Dysfunctions of the neural circuits that implement social behavior are necessary but not a sufficient condition to develop schizophrenia. We propose that schizophrenia represents a disease of general connectivity that impairs not only the “social brain” networks, but also different neural circuits related with higher cognitive and perceptual functions. We discuss possible mechanisms and evolutionary considerations.

Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the notion of private property (...) presupposed by that question is a product of the entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of (...) ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice and from the nature of political judgement. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Rawlsian project of public reason, or public justification-based 'political' liberalism, and its reception. After a brief philosophical rather than philological reconstruction of the project, the chapter revolves around a distinction between idealist and realist responses to it. Focusing on political liberalism’s critical reception illuminates an overarching question: was Rawls’s revival of a contractualist approach to liberal legitimacy a fruitful move for liberalism and/or the social contract tradition? The last section contains a largely negative answer to that (...) question. Nonetheless the chapter's conclusion shows that the research programme of political liberalism provided and continues to provide illuminating insights into the limitations of liberal contractualism, especially under conditions of persistent and radical diversity. The programme is, however, less receptive to challenges to do with the relative decline of the power of modern states. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams (...) and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise. (shrink)

Political realism is characterised by fidelity to the facts of politics and a refusal to derive political judgments from pre- political moral commitments. Even when they are not taken to make normative theorising impossible or futile, those characteristics are often thought to engender a conservative slant, or at least a tendency to prefer incremental reformism to radicalism. I resist those claims by distinguishing between three variants of realism—ordorealism, contextual realism, and radical realism—and contrasting them with both non-ideal theory and utopianism. (...) I then develop a version of radical realism as a form of debunking and vindicatory genealogy. Even though this new approach eschews both feasibility constraints (unlike non-ideal theory) and prescriptions about the ideal society (unlike utopianism), I show how it has more radical potential than morality-driven (and hence often ideological) political theory, and how it supports both open-ended, radical social critique and concrete forms of prefigurative political action. (shrink)

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War but also the rise of a melancholic vision of history as a series of losses. For the political left, the cause lost was communism, and this trauma determined how leftists wrote the next chapter in their political struggle and how they have thought about their past since. Throughout the twentieth century, argues Left-Wing Melancholia, from classical Marxism to psychoanalysis to the advent of critical theory, a culture of (...) defeat and its emotional overlay of melancholy have characterized the leftist understanding of the political in history and in theoretical critique. Drawing on a vast and diverse archive in theory, testimony, and image and on such thinkers as Karl Marx, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, and others, the intellectual historian Enzo Traverso explores the varying nature of left melancholy as it has manifested in a feeling of guilt for not sufficiently challenging authority, in a fear of surrendering in disarray and resignation, in mourning the human costs of the past, and in a sense of failure for not realizing utopian aspirations. Yet hidden within this melancholic tradition are the resources for a renewed challenge to prevailing regimes of historicity, a passion that has the power to reignite the dialectic of revolutionary thought. (shrink)

Le droit applicable à l’exercice de l’autorité parentale a été remanié par la loi du 4 mars 2002. Il existe désormais un statut légal du couple parental, applicable quelle que soit la situation familiale des parents, conditionné par l’établissement du lien de filiation de l’enfant. Ce droit commun est gouverné par un principe supérieur : les père et mère exercent en commun l’autorité parentale. La consécration progressive d’un principe d’autorité parentale conjointe (1970,1987,1993, 2002) est certes un progrès en ce qu’elle (...) invite les parents à s’accorder et à se consulter dans l’exercice de l’autorité parentale, mais l’indifférenciation des situations familiales sur laquelle repose désormais la notion de « coparentalité » est excessive en ce qu’elle conduit à détacher le principe du modèle d’un couple uni. Une autre orientation pourrait être prise : celle consistant à rapprocher du mariage le concubinage avec vie maritale, ce qui supposerait de prendre en la matière le contre-pied de la loi de 1999. L’apport le plus apparent de la loi du 4 mars 2002 est de prévoir tout un arsenal de dispositions de nature à assurer l’effectivité du principe de coparentalité, en particulier les conventions et la résidence alternée. Les conventions marquent, sous l’angle de la notion d’ordre public, l’avènement du pluralisme familial, nouveauté encadrée par un corps de règles de plus en plus tentaculaire. Quant à la résidence alternée, cette modalité présente le défaut majeur d’être désormais légale, ce qui implique sa vocation à s’appliquer à tous. Il serait souhaitable pour cette raison de rétablir dans la loi le principe de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant chez l’un de ses parents et de réserver la résidence alternée à la pratique judiciaire, à titre très exceptionnel et expérimental, pour des enfants en âge de l’assumer. (shrink)

