Darwins bahnbrechendes Werk 'Über die Entstehung der Arten' (1859) löste eine neue Debatte aus, die weniger durch wissenschaftliche Forschung als durch weltanschauliche Proklamationen geprägt war. Sie nahm in Deutschland einen anderen Verlauf als in England: Die dort noch starke Physikotheologie war in Deutschland bereits einflußlos geworden, und der vorangegangene Materialismus-Streit hatte den Boden für die Rezeption der Lehre Darwins vorbereitet. Von Seiten des weltanschaulichen Materialismus wurde der Darwinismus wegen seiner Eliminierung eines zwecksetzenden göttlichen Verstandes als unverhoffte Bestätigung angesehen und als (...) eine neue und zudem wissenschaftlich abgesicherte "Schöpfungstheorie" rezipiert und zum Schlüssel für die Lösung aller wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Rätsel stilisiert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche, Biology and MetaphorBabette E. BabichGregory Moore. Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 228. Cloth, $55.00.Gregory Moore's Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor is a well-written book on a topic of growing importance in Nietzsche studies. Not only concerned with offering an interpretation of Nietzsche in terms of biology and metaphor, Moore's approach offers a literary contextualization of Darwinism in the history of (...) ideas but also in terms of an important reflection on the idea of decadence so important to Nietzsche and so influential in theorizing public health and law in the twentieth century, most perniciously in its deadly expressions in Nazi propaganda. Moore is thus able to bridge the fields of the more specifically linguistic study of metaphor and source-scholarship. To Moore's great credit, he seeks to emphasize the extent to which Nietzsche's thought was developed in active correspondence with the scientific literature and debates of his age. But this reviewer thinks it important to warn those with classical or traditional interest in metaphor that the text presupposes that the reader (and this is also to say that Moore) knows a Nietzschean metaphor when he sees one.Moore begins with the question of Nietzsche's Darwinism, focusing on the physiology of power to explore the relations between Darwin, Spencer, Lamarck, and Rolph, but also Nietzsche's favorites, Malthus and Lange, etc. The discussion of the history of the reception of Darwin's ideas is careful and extensive and offers an insightful clarification of Darwin (necessary to distinguish Darwin from Darwinism, "social" and otherwise). Some readers will find it even more Anglophone than seems justified by Darwin's heritage, despite Moore's passing references to Cuvier and (at rather greater length) Haeckel and Roux.This reviewer notes that the latter references have been well-discussed in the German literature and to some great part Moore is fair to this tradition even if it is also true that the discussion never enters the level of the history of science as this reader, for one, might have wished. In the case of Moore's interpretation of Nietzsche's texts, the readings sometimes suggest a reprise of what has come to be the consensus (and not just among Nietzsche scholars) of views on Nietzsche's thinking. Thus where certain secondary authors are in force in Moore's well-documented account (Pick, Moles, and Ruse), others are missing. Indeed, in the case of Nietzsche and Darwinism, Frederick Gregory's Nature Lost? Natural Science and the German Theological Traditions of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1992) offers an important supplement. Another book that seems to have been overlooked is Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth Century German Biology (Dordrecht, 1982), and those interested in von Baer and other proponents of teleology in biology will find Lenoir's broader account useful.The second half of the book addresses degeneration and like most contemporary discussions, Moore's book is charged with the political history of the last century. Moore reviews the association of decadence with jazz music and—via physiognomy as its external signifier—to the ugly, the Jew, the Black, and, of course, to women who broke with the family role. As an instantiation, Moore uncovers the nineteenth century antipathy to "allegedly aberrant behavior such as masturbation and homosexuality" in Nietzsche's "restrictive" [End Page 348] (133) view of sexuality and precocious eroticism (134) as degeneration. However, the issue of masturbation is complicated. The nineteenth-century perspective on masturbation was less a matter of prudishness than a judgment backed with considerable social and medical force, which equated the practice with sickness or criminality, the counterpart to which today would be our judgment with regard to an addiction to cocaine or heroine. This censure drove Wagner's "exposure" of Nietzsche's personal dependence on this practice. Readers interested in this question can either take themselves to the easy-to-find because eponymous chapter in Marc Wiener's Richard Wagner and the Anti-Semitic Imagination (Lincoln, 1995) or to David B. Allison's account of this as the occasion for the break between Nietzsche and Wagner in Reading... (shrink)

