If patriotism can thus be seen as an incentive or as an instigation even in such a recondite science as epistemology, how much more readily can it be seen to perform such functions in other studies more immediately or inextricably bound up with communal human life? I pass over instances that occur to me—for instance, the Victorian Jesuit, Father Hopkins, declaring that every good poem written by an Englishman was a blow struck for England--and profit instead, if I may, by (...) the presence among us of Edward Said. I do not know, and it is none of my business to know, what passport Said presents at the international frontier. But it is surely common knowledge among us that he has deep and feelingful and intimate allegiances to the state of Lebanon. Who of us has failed to connect this with his books Orientalism and The Question of Palestine? The point is that, having made this connection, none of us thinks the worse of Said. On the contrary, we recognize that he has a special stake in such topics and therefore speaks on them with a special authority. Unless I am mistaken, that stake and that authority are, in a perhaps extended sense, patriotic. And whatever our speculative objections to the idea and the principle of patriotism, in practice we recognize it and we honour it.What I am questioning, it will now be plain, is the principle of "disinterest." "The disinterested pursuit of knowledge"—it is what in our distinct disciplines all of us have paid lip-service to, and perhaps more than lip-service. But when we come right down to it, is it what we believe? The honest patriot declares an interest; and if we are wise, we take note of the declaration, making allowances and reserving doubts accordingly. But what are we to make of the scholar who declares no interest, who claims implicitly to be truly disinterested. Can we believe him? And if we cannot, what guidance do we have as to what reservations to make, what doubts to entertain? I am of one mind with my Marxist colleagues who, from a political position very far from mine, warn us to be especially suspicious of the scholar who claims to have no axe to grind. We, all of us, have axes to grind; the crucial distinction is between those who know this about themselves and those who don't.Let me make myself clear. When I urge that the terms "patriotism" and "patriotic" be reinstated in our discourse, and particularly in those forms of our discourse that may be called "interpretation," I do not imply that patriotism is a nobler, a more elevated instigation than sundry others, mostly ideological, of which we are more aware. The point is precisely that of these others we are aware because we share a vocabulary which acknowledges them, whereas "patriotic" has been banished from our vocabulary, and so the reality which the word represents is left out of our calculations. Let me admit for the sake of argument what I do not in fact believe-- that patriotism is a concept and a sentiment so besmirched by the unholy uses made of it that, if mankind is to survive, patriotism will have to be eradicated. Even if that were the case, it remains true that patriotic interest and incitement are very far from having been eradicated from the world that we in fact inhabit, and try to interpret, here and now; and if we try to work within a vocabulary that pretends otherwise, we condemn ourselves to producing interpretations that are drastically partial and perhaps disastrously misleading. The point is not whether patriotism is a good thing or a bad thing but simply that it is; it exists, as powerful factor which we all in our hearts acknowledge even as our vocabulary refuses to. And when we speak in this context of "the world," we certainly include in that world ourselves, who offer to interpret it. Every one of our interpretations is coloured by the fact that we, the several interpreters, are British or American, French or Italian or Russian or whatever. If we think otherwise, we deceive ourselves; and yet where, in any of our currently acceptable vocabularies, determined as all of them are by the glib rationalism of the Enlightenment, do we find that momentous fact about ourselves acknowledged? Where is it acknowledged, for instance, in the vocabulary of feminism that "woman," as conceived by an American writing about Italians, cannot help but be significantly different from "woman" as conceived by an Italian looking at Americans? Or again, an Italian woman may well, we must suppose, be an Italian patriot; but where, in the current vocabulary of feminists, is that dimension of her "woman-ness" allowed for? Let it be acknowledged only so