In this article, we reflect on the use of formal methods in the philosophy of science. These are taken to comprise not just methods from logic broadly conceived, but also from other formal disciplines such as probability theory, game theory, and graph theory. We explain how formal modelling in the philosophy of science can shed light on difficult problems in this domain.

Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...) We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy , and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction. (shrink)

Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...) We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction. (shrink)

Los comportamientos económicos no muestran una única fuente motivacional: el autointerés. Son más bien el resultado de múltiples causas, entre las cuales destacan los sentimientos prosociales y los principios y valores morales. Tales evidencias han permitido pensar en la posibilidad de encontrar un modelo económico alternativo, más humano, eficaz y beneficioso para todas las partes afectadas por la actividad. El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer desde una perspectiva civil -como la desarrollada por Stefano Zamagni- y cordial -como la desarrollada (...) por Adela Cortina- orientaciones para el diseño de una economía a la altura de aquello que el momento histórico exige, a través de instituciones, organizaciones y empresas que incluyan en sus diseños aspectos tan importantes como la compasión, el cuidado, la reciprocidad, el compromiso y la participación activa y comprometida de la sociedad civil. Economic behavior do not show a single motivational source: self-interest. They are rather the result of multiple causes, among which prosocial sentiments and principles and moral values. Such evidence has let himself think about the possibility of finding a more humane, effective and beneficial for all parties affected by the activity alternative economic model. The aim of this paper is to propose from a civil perspective, as developed by Stefano Zamagni, and cordial, as developed by Adela Cortina, guidelines for the design of an economy at the height of what the historical moment demands through institutions, organizations and companies to include in their designs such important aspects as compassion, care, reciprocity, commitment and active and committed participation of civil society. (shrink)

This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.