Islamism is a form of political and religious utopia, created by the Arab-Muslim world, as an ideological alternative to the invasion of modern western doctrines: communism, socialism, liberalism, capitalism etc. This political and ideological current appears to some as a substitute for nationalism, which lost its appealin many Muslim countries, due to the application of a „socialist" model, as well as due to the deception that emerges from the successive defeats in the fight with the Israeli enemy. The anti-Occidentalism (...) of this movement is seen as a side effect in the fight against laicization, against materialism and moral degradation. (shrink)

"Roger Garaudy was for many years at the centre of the French Communist Party but was eventually expelled for his liberal views. In the Seventies he developed a project to bring Marxism and Christianity together, to include all humanity in a project to set all people free. What emerges from Garaudy's project is a very modern Marxism, with its emphasis on the individual, its ecological politics, and in its insistence on religion as central to human emancipation. Although Garaudy himself became (...) frustrated by the West and converted to Islam in 1982, ending his life discredited in the West, it is certainly possible that Garaudy's project represents a good, perhaps even the best, starting point for Marxism in today's world"--. (shrink)

After the fall of the communist regime in Romania, in the name of their shared religious faith, a series of religious NGOs from Turkey and other Islamic countries expressed their readiness to support the members of the two communities in their search for their lost religious identity after the religious constraints enforced by the communist regime had been lifted in 1989. The fieldwork undertaken as part of a research project on the two historical Muslim communities in Dobruja, the Turks and (...) the Tatars, has shown the involvement of some religious organizations in the life of these ethnic groups. The present study analyzes the feedback on the actions of the aforementioned organizations as they are depicted in oral testimonies recorded in 2013 and 2014 and in written texts. The aim of this paper is the description of the interactions between the old Muslim community of Dobruja and their co-believers who volunteered to support them through religious education and social work directed at the disadvantaged groups. Discussing their religious beliefs caused the individuals we interviewed to reflect on another version of Islam, unknown to them before 1990 and promoted today by those who read the Quran literally and follow it to the letter. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of central features of modern world history which suggest a confirmation, and extension, of something resembling Fukuyama's Kojeve-Hegel *end of history' thesis. As is well known, Kojeve interpreted Hegel as having argued that in a meaningful sense history, as struggle and endeavour to achieve workable stasis in the mutual relations of selves and state-society collectivities, literally came to an end with Napoleon's 1806 victory at the battle of Jena. That victory led to the establishment or (...) consolidation of a European system which significantly embodied the conceptually ideal roles and mutual relations of individual, state, law, and culture (including religious culture), in the aggregated states ruled or presided over by Napoleon. For Hegel the universal structures which constitute the progression of the Absolute are importantly independent of the actual concrete historical individuals and doings which embody and implement them. Once realized upon the earth, the idea of a civil society living, under law, with a sustainable religious and national normative ideology is inexpungible. Even if it has for a time dimmed, it will resurface and re-present itself, and, for Kojeve, has done so, in the gradual articulation of European union and the formations of the League of Nations and its successor the United Nations, in the world that is still our present world. It is much of this model that Fukuyama adopted, and conceived, more explicitly than perhaps either Hegel or Kojeve had done, as a realized triangulation of democracy, liberal individual rights ideology, and capitalism. The realization came to the fore, in Fukuyama's view, in the matrix of the events set in motion by the fall of communism in the European world in 1989. Contrary to Fukayama, of course, there has been rather a lot of 'history' very dramatically in the years in and since 1989, and of course especially explosively in 2001. This recent history notwithstanding, the end of history thesis seems plausible and defensible. Four large geopolitical struggles may be identified, as constituting sequential clusters of argument aimed at determining the human telos, or end-state. They constitute also a sequence of reductios of blueprints that are rivals to the liberalism-democracy-capitalism complex. The four are World War I and the geopolitical struggles between Liberal modernism and fascism, communism, and Islamism. Analyses of these four struggles are offered and defended. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of central features of modern world history which suggest a confirmation, and extension, of something resembling Fukuyama's Kojeve-Hegel *end of history' thesis. As is well known, Kojeve interpreted Hegel as having argued that in a meaningful sense history, as struggle and endeavour to achieve workable stasis in the mutual relations of selves and state-society collectivities, literally came to an end with Napoleon's 1806 victory at the battle of Jena. That victory led to the establishment or (...) consolidation of a European system which significantly embodied the conceptually ideal roles and mutual relations of individual, state, law, and culture, in the aggregated states ruled or presided over by Napoleon. For Hegel the universal structures which constitute the progression of the Absolute are importantly independent of the actual concrete historical individuals and doings which embody and implement them. Once realized upon the earth, the idea of a civil society living, under law, with a sustainable religious and national normative ideology is inexpungible. Even if it has for a time dimmed, it will resurface and re-present itself, and, for Kojeve, has done so, in the gradual articulation of European union and the formations of the League of Nations and its successor the United Nations, in the world that is still our present world. It is much of this model that Fukuyama adopted, and conceived, more explicitly than perhaps either Hegel or Kojeve had done, as a realized triangulation of democracy, liberal individual rights ideology, and capitalism. The realization came to the fore, in Fukuyama's view, in the matrix of the events set in motion by the fall of communism in the European world in 1989. Contrary to Fukayama, of course, there has been rather a lot of 'history' very dramatically in the years in and since 1989, and of course especially explosively in 2001. This recent history notwithstanding, the end of history thesis seems plausible and defensible. Four large geopolitical struggles may be identified, as constituting sequential clusters of argument aimed at determining the human telos, or end-state. They constitute also a sequence of reductios of blueprints that are rivals to the liberalism-democracy-capitalism complex. The four are World War I and the geopolitical struggles between Liberal modernism and fascism, communism, and Islamism. Analyses of these four struggles are offered and defended. (shrink)