as to be deplored; but let it in any event be acknowledged. At the moment, it isn't.Donald A. Davie, the distinguished poet, is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Vanderbilt University and honorary fellow of Saint Catharine's College, Cambridge and of Trinity College, Dublin. He has edited The New Oxford Book of Christian Verse, and his Collected Poems 1950-1970 appeared in 1972. His latest publications are Dissentient Voice and These the Companions; Recollections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:5. Grange plays the blame game on the free market system for example on pp. xviii, T^ 29, 67, 74, 85, 91, 94, 109, III; in connection with remarks on environmental mat- ~ ters it is a consistent subtext of his entire work. Two of his previous works are Nature: J^ An Environmental Cosmology, 1997, and The City: An Urban Cosmology, 1999 (both Albany: tfl SUNY Press). ^ 6. (...) The transliteration of ren as "authoritative person" is an egregious tour deforce, ^ leading to a somewhat inelegant result in English, as in the following examples: "Authoritative persons are content in being authoritative; wise persons flourish in it"; and "The Master said: "I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren)... And those who abhor behavior contrary to it, in becoming authoritative themselves, will not allow such conduct to attach itself to them" (cited from Grange, p. 29). Li (ritual propriety) is co-opted as a match for the Deweyan concept of experimental inquiry. Yi (sense of justice, outer righteousness, often combined with ren, which in combination constitute the two cardinal virtues of Confucian moral theory), and zhi (knowledge, wisdom) are similarly adopted to work in tandem with a model of an "aesthetic" populism. Grange renders yi as "what is fitting and appropriate," akin to "beauty," or "the fair and the fitting," that is, acting consistently in a manner of openness to what is happening that is "the very opposite of the narcissism that infects so much of Western culture" (p. 52)). 7. The demiurgic role of the "master" here reminds one of the fundamental rift between Whitehead and Dewey that is glossed over in this construction. Dewey, who remained committed to a naturalistic doctrine of emergent evolution, chided Whitehead for his doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects. In reply, Whitehead refused to change this key part of his cosmology. The doctrinal clash between the two thinkers appears to be reflected in the debate over the value of the Confucian concept of Heaven (tian), as indicated in note 4. Edited by Anne Waters American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 306 pages. $29.95 paper. This volume is a group of twenty-two essays about the various facets of Native American thought and philosophy. Eighteen Native American scholars of American Indian thought are the contributors. In many ways this volume is a first in that these Native peoples are trying to create an inteUectual space where ideas, philosophies, spiritualities and esthetics can be examined in a meaningful way. As a long time student of Native American political thought, I applaud this volume because it represents a departure from the attitudes that I encountered in the academy as a young Native American scholar a generation ago. I can remember as a young Associate Ptofessor being in the elevator of Bunche HaU at UCLA when a history colleague of mine turned to me and quizzed me about my interests in Native American history. When I stated that I was interested in Native American thought and particularly Native American political theory, the coUeague replied that they did not know that American Indians had any thoughts or inteUectual traditions. Needless to say, we have 863 ^ corne a long way since that conversation over twenty five years ago. I have ^ always taught undergraduate courses and graduate courses on the History of KH Native American Thought and I adopted this book for a graduate course of ^ mine when it first came out last year. I can say that it was well received by my ^ graduate students and it provided an excellent array of essays on the various areas of Native American philosophy. The work also demonstrates that Native American ideas can be examined within the context of the discipline of philosophy. This collection of essays by American Indian thinkers blends contemporary philosophies with traditional ideas and philosophical issues. Thus, philosophical questions relating to time, place, history, national communities, religion, law, science, the arts and ethics are all addressed. Moreover, the reader can compare Native American viewpoints on phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, epistemology, logic and science with the perspectives of Western philosophy on these topics. In a very real sense, this volume opens new ways... