This paper analyses the questions on the science of the soul and on the immortality of the soul in two commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima that subsist in the manuscripts of the teaching of philosophy in Coimbra in the sixteenth-century. The paper shows that the positions of the two commentators – Petrus Fonsecae (attr.) and Christophorus Gilli – are in total opposition, concerning either the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s De anima or the theories on the soul they (...) assume. Focused on unpublished and less studied sources this research brings to light some innovative aspects of the teaching of philosophy in Coimbra. We thus suggest that the manuscript sources of the period be reassessed and studied in comparison to the published works. (shrink)

본 논문은 심플리키오스의 저작으로 알려져 있는 『영혼론 주해』 (CAG XI)에나타난 프리스키아노스의 지성론에 대한 연구이다. 프리스키아노스는 아리스토텔레스의 『영혼론』을 풀이하면서 자신의 고유한 신플라톤주의적인 사상을 적극개진하고 있다. 본 논문은 『영혼론』에서 지성의 발전단계와 표상력 및 수동지성에관한 논의와 그에 대한 해석을 중심으로 프리스키아노스의 이론을 알아보고자한다. 따라서 본 논문은 아리스토텔레스의 『영혼론』의 신플라톤주의적인 해석과수용에 대한 한 가지 사례연구가 될 수 있다. 아리스토텔레스의 지성의 세 가지의 발전단계는 프리스키아노스의 인간 지성론에서의 신플라톤주의적인 삼중구조에 상응한다. 프리스키아노스에 따르면 인간의지성은 인간의 정신활동의 원인인 실체적 지성과 실체적 지성에서 유출된 발출지성으로 구성된다. 발출지성은 인식대상의 존재론적 (...) 지위에 따라 다시금 미완성 상태와완성 상태로 나뉜다. 인간의 지성은 미완성 상태에서 완성상태로 옮아가고, 그리고현실적으로 사유함으로써 실체적 지성과 동일하게 되는 것을 목표로 하는 발전과정으로 이해된다. 프리스키아노스는 인간의 표상력과 신체와의 결합을 감각기관에 대한 표상력의 전적인 종속으로 보지 않고, 감각기관을 규정하는 형상적 능력으로 이해한다. 또한 수동지성의 소멸은 신체의 소멸에 동반되는 소멸이 아니라, 유출된 자기 자신을 원인으로서의 자기 자신으로 되돌아가기 위해 지양한다는 의미에서의 소멸로 이해한다. 표상력과 수동지성에 대한 새로운 이해를 통해 프리스키아노스는 아리스토텔레스의 인간 지성의 발전단계를 신플라톤주의 체계 안에서의 지성의존재론적인 발전단계로 해석하는 데에 성공한다. (shrink)

Conrad Gessner was town physician and lecturer at the Zwinglian reformed lectorium in Zurich. His approach towards the world and mankind was centred on his preoccupation with the human soul, an object of study that had challenged classical writers such as Aristotle and Galen, and which remained as important in post-Reformation debate. Writing commentaries on Aristotles De Anima was part of early-modern natural philosophy education at university and formed the preparatory step for studying medicine. This article uses the (...) case study of Gessners commentary on De Anima to explore how Gessners readers prioritised De Animas information. Gessners intention was to provide the students of philosophy and medicine with the most current and comprehensive thinking. His readers responses raise questions about evolving discussions in natural philosophy and medicine that concerned the foundations of preventive healthcare on the one hand, and of anatomically specified pathological medicine on the other, and Gessners part in helping these develop. (shrink)

Born in 1126 to a family of Maliki legal scholars, Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes, enjoyed a long career in religious jurisprudence at Seville and Cordoba while at the same time advancing his philosophical studies of the works of Aristotle. This translation of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s _De Anima_ brings to English-language readers the complete text of this influential work of medieval philosophy. Richard C. Taylor provides rich notes on the Long Commentary and a generous introduction that discusses Averroes’ (...) most mature reflections on Aristotle’s teachings as well as Averroes' comprehensive philosophical views on soul and intellect. It is only in the Long Commentary that Averroes finally resolves to his satisfaction the much vexed issue of the nature of intellect, Taylor shows. (shrink)

According to Manuel de Góis the sensitive knowledge is the only source of the intellective knowledge, when the soul is united with the body. Among the external senses, vision plays the main role. Visual images are the principal source of the intellective knowledge. The pleasure of knowing is sourced also in the pleasure of seeing that expresses the beauty, the harmony and the variety of nature and points to the intelligibility and goodness of the Creation.

