Common reasoning about admissibility

Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325 (1996)
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Abstract

We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common reasoning about admissibility does not depend on how the strategic situation is represented. We further explore the links between iterated admissibility and backward and forward induction.

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Citations of this work

Subjunctive conditionals and revealed preference.Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.

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References found in this work

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Learning the Impossible.Vann McGee - 1994 - In Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 179-199.

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