L’origine et les modalités de développement des premières sociétés agricoles du Nord-Est des Balkans entre la fin du VIIe et le VIe millénaires demeurent encore très controversées. Le site d’Uğurlu sur l’île de Gökçeada au Nord-Est de la mer Égée apporte un éclairage nouveau sur cette question. À ce jour, 24 lames et 4 autres éléments dans un silex jaune miel à points blancs d’origine vraisemblablement septentrionale ont été découverts dans cet établissement. L’analyse de ces objets et des lames en (...) particulier montre que par leur technique, leur morphologie, leurs modalités d’approvisionnement et leur retouche, elles sont totalement assimilables aux «lames de Karanovo » des sites contemporains de Thrace bulgare et des régions voisines. Toutefois, leur rareté, les autres composantes de l’industrie lithique et surtout l’appartenance d’Uğurlu à la sphère ouest-anatolienne indiquent que le site ne s’inscrit que de manière marginale dans la sphère techno-économique de Thrace bulgare et dépend surtout d’autres systèmes techno-économiques. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

"Grapples with the legacy of Jerome Wakefield, one of the most influential critics of modern psychiatry and the use of the DSM for psychiatric diagnosis"--.

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies (...) in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description‐independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power. (shrink)

According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)

This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

According to a prominent view of evolutionary theory, natural selection and the processes of development compete for explanatory relevance. Natural selection theory explains the evolution of biological form insofar as it is adaptive. Development is relevant to the explanation of form only insofar as it constrains the adaptation-promoting effects of selection. I argue that this view of evolutionary theory is erroneous. I outline an alternative, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, (...) and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals. Only together can a statistical theory of selection and a mechanical theory of development explain why populations of organisms comprise individuals that are adapted to their conditions of existence. (shrink)

What is a logical constant? The question is addressed in the tradition of Tarski's definition of logical operations as operations which are invariant under permutation. The paper introduces a general setting in which invariance criteria for logical operations can be compared and argues for invariance under potential isomorphism as the most natural characterization of logical operations.

Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief (...) strength in the conclusion is then directly related to the belief strength in this meta-hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper examines a doctrine which David Lewis has called 'Humean Supervenience' (hereafter 'HS'), and a problem which certain imaginary cases seem to generate for HS. They include rotating perfect spheres or discs, and flowing rivers, imagined as composed of matter which is perfectly homogeneous right down to the individual points. Before considering these examples, I shall introduce the doctrine they seem to challenge.

Introduction In ancient rome, legend has it, a plebeian revolt was once quelled when the tribune Menenius Agrippa argued ...

Psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (i) that psychological states are individuated by their causal powers, and (ii) that causal powers supervene upon intrinsic physiological state. I distinguish two interpretations of individualism--the 'orthodox' and the 'alternative'--each of which is consistent with these motivating principles. I argue that the alternative interpretation is legitimately individualistic on the grounds that it accurately reflects the actual taxonomic practices of bona fide individualistic sciences. The classification of homeobox genes in developmental genetics provides an (...) illustration. When applied to the taxonomy of psychological kinds, alternative individualism has some surprising consequences. In particular, externalist taxonomies of thought are consistent with the alternative interpretation, and hence consistent with individualism. I conclude, on this basis, that the individualism/externalism dispute which has long preoccupied philosophy of psychology is an empty one. (shrink)

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation ⇒x. We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse (...) to—more precisely, forms a Galois connection with—the Bolzano-Tarski function. (shrink)

Since its origin in the early 20th century, the modern synthesis theory of evolution has grown to represent the orthodox view on the process of organic evolution. It is a powerful and successful theory. Its defining features include the prominence it accords to genes in the explanation of development and inheritance, and the role of natural selection as the cause of adaptation. Since the advent of the 21st century, however, the modern synthesis has been subject to repeated and sustained challenges. (...) In the last two decades, evolutionary biology has witnessed unprecedented growth in the understanding of those processes that underwrite the development of organisms and the inheritance of characters. The empirical advances usher in challenges to the conceptual foundations of evolutionary theory. Many current commentators charge that the new biology of the 21st century calls for a revision, extension, or wholesale rejection of the modern synthesis theory of evolution. Defenders of the modern synthesis maintain that the theory can accommodate the exciting new advances in biology, without forfeiting its central precepts. The original essays collected in this volume—by evolutionary biologists, philosophers of science, and historians of biology—survey and assess the various challenges to the modern synthesis arising from the new biology of the 21st century. Taken together, the essays cover a spectrum of views, from those that contend that the modern synthesis can rise to the challenges of the new biology, with little or no revision required, to those that call for the abandonment of the modern synthesis. (shrink)

