This paper investigates when two abstract logic-based argumentation systems are equivalent. It defines various equivalence criteria, investigates the links between them, and identifies cases where two systems are equivalent with respect to each of the proposed criteria. In particular, it shows that under some reasonable conditions on the logic underlying an argumentation system, the latter has an equivalent finite subsystem, called core. This core constitutes a threshold under which arguments of the system have not yet attained their final status and (...) consequently adding a new argument may result in status change. From that threshold, the statuses of all arguments become stable. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.