Ernst Haeckel’s popular book Nat¨urliche Sch¨opfungs- geschichte (Natural history of creation, 1868) represents human species in a hierarchy, from lowest (Papuan and Hottentot) to highest (Caucasian, including the Indo-German and Semitic races). His stem-tree (see Figure 1) of human descent and the racial theories that accompany it have been the focus of several recent books—histories arguing that Haeckel had a unique position in the rise of Nazi biology during the first part of the 20th century. In 1971, Daniel (...) Gasman brought the initial bill of particulars; he portrayed Haeckel as having specific responsibility for Nazi racial programs. He argued that Darwin’s champion had a distinctive authority at the end of the 19th century, throwing into the shadows the myriads of others with similar racial attitudes.1 But it was not simply a general racism that Haeckel expressed; he was, according to Gasman (1971: 157–159), a virulent anti-Semite. Since its original publication, Gasman’s thesis has caught on with a large number of historians, so that in the present period it is usually taken as a truism, an obvious fact of the sordid history of biological thought in the first half of the 20th century.2 Perhaps the most prominent scholar—at least among historians of biology—to adopt and advance Gasman’s contention was Stephen Jay Gould. In his first book, Ontogeny and Phy- logeny (1977), Gould took as his subject Haeckel’s principle of recapitulation, the proposal that during ontogeny the developing embryo went through the same morphological stages as the phylum passed through in its evolutionary descent. So according to this conception, the human embryo begins as a one-celled creature, then takes on the form of an ancient invertebrate (e.g., a gastraea), then of a primitive vertebrate, then of an early mammal, then of a primate, and finally of a distinct.. (shrink)

Resumo: Nas poucas referências explícitas de Nietzsche ao biólogo alemão Ernst Haeckel, há uma clara rejeição de seu pensamento biológico e cultural. O objetivo deste artigo é propor que, apesar da pequena quantidade de citações diretas, os ataques de Nietzsche a Haeckel constituem um intenso antagonismo entre eles e inserem-se no contexto das críticas nietzschianas contra a formação e a cultura alemãs e contra a condição metafísica da ciência. O texto apresenta quatro aspectos do antagonismo entre Nietzsche e (...) Haeckel: das Darwinismus de Haeckel; a influência de Haeckel sobre David Strauss; a inclusão do evolucionismo científico no currículo na Alemanha; e o conflito entre Ludwig Rütimeyer e Haeckel.: In Nietzsche's few explicit references to German biologist Ernst Haeckel, there is a clear rejection of his biological and cultural thinking. The aim of this article is to propose that, despite the small amount of direct mentions, Nietzsche's criticism of Haeckel constitute an intense antagonism between them and are part place of the context of Nietzschean censure against the German education and culture and against the metaphysical condition of science. The text presents four aspects of the antagonism between Nietzsche and Haeckel: Haeckel’s Das Darwinismus; Haeckel's influence on David Strauss; the inclusion of scientific evolutionism in the curriculum in Germany; and the conflict between Ludwig Rütimeyer and Haeckel. (shrink)

Just before Ernst Haeckel’s death in 1919, historians began piling on the faggots for a splendid auto-da-fé. Though more people prior to the Great War learned of Darwin’s theory through his efforts than through any other source, including Darwin himself, Haeckel has been accused of not preaching orthodox Darwinian doctrine. In 1916, E. S. Russell, judged Haeckel's principal theoretical work, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, as "representative not so much of Darwinian as of pre-Darwinian thought."1 Both Stephen Jay (...) Gould and Peter Bowler endorse this evaluation, and see as an index of Haeckel’s heterodox deviation his use of the biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.2 Michael Ruse, without much analysis, simply proclaims that “Haeckel and friends were not true Darwinians.”3 These historians locate the problem in Haeckel’s inclinations toward Naturphilosophie and in his adoption of the kind of Romantic attitudes characterizing the earlier biology of Goethe. These charges of heresy assume, of course, that Darwin’s own theory harbors no taint of Romanticism and that it consequently remains innocent of the doctrine of recapitulation. I think both assumptions quite. (shrink)

