In this paper we investigate AGM belief contraction operators by using the tools of algebraic logic. We generalize the notion of contraction to arbitrary finitary propositional logics, and we show how to switch from a syntactic-based approach to a semantic one. This allows to build a solid bridge between the validity of AGM postulates in a propositional logic and specific algebraic properties of its intended algebraic counterpart. Such a connection deserves particular attention when we deal with maxichoice contractions, as studied (...) in the final part of the paper. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim at highlighting the significance of the A- and B-properties introduced by Finch (Bull Aust Math Soc 2:57–62, 1970b). These conditions turn out to capture interesting structural features of lattices of closed subspaces of complete inner vector spaces. Moreover, we generalise them to the context of effect algebras, establishing a novel connection between quantum structures (orthomodular posets, orthoalgebras, effect algebras) arising from the logico-algebraic approach to quantum mechanics.

The variety of residuated lattices includes a vast proportion of the classes of algebras that are relevant for algebraic logic, e.g., \-groups, Heyting algebras, MV-algebras, or De Morgan monoids. Among the outliers, one counts orthomodular lattices and other varieties of quantum algebras. We suggest a common framework—pointed left-residuated \-groupoids—where residuated structures and quantum structures can all be accommodated. We investigate the lattice of subvarieties of pointed left-residuated \-groupoids, their ideals, and develop a theory of left nuclei. Finally, we extend some (...) parts of the theory of join-completions of residuated \-groupoids to the left-residuated case, giving a new proof of MacLaren’s theorem for orthomodular lattices. (shrink)

It is precisely through movement that the subject inscribes itself into the world and becomes visible to others. The subject is a movement directed to the outside, that is to say, the subject is desire. Desire is the “tension” toward the “extrême dehors” that we call the world. In all of his works Maurice Merleau-Ponty reaffirms, without thematizing it, a conception of life as movement, and of body as action and desire: the human being is “a certain lack of....” In (...) other words, it is the distance between myself and the absent that drives me to move, to annul the distance through motion. Thus life is nothing but the unfinished act of moving into space and thereby creating space—the space in which we, as desire and movement, encounter both others and the world. As the act of moving is the way one appears to another, every relationship is based on appearing. In short, life is the movement that leads us towards the world and coincides with our desire to make it appear.C’est précisément par le mouvement que le sujet s’inscrit dans le monde et devient visible pour les autrui. Le sujet est un mouvement dirigé au dehors, c’est-à-dire, le sujet est désir. Le désir est la « tension » vers le « dehors extrême » que nous appelons le monde. Partout, Merleau-Ponty affirme, sans la thématiser explicitement, une conception de la vie comme mouvement, et une conception du corps comme action et désir : l’homme est « un certain manque de ». En d’autres termes, c’est la distance entre moi-même et l’absente qui me force à bouger, à annuler la distance à partir du mouvement. Donc la vie n’est rien que l’acte inachevé de bouger dans l’espace et par là la création de l’espace – l’espace dans lequel nous, comme désir et mouvement, rencontrons les autrui et le monde. Comme l’action est le moyen par lequel l’un apparait à l’autre, tous les rapports sont basés sur l’apparence. En bref, la vie est le mouvement qui nous amène vers le monde et qui coïncide avec notre désir de le faire apparaître.È attraverso il movimento che il soggetto si iscrive nel mondo e diviene visibile per l’altro. Il soggetto è un movimento in direzione del “fuori”, il che significa che il soggetto è desiderio. Il desiderio è “tensione” verso quell’“estremo fuori” che chiamiamo mondo. Ovunque Merleau-Ponty riafferma, senza tematizzarlo esplicitamente, una concezione della vita come movimento, e una concezione del corpo come azione e desiderio: l’uomo è “una certa mancanza di”. In altri termini, è la distanza tra me e l’assente che mi forza a muovermi, ad annullare la distanza tramite il movimento. Dunque la vita non è che l’atto incompiuto di questo muoversi nello spazio e di questo creare lo spazio – lo spazio nel quale noi come desiderio e movimento incontriamo gli altri e il mondo. E poiché l’azione è il mezzo attraverso cui l’uno appare all’altro, tutti i rapporti sono basati sull’apparenza, e la vita è il movimento che ci conduce verso il mondo e che coincide col nostro desiderio di farlo apparire. (shrink)