The end of ideologies was declared in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In that moment, the way opened for the affirmation of a neoliberal and Darwinian society which proposes itself as a law of nature, thus affirming that it is not itself an ideology. It is a vision based on now-outdated 19th-century anthropology superseded by current scientific knowledge. The new conception of Man is very different and reveals a path to a profound anthropological revolution, the only possibility (...) for a real alternative to the neoliberal socio-economic model--Translated from front flap. (shrink)

1. Il significato del Parmenide nella filosofia di Platone -- 3. Tempo e verità nella fenomenologia di Husserl -- 4. Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann -- 5. Ingens sylva.

What do we talk about when we talk about ethical diversity as a challenge to the normative justifiability of liberal democracy? Many theorists claim that liberal democracy ought to be reformed or rejected for not being sufficiently ‘inclusive’ towards diversity; others argue that, on the contrary, liberalism is desirable because it accommodates (some level of) diversity. Moreover, it has been argued that concern for diversity should lead us to favour (say) neutralistic over perfectionist, universalistic over particularistic, participative over representative versions (...) of liberal democracy. This paper provides a conceptual framework to situate those debates, and argues that there are two fundamental ways in which diversity constitutes a challenge to the justificatory status of liberal democracy: consistency (whereby diversity causes clashes between the prescriptions generated by normative political theories), and adequacy (whereby diversity generates a rift between our experience of what is considered valuable and what the theory treats as such). (shrink)

Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...) as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgments are moral judgments, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgments are moral judgments. (shrink)

In the last two decades Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings—partly as a reaction against normative theorizing centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief paper begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (i) a non-ideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (ii) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of (...) the paper then compares and contrast three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory, and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising, and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo. (shrink)

One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that dominant approach I (...) put forward the idea that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality, and thus avoids some serious problems faced by mainstream theories of justice. I then argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independently grounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a context- and practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power. (shrink)