If we set aside personal edification, what reasons remain for a philosopher of science to study the intellectual biography of a famous (or infamous) scientist? This question raises familiar and perhaps tired arguments about the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science, but it is also practical: why take the time to digest almost 600 pages devoted to the controversial German zoologist Ernst Haeckel? A preliminary answer is the author. The historical investigations of Robert Richards have been (...) of ongoing interest to philosophers, whether it be evolutionary explanations of mind and behavior in the nineteenth century (Dennett 1989) or his contentious claims—reinvigorated in the present volume—about Darwin’s commitment to embryonic recapitulation (Lennox 1994). Richards has a knack for unearthing details germane to conceptual reflection, in no small part because of his own philosophical predilections (e.g., a selection model of scientific theory development). Here I entertain three more reasons to follow the injunction tolle lege: the prescient synthesis exemplified in Haeckel’s evolutionary theorizing, the impact of model organism choice, and the critical role of pictures in scientific reasoning accented by Haeckel’s artistic proclivities. (shrink)

La precisione di dettagli con cui l’elaborazione delle immagini interviene sempre di più nello sviluppo della ricerca scientifica - si pensi solo all’uso fattone dalle neuroscienze - sollecita il dibattito filosofico a occuparsi di nuovo e da punti di vista diversi dell’antica disputa sul rapporto tra arte e natura. Se oggi si tratta prevalentemente di immagini ottenute al computer, regolamentate fino all’obbligo di dichiarare il programma informatico utilizzato, la questione della Bildlichke...

The concept of cell, more than any other biological concept, has been modelled on three powerful metaphors: in a morphological perspective, the cell has been defined Baustein, the brick or elementary unit of the body; from the physiological point of view, it has been associated to a chemical laboratory and finally, in a systemic view, it has been compared to the citizen of the cellular state. The pathologist Rudolf Virchow and the zoologist Ernst Haeckel showed the philosophical and aesthetic (...) potential of the latter metaphor, opening two different perspectives on a crucial problem in the science of living: the problem of the definition of biological individual. (shrink)

Le but de cet ouvrage est de démontrer, à travers une reconstruction rationnelle des étapes historiques fondatrices de l'embryologie expérimentale, l'importance des concepts de préformation et d'épigenèse aux origines de cette discipline. L'analyse porte sur trois périodes charnières de l'histoire de l'embryologie : (1) la réforme mécaniste et darwinienne de l'embryologie descriptive par Ernst Haeckel (1866); (2) l'avènement d'une physiologie réductionniste du développement menée par Wilhelm His (1874); (3) la création d'une "mécanique du développement" par Wilhelm Roux (1885) et (...) les interprétations néo-darwinienne (A. Weismann), néo-vitaliste (H. Driesch) et organiciste (O. Hertwig) de ses résultats les plus significatifs (1888-1908). J'y défends qu'une logique de la découverte structurait ces développements, où les modèles mécaniques d'explication devaient constamment être renouvelés lorsque leur examen empirique engendrait la découverte de phénomènes épigénétiques inédits. L'étude réalisée traite d'un enjeu fondamental de la philosophie des sciences : le rapport entre la rationalité scientifique et la découverte. Elle offre aussi un éclairage sur une question très actuelle de la philosophie de la biologie, soit les transformations de la notion d'épigenèse en rapport avec les théories épigénétiques contemporaines. La méthodologie adoptée s'inscrit dans la tradition de l'épistémologie historique, consacrée à l'étude du développement des structures du savoir scientifique. Cette tâche exige l'analyse historique de diverses sources documentaires; mais un éclairage théorique constitué tant de modèles provenant de la philosophie des sciences que de connaissances scientifiques demeure indispensable. Ici le modèle d'Imre Lakatos, centré sur la notion de programme de recherche, est entre autres privilégié."--provided by publisher. (shrink)