This contribution attempts to show the ‘universality’ of Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ‘modernity and ambivalence’. First it tries to explain the new feeling of insecurity and fear after the end of the Cold War: we have lost our intimate enemy, communism, and got ‘alien’ Islamism instead. Further, it is argued that ‘exotic’ modernity (from a Eurocentric perspective) is also in fear of ambivalence, as demonstrated by Sinophobia in Indonesia. The conclusion is that a ‘postmodern’ accommodation of ambivalence is still (...) far from being accomplished. A rather guarded proposal is made that a self-image as a universal citoyen/ne might be part of a solution. (shrink)

This article analyzes the conflictive role of religion in post-1989 Europe. Three major reasons for this are addressed: first, the restoration of structural and cultural pluralism of European civilization since the breakdown of communism entails the reconstitution of the full diversity of European religion. Second, international migration as a crucial part of globalization has intensified, contributing to the transformation of Europe into a complex of multi-cultural and pluri-religious societies. Third, the wave of contemporary globalization has been accompanied by an (...) intensification of inter-civilizational and inter-religious encounters and conflicts — particularly between Christianity and Islam. As a result, European integration and enlargement as a secular and humanist mode of cultural integration and religious governance are basically challenged by this three-fold revitalization of religion. The growing tendency is to respond to this challenge by enhancing the Christian foundations of Europe rather than, as this article argues, to follow a more cosmopolitan, secularist and religious pluralist mode of European cultural integration. (shrink)

Islamic law; interpretation and construction; Shiites.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on Jewish and Christian Encounters with BuddhismHarold KasimowA thousand years hence, historians will look back at the twentieth century and remember it not for the struggle between Liberalism and Communism but for the momentous human discovery of the encounter between Christianity and Buddhism.—Arnold ToynbeeBeginning in the 1960s many American Jews and Christians have become fascinated with the Buddhist tradition and have immersed themselves in the study and (...) practice of Buddhism. In this presentation I will examine how Christian and Jewish leaders have responded to this phenomenon. Some have been quite suspicious of such interreligious and cross-cultural encounters, claiming that Buddhism is a great threat to their religions. However, others have argued that their encounters with Buddhism have led them to deeper insight into their own traditions and have helped them to become better human beings. Their practice of Buddhist meditation has been a way for them to develop sensitivity to God and greater commitment to their own traditions. Still others have converted to Buddhism; it is estimated that of the three million Buddhists in America, fully one million are converts from Christianity and Judaism.Because of the complexity and diversity within Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism, I will focus on the responses of leading Orthodox Jews and Roman Catholic Christians to Theravada Buddhism and to the Zen school in Mahayana, the two forms of Buddhism to which many Americans are drawn and with which I have some personal experience. I will first examine how members of the Jewish and Christian traditions view other religions, because an individual’s perception of the encounter is shaped by how their religion views the Buddhist tradition. This will help us understand why religious authorities find this fascination with Buddhism so problematic.the jewish-buddhist encounterHistorically, Judaism has largely been interpreted by its thinkers as the only true religion. However, this does not mean that members of other faiths may not attain [End Page 21] salvation. According to the Talmudic Doctrine of the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah, “the righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come,” that is, all human beings can attain salvation who establish courts of law and who refrain from idolatry, murder, blasphemy against God, incest, theft, and eating the limb of a live animal. Jewish authorities claim that because Christianity and Islam worship God they are not to be considered idolatrous, although some question the monotheistic nature of Christianity because of the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation. However, there is no question that members of Asian religions are practicing idolatrous worship, avodah zarah (“strange worship”). They are therefore in violation of the Noahide Law not to worship idols.With some exceptions, Orthodox rabbis in recent times agree with Rabbi Avigdor Miller (1908–2001) that “Buddhism, Shintoism, and all other religions of the Far East are forms of idol worship.”1 For Rabbi Miller the Torah contains all the knowledge that is necessary for Jews, and to even study another religious tradition is an affront to God. That this attitude toward the study of alien texts is common today is evident from the reaction of Rabbi Chaim Zvi Hollander to the suggestion of Rabbi Zalman Schachter that it is permissible to explore Asian forms of spirituality. Hollander charges that “Zalman Schachter’s incredible advice is a direct contradiction of the Almighty’s request that we not seek out and explore the spiritual modes of the Goyim, even if it is for the purpose of enhancing our spiritual experience in the service of our God.”2 He further states that “the practice of any religion other than Judaism is for a Jew an act of Avoda Zara.”3For Rabbis Miller and Hollander, blending Judaism with the Buddhist tradition, which is not concerned with a creator God and which rejects the idea of self, is inconceivable and more dangerous than Jews who convert to another religious tradition. However, even among the Orthodox, there are divergent views. Irving Greenberg, one of the outstanding liberal Orthodox rabbis of our generation, after meeting with the Dalai Lama wrote, “the Dalai Lama taught us a lot about Buddhism, even more about menschlichkeit... (shrink)

