This article addresses three main questions: What causes cognitive overload in the workplace? What analytical framework should be used to understand how agents interact with their work environments? How can environments be restructured to improve the cognitive workflow of agents? Four primary causes of overload are identified: too much tasking and interruption, and inadequate workplace infrastructure to help reduce the need for planning, monitoring, reminding, reclassifying information, etc… The first step in reducing the cognitive impact (...) of these causes is to enrich classical frameworks for understanding work environments, such as Newell and Simon’s notion of a task environment, by recognizing that our actual workplace is a superposition of many specific environments – activity spaces – which we slip between. Each has its own cost structure arising from the tools and resources available, including the cognitive strategies and interpretational frameworks of individual agents. These cognitive factors are significant, affecting how easy or difficult it is to perform an action, such as finding a specific paper in a “mess” desk. A few simple examples show how work environments can be redesigned and how restructuring can alter the cost structure of activity spaces. (shrink)

Individuals’ unverified information sharing on social media, namely, sharing information without verification, is a major cause of the widespread misinformation amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The association between perceived information overload and unverified information sharing has been well documented in the cognitive overload approach. However, little is known about the underlying mechanism of this process. This study aims to explore the mediating role of anxiety and the moderating role of perceived herd between perceived information overload and unverified (...) information sharing on WeChat. Anxiety demonstrates people’s emotional response to the pandemic, whereas perceived herd describes a willingness to share certain information if it has been shared by many. The results of an online survey in China showed that perceived information overload was positively associated with unverified information sharing. In addition, this relationship was partially mediated by anxiety. Moreover, perceived herd positively moderated the link between anxiety and unverified information sharing, such that the indirect effect of perceived information overload on unverified information sharing via anxiety was significant in conditions where the level of perceived herd was high, whereas the indirect effect was not significant in conditions where the level of perceived herd was low. The moderated mediation model extends the cognitive overload approach and indicates that unverified information sharing is not only an individual strategy to cope with information overload but also a herding behavior to manage anxiety. Practical implications for curbing people’s tendencies toward unverified information sharing on social media are discussed. (shrink)

As the pace of technological change accelerates, we are increasingly experiencing a state of information overload. Statistics show that we are interrupted every three minutes during the course of the work day. Multitasking between email, cell-phone, text messages, and four or five websites while listening to an iPod forces the brain to process more and more informaton at greater and greater speeds. And yet the human brain has hardly changed in the last 40,000 years. Are all these high-tech advances (...) overtaxing our Stone Age brains or is the constant flood of information good for us, giving our brains the daily exercise they seem to crave? In The Overflowing Brain, cognitive scientist Torkel Klingberg takes us on a journey into the limits and possibilities of the brain. He suggests that we should acknowledge and embrace our desire for information and mental challenges, but try to find a balance between demand and capacity. Klingberg explores the cognitive demands, or "complexity," of everyday life and how the brain tries to meet them. He identifies different types of attention, such as stimulus-driven and controlled attention, but focuses chiefly on "working memory," our capacity to keep information in mind for short periods of time. Dr Klingberg asserts that working memory capacity, long thought to be static and hardwired in the brain, can be improved by training, and that the increasing demands on working memory may actually have a constructive effect: as demands on the human brain increase, so does its capacity. The book ends with a discussion of the future of brain development and how we can best handle information overload in our everyday lives. Klingberg suggests how we might find a balance between demand and capacity and move from feeling overwhelmed to deeply engaged. (shrink)

Features and relevant services of online social media have been attracting users during the COVID-19 pandemic. Previous studies have shown that college students tend to use social media more frequently than other groups. However, in being affected by social media overload, the social media use behaviors of many college students have been out of their control in terms of their capabilities or cognition. Based on the stressor–strain–outcome model and the theory of compensatory internet use, we developed a research model (...) to study the causes of social media overload and its impact on college students’ academic performance during the COVID-19 pandemic. A total of 441 valid responses from college students through questionnaires in China are collected via purposive sampling and used in the data analysis. This study conducts PLS-SEM to analyze collected data, finding that boredom proneness is associated with overload, which has a bearing on social media overload and the reduction in final performance. Through illustrating the psychological and behavioral conditions that hinder the academic performance of students, this study provides deeper insights into students’ uncontrollable use of social media. Moreover, with respect to the identified antecedents, this study aims to find solutions to mitigate the impact of social media overload resulting from boredom proneness on the academic performance of college students. (shrink)

The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of information, along with the ability to share that information with others. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the enhancement potential of the Internet. We argue that unconditional access to information does not lead to cognitive enhancement. The Internet is not a simple, uniform technology, either in its composition, or in its use. (...) We will look into why the Internet as an informational resource currently fails to enhance cognition. We analyze some of the phenomena that emerge from vast, continual fluxes of information–information overload, misinformation and persuasive design—and show how they could negatively impact users’ cognition. Methods for mitigating these negative impacts are then advanced: individual empowerment, better collaborative systems for sorting and categorizing information, and the use of artificial intelligence assistants that could guide users through the informational space of today’s Internet. (shrink)

