According to a popular view, excuses undermine blameworthiness. At the same time, philosophers commonly accept that blameworthiness is composed of two necessary conditions: a moral objectionability condition and a responsibility condition. For excuses to do their job, they must undermine at least one of these conditions. In this paper, I conclude that excuses do neither. By inference to the best explanation, I propose a view that reconciles this conclusion with the function of excuses.

Marie van Loon | : In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of the subject to the evidence as a biased (...) relation. The subject does not simply believe on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of manipulated evidence. Mele puts forward four ways in which the subject does this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively, selectively focus, or gather evidence. Through these ways of manipulation, the evidence is framed such that the final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the subject may believe a proposition that fits that subject’s desire that P. Whichever form of manipulation the subject uses, the evidence against P must be neutralized in one way or another. Successful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what the evidence supports and the ability to react to it. These abilities consist precisely in the two parts of the reasons-responsiveness condition, reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity. In that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that self-deceived subjects are always responsible for their belief. | : Dans cet article, je soutiens que la conception d’auto-illusion chez Alfred Mele remplit toujours l’une des conditions de la responsabilité doxastique, à savoir la « sensibilité aux raisons ». Il en est ainsi car les mécanismes d’auto-illusion dans la formation de croyances produisent des types de croyances qui remplissent les critères pour la responsabilité doxastique quant à la sensibilité aux raisons épistémiques. J’explique pourquoi dans cet article. Mele décrit la relation du sujet à la preuve comme biaisée. Le sujet ne croit pas seulement sur la base de preuves, mais de preuves manipulées. Mele avance quatre façons qu’a le sujet de faire ceci. Le sujet peut mal interpréter positivement ou négativement, focaliser de façon sélective, ou accumuler des preuves. Par ces formes de manipulations, la preuve est formulée de sorte qu’elle produise un fondement pour la croyance en une proposition qui s’accorde avec le désir du sujet que P. Peu importe la forme de manipulation qu’emploie le sujet, la preuve contre P doit être neutralisée d’une façon ou d’une autre. Une neutralisation réussie de la preuve requiert la capacité de reconnaître ce que soutient la preuve et la capacité d’y réagir. Ces capacités consistent précisément en ces deux parties de la condition de la sensibilité aux raisons, soit la réceptivité et la réactivité aux raisons. En ce sens, les croyances d’auto-illusion remplissent toujours la condition de la sensibilité aux raisons pour la responsabilité doxastique. Toutefois, étant donné que la sensibilité aux raisons n’est une condition nécessaire que pour la responsabilité doxastique, cela ne veut pas dire que les sujets souffrant d’auto-illusion sont toujours responsables de leurs croyances. (shrink)

Health care organizations are constantly seeking ways to improve quality of care and one of the often-posed solutions to deliver ‘good care’ is reflexivity. Several authors stress that enhancing the organizations’ and caregivers’ reflexivity allows for more situated, and therefore better care. Within quality improvement initiatives, devices that guarantee quality are also seen as key to the delivery of good care. These devices do not solely aim at standardizing work practices, but are also of importance in facilitating reflexivity. In this (...) article, we study how quality improvement devices position the relationship between situated reflection and standardization of work processes. By exploring the work of Michel Callon, Michael Lynch, and Lucy Suchman on reflexivity in work practices, we study the development and introduction of the Care Living Plan. This device aimed to transform care organizations of older people from their orientation towards the system of care into organizations that take a client-centred approach. Our analysis of the construction of specific forms of reflexivity in quality devices indicates that the question of reflexivity does not need to be opposed to standardization and needs to be addressed not only at the level of where reflexivity is organizationally situated and who gets to do the reflecting, but also on the content of reflexivity, such as what are the issues that care workers can and cannot reflect upon. In this paper we point out the theoretical importance of a more detailed empirical study of the framing of reflexivity in care practices. (shrink)

Health care organizations are constantly seeking ways to improve quality of care and one of the often-posed solutions to deliver ‘good care’ is reflexivity. Several authors stress that enhancing the organizations’ and caregivers’ reflexivity allows for more situated, and therefore better care. Within quality improvement initiatives, devices that guarantee quality are also seen as key to the delivery of good care. These devices do not solely aim at standardizing work practices, but are also of importance in facilitating reflexivity. In this (...) article, we study how quality improvement devices position the relationship between situated reflection and standardization of work processes. By exploring the work of Michel Callon, Michael Lynch, and Lucy Suchman on reflexivity in work practices, we study the development and introduction of the Care Living Plan. This device aimed to transform care organizations of older people from their orientation towards the system of care into organizations that take a client-centred approach. Our analysis of the construction of specific forms of reflexivity in quality devices indicates that the question of reflexivity does not need to be opposed to standardization and needs to be addressed not only at the level of where reflexivity is organizationally situated and who gets to do the reflecting, but also on the content of reflexivity, such as what are the issues that care workers can and cannot reflect upon. In this paper we point out the theoretical importance of a more detailed empirical study of the framing of reflexivity in care practices. (shrink)