This brand new and fully updated edition builds upon nearly three decades of research, thought, conversation, and teaching of the most powerful political ideologies of our era. The Fourth Edition expands the treatment with significantly updated treatments of each ideology and new discussions of conservatism, neoconservativism, imperialism, Islamism, modernity, colonialism, and globalization. It contextualizes and explains the ideological foundations of the American war on terrorism and ongoing developments in nation states where pivotal ideological developments are occurring, especially the United States, (...) China, and Iran. The authors also offer fully updated introductory and concluding chapters on the ongoing significance of studying ideologies and their meaning in a new global era. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the work of Sayyid Qutb and in particular his book Milestones, which is often regarded as the Communist Manifesto of Islamic fundamentalism. This paper has four main sections. First I outline Qutb’s political position and in particular examine his advocacy of offensive jihad. In section two I argue that there are a number of tendencies that make his position potentially more liberal that it is often taken to be. I here argue that there are (...) at least six reasons why Qutb’s position is not intrinsically as anti-liberal as it might at first appear. First, many western liberals, influenced by the social contract tradition, regard the legitimacy of their societies as based on popular sovereignty. Qutb, however, regards a society based on popular sovereignty, where law emerges from the will of man rather than the will of God, as a form of tyranny, so it would seem that he is in principle opposed to Western liberal societies. It is not clear, however, that we, or Islamic fundamentalist, need to regard Western liberal societies as based on popular sovereignty, for it is always possible to interpret Western political institutions through the lens of natural law theory, which was one of the main sources of the liberal tradition. In this section I will compare Qutb’s political philosophy with that of Aquinas to illustrate this point and suggest the possibility of secularists and puritan Islamists being able to form an overlapping consensus on the legitimacy of liberal Western societies. Secondly, there is an analogue to the social contract in Qutb’s own position as he believes that legitimate authority requires the free submission of the governed. Thirdly, Qutb is in principle a fallibilist about human reason; this fallibilism extends even to our capacity to interpret divine revelation. Fourthly, Islamic universalism requires that Muslims regard enemies they might be fighting as potential converts. Fifthly, Qutb, like most Sunni fundamentalists, is an implacable enemy of theocracy. And finally, Qutb is a gradualist. In the third section I argue that the real danger for liberal societies from believers in a position like Qutb’s is sociological rather than intrinsic to the ideology – specifically, that there is a danger that such groups may develop in a ‘Leninist’ direction. In the final section I argue that one of the main reasons for this danger is the lack of a consensus in the Islamic world about what it is to be a good, or even a true, Muslim, and that the slow emergence of some sort of consensus will require a vigorous public debate amongst Muslims. Western liberals should welcome such debate rather than fearing such, and should do all they can to ensure that civil society, both in Western societies and in predominantly Islamic societies, is open to such debate. (shrink)

Here is the final volume of Norman O. Brown's trilogy on civilization and its discontents, on humanity's long struggle to master its instincts and the perils that attend that denial of human nature. Following on his famous books _Life Against Death_ and _Love's Body_, this collection of eleven essays brings Brown's thinking up to 1990 and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Brown writes that "the prophetic tradition is an attempt to give direction to the social structure precipitated (...) by the urban revolution; to resolve its inherent contradictions; to put an end to its injustice, inequality, anomie, the state of war... that has been its history from start to finish." Affiliating himself with prophets from Muhammad to Blake and Emerson, Brown offers further meditations on what's wrong with Western civilization and what we might do about it. Thus the duality in his title: crisis and the hope for change. In pieces both poetic and philosophical, Brown's attention ranges over Greek mythology, Islam, Spinoza, and _Finnegan's Wake_. The collection includes an autobiographical essay musing on Brown's own intellectual development. The final piece, "Dionysus in 1990," draws on Freud and the work of Georges Bataille to link the recent changes in the world's economies with mankind's primordial drive to accumulation, waste, and death. (shrink)

In traditional societies, knowledge is organized in hierarchical chains through which authority is legitimated by custom. Because the majority of the population is illiterate, sacred knowledge is conveyed orally and ritualistically, but the ultimate source of religious authority is typically invested in the Book. The hadith are a good example of traditional practice. These chains of Islamic knowledge were also characteristically local, consensual and lay, unlike in Christianity, with its emergent ecclesiastical bureaucracies, episcopal structures and ordained priests. In one sense, (...) Islam has no church. While there are important institutional differences between the world religions, network society opens up significant challenges to traditional authority, rapidly increasing the flow of religious knowledge and commodities. With global flows of knowledge on the Internet, power is no longer embodied and the person is simply a switchpoint in the information flow. The logic of networking is that control cannot be concentrated for long at any single point in the system; knowledge, which is by definition only temporary, is democratically produced at an infinite number of sites. In this Andy Warhol world, every human can, in principle, have their own site. While the Chinese Communist Party and several Middle Eastern states attempt to control this flow, their efforts are only partially successful. The result is that traditional forms of religious authority are constantly disrupted and challenged, but at the same time the Internet creates new opportunities for evangelism, religious instruction and piety. The outcome of these processes is, however, unknown and unknowable. There is a need, therefore, to invent a new theory of authority that is post-Weberian in reconstructing the conventional format of charisma, tradition and legal rationalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 151-165 [Access article in PDF] Santayana and Buddhism: The Choice between the Cross and the Bo Tree Paul Grimley KuntzEmory UniversitySantayana honors Gotama Buddha as a profound religious genius as well as an original philosopher. Gotama's way is genuine spiritual wisdom, and constantly compared with Christian mysticism as a way of enlightenment. It is therefore understandable that a Spaniard, who learned his catechism in Ávila, (...) and who was educated in the New England of Emerson and other Transcendentalists who honored Oriental wisdom, should have so much to say about the Buddha and Buddhism.The effort of this paper is to gather many of the isolated passages to give a coherent picture of Santayana and Buddhism. One difficulty to be overcome is that the philosopher rarely quotes his sources (the exception is a single quotation from Dasgupta). Although Santayana has numerous opinions, he does not reveal on which translations he has relied. Nor does he contrast different traditions of Buddhists. To overcome the vagueness of scholarship, I have used the volumes found in Widener Library: the sorts of books known to Santayana's dissertation director, Josiah Royce, and those of a sympathetic sort that had led Santayana as early as the writing of his dissertation on Rudolf Hermann Lotze to reject the latter's defiantly Christian and Western contempt for oriental "superstition." The sympathy can be expressed as similar to that of Schopenhauer in reading the Upanishads or Wilhelm von Humboldt in studying the Bhagavadgita. Santayana's study makes him aware of his Catholicism but he is unlike the Jesuit Dahlmann who attacks Buddhism as Nihilism. Santayana is more like his contemporaries who worked in psychology and philosophy of religion. Although Friedrich Heiler's work 1 and writings of James Bissett Pratt 2 were a bit too late to have influenced Santayana, comparison serves to illuminate and strengthen Santayana's conclusions. Perhaps Heiler is even more appropriate because Buddhistic insights remind him of those of St. Theresa. Santayana would support Pratt's view that Nirvana is not the annihilation of all desire but the extinguishing of evil passions. What Santayana finds congenial in Christian Neo-Platonism and in Spinoza, as well as in Buddhism, is the achievement of freedom of the spirit. 3 It has become a commonplace of world history that the two greatest founders of religion whose ways of salvation triumphed in Europe and in Asia respectively are the Christ and the Buddha. Philosophers of religion like Heiler accept both as saviors with a universal message, one, Jesus "the master of prayer" ("der Meister des Gebets"), the [End Page 151] other, Gotama "the master of contemplation" ("der Meister der Versenking"). Santayana is not concerned with the fact of the success of their missions, for there are indeed other triumphs such as Mohammed's Islam, and if it be classified as a religion, Marx's Communism. Santayana is hardly offering his services as a philosophic mediator, as Whitehead tries to do in Religion in the Making, to bring the two communities of faith to a closer approximation of a truly universal religion. 4Santayana reveals great personal depth as he ponders the contrast between the Gospel and the Fourfold Noble Truth. What is the appeal of Christ on the Cross dying "to save us?" What is the appeal of "the serene Buddha, lifting the finger of meditation and profound counsel?" 5 These questions are asked in a meditation in Soliloquies in England in the sympathetic way of those American philosophers who like Pratt have the option of remaining Christian or converting to Buddhism. William James might well have patted Santayana on the back for struggling with the alternatives, for wrestling with a live option. Probably because of Buddha's message of truth, Santayana has shifted from religion as poetry, which James considered "rotten," to how "a general truth about existence and experience" is symbolized poetically, which James would consider healthy.In answering the question "What does the cross signify?" Santayana strips away the "various analogies, legal, sentimental, or chivalrous," and he... (shrink)