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:5. Grange plays the blame game on the free market system for example on pp. xviii, T^ 29, 67, 74, 85, 91, 94, 109, III; in connection with remarks on environmental mat- ~ ters it is a consistent subtext of his entire work. Two of his previous works are Nature: J^ An Environmental Cosmology, 1997, and The City: An Urban Cosmology, 1999 (both Albany: tfl SUNY Press). ^ 6. (...) The transliteration of ren as "authoritative person" is an egregious tour deforce, ^ leading to a somewhat inelegant result in English, as in the following examples: "Authoritative persons are content in being authoritative; wise persons flourish in it"; and "The Master said: "I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren)... And those who abhor behavior contrary to it, in becoming authoritative themselves, will not allow such conduct to attach itself to them" (cited from Grange, p. 29). Li (ritual propriety) is co-opted as a match for the Deweyan concept of experimental inquiry. Yi (sense of justice, outer righteousness, often combined with ren, which in combination constitute the two cardinal virtues of Confucian moral theory), and zhi (knowledge, wisdom) are similarly adopted to work in tandem with a model of an "aesthetic" populism. Grange renders yi as "what is fitting and appropriate," akin to "beauty," or "the fair and the fitting," that is, acting consistently in a manner of openness to what is happening that is "the very opposite of the narcissism that infects so much of Western culture" (p. 52)). 7. The demiurgic role of the "master" here reminds one of the fundamental rift between Whitehead and Dewey that is glossed over in this construction. Dewey, who remained committed to a naturalistic doctrine of emergent evolution, chided Whitehead for his doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects. In reply, Whitehead refused to change this key part of his cosmology. The doctrinal clash between the two thinkers appears to be reflected in the debate over the value of the Confucian concept of Heaven (tian), as indicated in note 4. Edited by Anne Waters American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 306 pages. $29.95 paper. This volume is a group of twenty-two essays about the various facets of Native American thought and philosophy. Eighteen Native American scholars of American Indian thought are the contributors. In many ways this volume is a first in that these Native peoples are trying to create an inteUectual space where ideas, philosophies, spiritualities and esthetics can be examined in a meaningful way. As a long time student of Native American political thought, I applaud this volume because it represents a departure from the attitudes that I encountered in the academy as a young Native American scholar a generation ago. I can remember as a young Associate Ptofessor being in the elevator of Bunche HaU at UCLA when a history colleague of mine turned to me and quizzed me about my interests in Native American history. When I stated that I was interested in Native American thought and particularly Native American political theory, the coUeague replied that they did not know that American Indians had any thoughts or inteUectual traditions. Needless to say, we have 863 ^ corne a long way since that conversation over twenty five years ago. I have ^ always taught undergraduate courses and graduate courses on the History of KH Native American Thought and I adopted this book for a graduate course of ^ mine when it first came out last year. I can say that it was well received by my ^ graduate students and it provided an excellent array of essays on the various areas of Native American philosophy. The work also demonstrates that Native American ideas can be examined within the context of the discipline of philosophy. This collection of essays by American Indian thinkers blends contemporary philosophies with traditional ideas and philosophical issues. Thus, philosophical questions relating to time, place, history, national communities, religion, law, science, the arts and ethics are all addressed. Moreover, the reader can compare Native American viewpoints on phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, epistemology, logic and science with the perspectives of Western philosophy on these topics. In a very real sense, this volume opens new ways... (shrink)