En el contexto de nuevos cercamientos sobre la naturaleza y la cultura, la cuestión de los derechos de propiedad intelectual ha adquirido una relevancia inusitada, y ha redefinido la cuestión misma de la propiedad. El artículo examina las teorías de J. Locke y D. Hume, para confrontarlas con las posiciones que, desde el liberalismo contemporáneo, defienden o criti-can la propiedad intelectual. A partir de allí, se busca una línea superadora que trascienda los supuestos liberales sobre la propiedad intelectual en particular (...) y la propiedad privada en ge-neral. (shrink)

Cet article prend comme point de départ de sa réflexion les défis de l’éducation dans un « univers problématique », tel qu’il est analysé par Ricœur dans un entretien accordé à Anita Hocquard en 1985. Le caractère éminemment conflictuel de la tâche éducative nous amène à discuter les notions de traditionalité, de traditions et de tradition. Il s’agit, ainsi, de réfléchir autour de la lutte pour la reconnaissance, la légitimité et l’autorité des différentes traditions dans un contexte culturel où l’héritage (...) colonialiste s’est imposé comme le modèle qui délégitime les traditions plurielles qui coexistaient et rivalisaient avec cet héritage. Enfin, nous émettons l’hypothèse que la littérature représente une manière alternative de revitaliser ces héritages silencieux, sur la base d’une brève analyse du roman L’histoire de Poncia, de l’écrivaine brésilienne Conceição Evaristo. (shrink)

Dans cette contribution nous analysons l’interprétation de Merleau-Ponty du schéma corporel et du mouvement, en relation avec les découvertes récentes en neurosciences cognitives, afin de proposer une esquisse d’une phénoménologie du politique. Plus précisément, nous nous focaliserons, d’une part, sur le concept dynamique de schéma corporel chez Merleau-Ponty et sur sa compréhension de l’intentionnalité motrice et corporelle, ainsi que sur l’image du miroir qu’il utilise souvent, notamment dans la « Note sur Machiavel », et, d’autre part, sur la théorie des (...) neurones miroirs proposée par le neurophysiologiste Giacomo Rizzolatti sur la compréhension de la compréhension. C’est précisément la figure du miroir, et les théories pertinentes sur le réflexe et les réflexions, qui constituent la clé pour relier les études phénoménologiques du corps, du mouvement et de l’empathie avec les approches neuroscientifiques sur ces mêmes questions. Le concept de miroir se révèle comme essentiel afin de comprendre le fonctionnement des neurones miroirs ainsi que la base de l’empathie, qui doit être comprise comme compréhension et imitation incarnées. L’autre se révèle comme notre miroir. Nous fournissons ainsi, suivant à la fois les théories phénoménologiques et neuroscientifiques, la preuve qu’il existe effectivement une connexion entre phénoménologie et pensée politique, ainsi qu’une communication inter-corporelle entre moi et autrui, qui peut servir de base pour développer une théorie de l’intersubjectivité en tant qu’intentionnalité corporelle partagée, voire une introduction à une phénoménologie politique. (shrink)