These essays bring Weber's sociology to bear on the current transformation of the political landscape. After the collapse of communism, many states are faced with the challenges of democratization: they need to establish their legitimacy in an uncertain economic climate and within a new geopolitical order. The essays in this volume develop Weberian concepts and apply his comparative-historical method to deepen our understanding of these problems. They cover a wide range of examples, from the United Stated to Western and (...) Eastern Europe, and from Russia and Japan to the Islamic States. (shrink)

Kyrgyz people lived under the control of Soviet Union for about 70 years. During this time, they were forbidden to practice any kinds of religious duties. Their religious schools and mosques were closed or used for other aims rather than religious needs. In short, all kinds of religious freedom and practices were forbidden strictly. The aim was to bring up an atheistic people during the days of Soviet Union. However, when Kyrgyz people won their independence and established a new country, (...) all kinds of restrictions in terms of religion were abrogated and people began to establish their religious schools and mosques. While during the first years of independency of the country in 1991, there were only 39 mosques, as of 2018 there are nearly 3,000 mosques in the country. In addition to the increase of mosques, the number of people going to mosques also increases day by day. This article examines mainly the development of religious freedom in terms of legal aspect from the beginning of the establishment of the country to our time; the legal statues, functions, and duties of State Commission for Religious Affairs and Religious Office of Kyrgyzstan Muslims, and as common religious educational places mosques, religious activities done at mosques, the factors effecting these activities negatively.Summary: Kyrgyz Turks are one of the most ancient tribes in Central Asia. Although there are various views and knowledge about the religious life and the process of Islamization of them in various sources, there is no doubt that one of the most important elements which shapes Kyrgyz culture and social life is Islam. Even though they continued the activities of Islamic education and training under the rule of many nations thorough the history, all activities of religious education were tried to be forgotten and religion was removed from daily life under the Soviet communist regime. However, with the establishment of the Republic of Kyrgyz based on the secular and democratic bases on 31 August 1991, Muslim people showed a great effort and endeavor to open some institutions where they could live their religion, perform their religious duties, and teach religious and moral values for people. After the declaration of independence, with the enacting of “Freedom of Faith and Religious Institutions” on 16 December 1991 which was one of the first enacting laws, very important developments happened in terms of both formal and informal education. Some knowledge concerning Islam is given in some culture courses and “Religious Office of Kyrgyzstan Muslims” was created for meeting all kinds of religious needs of Muslims in the country in 1993. With the establishment of the “State Commission for Religious Affairs” in 1996, some new legal regulations were made. Thus the state’s policy about religious education and teaching gained a new dimension. During this process, the state faced some problems concerning developments in religious education. Although some of these problems have been solved legally, there are still many problems about religious education today. Since the independency until now, there have been many researches as articles, books, master theses and doctorate dissertations about various fields of religious education, religion-state relations, religious institutions, course books and their curriculums. However, a great majority of these studies belong to religion-state relations and the field of formal religious education. There aren’t any academic studies or research about mosques and imams that concern the great majority of the country population. In fact, from the point of religious education, common or informal religious education is as extremely important as formal religious education. For the mosques that are one of the most important institutions of common religious education are spread to the most remote corner of the country and serve for all people of different ages for the whole year. The effects of common religious education increase day by day. While there were just 33 mosques in 1933, there were 39 mosques in the independency year of 1991, as of 2018 this number has risen to 2830. Relating the imams who work at mosques, it is not possible to speak about a systematic structure. Since imams are generally graduated from madrasas, their educational levels are very low. As they have not enough financial support and highly educated teachers, they cannot give good education to their students and cannot adopt themselves to the modern educational levels in teaching religious issues. In order to solve this problem, Muftiyat either sends students to abroad or gives in service trainings for imams. Another important problem in relation to imams is the way of assignment. There is no criterion for assignment of imams. They are not designated by the Muftiyat, but it just legitimizes those imams who are chosen by congregation. Imams receive neither any salary from the Muftiyat, nor they have any social assurance. They work either voluntary or their incomes are paid by people. Although all of these negative conditions, mosques and imams have a great importance on Kyrgyz people’s education, culture, worship, and moral teaching. It can be said that there are two kinds of education at mosques and masjids. One of these is “moldos”, some men of religion who gather students and give some religious knowledge without following any curriculum. Although some of them take education from some Arabic countries or Pakistan, their educational level is very low and cannot recite even the Qur’an correctly. In addition, they have very little knowledge about pedagogy and religious themes, and they have not enough educational experience. The second type of education at mosques and masjids is carried out through Friday sermons and preaching. However, this is not an effective way in giving religious education. Because the way in which the Friday sermon is given is not appropriate as a good teaching method. As the sermons are done in Arabic, there is no effective communication between the imam and the congregation. However, Friday sermons and preaching are very important for people’s religious education and socialization. This article firstly deals with the developments in religion in the times of freedom of the country, secondly, it examines the institution of Muftiyat to which all mosques are adhered and “State Commission for Religious Affairs” that register the mosques which the Muftiyat approves, and lastly gives information about mosques and their congregations in the country. (shrink)

