Resumen: Este artículo analiza cómo se encadenan los planos de lo ontológico y lo óntico en la Teoría Política del Discurso de Ernesto Laclau. Se concluye que, desde el plano ontológico, la hegemonía constituye una forma político-discursiva de articulación y universalización relativa, precaria, contingente y parcial de los particularismos en significantes vacíos que actúan como puntos nodales. Desde el nivel fenoménico-político, Laclau pone en juego estos conceptos para mostrar el desplazamiento y contaminación discursiva entre lo particular y lo universal en (...) la operación hegemónica, que transforma las identidades políticas y construye un orden comunitario y un nuevo sentido común. Desde el nivel ético-político, la conceptualización de la hegemonía se articula a la construcción discursiva de una estrategia socialista y a una democracia radical. Este proyecto político lucha contra los esencialismos y las formas de explotación y opresión social y por un horizonte de liberación que amalgame las luchas de los grupos subordinados y reconozca las diferencias y particularidades como constitutivas y deseables. La teoría formal del populismo presenta algunas inconsistencias óntico-ontológicas en este esquema. Sin embargo, su sobredeterminación simbólica disuelve las disyunciones tajantes entre la lógica y el análisis histórico-político y entre la forma y el contenido. Ello pone de manifiesto el mutuo anudamiento entre lo óntico y lo ontológico y la centralidad de la noción gramsciana de hegemonía para el análisis político y crítico de fenómenos y procesos históricos contemporáneos.: This article analyzes how the ontological and ontic planes are interconnected in Laclau’s political discourse theory. It is concluded that, on the ontological level, hegemony constitutes a political-discursive form of relative, precarious, contingent and partial universalization and articulation of particularities in empty signifiers that act as nodal points. On the phenomenological-political level, Laclau shows the displacement and discursive contamination between the particular and the universal in the hegemonic operation which transforms political identities and builds a communitarian order and a new commonality. On the ethical-political level, the conceptualization of hegemony is articulated as the discursive construction of a socialist strategy and a radical democracy. This political project fights against essentialisms and forms of exploitation and social oppression of subordinate groups, and in favor of a horizon of liberation that recognizes conflicts and differences as constitutive and desirable. The formal theory of populism presents some ontic-ontological inconsistencies in this scheme. However, its symbolic overdetermination dissolves the disjunctions between logic and historical-political analysis and between form and content. This reveals the mutual interconnection between the ontic and the ontological, and the central relevance of the Gramscian notion of hegemony for the political and critical analysis of contemporary historical phenomena and processes. (shrink)