Current research on choice overload has been mainly conducted with choice options not associated with specific brands. This study investigates whether the presence of brand names in the choice set affects the occurrence of choice overload. Across four studies, we find that when choosing among an overabundance of alternatives, participants express more positive feelings (i.e., higher satisfaction/confidence, lower regret and difficulty) when all the options of the choice set are associated with familiar brands, rather than unfamiliar brands or (...) no brand at all. We also find that choice overload only appears in the absence of brand names, but disappears when all options contain brand names—either familiar or unfamiliar. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Contemporary Complex Cinema. Complex conditions: the resurgence of narrative complexity ; Complex cinema as brain-candy for the empowered viewer ; Narrative taxonomies: simple, complex, puzzle plots -- Cognitive Approach to Contemporary Complex Cinema. Why an (embodied-)cognitive approach? ; Various forms of complexity and their effects on sense making ; Problematizing narrative linearity ; Complicating narrative structures and ontologies ; Under-stimulation and cognitive overload ; Contradictions and unreliabilities ; A cognitive approach to classifying complexity ; Deceptive (...) unreliability and the twist film ; Disorienting but solvable puzzle films ; Impossible puzzle films -- Narrative Complexity and Dissonant Cognitions. The concept of cognitive dissonance ; Cognitions in dissonance: from social psychology to narrative engagement ; Types of dissonance in narrative comprehension ; Narrative incongruities ; Narrative impossibilities ; Cognitive access to impossible storyworlds: immersed and reflected operations ; 'Impossibilities' and embodied cognition ; Disrupting viewers' reliance on image schemas by perceptual impossibility ; Disrupting viewers' reliance on image schemas by formal impossibility -- Taming Dissonance: Cognitive Operations and Interpretive Strategies. Cognitive dissonance versus narrative coherence ; Reducing dissonance: interpretation and naturalization ; Foregrounding ; Narrating agency and authorship ; Artefact emotions and metareflexive appreciation ; Interpretation as dissonance reduction ; Coping with dissonance: frame-switches and poetic and aesthetic readings ; Frame-switching as hermeneutic play in impossible puzzle films ; Switching between narrative and symbolical readings: Enemy and Mulholland Drive ; Cognitive hesitation and the fantastic -- Impossible Puzzle Films: Between Art-Cinema and (Post-) Classical Narration. From art-cinema to puzzle films ; Art-cinema as a narrative mode ; Dissonance in modernist art-cinema ; Art-cinema as a cognitive reception frame ; Narrative complexity and meaning-making in art-cinema ; Impossible puzzle films and (post-)classical narration ; High degree of tellability ; Identification with goal-oriented characters ; Strong reliance on classical genre elements ; Adherence to classical narrative cohesion devices ; Inclusion of quasi-rational frames of naturalization -- Wallowing in Dissonance: The Attractiveness of Impossible Puzzles. Hermeneutic play and interpretive multiplicity ; Orientation, navigation, mapping ; Game logic and the fascination in failure ; Effort justification ; Diegetization of decoupling ; Fascination in infinity ; Destabilized ontological certainty ; Eudaimonic motivations and intrinsic needs. (shrink)

Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed the truth tellers’ performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation of the IFC on performance. During stimulation, (...) participants truthfully or deceptively indicated whether each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load and tDCS than lying. (shrink)

A search for the terms ‘acceptability judgment tasks’ & ‘language’ and ‘grammaticality judgment tasks’ & ‘language’ produces results which report findings that are based on the exact same elicitation technique. Although certain scholars have argued that acceptability and grammaticality are two separable notions that refer to different concepts, there are contexts in which the two terms are used interchangeably. The present work shows that these two notions and their scales do not coincide: there are sentences that are acceptable, even though (...) they are ungrammatical, and sentences that are unacceptable, despite being grammatical. First we adduce a number of examples for both cases, including grammatical illusions, violations of Identity Avoidance, and sentences that involve a level of processing complexity that overloads the cognitive parser and tricks it into (un)acceptability. We then discuss whether the acceptability of grammatically ill-formed sentences entails that we actually assign a meaning to them. Last, it is shown that there are n ways of unacceptability, and two ways of ungrammaticality, in the absolute and the relative sense. Since the use of the terms ‘acceptable’ and ‘grammatical’ is often found in experiments that constitute the core of the evidential base of linguistics, disentangling their various uses is likely to aid the field reach a better level of terminological clarity. (shrink)

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at (...) work. In this paper. we show how this argument by analogy is flowed with respect to the case of second-order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states. (shrink)

A large body of research in cognitive science differentiates human reasoning into two types: fast, intuitive, and emotional “System 1” thinking, and slower, more reflective “System 2” reasoning. According to this research, human reasoning is by default fast and intuitive, but that means that it is prone to error and biases that cloud our judgments and decision making. To improve the quality of reasoning, critical thinking education should develop strategies to slow it down and to become more reflective. The (...) goal of such education should be to enable and motivate students to identify weaknesses, gaps, biases, and limiting perspectives in their own reasoning and to correct them. This contribution discusses how this goal could be achieved with regard to reasoning that involves the construction of arguments; or more precisely: how computer-supported argument visualization tools could be designed that support reflection on the quality of arguments and their improvement. Three types of CSAV approaches are distinguished that focus on reflection and self-correcting reasoning. The first one is to trigger reflection by confronting the user with specific questions that direct attention to critical points. The second approach uses templates that, on the one hand, provide a particular structure to reason about an issue by means of arguments and, on the other, include prompts to enter specific items. And a third approach is realized in specifically designed user guidance that attempts to trigger reflection and self-correction. These types of approaches are currently realized only in very few CSAV tools. In order to inform the future development of what I call reflection tools, this article discusses the potential and limitations of these types and tools with regard to five explanations of the observation that students hardly ever engage in substantial revisions of what they wrote: a lack of strategies how to do it; cognitive overload; certain epistemic beliefs; myside bias; and over-confidence in the quality of one’s own reasoning. The question is: To what degree can each of the CSAV approaches and tools address these five potential obstacles to reflection and self-correction? (shrink)

In this paper we present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that it does not posit hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and it does not posit the operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. We nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, (...) pace Cappelen and Lepore, vis-à-vis a given situation, the latter being a fragment of a possible world or a partial world. In so doing we shall show how Cappelen and Lepore damage the insight of semantic minimalism insofar as they insist that the semantic content should be evaluated with respect to a whole possible world. This move fails to capture the powerful contextualist intuition that it does not make much sense to evaluate the content of, say, Naomi is rich, or Jon is tall, with respect to, for instance, the actual world. (shrink)

This study compares cognitive and emotional responses to 360-degree vs. static (2D) videos in terms of visual attention, brand recognition, engagement of the prefrontal cortex, and emotions. Hypotheses are proposed based on the interactivity literature, cognitive overload, advertising response model and motivation, opportunity, and ability theoretical frameworks, and tested using neurophysiological tools: electroencephalography, eye-tracking, electrodermal activity, and facial coding. The results revealed that gaze view depends on ad content, visual attention paid being lower in 360-degree FMCG ads (...) than in 2D ads. Brand logo recognition is lower in 360-degree ads than in 2D video ads. Overall, 360-degree ads for durable products increase positive emotions, which carries the risk of non-exposure to some of the ad content. In testing four ads for durable goods and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) this research explains the mechanism through which 360-degree video ads outperform standard versions. (shrink)