It is widely believed that implicit bias is common and that it contributes, in part, to the perpetuation of systemic injustice. Hence, the existence of implicit bias raises the question: can individuals be blameworthy for their implicit bias? Here, I consider what it is about implicit bias that renders agents blameworthy. I defend the claim that, when individuals omit to engage in activities that could prevent the influence of implicit bias on their behavior, they may be blamed for their implicit (...) bias. The plausibility of my proposal depends on whether individuals are able to engage freely in such activities and on whether there exists an obligation not to be biased (broadly put). I will answer positively to the former question and open the way for an answer to the latter, and tougher, question. (shrink)

This article deals with the birth of `the virus' as an object of technoscientific analysis. The aim is to discuss the process of objectification of pathogen virulence in virological and medical discourses. Through a short excursion into the history of modern virology, it will be argued that far from being a matter of fact, pathogen virulence had to be `produced', for example in petri-dishes, test-kits and hyper-real signification-practices. The now commonly accepted objective status of `the virus' has been an accomplishment (...) of a complex ensemble of actors. Indeed, this illustrates why objectification rather than objectivity has become the main focus of science and technology studies. The objectification of `the' virus was by no means a smooth process. It involved more than five decades of highly speculative and fragmented research projects before it became actualized as a separate discipline under the heading of virology. The specific objectification of viruses took place through an inter-disciplinary de-differentiation of research questions, methodologies, techniques and technologies. The main argument of this article is that viruses only became intelligible after the establishment of a virology-assemblage. Its inauguration in the early 1950s was radical and sudden because only then could the various substrands of virological technoscience affect each other through deliberate enrolment, and engender a universal intelligibility. (shrink)

This article deals with the birth of `the virus' as an object of technoscientific analysis. The aim is to discuss the process of objectification of pathogen virulence in virological and medical discourses. Through a short excursion into the history of modern virology, it will be argued that far from being a matter of fact, pathogen virulence had to be `produced', for example in petri-dishes, test-kits and hyper-real signification-practices. The now commonly accepted objective status of `the virus' has been an accomplishment (...) of a complex ensemble of actors. Indeed, this illustrates why objectification rather than objectivity has become the main focus of science and technology studies. The objectification of `the' virus was by no means a smooth process. It involved more than five decades of highly speculative and fragmented research projects before it became actualized as a separate discipline under the heading of virology. The specific objectification of viruses took place through an inter-disciplinary de-differentiation of research questions, methodologies, techniques and technologies. The main argument of this article is that viruses only became intelligible after the establishment of a virology-assemblage. Its inauguration in the early 1950s was radical and sudden because only then could the various substrands of virological technoscience affect each other through deliberate enrolment, and engender a universal intelligibility. (shrink)

Network is a device for organizing and conceptualizing non-linear complexity. Networks defy narrative, chronology and thus also genealogy because they entail a multiplicity of traces. Networks problematize boundaries and centrality but intensify our ability to think in terms of flows and simultaneity. As a concept, network has been highly conducive to theorizing phenomena and processes such as globalization, digital media, speed, symbiosis and complexity. This in turn enables us to rethink what constitutes the foundations of intelligence, knowledge and even life (...) itself. One particularly useful application of network as a concept is the notion of the gift, which is often seen as the archetypical figure for understanding the nature of economics and social relationships. (shrink)

The research ethics framework put forward by McCradden et al. to support systematic inquiry in the development of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies in healt...

Ulrich Beck's best selling Risk Society established risk on the sociological agenda. It brought together a wide range of issues centering on environmental, health and personal risk, provided a rallying ground for researchers and activists in a variety of social movements and acted as a reference point for state and local policies in risk management. The Risk Society and Beyond charts the progress of Beck's ideas and traces their evolution. It demonstrates why the issues raised by Beck reverberate widely throughout (...) social theory and covers the new risks that Beck did not foresee, associated with the emergence of new technologies, genetic and cybernetic. The book is unique because it offers both an introduction to the main arguments in Risk Society and develops a range of critical discussions of aspects of this and other works of Beck. (shrink)

The pipeline model framework proposed by Char et al. makes a timely contribution to the literature in allowing one to take a step back and consider machine learning healthcare app...

Following the outbreak of what would become the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing measures were quickly introduced across East Asia—including drastic shelter-in-place orders in some cities—drawing on experience with the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome almost two decades ago. “Smart City” technologies and other digital tools were quickly deployed for infection control purposes, ranging from conventional thermal scanning cameras to digital tracing in the surveillance of at-risk individuals. Chatbots endowed with artificial intelligence have also been deployed to shift part of (...) healthcare provision away from hospitals and to support a number of programmes for self-management of chronic disease in the community. With the closure of schools and adults working from home, digital technologies have also sustained many aspects of both professional and social life at a pace and scale not considered to be practicable before the outbreak. This paper considers how these new experiences with digital technologies in public health surveillance are spurring digitalization in East Asian societies beyond the conventional public health context. It also considers some of the concerns and challenges that are likely to arise with rapid digitalization, particularly in healthcare. (shrink)

This book is a rendition of selected parts of The Four Books, focusing on the nature and morality of man, the education process, and the perfect personality, ...

OpenAI’s Chat Generative Pre-training Transformer (ChatGPT), Google’s Bard and other generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) technologies can greatly enhance the capability of healthcare profess...

The ethical restatement of the “risk and crisis communication in public health emergency” (PHERCC) matrix by Spitale et al. (2024) is a step up from mainstream approaches like the Crisis and Emerge...