Este artigo traz uma reflexão sobre a influência que a Biologia evolutiva exerceu sobre Sigmund Freud no tocante à teoria das pulsões e à noção de patologia que a acompanha. Também, notadamente quanto às suas tendências regressivas, conforme apresentado em Além do princípio do prazer, publicação pródiga de referenciais evolucionários, especialmente da compreensão filogenética da espécie humana, ou seja, da teoria da recapitulação de Ernst Haeckel, articulada aos fenômenos clínicos e culturais. Amparados em Georges Canguilhem, observamos que a mesma (...) Biologia cumpre função normativa na qualificação das manifestações humanas. Assim, mostraremos que o recurso a ela serviu de apoio para Freud estabelecer uma concepção psicanalítica de sujeito igualmente normativa, a saber, dotado de um psiquismo regressivo e patológico em sua natureza, cuja tendência biológica o faz repetir comportamentos do passado. Se trata de uma opção teórica em detrimento da ruptura e da variação como norteadora de sua história, assim como da história da espécie humana. (shrink)

The "tree of life" iconography, representing the history of life, dates from at least the latter half of the 18th century, but evolution as the mechanism providing this bifurcating history of life did not appear until the early 19th century. There was also a shift from the straight line, scala naturae view of change in nature to a more bifurcating or tree-like view. Throughout the 19th century authors presented tree-like diagrams, some regarding the Deity as the mechanism of change while (...) others argued for evolution. Straight-line or anagenetic evolution and bifurcating or cladogenetic evolution are known in biology today, but are often misrepresented in popular culture, especially with anagenesis being confounded with scala naturae. Although well known in the mid 19th century, the geologist Edward Hitchcock has been forgotten as an early, if not the first author to publish a paleontologically based "tree of life" beginning in 1840 in the first edition of his popular general geology text Elementary Geology. At least 31 editions were published and those between 1840 and 1859 had this "paleontological chart" showing two trees, one for fossil and living plants and another for animals set within a context of geological time. Although the chart did not vary in later editions, the text explaining the chart did change to reflect newer ideas in paleontology and geology. Whereas Lamarck, Chambers, Bronn, Darwin, and Haeckel saw some form of transmutation as the mechanism that created their "trees of life," Hitchcock, like his contemporaries Agassiz and Miller, who also produced "trees of life," saw a deity as the agent of change. Through each edition of his book Hitchcock denounced the newer transmutationist hypotheses of Lamarck, then Chambers, and finally Darwin in an 1860 edition that no longer presented his tree-like "paleontological chart.". (shrink)

The phenomenon of globalization, which is well known in the economy, can nowadays be observed also in the area of science. It is based on the fact that more and more scientific disciplines are applying the same explanatory principle, namely the theory of evolution. Therefore, every development, including that of man, according to the pattern of genetic reproduction, takes place on the basis of natural selection. With psychological properties, mental abilities and social behaviours, which are eloquently referred to as “memes”, (...) it is as with genes: only those that are better, stronger, more capable of surviving will survive after accidental changes and only they will be passed on. In short, reproduction regulates and controls human behaviour. Such a way of thinking and explanation can be found today in many publications on sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. Even if they present many new details, they pay tribute to the old human desire to explain everything in a simple way, according to the same scheme. The same expectation towards science was expressed by E. Haeckel in the 19th century and J. Monod in the 20th century. However, when these two biologists explained man as a whole based on the theory of evolution, they admitted that they referred to philosophy, to which contemporary representatives of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology cannot or do not want to confess. (shrink)