Although multimodal input has the potential to lead to more sound learning outcomes, it carries the risk of causing cognitive overload, making it difficult to determine the exact effects of multimodal input on the second language phrase learning. This study tests the efficacy of multimodal input on L2 phrase learning. It adopts a mixed-method approach by utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data. The experimental design is a 2 × 3 mixed model, with a group [the experimental group and (...) the control group ] as the between-subject factor and time as the within-subject factor. A total of 66 participants were divided into two groups. All materials incorporated three aspects of phrase knowledge, but the materials of the CG were unimodal in that they were offered only on paper, and of the EG were multimodal in that they included pictures, audio recordings, and video clips. After the treatment, a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview were given to the EG learners to explore their perceptions of using multimodal materials to learn L2 phrases. The results indicate that both groups had significant gains in learning phrases, but students with the multimodal input achieved significantly better results than those with the unimodal input. Moreover, the EG students had a generally positive attitude toward the use of multimodal resources. This study validates the efficacy of multimodal input on the acquisition of English phrases and shows that cognitive overload was avoided by sequencing the information. (shrink)

Current guidelines and regulatory frameworks create a dilemma that threatens the effectiveness of much needed communication between patients and medical providers: How can patients be presented with detailed facts without creating cognitive “overload”? We explain how this is a false dichotomy and illustrate, using three examples, how fuzzy-trace theory offers a third way of informing patients.

The lostness measure, an implicit and unobtrusive measure originally designed for assessing the usability of hypertext systems, could be useful in Virtual Reality (VR) games where players need to find information to complete a task. VR locomotion systems with node-based movement mimic actions for exploration and browsing found in hypertext systems. For that reason, hypertext usability measures, such as “lostness” can be used to identify how disoriented a player is when completing tasks in an educational game by examining steps made (...) by the player. An evaluation of two different lostness measures, global and local lostness, based on two different types of tasks, is described in a VR educational game using 13 college students between 14 and 18 years old in a first study and extended using 12 extra participants in a second study. Multiple Linear Regression analyses showed, in both studies, that local lostness, and not global lostness, had a significant effect on a post-game knowledge test. Therefore, we argued that local lostness was able to predict how well-participants would perform on a post-game knowledge test indicating how well they learned from the game. In-game experience aspects (engagement, cognitive interest, and presence) were also evaluated and, interestingly, it was also found that participants learned less when they felt more present in the game. We believe these two measures relate to cognitive overload, which is known to have an adverse effect on learning. Further research should investigate the lostness measure for use in an online adaptive game system and design the game system in such a way that the risk of cognitive overload is minimized when learning, resulting in higher retention of information. (shrink)

With the rapid development of information technology and data science, as well as the innovative concept of “Internet+” education, personalized e-learning has received widespread attention in school education and family education. The development of education informatization has led to a rapid increase in the number of online learning users and an explosion in the number of learning resources, which makes learners face the dilemma of “information overload” and “learning lost” in the learning process. In the personalized learning resource recommendation (...) system, the most critical thing is the construction of the learner model. Currently, most learner models generally have a lack of scientific focus that they have a single method of obtaining dimensions, feature attributes, and low computational complexity. These problems may lead to disagreement between the learner’s learning ability and the difficulty of the recommended learning resources and may lead to the cognitive overload or disorientation of learners in the learning process. The purpose of this paper is to construct a learner model to support the above problems and to strongly support individual learning resources recommendation by learning the resource model which effectively reduces the problem of cold start and sparsity in the recommended process. In this paper, we analyze the behavioral data of learners in the learning process and extract three features of learner’s cognitive ability, knowledge level, and preference for learning of learner model analysis. Among them, the preference model of the learner is constructed using the ontology, and the semantic relation between the knowledge is better understood, and the interest of the student learning is discovered. (shrink)

This article reviews recent cognitive and neurological approaches to the study of attention. It argues that such research is based on the notion that attention has a positive cognitive function selecting, like a sieve or a filter, elements from the background and foreground, to then be processed by the brain and made conscious when required. These approaches fail to explain cognitive overload and recent findings demonstrating that recognition and understanding—sensory, visual and semantic—also occur prior to attention. (...) Merleau-Ponty and Freud offer a different model: a negative distractive attention. Negative distractive attention serves as a threshold for stimuli excluded by neurological processes regulating overload and ensuring that consciousness can concentrate on the singularity of its objects. Such approach to attention explains how one can drive and talk. It is not a positive multi-tasking model but a negative distractive one. (shrink)

Parks and town squares can play an important role by offering spaces for cognitive restorativeness in urban contexts. Therefore, it is important that these spaces be designed in a way that encourages restorativeness. Indeed, their perceived quality should motivate users to stay and take advantage of them. Yet, it is not clear whether perceptions as to the quality of these spaces is relevant in promoting restorativeness. Thus, the aim of this study is to analyze whether elements of environmental quality (...) perceived by users of public spaces favor restorativeness both in parks and squares. Environmental and social aspects are taken into consideration, since restorative experiences involve cognitive and physiological recovery, as well as a component of interaction with the environment. In this research, 519 users of 32 urban public spaces—town squares and parks—on the island of Tenerife participated. Participants evaluated these spaces using four dimensions that focused on spaces’ perceived environmental quality: design of spaces, care of spaces, social interaction, and presence of sensorial elements. Additionally, we evaluated the perceived restorativeness of each space. The results showed that the design of spaces, care of the spaces, social interaction, and presence of sensorial elements explain the variance in perceived restorativeness, although with different weights for parks and squares. We found that perceived quality of a space is a key predictor of its restorativeness. This means that maintaining parks and town squares is a relevant task given that they contribute to reducing cognitive overload, increasing sustainability, and facilitating health care in urban settings. (shrink)