In 1974, Winfried Fauser published his edition of Radulphus Brito’s commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s De anima. This contribution continues his project by providing an edition of Brito’s commentary on the first book and the first third of the second book. An analysis of this part of the commentary shows that Brito developed some original views that had an impact on the fourteenth-century commentary tradition.

Aristotle's highly influential work on the soul, entitled De anima, formed part of the core curriculum of medieval universities and was discussed intensively. It covers a range of topics in philosophical psychology, such as the relationship between mind and body and the nature of abstract thought. However, there is a key difference in scope between the so-called "science of the soul," based on Aristotle, and modern philosophical psychology. This book starts from a basic premise accepted by all medieval commentators, (...) namely that the science of the soul studies not just human beings but all living beings. As such, its methodology and approach must also apply to plants and animals. The Science of the Soul discusses how philosophers from Thomas Aquinas to Pierre d'Ailly dealt with the difficult task of giving a unified account of life and traces the various stages in the transformation of the science of the soul between 1260 and 1360. The emerging picture is that of a gradual disruption of the unified approach to the soul, which will ultimately lead to the emergence of psychology as a separate discipline. (shrink)

This new translation of Thomas Aquinas’s most important study of Aristotle casts bright light on the thinking of both philosophers. Using a new text of Aquinas’s original Latin commentary, Robert Pasnau provides a precise translation that will enable students to undertake close philosophical readings. He includes an introduction and notes to set context and clarify difficult points as well as a translation of the medieval Latin version of Aristotle’s _De anima _ so that readers can refer to the text (...) Aquinas had at hand. In his _De anima commentary_, Aquinas offers the first and most original of his studies of Aristotle. His influential, cogent reading of Aristotle’s notoriously difficult text not only contributes to our understanding of the Greek philosopher but also expresses in full detail Aquinas’s own views on central philosophical topics. Writing at the height of his intellectual powers, Aquinas considers in full detail the nature of the soul, the mind-body problem, the role of the intellect, the character of sensation, and many other related issues. (shrink)