Far from being haphazard, Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay on cinema and 1953 notes on cinema for the lectures at the Collège de France are a precursor of a genuine phenomenology of cinema. Accordingly, in this paper I shall demonstrate that a phenomenology of movement and space tacitly appears in films, since cinema is the art of motion on screen and therefore the art of intersubjectivity par excellence. Moreover, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontological conception of the chiasm between the visible and the (...) invisible resembles the interlacing of the “two spaces” mentioned by Noël Burch. Likewise, the interpretation of the world as the “something else” that is simultaneously present and absent in every appearance corresponds, in cinema, to Alain Bergala’s “présence in absentia” of the off-screen on the screen – i.e., to the opening up of off-screen space by means of eyeline match and characters exiting and entering the frame. I finally claim that the use both of long take and depth of field, as analysed by film theorist André Bazin, and of specific camera movements, as analysed by neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, preserves the continuity of reality and give the impression that the film is a perceptual experience that happens within reality’s space-time continuum.Loin d’être incohérent, l’essai de 1945 de Merleau-Ponty sur le cinéma et ses notes sur le cinéma pour son cours au Collège de France en 1953 sont les précurseurs d’une vraie phénoménologie du cinéma. Dans ce texte, je démontre qu’une phénoménologie du mouvement et de l’espace apparaît tacitement dans les films puisque le cinéma est l’art du mouvement à l’écran et par conséquent l’art de l’intersubjectivité par excellence. Par ailleurs, je montre que la conception ontologique de Merleau-Ponty du chiasme entre le visible et l’invisible ressemble à l’entrelacement des « deux espaces » mentionnés par Noël Burch. De même, l’interprétation du monde comme le « quelque chose d’autre » simultanément présent et absent dans toute apparition correspond, au cinéma à la « présence in absentia » du hors champ dans le champ d’Alain Bergala – à savoir l’ouverture de l’espace du hors champ par la technique du eyeline match et des personnages qui entrent et sortent du cadre. Je soutiens enfin que l’usage à la fois du plan long et de la profondeur de champ, analysés par le théoricien du cinéma André Bazin, ainsi que de mouvements spécifiques de caméra, analysés par le neuroscientifique Vittorio Gallese, préserve la continuité de la réalité et donne l’impression que le film est une expérience perceptive qui se produit à l’intérieur du continuum de l’espace temps de la réalité.Lungi dall’essere interventi estemporanei, i saggi di Merleau-Ponty sul cinema del 1945 e le sue note sul cinema per il corso al Collège de France del 1953 sono precursori di un’autentica fenomenologia del cinema. In questo articolo intendo mostrare come nei film si delinei tacitamente una fenomenologia del movimento e dello spazio, poiché il cinema è l’arte del movimento sullo schermo e per eccellenza l’arte dell’intersoggettività. Inoltre, intendo mettere in luce come la concezione ontologica merleau-pontyana del chiasma di visibile e invisibile si accosti all’intreccio dei “due spazi” menzionati da Noël Burch. In modo analogo, considererò l’interpretazione del mondo come il “qualcos’altro” che è al contempo presente e assente in ogni apparizione come corrispondente, nel cinema, a quella che Alain Bergala definisce la presenza “in absentia” del fuori campo sullo schermo, ossia all’apertura dello spazio fuori campo per mezzo del raccordo sullo sguardo e dell’ingresso e dell’uscita dei personaggi rispetto all’inquadratura. Infine, sosterrò che tanto l’impiego del long take e della profondità di campo, descritti dal teorico del cinema André Bazin, quanto l’uso di specifici movimenti di macchina, analizzati dal neuroscienziato Vittorio Gallese, preservino la continuità del reale e forniscano l’impressione che il film sia un’esperienza percettiva che si svolge entro il continuum spazio-temporale della realtà. (shrink)

In this paper we show that axiomatic extensions of H. Wansing’s connexive logic $$\textsf{C}$$ ( $$\textsf{C}^{\perp }$$ ) are algebraizable (in the sense of J.W. Blok and D. Pigozzi) with respect to sub-varieties of $$\textsf{C}$$ ( $$\textsf{C}^{\perp }$$ )-algebras. We develop the structure theory of $$\textsf{C}$$ ( $$\textsf{C}^{\perp }$$ )-algebras, and we prove their representability in terms of twist-like constructions over implicative lattices (Heyting algebras). As a consequence, we further clarify the relationship between the aforementioned classes. Finally, taking advantage of (...) the above machinery, we provide some preliminary remarks on the lattice of axiomatic extensions of $$\textsf{C}$$ ( $$\textsf{C}^{\perp }$$ ) as well as on some properties of their equivalent algebraic semantics. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el contexto de nuevos cercamientos sobre la naturaleza y la cultura, la cuestión de los derechos de propiedad intelectual ha adquirido una relevancia inusitada, y ha redefinido la cuestión misma de la propiedad. El artículo examina las teorías de J. Locke y D. Hume, para confrontarlas con las posiciones que, desde el liberalismo contemporáneo, defienden o critican la propiedad intelectual. A partir de allí, se busca una línea superadora que trascienda los supuestos liberales sobre la propiedad intelectual en (...) particular y la propiedad privada en general. ABSTRACT In the context of new enclosures of nature and culture, the issue of intellectual property rights has acquired unprecedented relevance and redefined the very question of property. The article examines the theories of J. Locke and D. Hume, in order to contrast them with those positions that either defend or criticize intellectual property from the perceptive of contemporary liberalism. This serves as the basis for a position that transcends liberal assumptions regarding intellectual property, in particular, and private property, in general. (shrink)

Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito (...) di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie. (shrink)

The author claims to present an interpretation of logic and dialectic, and in the second part of his brief work takes Hegel, Gentile, and Allmayer as examples for study. Not even his three page "clarifying note," however, makes his thesis clear.--R. D. G.