With his Statuten aus dem Land Wolfaria, Johann Eberlin von Günzburg is the first author to imitate More’s Utopia, even though Eberlin’s proposals for religious, social and political reform are addressed directly at contemporary Germany, in the style of the pamphlets that characterize the first years of the Reformation. Often acknowledged as the first Lutheran utopia, Wolfaria has in fact little in common with the subtle Humanistic game played by Erasmus and More, yet it still is an extremely interesting work, (...) precisely because it allows us to perceive, in all their unresolved issues, the enthusiastic moments of fervent Lutheran propaganda of the beginning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Desideri's Understanding of EmptinessEnzo Gualtiero BargiacchiThe works of Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733)1 lay forgotten in the archives for a very long time;2 had they been studied, European studies of Tibet and Buddhism would have begun a century earlier. The partial publication of his Relazione in 1904 was not enough to make scholars of Buddhism interested in the subject and resulted only a modest enthusiasm in the geographical and anthropological fields.3 (...) Later the Swedish geographer and explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952) stated that Desideri "had accomplished a journey which ought to make his name forever famous,"4 and also that "by far the greatest part of Desideri's narrative is a description of the cult and religion of the Tibetans, which is not less admirable than the geographical part."5 But it was yet another geographer and explorer, Filippo De Filippi (1869–1938), who made available the Jesuit missionary's work by publishing an English version of the Relazione6 in 1932. Charles Oldham recognized that "there will no longer be any excuse for the ignorance and misconceptions regarding Desideri, to which Cornelis Wessels and De Filippi have drawn such pointed attention."7In reality, however, Desideri's work would still be awarded inadequate consideration for some time, apart from the generous praise of Giuseppe Tucci, which appeared exclusively in Italian articles and books, and of a few other scholars of Buddhism. This continued even after the critical edition of the Relazione and letters, expertly edited by Luciano Petech,8 despite the prestigious reputation of this academic and the ISMEO, the institute directed by Tucci that sponsored the series; very little attention was also paid to the translations by Saverian missionary Giuseppe Toscano9 (1911–2003) of Desideri's works in the Tibetan language.10 Around the turn of the millennium academics such as Donald Lopez, Rudolf Kaschewsky, and Martin Brauen began to pay closer attention to Desideri's work.In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the Jesuit missionary's work, as shown by the panel "Buddhism in the Writings of Ippolito Desideri" at the Fifteenth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Atlanta, 23–28 June 2008), as well as two fundamental events concerning it; now Michael Sweet is completing the new English edition and translation of the Relazione.11Even today Desideri's writings can still provide academics in various disciplines with useful material for reflection, and not only in historical terms. As far as Tibetan religion is concerned, Desideri extensively discussed many important topics, in the Relazione and in his works in Tibetan, with considerable interpretative skill. [End Page 101] Unfortunately, none of this information reached the scholarly community, with the exception of a few rough ideas.12Roy Andrew Miller13 has pointed out his correct interpretation of the mantra oṁmaṇi padme hūṁ; more recently Rudolf Kaschewsky has maintained that Desideri's excellent linguistic analysis of this mantra "may mark the memorable beginning of Tibetology in the West."14 But the most surprising result is without doubt his perfect understanding of the Buddhist concept of emptiness. Tucci states thatSome aspects of Tibetan theology are very difficult to understand: for example, the concept of Ton pa gni—insubstantiality of all phenomenal things—in which, following the ancient mystical tendencies of the Mahayana, Buddhists dissolve all appearance and illusion, men and things, inexistent and unreal like a dream or mirage. Even today very few Westerners are able to attain a perfect understanding of the depth of this doctrine. It is therefore amazing how Desideri, with no knowledge of Indian philosophy, was able to grasp the real meaning of these difficult ideas.15Let us define here the reasons for this discovery and consider its profound meaning.Desideri certainly possessed remarkable linguistic and logical-philosophical aptitude, and he had honed and developed these skills during the challenging studies typical of Jesuit schools. He was furthermore assisted by a tenacious and heroic determination to fulfill his mission, but one of the decisive factors in explaining the reasons for his cognitive success lies in the complete honesty of his approach, as a man and a priest convinced of... (shrink)

The Stroop effect is a well-documented phenomenon, demonstrating both interference and facilitation effects. Many versions of the Stroop task were created, according to the purposes of its applications, varying in numerous aspects. While many versions are developed to investigate the mechanisms of the effect itself, the Stroop effect is also considered a general measure of attention, inhibitory control, and executive functions. In this paper, we implement “eStroop”: a new digital version based on verbal responses, measuring the main processes involved in (...) the traditional effect. eStroop features four categories of stimuli in four different colors: geometrical shapes, neutral words, congruent words, and incongruent words. The results of the administration to 307 University students confirm the Stroop effect and offer baseline data for future research and clinical testing. Direct comparisons with other recent versions of the task are discussed, offering insights into differences and similarities between different task variables. (shrink)

La epistemología de Kuhn ha inspirado investigaciones en el ámbito de la psicología del conocimiento. Del mismo modo los psicólogos investigadores de los procesos psico-cognitivos han tomado categorías kuhnianas para teorizar sus hallazgos. Finalmente, el mismo Kuhn se volvió hacia ellos para ilumin..

