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Knowledge-dependent games: backward induction

In Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press. pp. 327--343 (1992)

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  1. Inconsistencies in extensive games.Martin Dufwenberg & Johan Lindén - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):103 - 114.
    In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play outside the Nash equilibrium. She also claims that no inconsistency arises if the players have the minimal beliefs necessary to perform backward induction. We here show that another contradiction can be derived even with minimal beliefs, so there is (...)
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  • Dignity and the Value of Rejecting Profitable but Insulting Offers.E. Athanasiou, A. J. London & K. J. S. Zollman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):409-448.
    In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. We provide a formal model of how decision-makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. This is a modified version of the ultimatum game. We then use this model to illustrate ways in which the (...)
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  • Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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