It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

The dilemma about "unknown things-in-themselves" makes it clear that something is as a matter of fact known about them: namely, that whatever they are like, they do exist. So that what is at fault in the description is not obviously the very idea of things-in-themselves but the idea "unknown" as applied to them. The first question therefore is, "What is there in the idea of a thing's being unknown which allows this idea to issue in a descriptive dilemma?".

Of course it is necessary to distinguish clearly between statements which actually purport to be about non-existents and seemingly similar statements in which the question of non-existents is not in fact broached at all. These latter statements are to be distinguished from statements about non-existents, not in not being about non-existents and therefore being about existents, but in being distinct from the questions both of existence and nonexistence. They deal with another question altogether, namely that of the various predicative uses (...) of the substantive verb. The statement "fairies have wings," for instance, is a statement falling within this latter category: it is not concerned with the existential status of the objects of reference designated by the subject term nor indeed with any designation whatever; merely with the signification and analysis of the concept "fairy"; whether having wings is a subsidary and implicit description within the signification "fairy.". (shrink)

It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

The defining of 'image' as essentially that class of idea to which there is no object corresponding, springs from a commend able desire not to allow analysis to result in an incorrect conceptual multiplication of physical objects or situations. This result would be likely if the thinker succumbed to the temptation to consider that for every idea entertained there is somehow an objective physical situation corresponding. The simple calling of attention to the type of mental state signified by the word (...) 'imagining' is reckoned to be sufficient to guard against this danger. And so it is. But at the same time,- concentration upon this danger may easily lead to the consequent temptation to consider that there are some ideas which have no objects of reference whatever. This is just not the case. The true insight that some ideas have no objective physical situations corresponding to them does not imply that some ideas have no objects of reference unless it be assumed that all situations or states of affairs are physical. But then if this is true there can be no specific meaning at all for the word 'idea' since by it we imply at the very least some distinction from the physical as such; and in this case all attempts to distinguish 'idea' as over against 'object' break down. The presence of this dilemma is enough to demand a re-analysis of the original distinction. (shrink)

The criterion of reality is variable, and is as non-exclusive as reality itself. So that if freedom from contradiction, for example, be used as such a criterion, it has only to be asked if real muddles, or real chaos, or real contradictions are not possible?

First it will be necessary to examine the argument, and the meaning of the argument, by which Mr. Ingram-Pearson is led to uphold such an unusual position. Using the statement, "fairies do not exist," as his example, he observes: "In order to achieve its obvious status as a denial this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all." What, then, is (...) the designate of the term "fairies"? It is, we are told, "an existent [italics mine] which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there." To say that "fairies do not exist" is therefore to say that "certain entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are not present in the world," or "specific entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are really absent from the world." The latter statement is positive, and Mr. Ingram-Pearson tells us explicitly that positive statements cannot "succeed in making intelligible" something made intelligible by negative statements about non-existents; but he has in mind such "ordinary" positive statements as "fairies are imagined beings." In other words, it is not that negative statements about. (shrink)

This is a lively and engaging introduction to the contentious topic of Nietzsche's political thought. It traces the development of Nietzsche's thinking on politics from his earliest writings to the mature work in which he advocates aristocratic radicalism as opposed to 'petty' European nationalism. The key ideas of the will to power, eternal return and the overman are discussed and all Nietzsche's major works analysed in detail, such as Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals, within the context (...) of the concerns of modern political theory. The book concludes with an assessment of Nietzsche's enduring relevance and of the insights afforded by contemporary liberal and feminist readings. This textbook will be essential for all students of Nietzsche and of the history of political ideas. It includes a chronology of Nietzsche's life and works and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