Web-based learning resources provide learners with hyperspace where they can navigate in a self-directed way to learn the contents included in the Web pages. The navigation involves making a sequence of the pages visited, which is called navigation path. However, learners often fail in making the navigation path due to a cognitive overload, which is caused by diverse cognitive efforts at comprehending the contents in Web pages, and monitoring the navigation process such as planning and reflection of (...) navigation path. In the self-directed learning, in particular, it is difficult for learners to maintain the navigation monitoring. Focusing on navigation planning, this paper addresses the issue of how to facilitate learners' navigation monitoring to promote their learning in hyperspace provided by Web-based learning resources. Our approach to this issue is to provide learners with a space, in which they can see through the learning resources to plan a navigation path, apart from hyperspace. In this paper, we also demonstrate an assistant system for the navigation planning, which is composed of hyperspace map, page previewer, and path previewer. These facilities give learners an overview of Web pages and navigation path to help them make a navigation path plan without visiting Web pages in hyperspace. This paper also describes a case study with the assistant system. The results indicate that the system facilitates navigation particularly in a more complicated hyperspace. (shrink)

Psychology of communication must do everything is possible to promote an adequate perception of risk. This is particularly true when it comes to transmitting statistical and probabilistic data to an audience of non-experts, inevitably conditioning their perception of risk. Data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language, only if they are adequately transmitted. And we find these phenomena in the difficulty in representing the trend of, for instance, Covid-19 (...) contagion, based on probability of contagion and mortality. In general, then, when we communicate scientific terms or data we should re-introduce the psychological aspects which characterize communication. The nudging strategies can be considered as a prototype of approach to overcome risky behaviours, which takes into account the cognitive characteristics of the human system. This strategy acts on different levels, using implicit factors, bypassing defensive attitudes and exploiting adaptive inferential processes, without overloading the cognitive system. But from a communicative point of view, nudge, as well as any other type of intervention, is not a general ‘recipe. The acceptance of the suggestion, the effectiveness of the nudging implies the congruity with the system that receives it: the “way of reasoning”, and its implicit layer has to be taken into account. The right combination of the source, the adopted message and the decisional setting could improve the efficacy of the public policies. (shrink)

Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/- Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how (...) our beliefs are often distorted by prejudice and self-interest, and to improve the foundations of human knowledge. Ballantyne seeks to recover and modernize this classical tradition by vigorously defending an interdisciplinary approach to epistemology, blending philosophical theorizing with insights from the social and cognitive sciences. -/- Many of us need tools to help us think more circumspectly about our controversial views. Ballantyne develops a method for distinguishing between our reasonable and unreasonable opinions, in light of evidence about bias, information overload, and rival experts. This method guides us to greater intellectual openness--in the spirit of skeptics from Socrates to Montaigne to Bertrand Russell--making us more inclined to admit that sometimes we don't have the right answers. With vibrant prose and fascinating examples from science and history, Ballantyne shows how epistemology can help us know our limits. (shrink)