Il neotrascendentalismo di Giovanni Emanuele Barié - Giovanni Emanuele Barié, appointed Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Milan University in 1937, is one of the most neglected figures in Italian philosophy of the last century. An exponent of late Italian idealism, it could be argued that only through his work, alongside that of others like Bernardino Varisco, Pantaleo Carabellese and Vito Fazio Allmayer, was Italian idealism able to reach full theoretical maturity. Born in Milan in 1894, before going to (...) university, Barié displayed great courage on the battlefield during the first world war. On his return, he first studied Law and then took a second degree in Philosophy under Piero Martinetti. In 1933, his La spiritualità dell’essere e Leibniz enabled him to obtain a university teaching post, first in Genoa, later in Rome and, finally, in Milan in the chair previously occupied by his mentor. The first period of Barié’s work is characterized by a re-evaluation of the Kantian a priori against the reductionist perspective of contemporary thought. Books like La posizione gnoseologica della matematica and Oltre la Critica belong to this stage in his life. From 1933, Barié started on an interpretation of Hegel with the intention of toning down the transcendental aspects of Kant’s and Martinetti’s thought. His most important writings from this period are L’io trascendentale and his last work Il concetto trascendentale , which came out in the same year the philosopher committed suicide. (shrink)

This book encompasses a profound meditation on the twentieth-century fortunes of historicism as a philosophical model. After a reconstruction of its decline (as a unified and compact philosophical "ism" and as the direct heir of idealism, especially in Italy) and of its persistence as a philosophical style, the volume then penetrates the frontier of the neo-historicisms, probing two of their European faces in the shape of José Ortega y Gasset and Theodor W. Adorno. It then goes on to develop various (...) Italian paths: from Fazio-Allmayer to Garin (and his school) from Dal Pra to Massolo, and up to Preti (was he really an "anti-historicist"?). In all these paths the centrality of historicism and its post-metaphysical aspect are clearly focused, as also in the case of the School of Naples, which now represents the most outstanding and significant heir to such critical (and open) neo-historicism. (shrink)

This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...) most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning the relation of time to space, the dissection of time, and its relation to change and causation. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept and role of ‘institutional racism’ in contemporary discussions of race should be reconsidered. It starts by distinguishing between ‘intrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their constitutive features, and ‘extrinsic institutional racism’, which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their negative effects. It accepts intrinsic institutional racism, but argues that a ‘disparate impact’ conception of extrinsic conception faces a number of objections, the most serious being that it (...) has no plausible account of what it is that makes extrinsically racist institutions racist. It also argues that claims about the explanatory indispensability of institutional racism are overstated (individual racism is at least as important), critiques structural approaches to racial inequality, and suggests that there is reason to doubt whether institutional reform can provide us with all that morality may require in the racial domain. (shrink)

The essays that follow grew out of a workshop held at the Center for Buddhist Studies, University of California, Berkeley, in March 2018, on the topic of conceptuality and non-conceptuality in Buddhist philosophy. Discussions at the workshop focused specifically on the tenability of the claim made by the two Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that perceptual cognitions are non-conceptual and yet also contribute to the contents of conceptual thought. The four contributions collected here present just a few of the resulting (...) reflections.This essay explores the Dharmakīrtian1 notion of a "concept" in the specific context of a "pseudo-perception", that is, cognitive events that... (shrink)

We are immersed within an odorous sea of chemical currents that we parse into individual odors with complex structures. Odors have been posited as determined by the structural relation between the molecules that compose the chemical compounds and their interactions with the receptor site. But, naturally occurring smells are parsed from gaseous odor plumes. To give a comprehensive account of the nature of odors the chemosciences must account for these large distributed entities as well. We offer a focused review of (...) what is known about the perception of odor plumes for olfactory navigation and tracking, which we then connect to what is known about the role odorants play as properties of the plume in determining odor identity with respect to odor quality. We end by motivating our central claim that more research needs to be conducted on the role that odorants play within the odor plume in determining odor identity. (shrink)