Kurt Gödel is almost as famous—one might say “notorious”—for his extreme platonist views as he is famous for his mathematical theorems. Moreover his platonism is not a myth; it is well-documented in his writings. Here are two platonist declarations about set theory, the first from his paper about Bertrand Russell and the second from the revised version of his paper on the Continuum Hypotheses.Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely classes as “pluralities of things” or (...) as structures consisting of a plurality of things and concepts as the properties and relations of things existing independently of our definitions and constructions.It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.The first statement is a platonist declaration of a fairly standard sort concerning set theory. What is unusual in it is the inclusion of concepts among the objects of mathematics. This I will explain below. The second statement expresses what looks like a rather wild thesis. (shrink)

We prove the determinacy of all Δ 1 1 games on arbitrary trees, and we use this result and the assumption that a measurable cardinal exists to demonstrate the determinacy of all games on ω ω that belong both to – Π 1 1 and to its dual.

I will discuss Fields Outline of a Theory of Truth. I will point out important properties of Kripkeleast fixed points constructions and theory. I do this not to demean Field’s superb work on truth but rather to suggest that there may be no really satisfactory conditional connective for languages containing their own truth predicates.

Religious naturalism and three scientific revolutions: Introduction -- The cosmological revolution -- The evolutionary revolution -- The ecological revolution -- Inwardness and awareness in nature: Introduction -- Inwardness of life and inwardness of mind -- Mind and consciousness in nature -- The range of conscious awareness on earth -- Presumptive rights and conflicts of rights: Introduction -- Rs of the thou of nature -- A scheme of presumptive natural rights -- A fourth R of the thou of nature -- Conflicts (...) of rights -- Hunting and fishing : Introduction -- Hunting -- Fishing -- Responses to the charge of impractical idealism -- Eating and wearing: Introduction -- Using animals for food -- The vegetarian response -- Using animals for apparel and other purposes -- Other areas of responsibility and concern: Introduction -- Experimenting on animals -- Rodeos, circuses, zoos, and aquariums -- Endangered species and despoliations of natural environments -- The human population explosion -- The threat of global climate change -- A new moral and religious consciousness: Introduction -- Empowerment in religion of nature -- Objections and replies -- Principles and prescriptions. (shrink)

The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.

Winner of the 2014 Edward Goodwin Ballard Award for an Outstanding Book in Phenomenology, awarded by the Center for Advance Research in Phenomenology. -/- Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression offers a comprehensive reading of the philosophical work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a central figure in 20th-century continental philosophy. -/- By establishing that the paradoxical logic of expression is Merleau-Ponty's fundamental philosophical gesture, this book ties together his diverse work on perception, language, aesthetics, politics and history in order to establish the (...) ontological position he was developing at the time of his sudden death in 1961. Donald A. Landes explores the paradoxical logic of expression as it appears in both Merleau-Ponty’s explicit reflections on expression and his non-explicit uses of this logic in his philosophical reflection on other topics, and thus establishes a continuity and a trajectory of his thought that allows for his work to be placed into conversation with contemporary developments in continental philosophy. The book offers the reader a key to understanding Merleau-Ponty's subtle methodology and highlights the urgency and relevance of his research into the ontological significance of expression for today's work in art and cultural theory. (shrink)

Technological change is often seen as something that follows its own logic -- something we may welcome, or about which we may protest, but which we are unable to alter fundamentally. This reader challenges that assumption and its distinguished contributors demonstrate that technology is affected at a fundamental level by the social context in which it develops. General arguments are introduced about the relation of technology to society and different types of technology are examined: the technology of production: domestic and (...) reproductive technology; and military technology. The book draws on authors from Karl Marx to Cynthia Cockburn to show that production technology is shaped by social relations in the workplace. It moves on to the technologies of the household and biological reproduction, which are topics that male-dominated social science has tended to ignore or trivialise -- though these are actually of crucial significance where powerful shaping factors are at work, normally unnoticed. The final section asks what shapes the most frightening technology of all -- the technology of weaponry, especially nuclear weapons. The editors argue that social scientists have devoted disproportionate attention to the effects of technology on society, and tended to ignore the more fundamental question of what shapes technology in the first place. They have drawn both on established work in the history and sociology of technology and on newer feminist perspectives to show just how important and fruitful it is to try to answer that deeper question. The first edition of this reader, published in 1985, had a considerable influence on thinking about the relationship between technology andsociety. This second edition has been thoroughly revised and expanded to take into account new research and the emergence of new theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

In this volume Donald Walker brings together Robert Clower's influential essays on monetary economics, grouping them so as to bring out clearly the development of Clower's thought. Among Clower's contributions are an important reinterpretation of Keynes' work, a fresh treatment of the nature of money, the formulation of a microeconomic approach to the understanding of monetary behaviour, and distinct insights on money supply-and-demand and inflation. The essays constitute a well-rounded treatment of the major problems in monetary economics, and the (...) volume as a whole demonstrates how the study of monetary economics may extend knowledge of short-run economic fluctuations and prove useful in developing policy options to ameliorate them. (shrink)