A large number of previous reports described an effect of the pituitary hormone prolactin (PRL) on steroid hormone production by the adrenal cortex. However, those studies remained anecdotal and were never converted into a conceptual and mechanistic framework, let alone being translated into clinical care. In the light of our recently published landmark study where we described PRL signalling as a pivotal regulator of the sexually dimorphic adrenal phenotype in mouse and of adrenal androgen production in humans, we present here (...) the overarching hypothesis that PRL signalling increases the activity of Steroidogenic Factor‐1 (SF‐1/NR5A1), a transcription factor that has an essential role in adrenal gland development and function, to regulate adrenal cortex growth and hormonal production in physiological and pathological conditions. PRL can then be considered as a bona fide adrenocorticotropic hormone synergizing with ACTH in the endocrine control of adrenal cortex function. (shrink)

Como as definições de causa e causalidade são estabelecidas na Ciência Política? A explicação causal tornou-se fundamental para a constituição da disciplina como ciência capaz de produzir não só entendimentos, como também previsões acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Porém, a centralidade da causalidade tem sido reduzida à questão da inferência causal, elidindo discussões ontológicas, epistemológicas e metodológicas sobre o significado de causa. Nesse artigo, exploramos os modelos de explicação causal na Filosofia como forma de promover um diálogo entre as concepções de (...) causalidade na Ciência Política para além do problema da inferência causal. Argumentamos que a Ciência Política recorre a diferentes concepções de causalidade, mas seu engajamento com reflexões mais substantivas ainda é limitado. Propomos um canal de diálogo com a literatura do realismo filosófico e suas intervenções sobre poderes causais, capacidades e tendências, as quais oferecem uma base ontológica para as discussões de causalidade na Ciência Política. (shrink)

In the domain in which the definition of property energy is available, a rigorous and general proof of additivity is provided. Then, both the definition of energy and the proof of additivity are extended to broader domains.

This paper outlines an empirically-grounded account of normative political legitimacy. The main idea is to give a normative edge to empirical measures of sociological legitimacy through a non-moralised form of ideology critique. A power structure’s responsiveness to the values of those subjected to its authority can be measured empirically and may be explanatory or predictive insofar as it tracks belief in legitimacy, but by itself it lacks normative purchase: it merely describes a preference alignment, and so tells us nothing about (...) whether the ruled have reason to support the rulers. I argue that we can close this gap by filtering the preferences of the ruled through a form of non-moralised epistemic ideology critique, itself grounded in an empirical account of how belief in legitimacy is formed. (shrink)

This is a response to Erman and Moller's response to our reply to their 'Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World', both also in this journal.

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate (...) normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. (shrink)

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’ on the one side, ‘salus populi suprema lex’ on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone (...) of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or – in my view – worse. (shrink)

In many countries, prenatal testing for certain fetal abnormalities is offered via publicly funded screening programs. The concept of reproductive autonomy is regarded as providing a justificatory basis for many such programs. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine the normative basis of public prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities by changing our perspective from that of autonomy to obligation. After clarifying the understanding of autonomy adopted in the justification for public prenatal screening programs, we identify two problems concerning this (...) justification: first, the extent to which the government is obliged to meet this demand is not evident; and, second, it is not clear whether the provision of public screening is the most appropriate way to promote autonomy. Next, to tackle these problems, we focus on Onora O’Neill’s argument of rights and obligations. Drawing on this argument, we show that, in addressing the problems above, it is important to change our normative perspective from rights or autonomy to obligation. Our argument will show that since the government does not have an incontrovertibly fundamental obligation to promote autonomy, this obligation needs to be constrained in terms of compatibility with other fundamental obligations. In addition, even if a government is obliged to promote autonomy to some degree, there could be more appropriate means to achieve it than providing public prenatal screening; therefore, it is not necessary for government obligations to extend to the provision of public prenatal screening. (shrink)