Fatigue and increased fatigability occur as symptoms in almost every medical and psychiatric condition, as well as being common reactions to non pathological physical and psychological strain and stress. We will attempt to clarify the semantics of the terms "fatigue" and "fatigability", and we will put forward the hypothesis that the special kind of mental fatigability which characterises many cases of mild to moderate dysfunction of the brain is functional in a sense that it represents an overload of pathological (...) information (from the injured area) to higher cognitive mechanisms which may themselves be anatomically and physiologically intact. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Brian Boyd responds:In responding to my critical discussion, Lisa Zunshine restates the argument of Why We Read Fiction at some length but replies to none of my specific criticisms. These criticisms are all based on the evidence of the texts that she offers as case studies, especially Mrs Dalloway and Lolita. Although I—and the textual evidence—contradict her claims, she provides no answers to the criticisms.Let me respond to two (...) restatements. First: "Fictional narratives endlessly experiment with rather than automatically execute our evolved cognitive adaptations" (p. 190). This is often, but almost tautologically, true in the case of experimental fiction, as the work of Richardson, Woolf, and Nabokov (to cite Zunshine's key examples) was in their time. It is not necessarily true in the sense Zunshine especially means it—that authors give us a demanding cognitive workout of our capacity for Theory of Mind by incorporating multiple embedding, A's thoughts of B's thoughts of C's thoughts of D's thoughts of E—even in the case of fictional experimenters like Defoe, Tolstoy, or Joyce, and it is not true of the vast bulk of fiction, from folk tale or jokes to soap operas or pulp [End Page 196] novels, and it cannot therefore be an explanation for "why we read fiction," though it may explain why some of us read some fiction. And to identify overloaded embedding when it is not present, as Zunshine does in discussing Mrs Dalloway, constitutes a simple misreading.Second: "Our Theory of Mind makes literature as we know it possible" (p. 191). Granted, without Theory of Mind we would not have fiction. But nor would we have fiction without many other features of human nature: without sociality, episodic memory, language, childhood pretend play, empathy, the brain's inhibitory mechanisms, folk physics, our mental databases for individuals, and much, much more. An evolutionary and cognitive understanding of fiction needs to take into account many aspects of our capacity for understanding events and stories, not just one.Apart from one three-word phrase, Zunshine's sole quotation from my review is this: "To what extent has Zunshine benefited from the methodology, rather than results, of science?" (I refer to "the results of science" here because I note that although, for instance, she relies most heavily on Simon Baron-Cohen among Theory of Mind researchers, while ignoring major figures in the field like Janet Astington or Josef Perner, she does not even cite the book or any of the more than twenty papers of which Baron-Cohen has been primary author since his 1995 Mindblindness.) Her quotation from my review continues: "Alas, she appears to have learned less than one would have hoped.... Her formulations are often weak and indecisive, hedgings, rather than strong testable hypotheses. Rather than apply scientific stringency to her literary analysis, she seems more interested in exploiting than testing what she can find." She confesses herself puzzled by this charge. Let me explain one simple point.Science's core methodological principle is that claims should be subjected to the test of evidence, and accepted or rejected on the basis of their compatibility with the relevant evidence. Leo Spitzer long ago pointed out that good reading follows scientific method: we read, we make hypotheses about the text, and we either confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses according to what we find in the text, and search for ampler hypotheses when previous ones have been discredited.1 Literary scholarship has long been vitiated by a far flabbier methodology, by the naïve assumption that evidence for a proposition suffices: "I see a and b in the text, therefore my claim C is a valid interpretation." But if reading or interpretation C is incompatible with counter-evidence d and e in the text, it is a falsified hypothesis and needs to yield to a better [End Page 197] reading, an interpretation that can incorporate this counter-evidence. I showed that Zunshine's claims about her prime examples were not compatible with evidence in the texts. She does not challenge the textual counter-evidence I provide, but just ignores it. That is where literary criticism most urgently needs to learn from scientific... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fiction and Theory of MindBrian BoydWhy We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel, by Lisa Zunshine; 198 pp. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006. $59.95Lisa Zunshine's Why We Read Fiction aims "to put the cognitive-evolutionary concept of the Theory of Mind on the map of contemporary literary studies" (p. 84). Any literary critic who has stumbled upon this active research program in recent clinical, cognitive, (...) comparative, developmental and evolutionary psychology will have realized that Theory of Mind (ToM)—our intuitive systems for understanding the minds of others—must be relevant to literature. As someone who has long deplored its neglect in literary studies (often on the very pages of this journal) I regret to report that as a cartographer of this new terrain Zunshine has an unsteady hand.As its title suggests, her book makes a large claim: that we read fiction in order to give ourselves a cognitive workout, to exercise our capacity for ToM. We normally understand readily four levels of embedded intentionality (you doubt that Brian accepts that Lisa knows what Robin says), but we find it rapidly more difficult to handle further levels. Fiction often pushes "our ability to process embedded intentionalities beyond our cognitive zone of comfort" (p. 130). Why We Read Fiction also makes a second, implicit but no less central, claim: that analyzing fiction in terms of ToM offers criticism greater explanatory power, precision, and clarity. [End Page 590]Zunshine's explicit claim seems unlikely. All peoples tell and attend to fictions, but as Zunshine sometimes concedes not all these fictions push the boundaries of ToM. Many individuals and groups, perhaps most, especially enjoy fiction that does not involve high-level ToM, such as myth, fairy tale, and action adventure stories from epics to Westerns or martial arts movies. Children already engage in pretend play and enjoy stories compulsively long before they attain a uniquely human, yet still imperfectly developed, level of ToM in their fifth year. How can fiction be explained in terms of setting stiff challenges to our capacity for ToM, when so many children and adults enjoy fiction that makes no exceptional demands?Fiction can experiment with ToM, with, for instance, multiple levels of embedded intentionality. Barth's virtuoso exercise "Menelaiad" (1968) involves seven degrees of embedding, but the story feels, and is meant to feel, comically overloaded. Less flamboyant but more searching experiment with our capacity to comprehend minds, like Tolstoy's in Anna Karenina, may involve at its most original only one, two or three levels of intentionality: Stiva's thoughts alone, brilliantly evoked in the opening chapter, or his thoughts about Dolly's feelings or his own thoughts, or his thoughts about Dolly's thoughts about his feelings.Zunshine acknowledges that fiction places varied emphases on ToM, but dwells only on examples that support her case, and ignores many kinds of fiction that do not. More damaging still, the examples she does draw on fail to provide the support she thinks they do, thus undermining both her first claim, that fiction provides an intense ToM workout, and her second, that analyzing fiction through ToM sharpens and strengthens criticism. Interpreting fiction with an explicit awareness of ToM can have this effect, but Zunshine inadvertently reveals dangers rather than opportunities.Since texts are the hard evidence in literary study, we need to see in detail how Zunshine handles them. Her first display example comes from Woolf's Mrs Dalloway. She cites:And Miss Brush [Lady Bruton's secretary] went out, came back; laid papers on the table; and Hugh produced his fountain pen; his silver fountain pen, which had done twenty years' service, he said, unscrewing the cap. It was still in perfect order; he had shown it to the makers; there was no reason, they said, why it should ever wear out; which was somehow to Hugh's credit, and to the credit of the sentiments which his pen expressed (so Richard Dalloway felt) as Hugh began carefully writing capital letters with rings [End Page 591] around them in the margin, and thus marvelously reduced Lady Bruton's tangles to sense, to grammar such as the editor of the Times... (shrink)

Allen (2001) proposed the “Getting Things Done” (GTD) method for personal productivity enhancement, and reduction of the stress caused by information overload. This paper argues that recent insights in psychology and cognitive science support and extend GTD’s recommendations. We first summarize GTD with the help of a flowchart. We then review the theories of situated, embodied and distributed cognition that purport to explain how the brain processes information and plans actions in the real world. The conclusion is that (...) the brain heavily relies on the environment, to function as an external memory, a trigger for actions, and a source of affordances, disturbances and feedback. We then show how these principles are practically implemented in GTD, with its focus on organizing tasks into “actionable” external memories, and on opportunistic, situation-dependent execution. Finally, we propose an extension of GTD to support collaborative work, inspired by the concept of stigmergy. (shrink)

A growing body of empirical evidence suggests the existence of a Paradox of Choice, whereby a larger choice set leads to a lower expected payoff to the decisionmaker. These empirical findings contradict traditional choice-theoretic results in microeconomics and even social psychology, suggesting profound yet unexplained aspects of choice settings/behavior. The Paradox remains largely as a theoretically-rootless empirical phenomenon. We neither understand the mechanisms and conditions that generate it, nor whether the Paradox stems from choice behavior, choice setting, or both. We (...) present a general search model of consumer choice under incomplete information to examine the theoretical existence and conditions for the Paradox. The model departs from traditional microeconomic choice theory in assuming no “cognitive free lunches.” Search and evaluative efforts require time, focus, and opportunity cost in the model, as in real life. The model shows that conditions for Paradox readily exist, diminishing returns to potential value of the choice in choice set size is a necessary condition for a Paradox outcome, that a Paradox outcome can occur with or without a “choice overload” response by the decisionmaker, and that avoidance of a Paradox outcome is an impossibility in some choice settings (primitive to setting regardless of choice behavior). Lastly, we develop a pareto-improving choice set reduction algorithm that eliminates weakly dominated choice set elements and presents the restricted choice set to the decisionmaker. As such, it is shown that the algorithm acts to treat or mitigate the Paradox of Choice, as well as to pareto-improve choice-supporting evaluation more generally. Like established AI recommender systems, the novel algorithm filters choices. In the present case, the filtering is based upon identification of weakly dominated choice set elements. (shrink)