An insight, Central to platonism, That the objects of pure mathematics exist "in some sense" is probably essential to any adequate account of mathematical truth, Mathematical language, And the objectivity of the mathematical enterprise. Yet a platonistic ontology makes how we can come to know anything about mathematical objects and how we use them a dark mystery. In this paper I propose a framework for reconciling a representation-Relative provability theory of mathematical truth with platonism's valid insights. Besides helping to (...) clarify the ontology of pure mathematics, I think this approach suggests a novel philosophical interpretation of some central results of modern mathematics, Including godel's incompleteness theorems and the independence theorems for the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism, Christianity, and Modern Science:A Response to Masao AbeFrank FairAfter number of years of teaching philosophy of science, a few years ago I took up the challenge of teaching philosophy of religion. As one might imagine, it has always seemed to me to be important that our religious convictions harmonize with our best scientific knowledge of how the world works, and this became a more interesting issue when the (...) change in my teaching assignment brought me into contact with the work of Masao Abe, the eminent Japanese Buddhist scholar. His essay "Religion and Science in the Global Age—Their Essential Character and Mutual Relationship" (Abe 1985: 241–248) challenged me to expand my thinking to consider not only how theistic religions such as Christianity relate to science, but also to consider how nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism, might fare when interacting with modern science.In his essay on religion and science Abe expressed his agreement with the thought of Keiji Nishitani in this way:1. It is necessary for each religion to re-examine the basis of its world view. For any religion its world view is not like clothes that one can change whenever one pleases. A world view is to religion what water is to a fish. It is the indispensable condition through which religion can actually come into existence. Water is neither the life of the fish as such, nor its body, yet it is fundamentally linked to both. For a religion to change its world view is a matter no less fatal to it than for a fish to change from salt water to fresh.2. What is even more crucial and important is that each religion re-examine and reinterpret that tradition's understanding of God or the 'ultimate' and His or its relation to human beings and the world. With regard to this second point, Buddhism which is fundamentally non-theistic, is in a somewhat different situation from Christianity, which is basically theistic. (Abe 1985: 244–245)Abe continues: "Theistic answers to the question 'why' in Christianity, such as the 'will of God' and the 'rule of God' are incompatible with modern scientific answers to the question 'how.' This is because the former strongly emphasize the personality of the ultimate while the latter is essentially impersonal" (Abe 1985: 245). In this [End Page 67] discussion, I will follow Abe's lead and consider the question of whether Buddhism is more compatible with modern science than Christianity.Christianity and Modern Science: Tensions and HarmoniesOne set of issues causing tension between modern science and Christianity has to do with history. Briefly, ideas about the creation of the universe, about the special creation of humankind, and about miracles, as in the claims about the resurrection of Jesus, are ideas about the action of God in history. These ideas relate the stance that Abe attributed to Christianity as involving an attempt to answer "why" questions about meaning and purpose, an attempt which he feels brings Christianity into conflict with modern science. I will give a brief account of what I take to be the current state of the discussion about each of these matters, and my point is to argue that Abe's conclusion about the relative superiority of Buddhism over Christianity in relation to modern science is premature at best.The Creation of the UniverseThe rise of the Big Bang theory, which traces the origin of the universe back to a tremendously powerful event several billion years ago, at first gave comfort to traditional ideas of divine creation. However, it soon became apparent that this comfort was ambiguous at best. It was not clear, for instance, that one could really prove on the basis of observational evidence that there was an absolute starting point those many billions of years ago, or whether the totality of things could be going through a huge set of cycles. Then there is the issue that even if there is a "First Cause" responsible for the Big Bang, this does not automatically give evidence that the First Cause is a personal being who cares about us or has any immediate involvement in our lives. The First Cause... (shrink)

En este trabajo se intenta elaborar una indagación epistemológica crítica que contribuya a enriquecer al debate sobre la posibilidad o imposibilidad de abordar los fenómenos de las ciencias sociales y humanísticas de una manera neutral y/o objetiva.. A partir de un enfoque centrado en la teoría post-estructuralista francesa y, más específicamente, en los aportes brindados por el psicoanálisis lacaniano, se concluirá que el psicoanálisis, en su vertiente lacaniana, y retomado de un modo distinto por otros autores, como Zizek, ha mostrado (...) de una manera consistente que este supuesto objetivismo no es más que un imposible. La realidad objetiva no puede ser más que una utopía, en tanto toda realidad es construida por un lenguaje, un orden simbólico, que es contingente y, por lo tanto, relativo. Sin caer en un mero relativismo de los actuales enfoques “posmodernos”, que no exista la Verdad con mayúscula no implica que no existan verdades a medias, “minoradas”, como las denomina Lacan en su obra.Palabras clave: Objetividad, neutralidad valorativa, pos-estructuralismo lacaniano, ciencia sociales y humanísticas.This work tries to elaborate a critical epistemological inquiry that enriches the debate about the possibility or impossibility of approaching social and human science phenomena in a neutral and/or objective way. Starting from a view based on French post-structuralist theory, and more specifically, on contributions from Lacanian psychoanalysis, conclusions will be that psychoanalysis, at least Lacanian psychoanalysis, taken up again in a different way by other authors such as Zizek, has consistently shown that this supposed objectivism is impossible. Objective reality can be no more than a utopia, because all reality is constructed by a language, a symbolic order which is contingent, therefore relative. Without falling into postmodern relativism, the fact that there is no Truth with a capital letter does not imply that there are no truths.Key words: Objectivity, valuative neutrality, Lacanian post-structuralism, social and human sciences. (shrink)

