First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The idea that the self is in need of rethinking, as the title to this collection of essays suggests, presupposes that the self has already been “thought.” And indeed it has—both explicitly, by philosophers, and implicitly, in the practices of everyday life. For philosophers, this thinking about the self has taken place largely in abstract terms; persons have been treated as metaphysical-cum-moral subjects, disembodied minds that could plausibly be split from or melded with other such minds, or as rational agents, (...) capable of choosing a plan in terms of which to live their lives. In everyday life, in contrast, we “think” one another as selves by making assumptions about how the people we encounter fit into the social landscape and about how we ourselves have a place in the world. As the essays in this collection demonstrate, feminists have challenged both ways of thinking of selfhood in various, sometimes contradictory, ways. (shrink)

Introducing the work of three French feminists - Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Michele L Doeuff - "Sexual Subversions" provides access to the work of these writers. In doing so this book raises some key issues of relevance to feminist research, addressing debates around the nature of feminist theory; the relationship between feminist thinking theory; the relationship between feminist thinking and male-dominated areas of knowledge; the strategies appropriate for developing non-patriarchal or woman-centered knowledges. No book on French feminists (...) would be complete without including the contributions of Kristeva and Irigaray. The inclusion of Le Doeuff's work, which brings a different perspective to bear on the question of sexual difference, provides a counterbalance to literary appropriations of French feminism by Anglo-American readerships. Kristeva, Irigaray and Le Doeuff are the focal points of this study, precisely because each highlights the differences of the others, revealing the frameworks to which the others are committed. Nevertheless, while these writers do not present a common political or theoretical position or form a school, each does address the question of women's autonomy from male definition, affirms the sexual specificity of women, seeks out a femininity women can use to question the patriarchal norms and ideals of femininity and rejects the preordained positions patriarchy allots to woman. This book is intended for students and researchers in women's studies, philosophy and feminism. (shrink)

The dominant figure in Western Roman Catholic ethics is Thomas Aquinas, and Catholic tradition references a centralized magisterium. Nevertheless, Catholicism is internally pluralistic. After Vatican II, three models of theology and tradition emerged, all addressing gender equality: the Augustinian, neo-Thomistic, and neo-Franciscan. Latina, womanist, African, and Asian ethics of gender present more radical approaches to tradition—suggesting a Junian stream. Catholic ethical-political tradition is not defined by a specific cultural mediation, figure, or model but by a constellation of commitments shared by (...) Catholic feminists: difference in unity, moral realism, social meliorism, human equality, preferential option for the poor, and interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

Seeking new language for the Divine has encouraged Christian and Jewish feminists to explore other religious traditions which are richer in feminine language for God, and in some cases to borrow parts of what they find for their own use. However, these other religious traditions are often socially and politically less powerful, and borrowing their language and practice has ethical implications. Especially because the ethical dimensions of liturgy are bound up with theological issues, religious feminists have a moral (...) duty to consider these questions in which there are rarely if ever any easy answers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible (...) explanation of what is wrong with patriarchy and so can serve as the theoretical basis for feminist ethics.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article propose que les féministes de toutes tendances se doivent d'être contractualistes de type hobbesien ou de choix rationnel. L'argument débute par une critique de quelques-unes des raisons principales pour lesquelles les féministes ont résisté ou se sont opposées à une morale contractualiste et établit que leurs critiques n'atteignent pas leur cible lorsqu'elles sont dirigées contre les versions hobbesiennes de cette doctrine. Un argument positif vient brièvement conclure le tout, en montrant que le contractualisme rend compte, fort plausiblement, des défauts du patriarcat, et qu'il est donc à même de fournir une base théorique à une éthique féministe. (shrink)

This article challenges the widely held view that mysticism is essentially characterized by intense, ineffable, subjective experiences. Instead, I show that mysticism has undergone a series of social constructions, which were never innocent of gendered struggles for power. When philosophers of religion and popular writers on mysticism ignore these gendered constructions, as they regularly do, they are in turn perpetuating a post-Jamesian understanding of mysticism which removes mysticism and women from involvement with political and social justice.

In contrast to popular presumptions and prior research on women ofthe “postfeminist” generation, this study found anappreciation for recent historicalchanges in women’s opportunities, and an awareness of persisting inequalities and discrimination. The findings reveal support for feminist goals, coupled with ambiguity about the concept offeminism. Although some of the women could be categorized alonga continuum of feminist identification, half were “fence-sitters” or were unable to articulate a position. There were variations in perspectives amongthose with different life experiences, as well as (...) by racial and class background. (shrink)

This article aims to lay out the ‘for money’ and ‘for dignity’ arguments that feminist ethicists have given about the reproductive labour women perform in providing oocytes or in getting pregnant for others. Feminist arguments about the morality of these two practices overlap significantly because, from a feminist perspective, the morally relevant facts about them are quite similar. Still, there are dissimilarities, stemming from the obvious fact that one practice involves giving up oocytes while the other involves giving up a (...) baby after a pregnancy. Some arguments by feminists reflect this core difference, in that they apply specifically to one practice but not to the other. The article highlights when the relevance of a particular argument differs for these different reproductive practices. (shrink)