BackgroundDrawing from Erikson’s theory, Domino and Affonso constructed the Inventory of Psychosocial Balance, a scale with satisfactory reliability and validity. However, the lack of a credible Chinese version of the scale may hinder research on ego development in Taiwan. The aim of the present study was to construct a short form Chinese IPB. In addition, factor analysis was employed to shorten the original 120-item scale to make it suitable for application in the older adults in the future.MethodsThe study involved three (...) steps: The first step was to establish the 120-items of the Chinese Inventory of Psychosocial Balance, and we conducted translation, back-translation, expert validity, and reliability of pilot study for this step. Following the first step was to construct the short-form C-IPB in the second step, and the CIPB-SF was developed via item analysis and factor analysis. Finally, we assessed the reliability and validity of the CIPB-SF via structural equation model in the third step.ResultsThree hundred eight older adults without cognitive disorder completed the IPB. The 40-item CIPB-SF was completed through item analysis and factor analysis. The internal consistency test of CIPB-SF and the eight stages were good. The CIPB-SF had acceptable validity, except in the intimacy and identity stages, in which validity was only fair. Compared with the IPB, the CIPB-SF had good reliability and acceptable validity. However, because of its conciseness, the 40-item CIPB-SF was more suited for application among the Chinese elderly population because its application avoids physical overload.ConclusionThe CIPB-SF served as a concise scale for assessing ego development in our study. This scale can also serve as a useful tool for convenient screening in the future. (shrink)

The centrality of the embodiment of mind, self, and values for the later Nietzsche is widely acknowledged. Here, I reconstrue Nietzsche’s HL to show that he uses his drive model of the mind already in this early text. The “historical sickness” central to HL is diagnosed in the form of failures of embodiment and drive control. First, I argue that a precursor to Nietzsche’s figure of “the last human” is already the target in HL. Second, I offer working definitions for (...) terms such as “drives,” “affects,” and “values,” which are crucial to Nietzsche’s heuristic diagnostic framework. I then focus on the neglected passage that contrasts the medieval memento mori with a modern memento vivere, showing that the former functions as an embodied mechanism of willing and self-control, which Nietzsche claims the moderns have been unsuccessful in replacing. Finally, I draw on recent research in embodied cognition and identify two causes—“overload” and “semantic embodiment”— of the modern “historical sickness” that undermines flourishing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Breaking the Readmission CycleBrian HattenI want to share the story of my difficult patient Ms. L. She has twenty-seven current medical issues. Thirty-five active prescriptions. Limited mobility requiring the use of a motorized scooter. Non-medical care gaps. And over twenty hospital admissions since 2020. I met Ms. L approximately five years ago as her hospital attending and have continued to care for her during her frequent hospitalizations. I could (...) recite this 77-year-old female's litany of medical problems. But sufficed to say, her history is complex, with her admitting diagnoses running the gambit from cellulitis to gastrointestinal bleeding to altered mental status. But, her diagnosis and frequent exacerbations of congestive heart failure (CHF) are particularly frustrating for us both and will be my focus today.CHF makes her susceptible to fluid overload leading to feelings of shortness of breath, which progresses to respiratory distress. Like other individuals with CHF, she uses diuretics to prevent herself from becoming fluid overloaded. And, like many individuals who take diuretics, she hates them. She (un)affectionately calls her water pills "the bomb" because the effect is sudden, profound, and explosive when they begin working. The combination of the diuretic effect and her limited mobility causes significant emotional stress for Ms. L, a woman who values presenting herself outwardly as in control, well-dressed, and put together. Her dislike of the medical effect of her diuretics has led to her either taking them less often or outright discontinuing them. So, while discontinuation avoids those frustrating effects, it leads to fluid accumulation, subsequent respiratory distress, and readmission to the hospital.Her medical records mention she has memory issues. It is unclear how much her mild cognitive impairment affects her frequent readmissions. We have had many conversations where I would never suspect something was amiss. But sometimes, she can be forgetful and does not recall our recent discussions. That being said, she knows the names and uses of her medications. She can report to me her home weights when she checks them and knows what her "dry" weight should be. Yet, she does not act when her scales begin reading heavier or when she develops leg swelling. Instead, she presents to the emergency department in extremis. When directly questioned about why she lets her situation deteriorate to such a state that she requires hospitalization, she demurs. She comments that she can often be stubborn, that the diuretic effect of "the bomb" is burdensome, but always reminds me she is honest in admitting she wasn't taking her water pills.During several admissions, I worried for her survival after she had self-discontinued her medications and showed up at the emergency department in respiratory failure. For any patient with recurrent admissions, I discuss their overall goals of care to ensure we are working together toward achievable medical ends. But this conversation was essential to have with Ms. L. The possibility existed that she would present to the hospital too late in her disease process, and we would not be able to correct her respiratory failure. I wanted to ensure that the hospital staff and I respected her wishes regarding her care. Despite raising my concerns, she would [End Page 22] decline to discuss her wishes. Even worse, attempting to have her complete advance care planning documents like advance directives or a Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) form was a futile endeavor. Ms. L was always vague and non-committal. She simply did not want to engage in those types of conversations. When asked why she declined to discuss these issues, Ms. L would reply that she was doing okay, the discussion was unnecessary, and she had family members to make those decisions for her.Caring for her during her hospital stays was a source of professional frustration for me. Her recurrent admissions made me feel like I was failing her. During each hospital stay, we would go over her medications. We repeatedly discussed how she should check her weights daily and monitor for lower extremity edema. We created multiple action plans for when to call her physicians so we could head off another hospital visit. We completed all the... (shrink)