By questioning the validity of some of our basic concepts, such as space, object, and causality, quantum physics contributes quite decisively to the dramatic changes now taking place in our world picture. Veiled Reality provides a detailed view of the reasons why such a questioning arises, a survey of the corresponding conceptual and theoretical problems, and a comprehensive, up-to-date account, useful to scientists and epistemologists alike, of the various ways present-day physicists tackle these problems.The book deals with the E.P.R. reality (...) criterion, local causality, and quantum measurement including relativistic quantum collapse, decoherence theories, consistent histories approaches, and ontologically interpretable theories. Questions bearing on the connection between counterfactuality and realism, intersubjective agreement, and limits of the bearing of the verbs “to have” and “to be,” follow naturally from the analysis and are thoroughly examined. Finally, distinguishing between empirical reality and a veiled independent reality whose only knowable features are structural yields a clue to a plausible interpretation of current physics.Accessible to readers with only very elementary background in modern physics, Veiled Reality offers nonspecialists, including students in physics and philosophy, easy access to basic problems in the foundation of physics. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the subjective character of pain experience in terms of what we will call ‘embodied predictive processing’. The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation. In this paper we propose an embodied perspective on the PP theory we call the ‘embodied predictive processing (EPP) theory. The EPP theory proposes to explain pain (...) in terms of processes distributed across the whole body. The prediction error minimising system that generates pain experience comprises the immune system, the endocrine system, and the autonomic system in continuous causal interaction with pathways spread across the whole neural axis. We will argue that these systems function in a coordinated and coherent manner as a single complex adaptive system to maintain homeostasis. This system, which we refer to as the neural-endocrine-immune (NEI) system, maintains homeostasis through the process of prediction error minimisation. We go on to propose a view of the NEI ensemble as a multiscale nesting of Markov blankets that integrates the smallest scale of the cell to the largest scale of the embodied person in pain. We set out to show how the EPP theory can make sense of how pain experience could be neurobiologically constituted. We take it to be a constraint on the adequacy of a scientific explanation of subjectivity of pain experience that it makes it intelligible how pain can simultaneously be a local sensing of the body, and, at the same time, a more global, all-encompassing attitude towards the environment. Our aim in what follows is to show how the EPP theory can meet this constraint. (shrink)

When it originated in the late 19th century, psychometrics was a field with both a scientific and a social mission: psychometrics provided new methods for research into individual differences, and at the same time, these psychometric instruments were considered a means to create a new social order. In contrast, contemporary psychometrics - due to its highly technical nature and its limited involvement in substantive psychological research - has created the impression of being a value-free discipline. In this article, we develop (...) a contrasting characterization of contemporary psychometrics as a value-laden discipline. We expose four such values: that individual differences are quantitative (rather than qualitative), that measurement should be objective in a specific sense, that test items should be fair, and that utility of a model is more important than its truth. Our goal is not to criticize psychometrics for employing these values, but rather to bring them into the open and to show that these values are not inevitable and are in need of systematic evaluation. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is devoted to the analysis of the urgent problem of the information society: the overload of a person with information and, as a result, the impossibility of adequate formation and development of the personality; as well as the problem of "digitization" of human existence and the formation of a new reality of dataism. Theoretical basis. A lot of modern scientific works are devoted to the analysis of the information society, its problems and features. The information society is (...) a logical continuation of the scientific and technological revolution, which led to the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and the technology development. In the 20th century, technologies have touched the sphere of knowledge and information, as a result of which the formation and development of the information society, or "knowledge society", takes place. Information becomes the main resource in it, and, one way or another, a person’s life is inextricably connected with the information space. With the information society formation, the problem of information search and processing becomes one of the most urgent. It turns out that despite the abundance and availability of information, it is very difficult to determine its relevance. A lot of effort is spent on developing information retrieval algorithms. Another problem is related to the person’s inability to process large amounts of data. This situation begins to influence not only the education process and professional activity, but also the formation of a person’s personality. A person is "lost" in the information space and gradually loses his/her "I". Algorithms for data analysis come to the rescue, but gradually, instead of giving a person material for thought, they begin to make decisions on their own, and therefore, live life instead of a person. With the advent of Big Data processing algorithms, a new ideological paradigm appears – dataism, which predicts the merger of a person with the general data flow. Originality. The authors make assumptions that the dataistic future is "natural". A lot of works, including in the framework of philosophy, are focused on the problem of "dissolving" a person in the information space and finding ways to overcome it. But, in our opinion, this process is a completely logical continuation of human evolution. Conclusions. Existence of a person as a data flow is not a problem and a threat, but a new dimension of his/her being, and, therefore, requires a careful study and formulation of the main principles of this form of existence. (shrink)

Screen-based virtual worlds have been described as fundamentally disembodying. Contrary to this, the aim of this article is to provide a phenomenological analysis of bodily presence in one case of screen-based virtuality. By integrating phenomenology with qualitative research methodologies, I explore esports practitioners’ experiences of bodily presence in League of Legends (LoL). Here, descriptions from real-life esports practitioners are analyzed within the phenomenological framework of ‘incorporation’. My analysis shows that the practitioners’ experience and engage with their virtual world not just (...) by incorporating their physical gaming equipment, but also through incorporation of virtual abilities and tools specific to the game world. Having shown that the LoL practitioner’s body spans both physical and virtual space without leaving the body behind, I situate these results within the discussion of virtual presence in video games. I claim that the practitioners’ sense of presence can be accounted for by situating the integrated physical and virtual tools and abilities within the phenomenological framework of the ‘nullpoint’, understood as a bodily field of activity shaped by our incorporated skills and tools. (shrink)