Discussions about singular cognition, and its linguistic counterpart, are by no means exclusive to contemporary philosophy. In fact, a strikingly similar discussion, to which several medieval texts bear witness, took place in the late Middle Ages. The aim of this article is to partly reconstruct this medieval discussion, as it took place in Parisian question-commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, so as to show the progression from the rejection of singular intellection in Siger of Brabant to the descriptivist positions (...) of John Duns Scotus and John of Jandun, and finally to the singularism of John Buridan. All these authors accept some kind of intellectual access to individuals. Therefore, the conundrum is not whether we have some kind of intellectual knowledge of individuals, but rather whether we can know them singularly. This article begins by presenting the crucial obstacle to singular intellection in Siger. Thereafter, the author shows that Jandun and Scotus depart in fundamental ways from Siger’s account, but that for them the intellection of individuals is of a general character. Finally, she proposes that Buridan is a genuine singularist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AS A COMMENTATOR ON DE ANIMA 3.5 JAMES T. H. MARTIN St. John's University Jamaica, New York DOES ST. THOMAS AQUINAS in his commentary on De Anima 3.5 provide an acceptable gloss on Aristotle 's cryptic remarks about active mind? That is, can one accept.that what Aquinas says about active mind is what Aristotle meant but for some reason did not say? Many modern commentators, among (...) them Franz Brentano, Marcel de Corte, Paul Siwek, and Francisco Peccorino, appear to think so and present an interpretation of active mind which agrees substantially with what Aquinas says in his Sententia Libri De Anima (Sent.).1 i Senteiitia Libri De Anima, opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita (Paris: Vrin, for the Leonine Commission, 1984). While he does criticize St. Thomas Aquinas for some statements which " seem to betray a certain lack of clarity concerning the nature of active intellect,'' Franz Brentano awards the first place among earlier commentators on Aristotle's doctrine of active mind to Aquinas : " Indeed, I am not sure whether I should not say that he correctly grasped Aristotle's entire doctrine" (The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of Active Intellect, ed. and trans. Rolf George [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], p. 155). De Corte holds that the originality of his study consists entirely in combining " all the technical means refined by modern criticism and which the thirteenth century did not have at its disposition " with the " Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intelligence," an interpretation with which de Corte agrees, and which he presents as a necessary correction of the errors of modern commentators, who are "more or less instilled with an unconscious Averroism which radically vitiates their power of understanding" (La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote [Paris: Vrin, 1934], p. 2). Siwek notes that "many of St. Thomas's explanations of Aristotelian psychology are altogether consonant with our own explanations,'' and warns his readers against undervaluing Aquinas's views (Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima Graece et Latine, editit, versione latina auxit, commentario illustravit [Rome: Desclee & C.i, 1965], p. 30). Peccorini com621 622 JAMES T. H. MARTIN Aristotle's text is concerned with two minds, "a mind which is such as matter by becoming all things, and another which is such as an active principle by making all things" (430a14-15). What are these minds, and what do they do? The central elements of Aquinas's exegesis of De Anima 3.5 consist in his answers to these questions. He holds that these two minds are " parts or potencies of the soul " (Sent. 3.4. 126). The role of passive mind, the "mind which is such as matter," is to apprehend the intelligible object (Sent. 3.4. 101-2), while that of active mind, the mind " which is such as an active principle by making all things," is to abstract the intelligibles (Sent. 3.4. 103-4), a role which he explains in this way: Active mind makes those things intelligible in act which previously were intelligible in potency. It does this by abstracting them from matter, for in this way they are intelligible in act, as has been said. Aristotle was led to posit an active mind to exclude the opinion of Plato, who held that the natures of sensible things are separated from matter and actually intelligible. Thus for Plato it was not necessary to posit an active mind. But because Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible, it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible. (Sent. 3.4 50-63) Active mind on Aquinas's reading makes the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible, and in this way these sensible things become objects of thought. If one accepts this role for active mind, one is forced to accept as well, I think, that active mind is part of the soul rather than something separate from the knowing human subject. Aquinas argues this point at length in his commentary on De Anima 3.5. If thinking, the action of the passive mind, is in fact... (shrink)

Averroës, the greatest Aristotelian of the Islamic philosophical tradition, composed some thirty-eight commentaries on the "First Teacher's" corpus, including three separate treatments of _De Anima_ : the works commonly referred to as the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries. The Middle Commentary—actually Averroës's last writing on the text-remains one of his most refined and politically discreet treatments of Aristotle, offering modern readers Averroës's final statement on the material intellect and conjunction as well as an accessible historical window on Aristotle's (...) work as it was interpreted and transmitted in the medieval period. (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previously supposed. He contends that Aristotle seeks a comprehensive understanding of the soul and its faculties. By closely tracing the unfolding of the many-layered argumentation and the way Aristotle fits his inquiry meticulously within his scheme of the sciences, Polansky answers (...) questions relating to the general definition of soul and the treatment of each of the soul's principal capacities: nutrition, sense perception, phantasia, intellect, and locomotion. The commentary sheds light on every section of the De Anima and the work as a unit. It offers a challenge to earlier and current interpretations of the relevance and meaning of Aristotle's highly influential treatise. (shrink)