The paper examines the epistemological side of the Laclau’s political theory, incorporating tools that aim to convert discourse theory into a rigorous, useful, and valid method for socio-political and critical analysis in social sciences. In the first part, it displays some epistemological assumptions and arguments. The second part analyses some problematic epistemological aspects derived from the arguments. The proposal is based on Laclau’s main texts, complementing the analysis with related tools from critical hermeneutics and existential phenomenology. It is (...) argued that the incorporation of these tools to political discourse analysis contribute to solve some of the methodological and epistemic deficits of the theory of hegemony. El trabajo examina el plano epistemológico de la teoría política de Ernesto Laclau, aportando herramientas que tienen por objeto convertir a la teoría del discurso en un método riguroso, útil y válido para el análisis sociopolítico y crítico en ciencias sociales. En la primera parte, despliega una serie de postulados y presupuestos epistémicos. En la segunda parte, analiza algunos aspectos gnoseológicos problemáticos que se derivan de los postulados. Para desarrollar la propuesta, se toman como base los principales textos de Laclau, complementando el análisis con herramientas afines provenientes de la hermenéutica crítica y la fenomenología existencialista. Se sostiene que la incorporación de estas herramientas al análisis político del discurso contribuye a resolver algunos de los déficits metodológicos y epistémicos que presenta la teoría de la hegemonía. (shrink)

The major stakeholder classes in education have three distinct ways by which they judge the quality of knowledge claims. At times this can cause considerable distraction or mis-communication among stakeholders.

In theory and practice, the notion of fairness is far from simple. The principle is often elusive and subject to confusion, even in institutions of law, usage, and custom. In Fairness, Nicholas Rescher aims to liberate this concept from misunderstandings by showing how its definitive characteristics prevent it from being absorbed by such related conceptions as paternalistic benevolence, radical egalitarianism, and social harmonization. Rescher demonstrates that equality before the state is an instrument of justice, not of social (...) utility or public welfare, and argues that the notion of fairness stops well short of a literal egalitarianism. Rescher disposes of the confusions arising from economists' penchant to focus on individual preferences, from decision theorists' concern for averting envy, and from political theorists' sympathy for egalitarianism. In their place he shows how the idea of distributive equity forms the core of the concept of fairness in matters of distributive justice. The coordination of shares with valid claims is the crux of the concept of fairness. In Rescher's view, this means that the pursuit of fairness requires objective rather than subjective evaluation of the goods being shared. This is something quite different from subjective equity based on the personal evaluation of goods by those laying claim to them. Insofar as subjective equity is a concern, the appropriate procedure for its realization is a process of maximum value distribution. Further, Rescher demonstrates that in matters of distributive justice, the distinction between new ownership and preexisting ownership is pivotal and calls for proceeding on very different principles depending on the case. How one should proceed depends on context, and what is adjudged fair is pragmatic, in that there are different requirements for effectiveness in achieving the aims and purposes of the sort of distribution that is intended. Rescher concludes that fairness is a fundamentally ethical concept. Its distinctive modus operandi contrasts sharply with the aims of paternalism, preference-maximizing, or economic advantage. Fairness will be of interest to philosophers, economists, and political scientists. "[Fairness is] one of the most forceful conceptual analysis of fairness yet produced." -Ludwig Beckman, The Review of Metaphysics Nicholas Rescher is University Professor of Philosophy and vice chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He has written more than seventy books in various areas of philosophy, including Complexity: A Philosophical Overview and Inquiry Dynamics, both published by Transaction. (shrink)