The article considers such a largely unknown page in the philosophical history of Kyiv in the early 20th century as philosophical periodicals. The researcher proposed a new approach to the analysis – representing each journal not as a source for studying the work of one or another author, but as a separate, integral phenomenon, a certain type of philosophical discourse. Although there were no special philosophical periodicals in Kyiv at that time, she put forward the idea of the specifics of (...) philosophical publications on the pages of particular journals – “Universitetskie izvestia”, “Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii”, “Khristianskaya mysl’”. The author proved it using philosophical articles devoted to the ideas of Western European philosophy in the “Khristianskaya mysl’” journal (1916–1917). Firstly, she characterized the features that distinguished the journal from other periodicals: 1) its authors were united not by belonging to a certain academic institution, but by the commonality of the Orthodox worldview; 2) it had a scientific and educational character, i.e. it was intended for both professional and amateur philosophers. Secondly, the author noted the characteristic features of the analysis of Western European philosophy in “Khristianskaya mysl’”. She demonstrated that both the choice of topics and the perspective of the study were not determined by the purely academic interests of the authors of the articles, but by their understanding of the threat of certain ideas to both religious consciousness and the humanistic paradigm. In particular, she showed that such an approach was characteristic: 1) for criticizing certain types of science materialism (monastic philosophy of E. Haeckel, anti-metaphysical project of L. Boltzmann) as an attempt to replace religion and as a tool for opposing science and religion; 2) for criticizing the anti-humanism of secular philosophical anthropology, based on the postulates of classical rationalism, and substantiating Christian anthropology as its alternative. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p53 Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass . Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that (...) class='Hi'>Haeckel could not understand: Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

The rise of the mechanistic worldview in the seventeenth century had a major impact on views of biological generation. Many seventeenth century naturalists rejected the old animist thesis. However, the alternative view of gradual mechanistic formation in embryology didn’t convince either. How to articulate the peculiarity of life? Researchers in the seventeenth century proposed both “animist” and mechanistic theories of life. In the eighteenth century again a controversy in biology arose regarding the explanation of generation. Some adhered to the view (...) that life is a physical property of matter (e.g. Buffon), others saw living entities as the result of the development of pre-existing germs (e.g. Bonnet). Naturalists, lacked a convincing account that could guide their research. In interaction with leading naturalists of his time Immanuel Kant articulated an approach to explaining generation. Kant’s account, delineated in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of the power of judgment) (1790), is a combination of Newtonian non-reductionist mechanism in explanation, and a concept of natural end comparable to Stahl’s formal conception of organic bodies. It consists of two claims: a) in biology only mechanical explanation is explanatory, and b) living entities contain some original organisation, which is mechanically unexplainable. In the nineteenth century this approach influenced naturalists as Müller, Virchow, and Von Baer, in their physiological research. Dissatisfied with a sheer mechanistic or, on the other hand, a sheer teleological approach, they appreciated the Kantian account of mechanical explanation of natural ends. In Germany, in the second halve of the nineteenth century, Ernst Haeckel reopened the debate about abiogenesis, which still continuous. (shrink)

“I often said before starting, that I had no doubt I should frequently repent of the whole undertaking.” So wrote Charles Darwin aboard The Beagle , bound for the Galapagos Islands and what would arguably become the greatest and most controversial discovery in scientific history. But the theory of evolution did not spring full-blown from the head of Darwin. Since the dawn of humanity, priests, philosophers, and scientists have debated the origin and development of life on earth, and with modern (...) science, that debate shifted into high gear. In this lively, deeply erudite work, Pulitzer Prize–winning science historian Edward J. Larson takes us on a guided tour of Darwin’s “dangerous idea,” from its theoretical antecedents in the early nineteenth century to the brilliant breakthroughs of Darwin and Wallace, to Watson and Crick’s stunning discovery of the DNA double helix, and to the triumphant neo-Darwinian synthesis and rising sociobiology today. Along the way, Larson expertly places the scientific upheaval of evolution in cultural perspective: the social and philosophical earthquake that was the French Revolution; the development, in England, of a laissez-faire capitalism in tune with a Darwinian ethos of “survival of the fittest”; the emergence of Social Darwinism and the dark science of eugenics against a backdrop of industrial revolution; the American Christian backlash against evolutionism that culminated in the famous Scopes trial; and on to today’s world, where religious fundamentalists litigate for the right to teach “creation science” alongside evolution in U.S. public schools, even as the theory itself continues to evolve in new and surprising directions. Throughout, Larson trains his spotlight on the lives and careers of the scientists, explorers, and eccentrics whose collaborations and competitions have driven the theory of evolution forward. Here are portraits of Cuvier, Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel, Galton, Huxley, Mendel, Morgan, Fisher, Dobzhansky, Watson and Crick, W. D. Hamilton, E. O. Wilson, and many others. Celebrated as one of mankind’s crowning scientific achievements and reviled as a threat to our deepest values, the theory of evolution has utterly transformed our view of life, religion, origins, and the theory itself, and remains controversial, especially in the United States (where 90% of adults do not subscribe to the full Darwinian vision). Replete with fresh material and new insights, Evolution will educate and inform while taking readers on a fascinating journey of discovery. (shrink)