This article focusses on a hitherto underappreciated distinction between immortality and everlastingness in a Greek commentary of disputed authorship on Aristotle's De anima Book 3. This article argues that this distinction calls into question the attribution of the commentary to Philoponus.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Long Commentary on theDe Anima of AristotleKara RichardsonAverroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba. Long Commentary on the De Animaof Aristotle. Translated with an introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor, with Thérèse-Anne Druart, sub-editor. Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2009. Pp. cix + 498. Cloth, $85.00.The Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) had two names in the medieval Latin West: 'the Commentator', and (...) 'Averroes'. The first of these underscores his importance as an interpreter of Aristotle ('the Philosopher'). The second was modified at least once by the adjective 'accursed' (in Duns Scotus's Ordinatio, bk. 4, d. 43, q. 2). 'That accursed Averroes' refers to the person who held that there exists only one human intellect. Averroes defends this view—typically called the unicity doctrine—in his Long Commentary on Aristotle'sDe Anima.Richard C. Taylor's translation of the Long Commentaryis based on Crawford's 1953 edition of the medieval Latin text (the original Arabic text is extant only in fragments). Brief portions of this commentary, which relate directly to the controversial and influential unicity doctrine, have previously been translated into English. Taylor's complete translation makes available in English for the first time the whole account of the soul and its powers, of which the unicity doctrine is a part. The translation will benefit graduate or advanced undergraduate students of the history of philosophy, as well as non-specialist scholars who want to understand what all the fuss was about. Taylor also provides extensive notes, which contain, among other things, Averroes' sources, extant Arabic fragments corresponding to the Latin, and explanations of technical terms and dense argumentation. For these reasons alone, Taylor's work must be considered a significant contribution to scholarship in the history of philosophy. There is also a lengthy introduction that presents the state of research on Averroes' psychology.Readers of Aristotle are familiar with his distinction, in De Anima3.5, between intellect in its passive role as a receiver of intelligibles and intellect in its active role as a maker of intelligibles. Averroes' unicity doctrine is remarkable as an interpretation of the passiveintellect, which is called the "material intellect" by analogy with prime matter (like prime matter, the material intellect can, in its own way, receive any form). To advocate the unicity of the activeintellect is not so remarkable. The latter view was standard in the Arabic tradition, which inherited it from Greek commentators on Aristotle. Those who affirm the unicity of the active intellect may hold the material intellect to be a power for receiving intelligibles [End Page 398]that is ultimately brain-based. Or they may hold the material intellect to be the supreme cognitive power of incorporeal human souls, which are multiplied in accordance with the number of human bodies. Averroes' defense of the unicity of the material intellect in the Long Commentaryinvolves a principled rejection of each of these alternative views, as well as a novel account of the role of intellect in human cognition. Taylor's introduction treats the development of Averroes' unicity doctrine and adjudicates a dispute about the dating of his Middleand Longcommentaries on the De Anima. Based in part on a comparison of portions of the Long Commentaryidentical to portions of the Middle Commentary, Taylor argues that the Long Commentaryis most likely the later work. These passages are identified in the notes to the translation.The introduction also provides a brief exegesis of the Long Commentary. This section explains the reasons behind the unicity doctrine, but misses the opportunity to highlight other points of interest in Averroes' psychology. Moreover, it leaves unaddressed certain questions likely to be pressing for newcomers to the text. For example, the unicity doctrine entails the denial that intellect is the seat of individual consciousness; so how would Averroes explain individual consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness play in his account of cognition?Finally, Taylor's introduction includes a useful survey of Averroes' sources and a brief account of the influence of the Long Commentary, especially in the Latin West, which puts to rest the... (shrink)

Averroës, the greatest Aristotelian of the Islamic philosophical tradition, composed some thirty-eight commentaries on the "First Teacher's" corpus, including three separate treatments of De Anima : the works commonly referred to as the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries. The Middle Commentary--actually Averroës's last writing on the text-remains one of his most refined and politically discreet treatments of Aristotle, offering modern readers Averroës's final statement on the material intellect and conjunction as well as an accessible historical window on (...) Aristotle's work as it was interpreted and transmitted in the medieval period. (shrink)

Iamblichus , successor to Plotinus and Porphyry, brought a new religiosity to Neoplatonism. This edition of the fragments of Iamblichus' major work on the soul, De Anima, is accompanied by the first English translation of the work and a commentary.

