The Free Body

Chiasmi International 17:327-345 (2015)
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Abstract

It is precisely through movement that the subject inscribes itself into the world and becomes visible to others. The subject is a movement directed to the outside, that is to say, the subject is desire. Desire is the “tension” toward the “extrême dehors” that we call the world. In all of his works Maurice Merleau-Ponty reaffirms, without thematizing it, a conception of life as movement, and of body as action and desire: the human being is “a certain lack of....” In other words, it is the distance between myself and the absent that drives me to move, to annul the distance through motion. Thus life is nothing but the unfinished act of moving into space and thereby creating space—the space in which we, as desire and movement, encounter both others and the world. As the act of moving is the way one appears to another, every relationship is based on appearing. In short, life is the movement that leads us towards the world and coincides with our desire to make it appear.C’est précisément par le mouvement que le sujet s’inscrit dans le monde et devient visible pour les autrui. Le sujet est un mouvement dirigé au dehors, c’est-à-dire, le sujet est désir. Le désir est la « tension » vers le « dehors extrême » que nous appelons le monde. Partout, Merleau-Ponty affirme, sans la thématiser explicitement, une conception de la vie comme mouvement, et une conception du corps comme action et désir : l’homme est « un certain manque de ». En d’autres termes, c’est la distance entre moi-même et l’absente qui me force à bouger, à annuler la distance à partir du mouvement. Donc la vie n’est rien que l’acte inachevé de bouger dans l’espace et par là la création de l’espace – l’espace dans lequel nous, comme désir et mouvement, rencontrons les autrui et le monde. Comme l’action est le moyen par lequel l’un apparait à l’autre, tous les rapports sont basés sur l’apparence. En bref, la vie est le mouvement qui nous amène vers le monde et qui coïncide avec notre désir de le faire apparaître.È attraverso il movimento che il soggetto si iscrive nel mondo e diviene visibile per l’altro. Il soggetto è un movimento in direzione del “fuori”, il che significa che il soggetto è desiderio. Il desiderio è “tensione” verso quell’“estremo fuori” che chiamiamo mondo. Ovunque Merleau-Ponty riafferma, senza tematizzarlo esplicitamente, una concezione della vita come movimento, e una concezione del corpo come azione e desiderio: l’uomo è “una certa mancanza di”. In altri termini, è la distanza tra me e l’assente che mi forza a muovermi, ad annullare la distanza tramite il movimento. Dunque la vita non è che l’atto incompiuto di questo muoversi nello spazio e di questo creare lo spazio – lo spazio nel quale noi come desiderio e movimento incontriamo gli altri e il mondo. E poiché l’azione è il mezzo attraverso cui l’uno appare all’altro, tutti i rapporti sono basati sull’apparenza, e la vita è il movimento che ci conduce verso il mondo e che coincide col nostro desiderio di farlo apparire.

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Caterina Di Fazio
Radboud University

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