practiced by the Greeks. Fourth and finally, Foucault has a continuing relevance for problems of decision-making, responsibility and care. We can think about responsibility, for Foucault, through the question of care - and thus will avoid reducing responsibility to a merely juridical notion. Key Words: care • Foucault • medicine • norms • present • repetition • responsibility • revolution. (shrink)

On reproche fréquemment aux plaidoiries de ralentir le temps du procès et de ne pas avoir de vraie utilité. En réalité, conclusions écrites et observations orales sont complémentaires. Une justice accessible et à l’écoute suppose un temps d’échange adapté à la nature du procès, à la complexité de l’affaire et aux enjeux du dossier. Un juge actif pendant la phase orale permet aussi de rassurer le justiciable sur la prise en considération de son dossier. Dans le souci d’une bonne administration (...) de la justice, il existe différentes manières de rétablir une forme d’harmonie entre l’écrit et l’oral. À toutes les étapes du procès, en première instance, en appel et devant le juge de cassation, la boîte à outils est, désormais, bien achalandée pour faire du sur-mesure. ll reste à en faire la promotion et se saisir pleinement de ces outils. (shrink)

RésuméVivre, agir, c'est participer à des répétitions qui laissent en nous une marque et finissent par nous faire acquérir une pratique. La réflexion vient ensuite, utilise ces marques, en forme des images qu'elle peut évoquer à volonté, et qu'elle structure en représentations: langage intérieur, puis langage de communication. Une « intuition » est l'affleurement conscient d'une marque laissée par la pratique, et son insertion quasi‐instantanée dans le système des représentations internes. Les progrès alternés dans la pratique, dans l'association des images, (...) dans le langage, dans l'action se suscitent les uns les autres, au cours d'une évolution conditionnée par nos structures physiologiques .La pratique sur laquelle s'exerce ainsi la réflexion peut ětre la pratique měme de la réflexion. A chaque pratique particulière s'associe une technique: à l'origine empirique, puis, par réflexions successives, rationnelle, mathématique, formelle .Mais toute mathématique suppose un mathématicien, tout langage formalisé un méta‐langage, et la connaissance ne se laisse jamais enfermer dans une technique ultime: on retrouve les trois horizons de l'idonéisme. Le développement intellectuel qui va d'un niveau au niveau supérieur est à rapprocher du développement de l'embryon; l'ontogenèse répète la Phylogenèse; on ne peut atteindre un niveau de connaissances qu'en passant par les niveaux intermédiaires atteints successivement par nos prédécesseurs; il n'existe pas de raccourci, et la connaissance future ne peut ětre prévue par les moyens de la connaissance actuelle.SummaryTo live and to act is to share in repetitions which impress marks upon us and eventually makes us acquire a practice. Reflection comes later on, using those marks, shaping them into images that it can conjure up at will, and structuring them into representations: first inner language, then communication language. An « intuition » is the conscious outcrop of a mark left by practice and its quasi‐instantaneous insertion into the system of inner representations. Alternating progress in practice, in image‐ association, in language and in action give rise to one another in the course of an evolution conditionned by our physiological structure .The practice on which reflection exerts itself can be the very practice of reflection. To each particular practice is associated a technique, originally empirical, then, through a succession of reflections, rational, mathematical, formal .But every mathematics supposes a mathematician, every formalized language a metalanguage, and knowledge can never be shut into an ultimate technique: one is once more confronted with the three horizons of idoneism. Intellectual development, going from a certain level to an upper level, is to be compared with the development of an embryo; ontogenesis repeats phylogenesis; one can only reach a certain level of knowledge by going through intermediate levels successively reached to by our predecessors; there is no short cut, and future knowledge cannot be foreseen through the ways of present knowledge. (shrink)

RésuméLa probabilité présente, en Physique classique, des caractères paradoxaux; relative à un état de connaissance, et n'apportant de renseignements que sur un ensemble nombreux d'essais, elle semble pourtant se définir comme un caractère objectif de l'événement isolé; elle suppose qu'on doive répondre » peut‐ětre « à certaines questions, alors que la Logique classique n'admet d'autre réponse que » oui « ou » non «. Utilisée par la micro‐physique, elle brise l'unité des fondements physico‐mathématiques qui se manifestait dans la Logique bivalente, (...) conçue comme théorie de l'objet, de l'événement, de la théorie quelconques.L'analyse de ces caractères paradoxaux, ainsi que des notions d'objet et d'événement, montre que la Physico‐mathématique retrouve son unité de fondements si l'on substitue à la Logique bivalente, la Logique trivalente de la Composition , ou la Logique des Attitudes qui la généralise . Cette revision des notions fondamentales à laquelle la science en progrès s'oblige elle‐měme est une expérience de l'idonéisme en action.ZusammenfassungDie Wahrscheinlichkeit zeigt in der klassischen Physik paradoxe Züge; obwohl sie vom Stande des Wissens abhängt und nur über eine grosse Anzahl von Versuchen Auskünfte gibt, scheint sie als eine objektive Eigenschaft des Einzelereignisses definiert zu sein; sie nimmt an, dass gewisse Fragen mit » vielleicht « beantwortet werden müssen, obgleich die klassische Logik keine andere Antwort als » ja « oder » nein « zulässt. Durch die Mikrophysik nutzbar gemacht, durchbricht sie die Einheit der physikalisch‐mathematischen Fundamente, die sich kundtat in der bivalenten Logik, verstanden als Theorie des beliebigen Objektes, des beliebigen Ereignisses, der beliebigen Theorie. Die Analyse dieser paradoxen Züge, sowie der Begriffe des Objektes und des Ereignisses zeigt, dass Mathematik und Physik ihre einheitlichen Grundlagen wiederfinden, wenn man die bivalente Logik durch die trivalente der Komposition ersetzt oder durch die Logik der Einstellungen , welche sie verallgemeinert . Diese Revision der grundlegenden Begriffe, zu der sich die fortschrittliche Wissenschaft selbst verpflichtet, ist ein Beispiel des in die Tat umgesetzten Idoneismus.Probability shows paradoxical characteristics in classical physics; although dependent upon a state of knowledge, and yielding information only as the total result of numerous trials, it seems nevertheless to be definable as an objective characteristic of the isolated event; it assumes that one must reply » perhaps « to certain questions, whilst classical logic would allow no answer but » yes « or » no «. When used by micro‐physics, it breaks the unity of the physico‐mathematical foundations which became apparent in bivalent logic, in its conception as a theory of any object, any event or any theory.Analysis of these paradoxical characteristics and of the concepts » object « and » event « shows physics and mathematics regain their fundamental unity if bivalent logic is replaced by the trivalent logic of synthesis or the logic of attitudes, which generalises it . This revision of fundamental concepts which progressive science brings upon itself, is an example of the doctrine of suitability in action. (shrink)

Etre citoyen en démocratie ne consiste pas seulement à exercer le droit de vote. C'est aussi être impliqué dans le devenir d'une société dont chacun est responsable. Celle-ci se construit quotidiennement à travers des actes et des comportements qui sont inséparables de nos convictions et de nos choix. Etre citoyen, c'est donc aussi agir avec soi et sur soi. C'est être souverain sur soi. Pour être citoyen, il faut donc le vouloir, le concevoir, et trouver la bonne mesure, car nous (...) ne sommes pas souverains de droit divin. Pour le dire autrement, nous devons apprendre à être libres, au cœur même de notre finitude. (shrink)

Response to two papers by Philippe De Brabanter in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).