This paper analyzes notions and models of optimized cognition emerging at the intersections of psychology, neuroscience, and computing. What I somewhat polemically call the algorithms of mindfulness describes an ideal that determines algorithmic techniques of the self, geared at emotional resilience and creative cognition. A reframing of rest, exemplified in corporate mindfulness programs and the design of experimental artificial neural networks sits at the heart of this process. Mindfulness trainings provide cues as to this reframing, for they detail each in (...) their own way how intermittent periods of rest are to be recruited to augment our cognitive capacities and combat the effects of stress and information overload. They typically rely on and co-opt neuroscience knowledge about what the brains of North Americans and Europeans do when we rest. Current designs for artificial neural networks draw on the same neuroscience research and incorporate coarse principles of cognition in brains to make machine learning systems more resilient and creative. These algorithmic techniques are primarily conceived to prevent psychopathologies where stress is considered the driving force of success. Against this backdrop, I ask how machine learning systems could be employed to unsettle the concept of pathological cognition itself. (shrink)

In Nyāya philosophy, a special kind of extraordinary sensory connection is admitted named jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti or jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. It is held that sometimes our sense-organ can be connected to such an object which is not amenable to the operating sense-organ. In such cases, cognition (jñāna) plays the role of sensory connection and connects the content of itself to the operating sense-organ. The paradigmatic example of jñānalakṣaṇa perception is to ‘see’ fragrant sandal through visual sense from non-smellable distance. This hypothesis of (...) jñānalakṣaṇa has been criticized by the opponents being considered as counterintuitive, mysterious and theoretically overloaded. This paper tries to demystify the notion. It shows that although it seems to be metaphysically mysterious phenomenon at first sight, it is not so at all. The paper explores the psychological process involved in this sensory connection. The hypothesis is shown to have sufficient explanatory power, because the Naiyāyikas have used this hypothesis to explain five different epistemic situations. Hence, this paper argues that it is not a theoretical overload. The opponents counter-argue that all those five cognitive situations can be explained without admitting jñānalakṣaṇa. Moreover, if we admit jñānalakṣaṇa, then a particular kind of inference will become redundant. The paper answers all those objections and defends the hypothesis. The second part of the paper presents an empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. The arguments leveled against the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa can be contested on the ground that they try to disprove something which is supported on experimental ground. Experiments represent universally acceptable objective facts supported by experience—denying which amounts to anubhavavirodha, which philosophers would want to avoid. Hence, supporting jñānalakṣaṇa on the ground of scientific experiments can be considered as a philosophical stand. Now, there is a clinically recognized and neurophysiologically proved condition, called synaesthesia, where stimulation of a particular sensory modality automatically and involuntarily activates a different sensory modality simultaneously without a direct stimulation of the second modality. As for example, when a sound → colour synaesthete listens to a particular tone such as C-sharp, she visualizes particular colour, such as blue, in her mind’s eye; for a grapheme → colour synaesthete a particular number or alphabet is always tinged with a particular colour. This paper shows that the cognitive process involved in synaesthesia lends support to the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti. It has been proved through several experiments that it is a genuine perceptual phenomenon and is not a confabulation of memory. There are several alternative theories which explain the phenomenon neurophysiologically. The paper discusses the most popular one: the cross-activation hypothesis. There are two major objections against the project of comparing jñānalakṣaṇa with synaesthesia. First, synaesthesia is a neurological condition present in a few numbers of people whereas jñānalakṣaṇa is claimed to be universal phenomenon. Second, syneasthesia is a sensory experience whereas jñānalakṣaṇa involves application of concepts. The paper answers these questions. Firstly, multimodal processing in the brain is a universal phenomenon; secondly, there is a form of synaesthesia where top-down processing is involved. In those cases, concepts play important role for having synaesthetic experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CompassionEdward J. VolpintestaTo the Editor: In his essay, “Can We Mandate Compassion?” (March–April 2011), Ron Paterson, a former health and disability commissioner in New Zealand, discusses the decline of physicians’ compassion—an issue that is receiving more attention in the media, and in our journals, hospitals, and medical societies, as well.He decided—and I agree—that compassion should not be mandated. How could it be? After all, it’s unquantifiable; it’s not meted (...) out in milliliters or grams. Compassion is a spontaneous emotion that arises from the individual caregiver’s spiritual reservoirs. Trying to regulate or mandate it would be absurd—the ultimate attempt at dehumanizing medicine. Giving students more exposure to the humanities, however, and teaching doctors what is not acceptable in “terms of conduct, attitudes, and behavior” may increase awareness of its importance. Putting that awareness into action is another thing.Could it be that physicians are too hard-pressed for time and too overstressed with ordering and interpreting tests that they have little time and energy left for compassion? Has the threat of malpractice suits made physicians distrust patients, seeing them more as potential lawsuits than as suffering human beings, as horrible as that may sound to some? Or has the vast amount of new medical knowledge that rapidly reaches doctors given them an information overload so great that they have room only for cognition and none for emotion? When one adds the pressure physicians feel to control costs and to follow guidelines that often clash with their judgment, it becomes clear why compassion has declined.As a primary care doctor, there are days when all I have to offer some patients is compassion. A divorce, problems with personal finances, depression, a recent death, a child in trouble with the law or with drugs, an unwanted pregnancy—these are some of the problems that are the most difficult and time-consuming for me. They do not require any new scientific knowledge. Like compassion, they are not quantifiable, and there are no board exams to test how well I help my patients cope with them. There is also no code that I can send to an insurance company that will accurately convey what I have done, or its value to my patients. Only my patient and I are aware of whether I was able to use compassion in a way that helped. How could it be otherwise?It is much easier for me to treat a patient with pneumonia or conjunctivitis. I doubt that there ever will be a foolproof way to teach compassion to physicians. Perhaps performing psychological tests on incoming medical students may be the best way to determine which are most inclined to become compassionate physicians.The Flexner Report of 1910, which contained many recommendations for improving medical education, may have overstressed the importance of science while neglecting the human dimensions of medical practice. The Carnegie Foundation, which funded the original study, has undertaken a second examining any unintended consequences of the first. Unlike the first, which was dominated by one man, the second comprises a broad team of educators, doctors, philosophers, and psychologists. Perhaps this broader approach will restore compassion to its rightful place.Letters to the editor may be sent by e-mail to [email protected], or to Managing Editor, Hastings Center Report, 21 Malcolm Gordon Road, Garrison, NY 10524; (845) 424-4931 fax. Letters appearing in the Report may be edited for length and stylistic consistency.Statement of Ownership, Management, and CirculationThe Hastings Center Report is a bimonthly journal published by The Hastings Center, 21 Malcolm Gordon Road, Garrison, NY 10524. The editor is Gregory Kaebnick, at the same address. The annual subscription price is $80; contact person is Anne Marie Schoonhoven; telephone number is 845-424-4040. The tax status of the organization has not changed during the preceding twelve months.As of the filing date of September 6, 2011, the average number of copies of each issue during the preceding twelve months was 3,342; the actual number of copies of the single issue published nearest to the filing date was 3,150. The journal has a total paid and/or requested circulation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Suñña at the Bone:Emily Dickinson’s Theravadin RomanticismAdam KatzA narrow Fellow in the GrassOccasionally rides—You may have met him? Did you notHis notice instant is—The Grass divides as with a Comb—A spotted Shaft is seen,And then it closes at your FeetAnd opens further on—He likes a Boggy Acre—A Floor too cool for Corn—But when a Boy and BarefootI more than once at NoonHave passed I thought a Whip LashUnbraiding in (...) the SunWhen stooping to secure itIt wrinkled And was gone—Several of Nature’s PeopleI know and they know meI feel for them a transportOf CordialityBut never met this FellowAttended or aloneWithout a tighter BreathingAnd Zero at the Bone.1Via the Arabic word cipher, the English word “zero” comes straight from the Sanskrit word shunya (empty). In Pali, the early Buddhist liturgical language, it is suñña. This poem’s story recalls the common Buddhist simile where a rope is mistaken for a snake in the dim light. There is nothing in the rope that should be feared as a snake, and likewise there is ultimately nothing in the five aggregates—basically, everything—that [End Page 111] can be regarded as atman (soul, self). So the aggregates are empty of self: anatta, in Pali. This is the doctrine of emptiness. Fallaciously imputing selfhood to the inherently selfless flux of the aggregates is a major source of suffering, so realizing emptiness brings liberation, just as investigating the rope and finding it empty of snakehood liberates one from fright.Recognizing that the rope is a rope and not a snake is a simile for realizing emptiness. Likewise, in the poem, recognizing that the snake is a snake and not a “Whip Lash / Unbraiding in the Sun” catapults the speaker into a sublime experience of “Zero at the Bone.” This last line may be a metaphor for being chilled to the bone, but the absence of a subject for zero to modify and the sonic and aesthetic overload in an otherwise mostly matter-of-fact nature poem suggest that the sudden recognition of the snake scares us out of ourselves, empties us out, providing a Romantic corollary for Buddhist emptiness.In the Buddhist simile and in the poem, the correction of faulty recognition precipitates the realization of emptiness. But in the simile, what is primarily important is that the rope is recognized as not a snake. One Tibetan text says that substantial progress can be made by, as it were, mistaking the rope for a vine, just so the scary snake perception is cleared away.2 A slightly later Tibetan text says that, simile aside, recognizing that the rope is not a snake and not even a vine but precisely a rope is merely a matter of “conventional valid cognition,” which stops far short of liberating insight into the selflessness of phenomena as such.3 Believing the rope really is a rope is the same as, in the simile, mistaking the rope for a snake, because in both cases it is a matter of perceiving substantiality where there is impermanence. By contrast, Dickinson’s poem emphasizes neither clearing up a particularly pernicious and persistent misconception about existence nor replacing this misconception with complete insight; rather, the poem emphasizes “conventional valid cognition” itself as a vehicle for sublime transcendence. The ecstatic experience of “Zero at the Bone” requires that the snake be accurately recognized as a snake.This “conventional valid cognition” is technically compatible with complete insight into the selflessness of phenomena as such, and it is certainly possible that the speaker experiences zeroness due to an optical illusion or hallucination or dream rather than recognizing a real snake, but the poem does not highlight either of these possibilities. It emphasizes recognitional accuracy, and being thrown from the quotidian as a result. This is quite different from the lesson of the Buddhist simile, where, again, the emphasis is on what is not there, specifically selfhood, rather than on what is there in its precise distinctness from other things. In this regard the poem is, however, eminently compatible... (shrink)