The benefit-fairness theory of punishment, which is one of the most prominent retributive justifications of punishment, appeals to some benefits received by an offender in explaining why it is fair to impose punitive burdens on him. However, many see the two traditional versions of the theory, found in the works by writers such as Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and George Sher, as being susceptible to fatal objections. In a recent paper, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and Punishment,” Zachary (...) Hoskins offers a new version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment. I will highlight his original contribution by showing how his version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment is different from the traditional versions in such a way that the main objections applying to the traditional versions do not apply to his account. Nonetheless, despite its many virtues, I will argue that Hoskins’s theory fails because it would entail disproportionate punishment. (shrink)

Research in recent years suggests that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-up problems. In this study, we report theoretical analysis and experimental evidence on an opposite possibility: that fairness concerns could also induce hold-up problems. In our setup, hold-up problems will not occur with purely self-interested agents, but theoretically could be induced by demand for distributional fairness among agents without sufficiently strong counteracting factors such as intention-based reciprocity. We observe a widespread occurrence of hold-up in our experiment. Relationship-specific (...) investments occurred less than half of the time, resulting in significant inefficiencies. Moreover, whenever a relationship-specific investment was made: (a) it was typically not reciprocated by the partner; (b) nor did the investor’s offers at the bargaining stage exhibit expectations for reciprocity. Consequently, the partner extracted all the additional expected payoff from relationship-specific investments. Further experimentation suggested that our results were driven by a fundamental lack of intention-based reciprocity in fairness concerns, rather than self-serving bias. (shrink)

Abstract:Work on stakeholder theory has proceeded on a variety of fronts; as Donaldson and Preston (1995) have noted, such work can be parsed into descriptive, instrumental, and normative research streams. In a normative vein, Phillips (1997) has made an argument for a principle of fairness as a means of identifying and adjudicating among stakeholders. In this essay, I propose that a reconstructed principle of fairness can be combined with the idea of consent as outlined in integrative social (...) contract theory (ISCT) to bring about a more normative stakeholder theory that also has ramifications for corporate governance. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has become a central issue in the literature on business ethics / business and society. There are, however, a number of problems with stakeholder theory as currently understood. Among these are: 1) the lack of a coherent justificatory framework, 2) the problem of adjudicating between stakeholders, and 3) the problem of stakeholder identification. In this essay, I propose that a possible source of obligations to stakeholders is the principle of fairness (or fair play) as discussed (...) in the political philosophic literature of Rawls, Simmons, and Cullity among others. The principle of fairness states that, “Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, there exist obligations of fairness on the part of these persons or groups to co-operate in proportion to the benefits accepted.” In this essay I discuss the gaps in the current stakeholder literature, elucidate and defend a principle of fairness that fills the gap, compare the fairness model to other similar models of business ethics, and draw some conclusions for the future of stakeholder theory. (shrink)

This paper presents an intuitive explanation about why and how Rawlsian Theory of Justice (Rawls in A theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1971) provides the foundations to a solution for algorithmic bias. The contribution of the paper is to discuss and show why Rawlsian ideas in their original form (e.g. the veil of ignorance, original position, and allowing inequalities that serve the worst-off) are relevant to operationalize fairness for algorithmic decision making. The paper also explains (...) how this leads to a specific MinMaxfairness solution, which addresses the basic challenges of algorithmic justice. We combine substantive elements of Rawlsian perspective with an intuitive explanation in order to provide accessible and practical insights. The goal is to propose and motivate why and how the MinMaxfairness solution derived from Rawlsian principles overcomes some of the current challenges for algorithmic bias and highlight the benefits provided when compared to other approaches. The paper presents and discusses the solution by building a bridge between the qualitative theoretical aspects and the quantitative technical approach. (shrink)