American biologists in the late nineteenth century pioneered the descriptive-comparative study of all cell divisions from zygote to gastrulation -- the cell lineage. Data from cell lineages were crucial to evolutionary and developmental questions of the day. One of the main questions was the ultimate causation of developmental patterns -- historical or mechanical. E. B. Wilson's groundbreaking lineage work on the polychaete worm Nereis in 1892 set the stage for (1) an attack on Haeckel's phylogenetic-historical notion of recapitulation and (...) (2) support for mechanistic explanations of cleavage patterns. As more lineage work -- especially Lillie's work on "Unio" and Conklin's on "Crepidula" -- became available in the mid-late 1890s, mechanism was tempered with more evolutionary, homology-based views. However, as I show by focusing on three major issues -- homology, body plans and life history -- these views were primarily based on the precocious segregation and prospective significance -- what the cell became not what it was. Even on issues like adaptation, most lineagists argued teleologically from the adult backward. Most cell lineage workers, by 1900, were to varying degrees mechanist/experimentalist and recapitulationist simultaneously. The exception was E. G. Conklin, whose views were more akin to a Darwinian evolutionist than either mechanist or recapitulationist. Lineage work eventually declined and by 1907 published accounts of new lineages had basically stopped. I argue that established workers and younger researchers stopped wanting to take on cell lineage projects because the general patterns were the same for all the spiralians while the specifics showed too much variation. It was hard to theoretically encompass or analyze the minutiae of variation in a recapitulationist or mechanist framework. The only established worker who continued to do comparative lineage studies was E. G. Conklin, perhaps because the variation could best be accommodated by Darwinian evolution. (shrink)