In order to understand the various strands of general equilibrium theory, why it has taken the forms that it has since the time of Léon Walras, and to appreciate fully a view of the state of general equilibrium theorising, it is essential to understand Walras's work and examine its influence. The first section of this book accordingly examines the foundations of Walras's work. These include his philosophical and methodological approach to economic modelling, his views on human nature, and the basic (...) components of his general equilibrium models. The second section examines how the influence of his ideas has been manifested in the theorising of his successors, surveying the models of theorists such as H. L. Moore, Vilfredo Pareto, Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Abraham Wald, John von Neumann, J. R. Hicks, Kenneth Arrow, and Gerard Debreu. The treatment also examines models of many types in which Walras's influence is explicitly acknowledged. (shrink)

In this book Dr Walker brings together Dr William Jaffé's essays on the important and interesting work of Léon Walras, the founder of general equilibrium analysis. The essays were selected on the basis of their importance to the Walrasian literature, in that they provide information on Walras's intellectual biography with which we would otherwise be unfamiliar or they make a contribution to the interpretation and analysis of his ideas. One of Jaffé's main interests was to explain the genesis of Walras's (...) work, which he did by examining Walras's biography. Using a wide variety of sources, Jaffé pieced together an account of these matters in the belief that biography is essential for understanding the origins and development of a scientist's work. Jaffé corrected what he regarded as errors of interpretation of Walras by other writers, evaluated Walras's contributions, and indicated his significance for modern economics. The essays are informative, illuminating, and - as a result of Jaffé's scholarly and literary craftsmanship - aesthetically satisfying. (shrink)

Walras's Market Models describes and evaluates Léon Walras's models of competitive markets. Through identification of his career phases and the associated general equilibrium models, which are shown to be very different in character, this book differs from previous examinations of his work. During his mature phase of theoretical activity, Walras was concerned with a competitive economy which passes through a phase of disequilibrium in the production and sales of commodities. While in his last phase of theoretical activity, he developed a (...) model in which there is no production, sales, hiring, consuming or saving until an assumed set of equilibrium prices obtains of the model. The two phases of Walras's theoretical work have not previously been identified, and the models have not been subjected to an accurate analysis and evaluation. (shrink)

Two key themes structure the work of French philosopher of science Gilbert Simondon: the processes of individuation and the nature of technical objects. Moreover, these two themes are also at the heart of contemporary debates within Ethics and Bioethics. Indeed, the question of the individual is a key concern in both Virtue Ethics and Feminist Ethics of Care, while the hyper-technical reality of the present stage of medical technology is a key reason for both the urgency for and the success (...) of the field of Bioethics. And yet, despite its potential for thinking about these issues, Simondon’s philosophy remains largely unknown. Rather than exploring Simondon’s complex ontology for itself, the aim of this paper is to establish what contribution his work can make in Ethics and Bioethics on two essential questions: the relational structure of the self and the nature of the human-technology relation. I argue that Simondon’s re-conceptualization of the individual harmonizes with perspectives in Feminist Bioethics (particularly the Ethics of Care) and points toward what I call an “open” Virtue Ethics that takes relations to be essential. In order to establish this connection, I explore at length the relational approach to Feminist Bioethics offered by Susan Sherwin’s work. I argue that a Simondonian account of technology and of the individual furthers the relational understanding of the self, offers a characterization of Virtue Ethics that is in harmony with the Ethics of Care, and clarifies a notion of responsibility that is implicated in the complex reality of the modern technological milieu. (shrink)

Part 1. Introduction -- Introduction: Navigating the Perfect Moral Storm in Light of a Thirty-Five Year Debate -- Thirty-Five Year Climate Change Policy Debate -- Part 2. Priority Ethical Issues -- Ethical Problems with Cost Arguments -- Ethics and Scientific Uncertainty Arguments -- Atmospheric Targets -- Allocating National Emissions Targets -- Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs -- Obligations of Sub-national Governments, Organizations, Businesses, and Individuals -- Independent Responsibility to Act -- Part 3. The Crucial Role of Ethics in Climate (...) Change Policy Making -- Why Has Ethics Failed to Achieve Traction? -- Conclusion: Navigating the Perfect Moral Storm. (shrink)