Abstract:Work on stakeholder theory has proceeded on a variety of fronts; as Donaldson and Preston (1995) have noted, such work can be parsed into descriptive, instrumental, and normative research streams. In a normative vein, Phillips (1997) has made an argument for a principle of fairness as a means of identifying and adjudicating among stakeholders. In this essay, I propose that a reconstructed principle of fairness can be combined with the idea of consent as outlined in integrative social (...) contract theory (ISCT) to bring about a more normative stakeholder theory that also has ramifications for corporate governance. (shrink)

A theory of fairness in international trade should answer at least three questions. What, at the basic level, are we to assess as fair or unfair in the trade context? What sort of fairness issue does this basic subject of assessment raise? And, what moral principles must be fulfilled if trade is to be fair in the relevant sense? This discussion presents answers to these questions that derive from a “constructivist” methodology inspired by John Rawls and the (...) social contract tradition. (shrink)

This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform to them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal (...) imagination. Chapter 2 then shows that these capacities present human decisionmakers with a problem of diachronic rationality that includes but generalizes beyond, L.A. Paul’s problem of transformative experience: a problem that I call “the problem of possible future selves.” Chapter 3 then argues that a new principle of rationality—the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative—is the only rational solution to this problem, as it requires our present and future selves to forge and uphold a recursive, bi-directional contract with each another given mutual recognition of the problem. Chapter 4 then shows that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative has three identical formulations analogous but superior to Immanuel Kant’s various formulations of his ‘categorical imperative.’ Chapter 5 shows that these unified formulas jointly entail a particular test of moral principles: a Moral Original Position similar to John Rawls’ famous ‘original position’, but which avoids a variety of problems with Rawls' model. Chapter 6 then shows that the Moral Original Position generates Four Principles of Fairness, which can then be combined into a single principle of moral rightness: Rightness as Fairness. This new conception of rightness is shown to reconcile four dominant moral frameworks (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and contractualism), as well as entail a new method of moral decisionmaking for applied ethics: a method of “principled fair negotiation” according to which applied ethical issues cannot be wholly resolved through principled debate, but must instead be resolved by actual negotiation and compromise. This method is then argued to generate novel, nuanced analyses of a variety of applied moral issues, including trolley cases, torture, and the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals. Chapter 7 then shows that Rightness as Fairness reconciles three leading political frameworks—libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism—showing how all three embody legitimate moral ideals that can, and should, be fairly negotiated against each other to settle the scope, and nature, of domestic, international, and global justice on an ongoing, iterated basis. Finally, Chapter 8 argues that Rightness as Fairness satisfies all seven of the principles of theory-selected defended in Chapter 1 more successfully than rival theories. (shrink)

We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative game theory, that do not face the problem of non-aggregativity. We (...) use this observation to argue that the universal claim that no non-trivial theory of fairness can guarantee aggregativity is false. Paseau and Saunders’s mistaken assertion can be understood as arising from a neglect of the games approach to fair division. Our treatment has two further pay-offs: for one, we give an accessible introduction to the games approach to fair division, whose significance has hitherto not been appreciated by philosophers working on fairness. For another, our discussion explores the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems in a comprehensive fashion. (shrink)

The definition and measurement of social welfare have been a vexed issue for the past century. This book makes a constructive, easily applicable proposal and suggests how to evaluate the economic situation of a society in a way that gives priority to the worse-off and that respects each individual's preferences over his or her own consumption, work, leisure and so on. This approach resonates with the current concern to go 'beyond the GDP' in the measurement of social progress. Compared to (...) technical studies in welfare economics, this book emphasizes constructive results rather than paradoxes and impossibilities, and shows how one can start from basic principles of efficiency and fairness and end up with concrete evaluations of policies. Compared to more philosophical treatments of social justice, this book is more precise about the definition of social welfare and reaches conclusions about concrete policies and institutions only after a rigorous derivation from clearly stated principles. (shrink)

