I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attachments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too high.

This volume is fourth in the series of annuals created under the auspices of The Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory . The topics covered herein_from peacekeeping and terrorism, to sex trafficking and women's paid labor, to poverty and religious fundamentalism_are vital to women and to feminist movements throughout the world.

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are "mini-wars" which encourage hatred; (2) while not "mini-wars," competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some (...) competition may be useful. (shrink)

Biocentric individualism, the position that all life has intrinsic value, is of no practical help in policy-making contexts. Examples commonly used in discussions of biocentric individualism are themselves alienating and threaten to make environmental philosophy appear irrelevant to policy decisions. Hence, both biocentric individualism and typical discussions of it are problematic for those wishing to make environmental philosophy useful in policy. A recent article by Jason Kawall, in which he attempts to defend biocentric individualism, demonstrates these points.

Biocentric individualism, the position that all life has intrinsic value, is of no practical help in policy-making contexts. Examples commonly used in discussions of biocentric individualism are themselves alienating and threaten to make environmental philosophy appear irrelevant to policy decisions. Hence, both biocentric individualism and typical discussions of it are problematic for those wishing to make environmental philosophy useful in policy. A recent article by Jason Kawall, in which he attempts to defend biocentric individualism, demonstrates these points.

This chapter contains sections titled: Historical connections Value dualisms and the logic of domination Ecofeminism and animals Environmental racism Ecofeminism and critiques of development Charges of essentialism Mainstream approaches Social ecology and deep ecology Some future hopes for ecofeminism.

This paper critiques a conception of intelligence central in AI, and a related concept of reason central in moral philosophy, from an ecological feminist perspective. I argue that ecofeminist critique of human/nature dualisms offers insight into the durability of both problematic conceptions, and into the direction of research programmes. I conclude by arguing for the importance of keeping political analysis in the forefront of science and environmental ethics.

I reply to Laura Duhan Kaplan that I do not suggest women's political choices concerning pacifism are determined by biology. Although I contend the practice of mothering does not imply a pacifist commitment, this does not imply that the practice of mothering is inconsistent with such a commitment. Further, because the practice of mothering is not limited to women, even if it is inconsistent with pacifist commitment, this does not limit choices based on biology.

: In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an "intuition" that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is "unnatural" rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is "natural," an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called "natural" in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.

In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an “intuition” that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is “unnatural” rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is “natural,” an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called “natural” in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.

In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an “intuition” that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is “unnatural” rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is “natural,” an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called “natural” in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.

Here I support my position in "Do Good Feminists Compete?" against the suggestion that competing with others weakens rather than strengthens one's sense of self.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future of Environmental PhilosophyVictoria Davion (bio)I agree with Baird Callicott that we still see many suggestions that we can deal with problems such as global climate change individually and voluntarily, and that this is hopelessly naïve. Obviously, many people aren't even in a position to think about these issues, as daily survival is a problem. Hence, proclamations such as those in the most recent version of the Earth Charter (...) (www.earthcharter.org), stating ideas such that we are all responsible for the future of our planet, and that we all belong to one human family are hopeless and useless. However, this leaves open the question of how to deal with serious issues such as global climate change. Baird is right we need to deal with issues of scale.This brings me to some of the things that Bryan Norton and Bill Throop have mentioned. Bryan suggests that the fact that environmental ethicists have been too focused on metaphysical foundations of environmental values and have not focused enough on concrete empirical issues. I agree with Bryan here. However, Baird's concern with how we are going to understand issues of scale necessary to deal with problems such as global climate change seems to bring us back to the need for a focus on metaphysical foundations of environmental values. Hence, I am having trouble with Bill's idea that we can somehow split the labor between those who are involved with more concrete issues and those involved with issues of metaphysical foundational value. And, I am worried about what these more applied environmental ethicists will bring to the table, if they aren't well grounded in philosophical traditions.I agree with Bill that this places a great burden on students of environmental [End Page 149] philosophy, but I am not sure how to get around this burden. This brings me to Clare Palmer's comments. It is still true that many mainstream programs believe that environmental philosophy is simply second-string. It is important that undergraduates have a course available, but that's about it. She is right to point out that in the days of Leiter, we need to have plenty of up-to-date information available for those who might be interested in environmental philosophy. However, I believe they will certainly need a strong grounding in the history of philosophy in order to be at all successful in academic philosophy, or particularly useful in collaboration on interdisciplinary projects. This will also require field training as several of our contributors point out. Again, I realize this places an increased burden on students, but I see no way around it.Victoria Davion Victoria Davion is head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Georgia. She is founding and current editor of Ethics & the Environment. Her research areas include feminist philosophy, environmental ethics, ethics, and political philosophy. E-mail: [email protected] © 2007 Indiana University Press... (shrink)

This essay explores several moral issues raised by global warming through the lens of Claudia Card's theory of evil. I focus on Alaskan villages in the sub-Arctic whose residents must relocate owing to extreme erosion, melting sea ice, and rising water levels. I use Card's discussion of genocide as social death to argue that failure to help these groups maintain their unique cultural identities can be thought of as genocidal.