Nella prima parte dello studio l'A. esamina i tre tipi di commentari averroisti ad Aristotele: i cosiddetti «brevi», «medi» e «lunghi», evidenziandone le specifiche caratteristiche. Viene poi brevemente esaminato il rapporto fra il commento medio e quello lungo al De anima, sottolineando la dipendenza del primo dal secondo. La seconda parte dello studio tratta del commentario breve al De anima. L'A. sottolinea gli elementi di peculiarità di questo testo, in particolare l'interesse per l'aspetto fisiologico dell'anima e le (...) relazioni anima-corpo. Lo studio dei sensi, della sensibilità, del medium, dell'immaginazione, della ragione, dell'intelletto, dell'Intelletto Agente e il problema dell'intelletto materiale sono i principali argomenti su cui verte il commentario. (shrink)

The traditional ascription of the Neoplatonic commentary on the De Anima to Sim­plicius has prominently been disputed by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier, along with J.O. Urmson and Francesco Piccolomini, among others. Citing problems with terminology, diction, cross-references, doctrine, and other features, these authors have argued that the commentary cannot have been composed by Simplicius and that Priscian of Lydia is a favored alternative. In this paper, I present some new arguments for why the traditional attribution to Simplicius is, (...) in fact, the correct one. In particular, while addressing some of the terminological facts that have also been discussed by Christina Luna, Peter Lautner, Patricia Huby, and Philippe Vallat,1 among others, I offer a more secure basis for identifying the author of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius than has so far been proposed. In place of the disputes regarding terminology, which the debate has largely centered upon, I argue that certain unique and characteristic interpretive procedures, which one only finds in the undisputed Simplician works, allow us to identify the authorship of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius securely. Further, comparison of these methodological features with the extant works of Priscian rules out the possibility of his authorship of the commentary. I also provide some suggestions for resolving a few remaining issues of cross-reference between the De Anima commentary and the rest of Simplicius’s work. Finally, I conclude with some words on how that particular form of harmonization pursued by Simplicius’s contemporaries differs from both that of the De Anima commentary as well as his other works. (shrink)

On se propose d'établir dans cet article qu'Averroès a rédigé sonMoyen commentairesur le DeAnimaaprès sonÉpitoméet sonGrand commentaire. Une comparaison minutieuse des deux textes montre qu'il avait sous les yeux sonGrand commentairelorsqu'il composait sonMoyen commentaire. Ceci est de grande conséquence tant pour notre appréciation du développement de la doctrine de l'intellect chez Averroès que pour notre compréhension du mode de composition de ses commentaires.

In the _Sententia cum questionibus in libros De anima I-II Aristotelis _, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, the recovered Aristotelian understanding of the soul does not completely replace the old Neoplatonic frame. Indeed, the commentary holds the existence of self-knowledge from the very beginning of the existence of the soul, before the acquisition of species. The aim of this paper is to describe _Sententia_’s view on self-knowledge analysing it in the context of its eclectic psychology and epistemology. I will attempt (...) to demonstrate that, although the commentary is set in an explicit Neoplatonic framework, Petrus Hispanus seems to be quite uncomfortable within this framework and becomes increasingly committed to the Aristotelian doctrine and its vision of science. (shrink)

Aristotle's philosophy of mind has recently attracted renewed attention and respect from philosophers. This volume brings together outstanding new essays on De Anima by a distinguished international group of contributors including, in this paperback efdition, a new essay by Myles Burnyeat. The essays form a running commentary on the work, covering such topics as the relation between body and soul, sense-perception, imagination, memory, desire, and thought. the authors, writing with philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging scholarship, present the philosophical substance of (...) Aristotle's views to the modern reader. they locate their interpretations firmly within the context of Aristotle's thought as a whole. (shrink)