Although not always termed “organizational justice,” the fairness of organizations has been a consistent concern of management thinkers. A review of the 1900–1965 time period indicates that management theorists primarily conceptualized organizational justice in utilitarian terms, although each theory emphasized distributive and procedural justice to different degrees. There is clearly a need for contemporary scholars to consider non-economic rationales for organizational justice, but the willingness of earlier scholars to make utilitarian arguments about organizational justice and productive efficiency helped (...) legitimize the idea of fairness in organizations as an arbiter of value. Further, each theory tempered absolute managerial autonomy with some inherent check thereon. Researchers interested in organizational justice should therefore take a historical perspective in considering how management theory includes consideration of justice-related concerns. (shrink)

Normative political theorists frequently compare hypothetical scenarios for the purpose of identifying reasons to prefer one kind of institution to alternatives. We examine three types of "unfair" comparisons and the reasoning errors associated with each. A theorist makes an _obscure comparison_ when one (or more) of the alternatives under consideration is underspecified; a theorist makes a _mismatched comparison_ when they fail to hold fixed the relevant contextual factors while comparing alternatives; and a theorist makes an _irrelevant comparison_ when they compare (...) alternatives assuming contextual factors that differ in important respects from those they "should" assume given their theoretical aims. We then introduce the notion of a modeling mindset and show how this mindset can help theorists detect and avoid the three types of error. We conclude with a reconstruction of Cohen's (2009) camping trip thought experiment to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

Although not always termed “organizational justice,” the fairness of organizations has been a consistent concern of management thinkers. A review of the 1900–1965 time period indicates that management theorists primarily conceptualized organizational justice in utilitarian terms, although each theory emphasized distributive and procedural justice to different degrees. There is clearly a need for contemporary scholars to consider non-economic rationales for organizational justice, but the willingness of earlier scholars to make utilitarian arguments about organizational justice and productive efficiency helped (...) legitimize the idea of fairness in organizations as an arbiter of value. Further, each theory tempered absolute managerial autonomy with some inherent check thereon. Researchers interested in organizational justice should therefore take a historical perspective in considering how management theory includes consideration of justice-related concerns. (shrink)

Just War Theory addresses ethical issues surrounding war by construing it primarily as a relatively common feature of human life with high stakes, especially regarding harm. This characterization suits love as well. This chapter takes the framework of Just War Theory and applies it to loving relationships. Three questions are addressed: Are loving relationships subject to ethical constraints? When, if ever, is it ethically acceptable to enter a loving relationship? What sorts of action are ethically acceptable within loving (...) relationships? The details canvassed in answering these questions constitute a sketch of a Theory of Just Love. (shrink)

The debate on ideal theory focuses mainly on whether it can provide a long-term target and a metric for assessing the justice of different institutional arrangements in non-ideal theory. Both critics and defenders of ideal theory typically overlook the role it plays in a model of fairness that can restrict the range of permissible arrangements under non-ideal conditions. In this paper, I explain ideal theory’s fairness role and its part in ensuring an institutional structure (...) that benefits everyone in a society. Critics of ideal theory therefore cannot reject it as simply useless. But I consider how they can question the attractiveness of an ideal-theory-based fairness constraint on non-ideal theory. (shrink)

:Robert Nozick allegedly introduced his liberal theory of private ownership as an objection to theories of end-state justice. Nevertheless, we show that, in a stylized framework for the allocation of goods in joint ventures, both approaches can be seen as complementary. More precisely, in such a context, self-ownership followed by voluntary transfer can lead to end-state fairness. Furthermore, under a certain solidarity condition, the only way to achieve end-state fairness, following Nozick’s procedure, is to endorse an egalitarian (...) rule for the initial assignment of rights. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V.