Introduction A Brief Conceptual Framework for Biology PART ONE: UNDERSTANDING NATURE 1. The Antecedents of Scientific Thought Animism, Totemism, and Shamanism The Paleolithic View Mesopotamia Egypt 2. Aristotle and the Greek View of Nature The Science of Animal Biology The Parts of Animals The Classification of Animals The Aristotelian System Basic Questions 3. Those Rational Greeks? Theophrastus and the Science of Botany The Roman Pliny Hippocrates, the Father of Medicine Erasistratus Galen of Pergamum The Greek Miracle 4. The Judeo-Christian Worldview (...) The Bishop of Hippo Scholastic Thought Islamic Science Books on Beasts Antecedents of a Revolution 5. The Revival of Science Andreas Vesalius and the Study of Structure William Harvey and the Study of Function Sir Francis Bacon’s Great Instauration Induction, Hypothesis, Deduction The Very Small--Animalcules Robert Hooke and the Discovery of Cells 6. Figur’d Stones and Plastick Virtue Marine Life on Mountain Tops? Figured Stones of Unknown Creatures Baron Cuvier Quarries of the Paris Basin Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism William Smith and the Geological Column Understanding Nature in 1850 PART TWO: THE GROWTH OF EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 7. The Paradigm of Evolution First Questions The Paradigm of Natural Theology First Answers 8. Testing Darwins Hypotheses Have Life Forms Changed over Time? Do Species Evolve into Different Species over Time? Has There Been Time Enough for Evolution? Is Natural Selection the Mechanism of Change? The Genetic Basis of Natural Selection Accounting for the Diversity of Life 9. In the Light of Evolution Comparative Anatomy Embryonic Development Classification Microstructure Molecular Processes 10. Life over Time The Origin of Life The Rise of Multicelled Organisms What Is a Phylum? Burgess Shale Metazoans Early Evolution of the Vertebrates The Age of Dinosaurs Birds, Mammals, and Flowering Plants The Rancho La Brea Tar Pits Human Evolution The Role of Extinction in Evolution PART THREE: CLASSICAL GENETICS 11. Pangenesis What Is the Question? Hippocrates and Aristotle The Darwinian Answer Assembling the Data Formulating the Hypothesis by Induction Galton’s Rabbits 12. The Cell Theory The Discovery of Cells: Robert Hooke Schwann and Cells in Animals Gametes as Cells Omnis cellula e cellula? The Technology of Cell Research 13. The Hypothesis of Chromosomal Continuity The Ephemeral Nucleus Schneider, Flemming, and Cell Division The Chromosomes and inheritance Gamete Formation Fertilization 14. Mendel and the Birth of Genetics Model for Monohybrid Crosses Model for Dihybrid Crosses Mendel’s Laws Initial Opposition to Mendelism 15. Genetics + Cytology: 1900-1910 Sutton’s Model The Cytological Basis of Mendel’s Laws Boveri and Abnormal Chromosome Sets Variations in Mendelian Ratios The Discovery of Sex Chromosomes 16. The Genetics of the Fruit Fly Morgan’s First Hypothesis Morgan’s Second Hypothesis The Fly Room Linkage and Crossing-Over The Cytological Proof of Crossing-Over Mapping the Chromosomes The Final Proof The Determinants of Sex The Conceptual Foundations of Classical Genetics 17. The Structure and Function of Genes One Gene, One Enzyme The Substance of Inheritance The Watson-Crick Model of DNA Genes and the Synthesis of Proteins The Genetic Code PART FOUR: THE ENIGMA OF DEVELOPMENT 18. First Principles The Peripatetic Stagirite The Death and Rebirth of Scientific Thought Harvey and Malpighi A Two-Millennial Summing Up Preformation versus Epigenesis 19. The Century of Discovery Von Baer’s Discovery of the Mammalian Ovum Darwin’s Contribution to Embryology Haeckel and Recapitulation 20. Descriptive Embryology Germ Layers The External Development of the Amphibian Embryo The Internal Development of the Amphibian Embryo 21. The Dawn of Analytical Embryology His, Roux, and Mosaic Development Driesch and Regulative Development Novelty in Development Cell Lineage Nucleus or Cytoplasm? Fin de Siècle 22. Interactions during Development Amphibian Organizers Secondary Organizers The Reacting Tissue The Chemical Nature of the Organizer Putting It All Together Conclusion Further Reading References Illustration Credits Index. (shrink)

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a “post-truth” era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of “conspiracy theories”—a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological (...) standard often involved in this indictment, however—the standard of “obvious” falsity—invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people’s political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors. (shrink)

The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. In this paper, special attention is given to the supposed link between truthmaking and realism, but it (...) is argued that this link should not be taken too seriously, as truthmaking turns out to be, to a large extent, ontologically neutral. Some consequences of this are studied. (shrink)