My thesis explores the possibility that the wrongful intentions principle might not apply in certain deterrent situations. WIP states that if it is wrong to do something under certain conditions, it is wrong to intend to do it should those conditions arise. Questions about applications of WIP are frequently raised in discussions about the morality of nuclear deterrence. Some philosophers, such as Gregory Kavka, maintain that in certain situations where gaining deterrence is important, it is morally permissible, and perhaps even (...) obligatory to form a sincere intention to retaliate although retaliation is wrong. ;The rejection of WIP causes paradoxes about relationships between good agents and right actions. Good and rational agents are unable to fulfill obligations to intend wrong, as their unwillingness to do wrong makes intending it impossible. Hence, the paradoxical conclusion that only a corrupt individual can do right in certain situations. ;The conclusion that in certain situations only corrupt agents can do right rests upon rejecting the WIP. I show that WIP applies in all deterrence situations and in all situations, period. Because WIP always applies, there are no situations where goodness and rationality prevent right action. ;Chapter one presents consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments to the conclusion that actual retaliation against civilian populations is wrong. In chapters two and three I argue that the kinds of situations discussed by Kavka and others doesn't warrant rejecting WIP. I maintain that non-consequentialist theories cannot permit agents to separate questions about intentions from questions about actions. Consequentialism cannot justify rejecting WIP in these situations either. Rejection of WIP implies that a corrupt leader is needed, and consequentialism cannot justify seeking such a leader. Chapter four argues that WIP must apply in all situations because it must be part of any action-guiding theory, either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. Talk of rejecting WIP is incoherent. Hence, because WIP always applies, goodness and rationality will never preclude right action, and whenever performing an action is wrong, intending to perform it is wrong as well. (shrink)

In this paper I link the very interesting analysis of responsibility provided by Larry May and Robert Strikwerda in "Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape (May and Strikwerda 1994) to some strategies for helping women avoid rape. In addition, I call for some clarification on May and Strikwerda's claim that rapists are fully responsible for their actions and that it is largely a matter of luck which men actually turn out to be rapists.

RÉSUMÉ Ce texte porte sur l'élaboration des politiques publiques à partir d'une perspective conséquentialiste basée sur les probabilités. En utilisant l'exemple de la dissuasion par la menace nucléaire, je montre que ceux qui sont véritablement dévoués à la protection de l'environnement, ceux qui se soucient véritablement du problème de l'environnement devraient refuser le conséquentialisme basé sur les probabilités sans le principe de la reconsideration, un principe que nous proposons ici pour la première fois, le principe de la reconsideration doit être (...) adopté parce que, sans lui, le conséquentialisme basé sur les probabilités pourrait justifier qu'on poursuive l'application de politiques même lorsque celles-ci se sont révélées inadéquates, et même lorsqu'elles minent elles-mêmes leurs chances de succès. On peut ainsi conclure que le principe de la reconsidération est nécessaire pour assurer le lien entre les politiques justificatrices et leur succès. ABSTRACT This paper examines the making of public policy from a probability-based consequentialist perspective. Using nuclear deterrence policies as an example, I show that those truly committed environmental protection, those who truly care about the environment should not accept probability-based consequentialism without the reconsideration principle, a principle introduced in this paper. The reconsideration principle must be accepted, because without it, probability-based consequentialism can justify continuing to act on policies even when they have failed, and even when they undermine their original goal altogether. Thus, we conclude that the reconsideration principle is neeaed to insure connection between the justification policies and their success. (shrink)

This essay explores the American Girl Just Like You doll through a variety of feminist lenses. It was inspired by my experiences chaperoning my friend Grace to the American Girl Store in New York City, and returning to the store to shop for my own doll. I returned to the store because I was not sure why I was so extremely disturbed by this doll. The doll is not emaciated, not overtly sexy, and marketed along with outfits that supposedly send (...) girls the message that they can achieve their goals. She comes in a variety of skin, eye, and hair colors, and the line is therefore marketed as racially and ethnically sensitive. I argue that although the Just Like You line appears to be empowering and racially sensitive on a superficial level, an in-depth feminist analysis indicates that it is not. In fact, the Just Like You line is highly problematic from a feminist perspective. (shrink)

The author discusses Claudia Card's life work in that it concerns character development under heteronormative patriarchy as pertaining to the American Girl Just Like You doll. American Girl advertises this doll as a doll that can help little girls feel strong, powerful, unique, and ready to take on the world. The word "feminist" is not used in any of the company's marketing, but the company is clearly trying to market the idea that the Just Like You line is empowering for (...) girls. The author argues that the Just Like You doll discourages learning the skills that are required for world traveling, and that it also implies that such skills are not important. In order to successfully engage in cross‐cultural world traveling, one must leave arrogant perception behind and begin to understand how the other sees himself or herself as a subject in that world. (shrink)

This volume is fourth in the series of annuals created under the auspices of The Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST). The topics covered herein-from peacekeeping and terrorism, to sex trafficking and women's paid labor, to poverty and religious fundamentalism-are vital to women and to feminist movements throughout the world.