Argues that a pluralistic understanding of truth can foster productive conversations about common concerns involving religion, science, ethics, politics, economics, and ecology without falling into relativism. In this book, Donald A. Crosby defends the idea that all claims to truth are at best partial. Recognizing this, he argues, is a necessary safeguard against arrogance, close-mindedness, and potentially violent reactions to differences of outlook and practice. Crosby demonstrates how “partial truths” are inevitably at work in conversations and debates about religion, (...) science, morality, economics, ecology, and social and political progress. He then focuses on the concept in the discipline of philosophy, looking at a number of distinctions that are taken to be strictly binary—those between fact and value, continuity and novelty, rationalism and empiricism, mind and body, and good and evil—and demonstrates how in all of these cases, each on its own can offer only an incomplete picture. Partial Truths and Our Common Future invites ongoing dialogue with others for the sake of mutual enlargements of understanding rather than mere civility, and provides incentive for continuing open-minded and shared inquiries into the important issues of life. “This is a transdisciplinary philosophical work that moves with grace across traditions, time periods, and thinkers. It is a master class in the existential and public relevance of philosophy and a rare example of a book that is both timely and timeless.” — Michael S. Hogue, author of The Promise of Religious Naturalism. (shrink)

In American Heat, Donald Brown critically analyzes the U.S. response to global warming, inviting readers to examine the implicit morality of the U.S position, and ultimately to help lead the world toward an equitable sharing of the burdens and benefits of protecting the global environment. In short, Brown argues that an ethical focus on global environmental matters is the key to achieving a globally acceptable solution.

Much controversy has surrounded the use of animals in research. Empirically, much of the research has focused on how ethical individuals believe animal research to be, but it has not systematically examined the specific beliefs or reasons why individuals do or do not believe animal research to be ethical. Study 1 investigated the thematic foundations for the decision that animal research is or is not ethical by examining the content of essays written by participants explaining why they do or do (...) not support the use of animals in research. Results indicated that individuals who believed animal research was ethical most often referenced beliefs that animal research furthered human well-being, provided mechanisms to cure disease, and was well-regulated. Individuals who believed animal research was not ethical most often referenced beliefs that animal research was inhumane, unnecessary, and nonconsensual. Study 2 used the themes to create a scale to assess animal research attitudes. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is one of the central figures of 20th-century Continental philosophy, and his work has been hugely influential in a wide range of fields. His writings engage in the study of perception, language, politics, aesthetics, history and ontology, and represent a rich and complex network of exciting ideas. -/- The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary provides the reader and student of Merleau-Ponty with all the tools necessary to engage with this key thinker: a comprehensive A to Z that provides summaries of (...) all his major texts and articles, clear and straightforward explanations of his terminology and innovative concepts, and detailed discussions of the figures and philosophies that influenced his work. The book also includes a philosophical introduction, a chronology of Merleau-Ponty's life and works, and suggestions for further reading. This dictionary is the ideal reading and research companion for students at all levels. (shrink)

This book argues that the subjective and the objective are crucially dependent on one another and neither is intelligible apart from the other. There is no such thing as a purely external, in-itself world. This book is not intended as a defense of epistemological relativism but as a strong recommendation for modest fallibilism and pluralism.

This book is our century’s most comprehensive and wise treatment of nihilism in all of its guises, comparing favorably with Rosen, Cavell, and indeed with Spengler. Crosby argues that our culture is genuinely haunted by nihilism expressing itself in the fideism of fundamentalism as well as in the debilitating alienation from all orientation. This results from a one-sided development of Western culture. Unlike most writers on this topic, Crosby acknowledges many sources colluding to frame the culture of nihilism, including “the (...) death of God,” the objectification of nature, the meaninglessness of suffering in a mechanical universe, the ephemerality of time in a world where value does not accumulate, the arbitrariness of historicized reason, the reduction of value to will, and the alienation of the Cartesian ego. These sources are reviewed in the first two parts of the book with the result that the phenomenon of nihilism becomes understandable. In its third and fourth parts, Crosby provides a critical analysis of the religious and philosophical forces leading to nihilism by discussing authors from the early modern period through Dostoyevsky, Sartre, Russell, and Derrida. He shows that these forces are skewed and impoverished and should not be allowed to determine our situation. The comprehensive attention to detail and the multi-perspectival interpretation demonstrates as well as asserts the richness of the culture that puts nihilism in its place. Part Five, finally, rephrases the criticism of the sources of nihilism in positive ways. Part Four in particular is a tour de force of philosophical argument. Its richness of nuance, plurality of views examined, and adroitness of critical interpretation provide cumulatively a powerful, non-nihilistic reading of the philosophic tradition. The force of the argument derives from its comprehensive, cumulative character. Crosby distinguishes and relates five areas of nihilism: political, moral, epistemological, cosmic, and existential. Throughout the book, he illustrates and examines these as they are expressed in literature and art, in daily life and practical affairs, and in philosophy. The book is richly erudite in its marshalling of consciousness from so many domains. (shrink)