The Mechanics of the Mind, in the words of its author, "is an attempt to interpret the phenomenon of mind in terms of the physiological processes of the nervous system and to explore the philosophical implications of a realistically conceived theory." The first four chapters of the book is little more than a survey of some neurophysiological, cognitive, psychosocial and clinical experimental data, the consideration of which presumably leads one to the conclusion that behavior is strictly neuronic. This extensive survey (...) of research data reads like a textbook in Introductory Psychology, for Lohr details experimental studies that are familiar to every college freshman. We hear once again of Kleitman’s sleep experiments, Harlow’s surrogate mothers, even Pavlov’s dogs. Yet, not only is this analysis boring, it is quite defective. Lohr relies solely on these classic experiments in order to argue his thesis; he seems largely to be ignorant of recent experimental research which directly affects his position. This fact is painfully evident both in his discussion of the Central Nervous System and in his treatment of clinical research. Concerning the CNS, Lohr does not take into account Moruzzi and Jouvet’s studies of the ARAS, the recent interest in the hippocampus and the work of Spencer, Thompson and Nielson on the neuronic basis of learning. Lohr’s clinical data are taken, almost exclusively, from the 1950 edition of Coleman’s textbook—an undergraduate primer in abnormal behavior. Yet, even if Lohr were conversant with recent physiological and clinical research it would be impossible to verify his conclusions independently since he provides not one footnote in 513 pages of technical discussion. There are occasional references to specific experiments but by author only; he does not offer dates or source of publication for any of the studies he cites. Moreover, Lohr provides no index and only a nominal bibliography whose omissions are more notable than its entries. These infractions of scholarly courtesy are, however, merely remote indications of the deeper difficulty. From his inadequate survey of experimental research Lohr concludes that an understanding of behavior as exclusively neuronic leads us back to "traditional values" once discarded by psychologists who thought their research explained away "innate tendencies." Lohr argues that "the institutions [i.e., social values] which have evolved do not reflect an artificial set of conditions imposed upon man." Rather, the shape of our nervous system forces upon us certain limits and therefore certain objective moral values. Physiological processes thus "determine" higher order behavior in that they provide an objective matrix from which certain kinds of behavior can be judged aberrant. Hence belief in God, and freedom of the will, insofar as these elements are entailed by objective moral standards, are respectable, even desirable, accoutrements of Lohr’s "mechanistic metaphysics." This reconstruction of morals on the basis of biology suggests a close parallel with certain 19th century evolutionist-philosophers, Spencer, Haeckel and Fiske being, perhaps, the most prominent of the school. These Victorian biologist-philosophers were much more certain of a direct link between neural processes and high-order behavior than their late 20th century counterparts, and they were much more liable to conflate possible social and cultural consequences of their work. Today, however, the type of connection between neural activity and higher order behavior is much less obvious due to more sophisticated research techniques and a more critical lay public. Lohr, as we have noted, does as little justice to these new techniques and trends as Spencer would have done. He completely ignores significant research and virtually all philosophical discussion concerning mind-brain identity. As a consequence, The Mechanics of the Mind fits the same genre as Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy and Haeckel’s Riddle of the Universe—neither good science nor good philosophy.—J. F. (shrink)

It is now possible to have a child without sexual intercourse. The history of this apparently new statement has been breefly synthetised.The new perspectives open ethical problems for the scientific community and a new social context for single women.

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logics of evidence and truth $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ together with sound, complete, and decidable six-valued deterministic semantics for them. These logics extend the logics $$LET_{K}$$ and $$LET_{F}^-$$ with rules of propagation of classicality, which are inferences that express how the classicality operator $${\circ }$$ is transmitted from less complex to more complex sentences, and vice-versa. The six-valued semantics here proposed extends the 4 values of Belnap-Dunn logic with 2 more values (...) that intend to represent (positive and negative) reliable information. A six-valued non-deterministic semantics for $$LET_{K}$$ is obtained by means of Nmatrices based on swap structures, and the six-valued semantics for $$LET_{K}^+$$ is then obtained by imposing restrictions on the semantics of $$LET_{K}$$. These restrictions correspond exactly to the rules of propagation of classicality that extend $$LET_{K}$$. The logic $$LET_{F}^+$$ is obtained as the implication-free fragment of $$LET_{K}^+$$. We also show that the 6 values of $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ define a lattice structure that extends the lattice L4 defined by the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic with the 2 additional values mentioned above, intuitively interpreted as positive and negative reliable information. Finally, we also show that $$LET_{K}^+$$ is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable and that its implication-free fragment $$LET_{F}^+$$ coincides with the degree-preserving logic of the involutive Stone algebras. (shrink)

Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.