Speculations about Islam, Islamization and Fundamentalism proceed from the deficit of a serious historic study on the origin and activity of the Bulgarian Muslims (the Pomaks), which is due to both the politicization and ideologization of this theme through many centuries, and various national and chauvinistic interests. From the beginning of the 1890's and especially in the 1920’s and 1930's, the continuous campaign in the press encourages public opinion to differentiate religious affiliation from ethnic affiliation and to accept the Pomaks (...) as the part of the Bulgarian nation. In the 1960’s, there is a growing pressure to integrate the “Bulgarian Muslims” (the Pomaks) into the community of the ethnic Turks at the same time that the ethnic Turks use the privileges of communism,of which they were gradually deprived later. Twenty years after the change, the state continues to abdicate its responsibilities for this clearly Bulgarian compactmass of the population, whose mother tongue is Bulgarian. The state does not pay attention to the poor, to education, to the large unemployment rate, the lack of investments in these regions, the lack of infrastructure, the discovery of the adequate and transparent way of financing the religious education of these people, or to their need to participate actively in the processes of building civil society. (shrink)

Political liberalism began in the eighteenth century with the effort to establish a secular state in which religious differences would be tolerated. If religious views include universal principles to apply to all by force if necessary, diverse religions must conflict, perhaps fatally. In a sense, then, political liberalism was an invention to resolve a then current, awful problem. Its proponents were articulate and finally persuasive. There have been many comparable social inventions, many of which have failed, as Communism, egalitarianism, (...) and perhaps socialism have all failed to date. The extraordinary thing about political liberalism is that it seems to have succeeded in its authors' initial hope for it. It may have helped end the turmoil occasioned by religious differences. Political liberalism has since expanded in various ways under other influences, and, if it were not for Islamic fundamentalism with its seemingly coercive theocratic program, we might no longer today associate religious conflict with the core of liberalism in its actual practice. (shrink)

This article depicts empirical research conducted in the Western Balkans and Bulgaria (project Balkan Monitor 2006 conducted by the Gallup Europe) that is geared towards the trust that citizens have in national and international institutions, as well as people in general. Empirical research provides a realistic picture of trust as seen from the inside. According to the data collected, within the general population, the strongest percentage was given to neighbors, followed by the police and European Union. A considerable degree of (...) attention was given to interreligious confidence and focus was placed on the number of adepts of a particular faith and the degree of confidence. From Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism to Protestantism, the degree of confidence diminishes, as well as the number of adherents, which points out to the relationship between minority and majority. The findings suggest that the degree of trust towards religious communities comes as a dominant attitude which means that these are the institutions that merit the greatest degree of trust. The exceptions are Albania and Kosovo where NATO comes first, whereas in Serbia NATO comes last. Ex- communists enjoy trust from 4% of the respondents whereas 24% completely rejects them. 8% of the respondents have a lot trust in people in general whereas 9% have no trust in people at all. For the purposes of this paper we will depict only a number of questions related to the degree of trust in various countries. (shrink)

Increasingly in today’s world we are experiencing intensifying antagonisms around religious and ethno-cultural differences. The confrontation between political Islam and the so-called ‘West’ has replaced the rhetoric of the Cold War against communism. This new constellation has not only challenged the hypothesis that ‘secularization’ inevitably accompanied modernity but has also placed on the agenda political theology as a potent force in many societies. This article analyzes the contemporary revival of political theology by focusing on the headscarf debate in comparative (...) constitutional perspective. It compares the well-known decision of the French Parliament banning the wearing of the headscarf in public schools (2004) with the decision of the German Constitutional Court concerning whether Fereshta Ludin, an Afghani-German teacher wearing the hijab, could teach in German schools (2003) and with the more recent judgment of the Turkish Constitutional Court (summer 2008) upholding the ban on the wearing of the scarf or the turban in institutions of higher learning. At stake in these debates is not only the meaning of fundamental human rights but also why women and their bodies become the object of disciplinary conflicts in culture, law and religion. (shrink)