Trafficking in women’ has, in recent years, been the subject of intense feminist debate. This article analyses the position of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and the writings of its founder, Kathleen Barry. It suggests that CATW's construction of ‘third world prostitutes’ is part of a wider western feminist impulse to construct a damaged ‘other’ as justification for its own interventionist impulses. The central argument of this article is that the ‘injured body’ of the ‘third world trafficking victim’ (...) in international feminist debates around trafficking in women serves as a powerful metaphor for advancing certain feminist interests, which cannot be assumed to be those of third world sex workers themselves. This argument is advanced through a comparison of Victorian feminist campaigns against prostitution in India with contemporary feminist campaigns against trafficking. The term ‘injured identity’ is drawn from Wendy Brown's (1995) States of Injury, Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Brown argues that certain groups have configured their claims to inclusion in the liberal state in terms of ‘historical ‘injuries’. Antoinette Burton (1998) extends Brown's analysis to look at Victorian feminists’ relationship to Empire, arguing that the ‘injured identities’ of colonial ‘others’ were central to feminist efforts to mark out their own role in Empire. This paper builds on Burton's analysis, asking what role the ‘injured identities’ of third world sex workers play in the construction of certain contemporary feminist identities. The notion of ‘injured identities’ offers a provocative way to begin to examine how CATW feminists position the ‘trafficking victim’ in their discourse. If ‘injured identity’ is a constituent element of late modern subject formation, this may help explain why CATW and Barry rely so heavily on the ‘suffering’ of ‘third world trafficking victims’ in their discourses of women's subjugation. It also raises questions about the possible repressive consequences of CATW's efforts to combat ‘trafficking in women’ through ‘protective’ legislation. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with two questions: What is sexist humor? and what is wrong with it? To answer the first question, I briefly develop a theory of humor and then characterize sexist humor as humor in which sexist beliefs (attitudes/norms) are presupposed and are necessary to the fun. Concerning the second question, I criticize a common sort of argument that is supposed to explain why sexist humor is offensive: although the argument explains why sexist humor feels offensive, (...) it does not place responsibility for the offense in the humorist or audience that enjoys sexist humor. I develop an alternate account of the offense in sexist humor that places responsibility for offense in precisely those quarters. (shrink)

This brief comment was a contribution to a 1995 Symposium on Feminism and Philosophy in the 1990s held at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in conjunction with the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs. I suggest the usefulness of paying attention to the differences among philosophers who are women; philosophers who are feminists; philosophers who do feminist philosophy; and philosophers who want to express their feminism in their roles as philosophers. Keeping these differences in mind might help (...) us to avoid mistaken and disrespectful assumptions about both philosophers and feminist philosophy. (shrink)

—Grayson Hunt1In 2015, I visited Lake Cumberland in Kentucky for a day of boating and swimming with friends. At one end of the lake was an amazing waterfall. As I was swimming near it, I looked up and saw a man thirty feet above in the bushes on top of the falls. He waved. I waved back. Only he wasn’t boating; he was just standing there. So I stared at him, wondering what he was doing up there. Then I realized (...) he was masturbating. Stunned, I turned away to swim back to the boat, and I could feel shame sneaking into my chest and face. I began to feel responsible for what was happening to me, which was the very message I internalized after being sexually assaulted as a teen. This time, however, I decided that I... (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are "mini-wars" which encourage hatred; (2) while not "mini-wars," competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, (...) some competition may be useful. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with two questions: What is sexist humor? and what is wrong with it? To answer the first question, I briefly develop a theory of humor and then characterize sexist humor as humor in which sexist beliefs are presupposed and are necessary to the fun. Concerning the second question, I criticize a common sort of argument that is supposed to explain why sexist humor is offensive: although the argument explains why sexist humor feels offensive, it (...) does not place responsibility for the offense in the humorist or audience that enjoys sexist humor. I develop an alternate account of the offense in sexist humor that places responsibility for offense in precisely those quarters. (shrink)

Although at times criticized for its philosophical density, French cultural theory remains a flourishing, if highly contested, area of academic study. Four feminist thinkers in this tradition continue to be especially prominent: Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray. This new collection from Routledge gathers together the very best secondary literature on these thinkers to provide an indispensable conspectus of their works. Each of the four thinkers is represented by an individual volume, and each volume includes a (...) newly written introduction to that thinker’s work and her philosophical relevance. (shrink)

Stuart Swindle in “Why Feminists Should Take the Phenomenology of Spirit Seriously” accuses me of failing to interpret the passages in the Phenomenology on the family and women in the full context of the progress to absolute spirit. He gives no particular evidence for this claim, but merely asserts it repeatedly and at an ever increasing decibel level. To this general criticism I assert that nothing that I wrote in “Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?” denied that (...) spirit progresses beyond the Hellenic world or any other particular stage of development. In fact, my argument was predicated on just such a development. Women, however, - I argued - do not seem to develop, nor are they capable of development, in their consciousness or social expression according to Hegel from Greek times to modernity. (shrink)