Christopher Shields presents a new translation and commentary of Aristotle's De Anima, a work of interest to philosophers at all levels, as well as psychologists and students interested in the nature of life and living systems. The volume provides a full translation of the complete work, together with a comprehensive commentary. While sensitive to philological and textual matters, the commentary addresses itself to the philosophical reader who wishes to understand and assess Aristotle's accounts of the soul and body; perception; (...) thinking; action; and the character of living systems. It aims to present controversial aspects of the text in a neutral, fair-minded manner, so that readers can come to be equipped to form their own judgments. (shrink)

Late medieval and early modern commentaries on De anima are Janus-faced texts. They look backwards, continuing ancient debates about well-known Aristotelian topics, and forwards, introducing new concepts and methodological principles that pave the way for non-Aristotelian theories of mind. The eleven essays in this volume, which cover the period between the late thirteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, elucidate this double orientation by presenting case studies of Aristotelians who engaged in discussions about classical issues and thereby opened the (...) door to new theories such as materialism and substance dualism. The papers do not aim at providing a survey of the commentary literature, but focus on specific texts. Some of them deal with often neglected sources. Thus, Olaf Pluta presents a detailed analysis of Nicholas of Amsterdam’s Questions on De anima and nicely shows that one can find a form of “soft materialism” in his philosophy of mind. For Nicholas rejected the thesis that the intellect is a separable, immaterial entity, claiming instead that intellectual states are always dependent on material ones without being reducible to them. Other papers provide a fresh re-interpretation of well-known texts. (shrink)

This book traces the historical roots of the cognitive sciences and examines pre-modern conceptualizations of the mind as presented and discussed in the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's De anima from 1200 until 1650. It explores medieval and Renai.

This contribution offers a detailed presentation of the commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s De anima by Walter of Wervia. Walter wrote his commentaries between 1445 and 1472 at the University of Paris. Both works bear witness to the influence of John Duns Scotus and Scotism on Parisian Masters of Arts.

Originally published in 1907, this book contains the ancient Greek text of Aristotle's De Anima, his treatise on the differing souls of living things. An English translation is provided on each facing page, and Hicks supplies a very detailed commentary on each line at the end of the book, as well as a summary of each section. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Greek philosophy and the history of classical scholarship.

Richard Rufus of Cornwall was educated as a philosopher at Paris where he was a master of arts.Thomas Eccleston, De adventu Fratrum minorum in Angliam c. 6 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951), p. 30. In 1238, after lecturing on Aristotle’s libri naturales, Rufus became a Franciscan and moved to Oxford to study theology, becoming the Franciscan master of theology in about 1256 and probably dying not long after 1259.A. Little, “The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century,” Archivum Franciscanum (...) Historicum 19 (1926): 842–45. Wills and Inventories, Surtees Society Publications 2 (London: J.B. Nichols, 1835), pp. 10–11. Cf. A. Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 143. (shrink)

R. W. Sharples provides a new edition, with introduction and commentary in English, of the Greek text. The Mantissa is a collection of short discussions, transmitted as a supplement to the treatise On the Soul by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 AD).The collection includes discussion of a range of topics, among them the nature of soul and intellect, theories of how seeing takes place, issues in ethics, and the nature of fate. The text is based upon a new (...) collation of the principal manuscript, the ninth century Venetus Marcianus graecus 258, and the apparatus corrects Bruns' misreportings of the principal manuscript and of the others that he used. Account has also been taken of the medieval Arabic and Latin versions of some of the sections which circulated independently, notably On Intellect which had a substantial influence on medieval philosophy. The introduction is chiefly concerned with the manuscripts and the relation between them. The commentary is based on the notes to the editor's English translation of the work (London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); however, the commentary also takes into account more recent work on the collection by various scholars. (shrink)