English summary: Jean-Francois Revel (1924-2006) was an essential intellectual and author of the twentieth century. His work explored the ideological sources that fed the various forms of totalitarianism, from Communism to Islamism. The present biography sheds light on the multiple aspects of this combative thought couched in the will affirm the principals of both economic and political liberal democracy. French description: Loin de n'avoir ete qu'un polemiste de talent, Jean-Francois Revel (1924-2006) a ete, de Pourquoi des philosophes? (1957) a (...) L'Obsession antiamericaine (2002), l'auteur d'une oeuvre de premiere importance, jalonnee par de fracassants succes populaires et internationaux. Allant bien au-dela du seul engagement anticommuniste, la force et la singularite intellectuelles de sa pensee n'avaient jamais, jusqu'ici, fait l'objet d'une synthese exhaustive qui aurait permis d'en eclairer la place dans l'histoire contemporaine des idees - une beance que le present ouvrage vient enfin combler. Avant tout anime par la passion des faits, ce philosophe s'est constamment employe a pourfendre et a deconstruire les impostures ideologiques dont se sont nourries les diverses tentations totalitaires qui ont marque le XXe siecle, jusque sous leurs recents avatars de l'islamisme et de l'antiracisme devoye. Philippe Boulanger, dans cette passionnante biographie intellectuelle, expose les etapes successives et les multiples aspects de cette pensee de combat qui trouve son unite profonde dans la volonte de reaffirmer sans concession l'insigne valeur des principes d'une democratie liberale, en economie comme en politique. Chaque jour qui passe semble en rappeler l'intempestive et remarquable pertinence. (shrink)

Recent studies highlight the need for ethical and equitable digital health research that protects the rights and interests of racialized communities. We argue for practices in digital health that promote data self-determination for these communities, especially in data collection and management. We suggest that researchers partner with racialized communities to curate data that reflects their wellness understandings and health priorities, and respects their consent over data use for policy and other outcomes. These data governance approach honors and builds on Indigenous (...) Data Sovereignty (IDS) decolonial scholarship by Indigenous and non-indigenous researchers and its adaptations to health research involving racialized communities from former European colonies in the global South. We discuss strategies to practice equity, diversity, inclusion, accessibility and decolonization (EDIAD) principles in digital health. We draw upon and adapt the concept of Precision Health Equity (PHE) to emphasize models of data sharing that are co-defined by racialized communities and researchers, and stress their shared governance and stewardship of data that is generated from digital health research. This paper contributes to an emerging research on equity issues in digital health and reducing health, institutional, and technological disparities. It also promotes the self-determination of racialized peoples through ethical data management. (shrink)

I examine the way in which President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan has attempted to legitimate authoritarian rule since the transition from communism. A comparison is made between late-Soviet modes of authoritarian legitimation and those of the Karimov regime, and the success of the project at the conceptual level is examined. The article closes with a consideration of the implications of this study for evaluating Juan J. Linz's classical thesis on the relationship between authoritarianism and ideology and some general propositions (...) on the structure of authoritarian legitimation. (shrink)

In this contribution, the author argues that there are in our European tradition two fundamental conceptions of politics since the French Revolution. We can call them the politics as the art of co-existence, and the politics of dénouement. Both conceptions also have a very different stance towards the traditional religions: for the first one mentioned freedom of religion is constitutive, for the second one religion must serve the state or can even be made redundant. Paradigmatic in this respect was the (...) communist treatment of religion as a relic of the past that will disappear when historic reason makes our society transparant. Here politics transforms in a quasi-eschatological political religion. In the twientieth century neo-marxist philosophers say farewell to this kind of politics and begin to rediscover religious inheritances and theological motives. Today two other positions towards religions are noticeable: the utilitaristic reductionist treatment of religion as a need, and ‘Enlightment fundamentalism’ which continues the rationalist communist conception of religion as a relic of the past. The author criticises both tendencies, and defends a ‘politics without dénouement’ which correspondents to a ‘religion without guarantee’. In closing the author argues that the recent populist politics either dream of a new alliance between religion and/or ‘culture’ and the state, or – in a strange inversion of the multicultural ideals of the nineties – promote a purely polemical identity against an ‘alien’ religion, i.c. Islam. Here the author claims that both tendencies fail to recognize the real nature of the new problems. (shrink)

The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? Michael Strevens provides a partial answer to these questions by showing that scientists should be willing to sign a social contract that mandates sharing. However, he also argues that it is not in an individual credit-maximizing scientist's interest to follow this norm. I argue against Strevens that individual scientists can rationally conform to the communist norm, even (...) in the absence of a social contract or other ways of socially enforcing the norm, by proving results to this effect in a game-theoretic model. This shows that the incentives provided to scientists through the priority rule are sufficient to explain both the origins and the persistence of the communist norm, adding to previous results emphasizing the benefits of the incentive structure created by the priority rule. (shrink)

This essay articulates a double helix at work in Badiou’s thought on politics as a condition of philosophy and philosophy as such by focusing on what Badiou calls “the Idea of communism” and we will call “the communism of the Idea.” The former refers to communism as an Idea par excellence, while the latter concerns the Idea as a philosophical communism. The first section of the essay unpacks the Idea of communism as a composite interaction (...) of politics, history, and subjectivity insofar as each of these elements cannot be taken in themselves. Contrary to post-ideology, Badiou condemns the claim that we should live without an ideological framework insofar as this asks us to live without an Idea. The second section will focus on the communism of the Idea as the result of Badiou’s broader philosophical project and its major Platonic gestures. Badiou’s broader concerns pertain to the commitment to live with an Idea as finite, infinite, and transfinite to the endpoint that philosophy itself is characterized to be destined for communism. The crux that anyone can become a serious philosopher if, to paraphrase Diotima in Plato’s Symposium, they gracefully lend themselves to the process of truths as their fundamental commitment. (shrink)

Arguing that psychology and business ethics are best brought together through a multi-level, broad-based agenda, this essay articulates a vision of psychology and business ethics to frame a future research agenda. The essay draws upon work published in JBE, but also identifies gaps where published research is needed, to build upon psychological conceptions of business ethics. Psychological concepts, notably, are not restricted to phenomena “in the head”, but are discussed at the intra-psychic, relational, and contextual levels of analysis. On the (...) basis of this presentation, I discuss future directions for development in psychology and business ethics, including but not limited to studies of personality, emotion, decision making, motivation, and the biological bases of psychology and business ethics. An inclusive approach to these and related areas, it is argued, will both bring about depth of understanding on the psychological bases of business ethics, and allow dialogue across disciplinary areas within JBE. (shrink)

United in Hate analyzes the Left's contemporary romance with militant Islam as a continuation of the Left's love affair with communist totalitarianism in the ...