Le Précis de philosophie des sciences vise à présenter, de manière pédagogique, l'état actuel des grandes questions et des grands domaines de la philosophie des sciences. C'est un ouvrage de niveau "intermédiaire", entre les ouvrages d'initiation et les ouvrages de recherche. Il peut être utilisé comme manuel pour des cours de philosophie des sciences au niveau Master, ainsi que dans le cadre de la préparation aux nouvelles épreuves d'épistémologie des CAPES scientifiques. Il a notamment pour vocation de servir de support (...) de cours pour des enseignements en épistémologie et philosophie des sciences de niveau L3, M1 et M2. (shrink)

Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is (...) sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content. (shrink)

The problem of logical constants consists in finding a principled way to draw the line between those expressions of a language that are logical and those that are not. The criterion of invariance under permutation, attributed to Tarski, is probably the most common answer to this problem, at least within the semantic tradition. However, as the received view on the matter, it has recently come under heavy attack. Does this mean that the criterion should be amended, or maybe even that (...) it should be abandoned? I shall review the different types of objections that have been made against invariance as a logicality criterion and distinguish between three kinds of objections, skeptical worries against the very relevance of such a demarcation, intensional warnings against the level at which the criterion operates, and extensional quarrels against the results that are obtained. I shall argue that the first two kinds of objections are at least partly misguided and that the third kind of objection calls for amendment rather than abandonment. (shrink)

Providing a principled characterization of the distinction between logical and non-logical expressions is a longstanding issue in the philosophy of logic. In the Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap proposes a syntactic solution to this problem, which aims at grounding the claim that logic and mathematics are analytic. Roughly speaking, his idea is that logic and mathematics correspond to the largest part of science for which it is possible to completely specify by "syntactic" means which sentences are valid and which are (...) not. Despite a renewed interest in the philosophical benefits of analyticity, both inside and outside of Carnap scholarship, Carnap's definition of logical expressions seems to have drawn too little attention. I shall argue that it is worth a second look. More precisely, my aim will be to defend this idea against some technical problems faced by Carnap's way of implementing it and against Quinean attacks on syntax-based conventionalism. Section 1 presents Carnap's definition in the context of Logical Syntax of Language, that is, how exactly the definition works, and why Carnap needs it. In section 2, I review three challenges that have been raised in the literature, and I propose to revise the definition accordingly. I argue that its modified version is immune to the previous challenges, and, to some extent, immune to new challenges as well. In the last section, I suggest that the definition has a philosophical interest of its own, because standard Quinean objections are not as conclusive as one might think when attention is paid to the fact that Carnap requires complete syntactic specification of validities. (shrink)

The Social Scientist's Bestiary addresses a number of important theoretical and philosophical issues in the social sciences from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. It is intended to guide social scientists - researchers, teachers and students - so that they will not fall victim to the beasts they will encounter in the course of their enquiries. Such beasts include holism, post-positivistic work in the philosophy of science, Kuhnian relativism, the denial of objectivity, hermeneutics and several others, both good and (...) bad. (shrink)

Now that complex Agent-Based Models and computer simulations spread over economics and social sciences - as in most sciences of complex systems -, epistemological puzzles (re)emerge. We introduce new epistemological concepts so as to show to what extent authors are right when they focus on some empirical, instrumental or conceptual significance of their model or simulation. By distinguishing between models and simulations, between types of models, between types of computer simulations and between types of empiricity obtained through a simulation, section (...) 2 gives the possibility to understand more precisely - and then to justify - the diversity of the epistemological positions presented in section 1. Our final claim is that careful attention to the multiplicity of the denotational powers of symbols at stake in complex models and computer simulations is necessary to determine, in each case, their proper epistemic status and credibility. (shrink)

De 1683 a 1694, Antoine Arnauld et Nicolas Malebranche, anciens amis et pretres que leur interet pour Descartes, leur reverence pour Augustin et leur commune inquietude face au libertinage semblaient pourtant destiner a s'entendre, polemiquerent violemment. En insistant sur l'aspect philosophique de ces debats, cet ouvrage propose la premiere interpretation d'ensemble de cette celebre confrontation. Y a-t-il de serieuses raisons philosophiques au desaccord entre Arnauld et Malebranche? Leur determination permet-elle d'eclairer certains aspects du malebranchisme? Existe-t-il une philosophie d'Antoine Arnauld et (...) peut-on en preciser les contenus? Ces trois questions centrales conduisent au point de fuite de ce travail: l'impuissance theologique du cartesianisme est-elle congenitale, ou bien peut-on tirer des dividendes theologiques de la philosophie cartesienne sans en faire jouer les structures et en modifier les concepts fondamentaux? (shrink)