I am struck by how little is known about so much of cognition. One goal of this paper is to argue for the need to consider a rich set of interlocking issues in the study of cognition. Mainstream work in cognition—including my own—ignores many critical aspects of animate cognitive systems. Perhaps one reason that existing theories say so little relevant to real world activities is the neglect of social and cultural factors, of emotion, and of the major points that distinguish (...) an animate cognitive system from an artificial one: the need to survive, to regulate its own operation, to maintain itself, to exist in the environment, to change from a small, uneducated, immature system to an adult, developed, knowledgeable one.Human cognition is not the same as artificial cognition, if only because the human organism must also be concerned with the problems of life, of development, of survival. There must be a regulatory system that interacts with the cognitive component. And it may well be that it is the cognitive component that is subservient, evolved primarily for the benefit of the regulatory system, working through the emotions, through affect.I argue that several concepts must become fundamental parts of the study of cognition, including the roles of culture, of social interaction, of emotions, and of motivation. I argue that there are at least 12 issues that should comprise the study of cognition, and thereby, the field of Cognitive Science. We need to study a wide variety of behavior before we can hope to understand a single class. Cognitive scientists as a whole ought to make more use of evidence from the neurosciences, from brain damage and mental illness, from cognitive sociology and anthropology, and from clinical studies of the human. These must be accompanied, of course, with the study of language, of the psychological aspects of human processing structures, and of artificially intelligent mechanisms. The study of Cognitive Science requires a complex interaction among different issues of concern, an interaction that will not be properly understood until all parts are understood, with no part independent of the others, the whole requiring the parts, and the parts the whole. (shrink)

I am struck by how little is known about so much of cognition. One goal of this paper is to argue for the need to consider a rich set of interlocking issues in the study of cognition. Mainstream work in cognition—including my own—ignores many critical aspects of animate cognitive systems. Perhaps one reason that existing theories say so little relevant to real world activities is the neglect of social and cultural factors, of emotion, and of the major points that distinguish (...) an animate cognitive system from an artificial one: the need to survive, to regulate its own operation, to maintain itself, to exist in the environment, to change from a small, uneducated, immature system to an adult, developed, knowledgeable one.Human cognition is not the same as artificial cognition, if only because the human organism must also be concerned with the problems of life, of development, of survival. There must be a regulatory system that interacts with the cognitive component. And it may well be that it is the cognitive component that is subservient, evolved primarily for the benefit of the regulatory system, working through the emotions, through affect.I argue that several concepts must become fundamental parts of the study of cognition, including the roles of culture, of social interaction, of emotions, and of motivation. I argue that there are at least 12 issues that should comprise the study of cognition, and thereby, the field of Cognitive Science. We need to study a wide variety of behavior before we can hope to understand a single class. Cognitive scientists as a whole ought to make more use of evidence from the neurosciences, from brain damage and mental illness, from cognitive sociology and anthropology, and from clinical studies of the human. These must be accompanied, of course, with the study of language, of the psychological aspects of human processing structures, and of artificially intelligent mechanisms. The study of Cognitive Science requires a complex interaction among different issues of concern, an interaction that will not be properly understood until all parts are understood, with no part independent of the others, the whole requiring the parts, and the parts the whole. (shrink)

This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the Inferiority Complex.