The great disputants within the Islamic tradition, the Mutakallimūn, laid down the basis for rational discussion of causality by affirming the right of reason to engage in independent research. This affirmation could not be absolute; it took the form of a division of the spheres of competence belonging, respectively, to reason and Law. Reason was declared to be the judge in ontological and epistemological questions, whereas the sphere of ethics and legislation were left subject to religious Law. Certainly, this division (...) should not be understood too rigidly. The Mutakallimūn often remained loyal to the Law and did not permit reason to execute its rights to the full even when disputing ontological problems. On the other hand, in the sphere of legislation they asserted the rights of reason to define new norms, not established in Revelation, on the basis of rational analysis of revealed Law, thus defying the Zāhiriyya, “people of the manifest,” who denied the legitimacy of rational procedures for determining new norms of law. (shrink)

This study highlights various totalitarian and undemocratic practices in which Bangladesh’s current Awami League-led coalition regime engages. It shows that since its inception in early 2009, the regime has tried to mobilize and manipulate public support from within through—among other means—creating the discourse of “war crimes” and to obtain international support through the discourse of “Islamism” and terrorism. Although “a secular plan” to combat and replace “Islamism” may soothe the nerves of many in the international community, its deployment in Bangladesh (...) has paradoxically produced a dangerous culture of disappearances and extrajudicial killings, infringements on freedom of speech and the stifling of dissenting voices, and the interception of opposition programs and the torture of opposition leaders and activists. The regime has also made a mockery of the law and the country’s judicial system. Many commentators believe that the country’s law courts are now simply an extension of the regime’s political clout. In these circumstances, political repression continues unabated, and victims of persecution are left with inadequate legal recourse. In the name of combating “Islamic terrorism,” Bangladesh’s ruling regime has resorted to a reign of terror that is in many respects tantamount to what we know as fascism. (shrink)

L’article porte sur le rapport entre communisme et féminisme dans l’entre-deux-guerres en prenant comme point de départ un débat transnational entre chercheuses d’horizons divers, débat paru dans une revue sur l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans les pays d’Europe de l’Est fondée récemment. Trois approches différentes permettent d’éclairer la position ambiguë du féminisme dans les organisations communistes et l’Internationale communiste. Dans un premier temps, ce sont les opportunités et les limites de l’égalité formelle offerte aux femmes communistes qui sont (...) abordées, puis les positions théoriques les plus innovantes et leur réception. Enfin trois cas de femmes cadres serviront d’exemples pour illustrer les négociations nécessaires, dans la pratique, pour concilier les attentes contradictoires propagées par le régime stalinien et les organisations communistes. (shrink)

A growing body of literature has thought to draw the link between Islamic ethics and environmental stewardship to explain the foundational principles of why humans should care about the environment, which gave rise to the coining of the term “Eco-Islam”. But only recently have we started to witness the birth of empirical examinations of the Eco-Islam concept, going beyond the why principles and so explaining what is meant by the environment, the role of humans towards it, and its regard as (...) explained in the holy book of Muslims—the Qur’an. However, these foundational (why and what) principles do not suggest specific behavioural actions. This study conceptually and methodologically advances the existing literature from the belief (why and what) level of Islamic teachings about the environment to the action level by addressing questions such as: how can we take our belief of “Eco-Islam” to actually guide behaviours and outcomes? And in which business contexts are these behavioural principles more immediately applicable? To achieve this, we have undertaken qualitative research to analyse the content (i.e. verses) of the holy Qur’an. Our findings yield a framework that proposes key behavioural application principles (how) of Eco-Islam. Examples of practical applications of the framework and policy implications are discussed. (shrink)

Abstract The apparent contradictory relationship between Islam and evolution is important because it has been cited as an example of contradiction between religion and science by both thinkers in the West and Muslims. Muslim scholars and scientists mainly disagree with evolution's legitimacy. Islam's Quantum Question by Nidhal Guessoum is a unique narrative providing in one of its first chapters an overview of evolution from neo-Darwinists to creationists, including the views of scholars throughout Islamic history. Guessoum then proceeds to advocate for (...) evolution. Drawing from Nidhal Guessoum's work, I highlight the reasons why there is an apparent contradiction between Islam and science—and, in particular, Islam and evolution—which include lack of freedom of thought and misinterpretation of the Qur’an. In doing so, I suggest setting the stage for a new Einsteinian theory of evolution, which involves the dimension of time and human cognition. (shrink)

This article approaches a potential tension in the work of Slavoj Žižek between his critique of communist ideology and his endorsement of the communist idea. The aim is to show how this endorsement, in effect, emerged out of Žižek’s sustained engagement with communist ideology. The article captures this transformation by focusing on his understanding of the notion of the idea and the ways in which ideology can be transgressed. The conclusion drawn is that in moving from a Kantian to a (...) Hegelian notion of the idea, Žižek also leaves behind his initial Beckettian Leninism in favor of an understanding of revolution that no longer depends on the heroic act of a subject, but on the immanent logic of the communist idea. (shrink)