Là où on peut dater les commentaires d'Averroès sur Aristote, le Commentaire Moyen d'une œuvre donnée peut être considéré comme antérieur au Commentaire Long. En accompagnement de sa belle édition du Commentaire Moyen d'Averroès sur leDe anima, A. Ivry a soutenu que dans ce cas-ci les choses sont inversées et que le Commentaire Moyen duDe animaest “une version abrégée et révisée” du Commentaire Long de la même œuvre. Ivry développe sa thèse avec le plus de détails dansArabic Sciences and (...) Philosophy, 5. Là, il soutient que deux passages dans le Commentaire Moyen duDe animase rapportent nominalement au Commentaire Long, qu'un troisième passage fait allusion au Commentaire Long, et que dans d'autres passages le Commentaire Moyen et le Commentaire Long utilisent une phraséologie semblable et qu'on peut considérer que le premier a été la version abrégée du second. Le présent article répond à cette thèse de la manière suivante: les deux passages dans le Commentaire Moyen qui semblent selon d'lvry se rapporter explicitement au Commentaire Long peuvent vraisemblablement être compris comme des references a l'intérieur du Commentaire Moyen lui-même. Le passage qu'il comprend comme faisant allusion au Commentaire Long ne fait pas réellement allusion à cette œuvre, mais constitue une référence non-equivoque à une section ultérieure du Commentaire Moyen. II n'y a rien qui justifie le fait de regarder les passages dans le Commentaire Moyen cités par Ivry et utilisent une phraséologie semblable à celle du Commentaire Long comme des emprunts faits à ce dernier. Au cours de son argumentation, Ivry mentionne la position d'Averroes sur la nature de l'intellect materiel de l'homme, question qui a donne a Averroes le plus de peine dans ses commentaires sur le De anima d'Aristote et qui, depuis lors, a le plus intrigue ceux qui etudient Averroes. Le présent article souligne que sur le sujet de l'intellect materiel de l'homme, ni le Commentaire Moyen, ni le Commentaire Long sur leDe animan'empruntent I'un a l'autre, car les conceptions de l'intellect matériel qu'ils embrassent sont différentes et incompatibles. (shrink)

Richard Rufus of Cornwall was educated as a philosopher at Paris where he was a master of arts. 1 In 1238, after lecturing on Aristotle’s librinaturales, Rufus became a Franciscan and moved to Oxford to study theology, becoming the Franciscan master of theology in about 1256 and probably dying not long after 1259. 2.

In this paper I will show some contributions from Averroes around some issues related to psychology and medicine. My intention is to establish some relations between the commentaries on De anima and the medical treatises. The itinerary is the following: a) I will show that, like Aristotle, Averroes conceives the soul as a set of biological capacities; b) De anima is a biological treatise, so there we can find some considerations that must be understood from a medical (...) point of view, specially, from the Arabic contributions on Anatomy. It is necessary, then, to point out the importance of the nerves and the brain to understand the narrow relation between the De anima and the Book of Medicine. We will find that Averroes does not understand the soul as a 'spiritual principle' but like something generated that makes possible several biological functions, from the vegetative and the sensitive to the intellectual ones. So, Averroes denies the Neoplatonic conception of the soul as something separated from the body. Averroes explains that the soul is the concretion of the biological process denominated "life". KEY WORDS – Averroes. Aristotle. De anima. Neoplatonism. Biology. Life. (shrink)

Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

This edition of Zerah yah's Hebrew translation of "De Anima," Aristotle's monograph on the soul, is of major importance for the history of transmission of Aristotle's text in the Middle Ages. Zerah yah's translation is based on the same lost Arabic translation as Averroes' long commentary, and the solution which it provides for the question of the authorship of this lost Arabic translation thus also holds good for Averroes' text.

This is a review of a new edition with translation of the final question commentary of John Buridan on Aristotle's "De anima", published by Springer in May 2023.

This is the overdue replacement of D. W. Hamlyn’s somewhat dismissive 1968 translation and commentary of the first two books of Aristotle’s De Anima. Hamlyn hardly did justice to this foundational treatise of Aristotle’s science of living beings: not only did he mistake it for a treatise on “the” philosophy of mind, he also did not bother to translate the first book apart from two snippets. Shields’s replacement is entirely free from such vices. It provides a new translation and (...) commentary on the whole argument of De Anima, and offers a much more philosophically satisfying interpretation... (shrink)