Professor Fletcher challenges the traditional account of the development of tort doctrine as a shift from an unmoral standard of strict liability for directly causing harm to a moral standard based on fault. He then sets out two paradigms of liability to serve as constructs for understanding competing ideological viewpoints about the proper role of tort sanctions. He asserts that the paradigm of reciprocity, which looks only to the degree of risk imposed by the parties to a lawsuit on each (...) other, and to the existence of possible excusing conditions, provides greater protection of individual interests than the paradigm of reasonableness, which assigns liability instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus. Finally, Professor Fletcher examines stylistic differences between the two paradigms which may explain the modern preference for the paradigm of reasonableness. (shrink)

Fair play theories of punishment locate the permissibility or desirability of legal punishment in its ability to restore relations of fairness between lawbreakers and other members of society. This chapter discusses the chief objection leveled against such views, which is that many crimes do not yield any benefit for the offender and thus do not create unfair advantages of the sort punishment is supposedly to correct. Duus-Otterström argues that, while this objection squarely hits traditional versions of the fair play (...) theory that emphasize benefits deriving from committing crime, it is less persuasive against versions that emphasize losses inflicted by crime or the offender’s lack of entitlement to the benefits of the legal order. (shrink)

I challenge the adequacy of David Brink’s “master principle” of culpability. I allege that it fails to account for the moral relevance of ignorance of wrongdoing. I describe three cases in which I believe that Brink’s theory of normative competence cannot account for the significance of a variable that bears on culpability. In most of this paper I attempt to anticipate and reply to the various responses Brink might offer to my challenge.

Although not always termed “organizational justice,” the fairness of organizations has been a consistent concern of management thinkers. A review of the 1900–1965 time period indicates that management theorists primarily conceptualized organizational justice in utilitarian terms, although each theory emphasized distributive and procedural justice to different degrees. There is clearly a need for contemporary scholars to consider non-economic rationales for organizational justice, but the willingness of earlier scholars to make utilitarian arguments about organizational justice and productive efficiency helped (...) legitimize the idea of fairness in organizations as an arbiter of value. Further, each theory tempered absolute managerial autonomy with some inherent check thereon. Researchers interested in organizational justice should therefore take a historical perspective in considering how management theory includes consideration of justice-related concerns. (shrink)

Dans un essai d’ego-histoire, l’auteur s’interroge sur la manière dont peuvent interagir l’intelligibilité narrative et l’intelligibilité explicative. Car loin d’être acces­soire, l’acte d’écrire ne se borne pas à donner un habillage linguistique venant accoutrer une intelligence du passé déjà constituée avant de s’encrer dans une forme littéraire. L’écrit participe activement à la valeur cognitive d’un travail. Si dans son déploiement, la narration doit assumer un style et une singularité, elle reste surtout un instrument de pensée.

an unpublished paper written in 1998-1999.

Fairness-related decision making is an important issue in the field of decision making. Traditional theories emphasize the roles of inequity aversion and reciprocity, whereas recent research increasingly shows that emotion plays a critical role in this type of decision making. In this review, we summarize the influences of three types of emotions (i.e., the integral emotion experienced at the time of decision making, the incidental emotion aroused by a task-unrelated dispositional or situational source, and the interaction of emotion and (...) cognition) on fairness-related decision making. Specifically, we first introduce three dominant theories that describe how emotion may influence fairness-related decision making (i.e., the wounded pride/spite model, affect infusion model, and dual-process model). Next, we collect behavioral and neural evidence for and against these theories. Finally, we propose that future research on fairness-related decision making should focus on inducing incidental social emotion, avoiding irrelevant emotion when regulating, exploring the individual differences in emotional dispositions, and strengthening the ecological validity of the paradigm. (shrink)

John Broome argues that fairness requires that claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength. Broome holds that, when distributing indivisible goods, fairness requires the use of weighted lotteries as a surrogate to satisfy proportionally each candidate's claims. In this article, we present two arguments against Broome's account of fairness. First, we argue that it is almost impossible to calculate the weights of the lotteries in accordance with the requirements of fairness. Second, we argue that Broome (...) rules out those methods whose use might provide some resolution to this problem. From these arguments, we conclude that, contra Broome, fairness does not require the proportional satisfaction of claims. (shrink)