La théologie a de tous temps eu des problèmes avec l’anthropologie au sens de la définition de ce qu’il faut entendre par « être humain ». Bruno Latour a tenté de développer une « anthropologie des modernes ». Il se pourrait donc que Latour apporte quelques lumières à la théologie, d’autant qu’il s’affichait chrétien et n’a pas rechigné à intégrer à son anthropologie le « mode d’existence religieux ». L’anthropologie de Latour juxtapose 15 modes d’existence qui se croisent selon des (...) modalités qui excluent la possibilité pour l’un d’eux de devenir dominant sous peine de sombrer dans ce qu’il appelle le « fondamentalisme ». Cette exigence pose problème au théologien. Celui-ci affirme, en effet, que notre relation à Dieu représente un fondement pour toute authentique compréhension de soi. L’anthropologie empiriste de Latour est-elle donc compatible avec la théologie et donc informative pour elle? Et à quelles conditions? (shrink)

Introduction Codex Upsaliensis Graecus 8 contains a miscellany of Greek texts, mostly from the Byzantine period, ranging all the way from Stephanites et Ichnelates to botanical lexica. Among these varied texts is a collection of mathematical problems on ff. 324r–331r. We might compare it to other known Byzantine textbooks of mathematical problems, such as the following: the mathematical epigrams attributed to Metrodorus in the Greek Anthology (14:116–146); the papyrus found at Akhmim from the 7th or 8th century; Nicholas Rhabdas' letter (...) on mathematics to Theodore Tzabouches; an anonymous collection found in the 14th century cod. Par. Suppl. Gr. 387 (Vogel 1968); and another anonymous collection from the latter half of the 15th century found in cod. Vind. Phil. Gr. 65 (Hunger-Vogel). The collection in Uppsala most resembles these last two textbooks. (shrink)

RésuméL'interprétation substitutionnelle de la quantification impose une redéfinition des principaux concepts du calcul logique.Son intérêt majeur réside dans le fait qu'elle permet d'esquisser une théorie de l'intensionnalité qui lève les difficultés résultant du traitement logique des contextes de modalité, de croyance et de citation.Pour autant, on ne saurait éluder la traditionnelle question de la référence et de l'existence. Celle‐ci relève maintenant d'une construction sémantique de modèles.SummaryThe substitutional interpretation of quantification modifies the main concepts of logical calculus.Its principal interest lies in (...) that it permits to sketch a theory of intensionality which removes the difficulties rising from the logical treatment of the contexts of modality, belief and quotation.For all that, we cannot evade the traditional question of reference and existence. This now depends on a semantical construction of models.ZusammenfassungDie substitutionelle Interpretation der Quantifikation erfordert eine neue Definition der Grundbegriffe des Logikkalküls.Ihr Hauptinteresse besteht darin, dass sie den Entwurf einer Theorie der Intensionalität ermöglicht; dadurch werden die Schwierigkeiten behoben, die bei der Behandlung von Kontexten mit Modal‐ und Meinungswörtern und Zitaten entstehen.Die traditionelle Frage nach der Referenz und der Existenz wird dabei nicht umgangen, indem sie nunmehr vermittelst von semantischen Modellen behandelt wird. (shrink)

Qu’entendre au juste par « résistance » aujourd’hui ? Nombre de diagnostics sur la condition « humaine » attestent d’un malaise diffus et général, qui s’accroît avec le développement des sociétés contemporaines. Le Principe d’Université de Plínio Prado, ainsi que les essais qui le précèdent et le suivent, posent les fondements d’une résistance artistique, poétique et éthique, qu’il ne serait pas interdit d’envisager aussi comme une certaine « politique ». Face au nihilisme et à la mélancolie des temps présents, dans (...) un champ de ruines, il risque l’espoir quand même d’une réinvention de l’Université à venir. (shrink)

Barely a decade after the discovery of the chromosomal basis of inheritance, and the articulation of the genetical theory of population change, the gene came to be widely regarded as the fundamental unit of biological organization. This is hardly surprising. The gene concept is a powerful one; it plays a unifying role in our understanding of evolution. Darwin told us that evolution by natural selection occurs in a population when organisms survive, die and reproduce differentially on account of their heritable (...) form. This is a very schematic theory. It requires an account of the process of inheritance and also an account of the generation of phenotype. The gene concept plays a prominent role in explaining, and uniting, these phenomena. Genes are the units of inheritance; they are passed from parents to offspring in reproduction. Moreover, they are seen as units of phenotypic control. Evolutionary biologists often speak of the genome as a program for the production of an organism. Genes also became the elements of which populations are composed. Our best theory of population dynamics—inherited from Fisher, Haldane, and Wright—is a theory of changes in the relative frequencies of gene types. Genes are not just the principal causes of evolutionary change, they are also the units over which evolutionary change is defined and measured. So, at least, the orthodox reading of the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution would have us believe... (shrink)

This collection of original essays covers a wide range of issues in current naturalised philosophy of mind.