The problem of truth was raised in medieval Islamic philosophy within the framework of discussions starting from the question of whether our knowledge corresponds to the “actuality of affairs.” The notion of validity thus elaborated was comprehended as a quality of knowledge established through a comparison with “matters of fact.” What was intended is not coincidence with what is and has existence. Existence (wujūd) was generally understood in Islamic thought as one of the attributes (ṣifa) that a thing might or (...) might not possess while still being “a thing” (shay’), and since our knowledge embraces things independently of their accidental attributes, the question about truth was placed on a wider footing. Validity, from that point of view, testifies that our knowledge conforms with reality in the immediate meaning of the term – thing‐ness. This notion of reality (shay’iyya) does not necessarily exclude Divinity, for God in Islamic sciences is often comprehended as The Thing, although different in every respect (except that of thing‐ness) from all other things. The concept of “thing” serves to introduce something into the current of intellectual discourse rather than to state anything definite about it; to be a thing – that is, fixed and established – means to enter the field of discussion. (shrink)

This paper analyses mass media exposure and its effect on family planning in Bangladesh using data from the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) 1993s place of residence, education, economic status, geographical region and number of living children appeared to be the most important variable determining mass media exposure to family planning. Multivariate analysis shows that both radio and TV exposure to family planning messages and ownership of a radio and TV have a significant effect on current use of family (...) planning methods. These factors remain significant determinants of contraceptive use, even after controlling socioeconomic and demographic factors. The study reveals that both socioeconomic development policies and family planning programmes with a special emphasis on mass media, especially radio, may have a significant effect on contraceptive use in Bangladesh. The principal policy challenge is to design communications strategies that will reach the less privileged, rural and illiterate people who are by far the majority in Bangladesh. (shrink)

Examines core issues common to Jewish and Islamic philosophy, such as freedom and determinism, the basis of ethical values, and the relationship between faith ...

This article reviews the new developments that have occurred in the past ten to fifteen years in the field of Islam and science: the emergence of a “new generation” of thinkers, Muslim scientists who accept modern science's fundamental methodology, theories, and results, and try to find ways to “harmonize” it with Islam; and the exponential increase in the popularity of the I‘jaz ‘Ilmiy “theory,” the “miraculous scientific content of the Qur'an” as well as the continuation of the traditionalist school among (...) a section of the Muslim intelligentsia. The author then focuses on the next phase of issues, that is the “challenges” that this “new generation” must address, including the integration of methodological naturalism and evolution in the Islamic worldview, and positions to adopt regarding divine action and miracles. The author also mentions “educational and social issues” where Islam and science interface, and concludes with “the way forward.”. (shrink)

Abstract When speaking about Islam and contemporary issues in science, Guessoum's Islam's Quantum Question shares many characterizations with Barbourian science and religion discourse. The focus is on theological responses to particular scientific theories. In this article I suggest an expansion of the discourse by looking at how science meets religion (as well as other local system of knowledge) in practice, in particular events such as natural disaster, when they are called upon as sources of meaning making. The encounter takes place (...) not only at the cognitive level, but may take the form of competition, collaboration, or negotiation over the authority to provide explanation. In practice the authority is supported not only by objective knowledge but involves many other factors, including politics. Thus, part of my proposal for expansion suggests the broadening of how we understand science and religion to include how assertions of authority are made in practice. (shrink)

China is moving from a centralized to a market economy to bring about efficiency in its economy and to form a business partnership with the West. With its reform adopting an open-door policy, there may be a need to assure its partners in the western world that appropriate steps would be taken to develop and foster a business culture with which the western countries and the Chinese businesses can work. The present study attempted to find whether there has been a (...) change in business ethical culture, accounting system and practice in the Chinese business between 1978 and the present, and the degree of similarity in the Chinese ethics and guidelines compared to Western ethics and guidelines. The result of the study has been analyzed from an institutional perspective to explore institutional change. The result showed that there is general growing support of Chinese management toward change in business ethical culture and practice. It was observed that there was not much similarity in the documents used for ethical guidance and control with those of the West. The findings of the paper are expected to be relevant to international investors and executives interested in investing or working in China. (shrink)

This paper examines parallels between contemporary Western and Islamic thought. It will propose that there is congruence between Western and Muslim political thought processes on issues of soft-foundationalism, negative theology, provisional truth claims and religious democracy, in order to offset hegemonic tendencies. This will be illustrated by a concise juxtaposition of the ideas of Davutoglu, Winkel, Sardar, Tariq Ali, Derrida, Foucault, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohammed Arkoun and others. In the social sciences, namely political science, the neutralization of ideology is also supported (...) in relation to the concern of ideological encroachments into the discipline by William E. Connolly, that echoes Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. This paper concludes that similar concerns on the relationship between power and knowledge in contemporary Western and Islamic political thought processes are beneficial to the study of Islam and its transformation as a social and political phenomenon. (shrink)

Marx and Engels's Communist Manifesto has become one of the world’s most influential political tracts since its original 1848 publication. Part of the Rethinking the Western Tradition series, this edition of the Manifesto features an extensive introduction by Jeffrey C. Isaac, and essays by Vladimir Tismaneanu, Steven Lukes, Saskia Sassen, and Stephen Eric Bronner, each well known for their writing on questions central to the Manifesto and the history of Marxism. These essays address the Manifesto's historical background, its impact on (...) the development of twentieth-century Communism, its strengths and weaknesses as a form of ethical critique, and its relevance in the post-1989, post-Cold War world. This edition also includes much ancillary material, including the many Prefaces published in the lifetimes of Marx and Engels, and Engels's "Principles of Communism.". (shrink)

Should Marxists support universal basic income (UBI), i.e., a regular cash income paid to all without a means test or work requirement? This paper considers one important argument that they should, namely that UBI would be instrumentally effective in helping to bring about communism. It argues that previous answers to this question have paid insufficient attention to a logically prior question: what is Marx’s account of communism? In reply, it distinguishes two different accounts: a left-libertarian version that associates (...) communism with the freedom to live and work how one wants, and a perfectionist version that associates communism with the overcoming of alienated labour and self-realisation in work. It argues that UBI would make steps towards the left-libertarian account but not the perfectionist account. Ultimately, then, the question “should Marxists support basic income?” is shown to partly depend on which account of communism Marxists want to bring about. (shrink)