More recent advancements in digital technologies have significantly alleviated the dissemination of new scientific ideas as well as the storing, searching and retrieval of large amounts of published research findings. While not denying the benefits of this novel ‘economy of memory,’ this paper endeavors to shed light on the ways in which the use of digital technologies may be linked to a distortion of the system of formal publications that facilitates the effective dissemination and collaborative building of scientific knowledge. Through (...) combining three different strands of discussion that are often left separate – those pertaining to the cognitive effects of new technological memory systems, those pertaining to citation and publishing practices, and those regarding the effects of formalizing modes of research governance – it is also shown that this distortion is not merely a consequence of technological developments alone. Rather, such a distortion is inseparable from and potentially aggravated by the spreading of increasingly dysfunctional, formalizing research governance mechanisms. It is argued that these mechanisms run the risk of fostering the proliferation of knowledge practices that are characterized by an increasing degree of superficiality as well as the strategic publication of research that is of a decreasing degree of originality. If left unaddressed, this may pose a serious threat to the efficiency and effectiveness of the formal record of scientific knowledge as a tool for the dissemination of original research. By extension, this may in the long run seriously undermine the capacity of the publicly funded research system more generally. (shrink)

In this paper I have two main aims. My first aim is to introduce the notion of bounded emotionality. This notion is the analogue of that of bounded rationality in behavioural economics. Bounded rationality says, roughly, that human beings are cognitively limited with respect to their processing and memory capacities. Bounded emotionality says that we are limited in our emotional capabilities, notably in the intensity, duration, and possible combinations of our emotional states. Bounded rationality is a foundational notion in behavioural (...) economics and has played an important role in various fields of philosophy as well. In particular, in epistemology bounded rationality has been thought to have implications with respect to our doxastic norms. My second aim in this paper is to suggest that bounded emotionality also has an important role to play in philosophy. As a case in point, I discuss the implications that bounded emotionality has for our doxastic norms. In particular, I argue that one is not obligated to believe something or to stop holding a belief if one could not believe/fail to believe it without having an emotional response that exceeds one's bounded emotional capacities. (shrink)