The work of Gilles Deleuze has had an impact far beyond philosophy. He is among Foucault and Derrida as one of the most cited of all contemporary French thinkers. Never a student 'of' philosophy, Deleuze was always philosophical and many influential poststructuralist and postmodernist texts can be traced to his celebrated resurrection of Nietzsche against Hegel in his Nietzsche and Philosophy , from which this collection draws its title. This searching new collection considers Deleuze's relation to the philosophical tradition and (...) beyond to the future of philosophy, science and technology. In addition to considering Deleuze's imaginative readings of classic figures such as Spinoza and Kant, the essays also point to the meaning of Deleuze on 'monstrous' and machinic thinking, on philosophy and engineering, on philosophy and biology, on modern painting and literature. Deleuze and Philosophy continues the spirit of experimentation and invention that features in Deleuze's work and will appeal to those studying across philosophy, social theory, literature and cultural studies who themselves are seeking new paradigms of thought. (shrink)

The book seeks to illuminate Bergson's view that philosophy is the discipline of thinking that makes the effort to think beyond the human condition so as to extend our perception of the universe. In the book I explore Bergson on time and freedom, on memory, on his reformation of philosophy in Creative Evolution, on religion, on ethics, and on education and the art of life.

This unique book explores Nietzsche’s philosophy at the time of Dawn’s writing and discusses the modern relevance of themes such as fear, superstition, terror, and moral and religious fanaticism. The authors highlight Dawn’s links with key areas of philosophical inquiry, such as “the art of living well,” skepticism, and naturalism. The book begins by introducing Dawn and discussing how to read Nietzsche, his literary and philosophical influences, his relation to German philosophy, and his efforts to advance his ‘free spirit’ philosophy. (...) Subsequent discussions address a wide range of topics relevant to Dawn, including presumptions of customary morality, hatred of the self, free-minded thinking, and embracing science and the passion of knowledge. (shrink)

This essay examines Deleuze’s relation to new materialism through an engagement with new materialist claims about the human and nonhuman relation and about agency. It first considers the work of Elisabeth Grosz and then moves on to a consideration of Deleuze’s own conception of a new materialism/new naturalism. I seek to show that Deleuze is an ethically motivated naturalist concerned with an ethical pedagogy of the human, which he derives from his reading of Spinoza. I seek to illuminate some of (...) the principal features of this ethically guided materialism/naturalism and show that even in his later work with Felix Guattari, which situates all life, human and nonhuman, on a plane of immanence, there remains a recognition that the human animal is ethically distinguished as the inventive species par excellence. My main claim, then, is that Deleuze’s project cannot be aligned with a new materialism that supposes a flat ontology and that does away with an ethical distinction between the human and the nonhuman. Although Deleuze bequeaths a complex legacy to post-modern thought in his thinking about the human, it should not be supposed that he has no affinities with aspects of a humanist position and pedagogy. (shrink)

_A Companion to Nietzsche_ provides a comprehensive guide to all the main aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy, profiling the most recent research and trends in scholarship. Brings together an international roster of both rising stars and established scholars, including many of the leading commentators and interpreters of Nietzsche. Showcases the latest trends in Nietzsche scholarship, such as the renewed focus on Nietzsche’s philosophy of time, of nature, and of life. Includes clearly organized sections on Art, Nature, and Individuation; Nietzsche's New Philosophy (...) of the Future; Eternal Recurrence, the Overhuman, and Nihilism; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy and Genealogy; Ethics; Politics; Aesthetics; Evolution and Life. Features fresh treatments of Nietzsche’s core and enigmatic doctrines. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the nature of Deleuze’s commitment to an affirmative naturalism that is based on certain Epicurean principles and insights. The essay is divided into two main parts. In the first part I bring to light some of the key features of Lucretius’s great poem on the nature of things, and I do so with the aid of Bergson and his reading of the teaching as fundamentally melancholic. In the second part I switch my attention to Deleuze (...) and show how he links together physics and ethics as a way of providing an emancipatory and affirmative philosophy of life and one that aims to defeat sadness. In the conclusion I return to the question of melancholy and indicate how the problem might be best negotiated. (shrink)

In this article I explore naturalism as a joyful science by focusing on how Nietzsche and Deleuze appropriate an Epicurean legacy. In the first section I introduce some salient features of Epicurean naturalism and highlight how the study of nature is to guide ethical reflection on the art of living. In the next section I focus on Nietzsche and show the nature and extent of his Epicurean commitments in his middle period writings. In the third and final main section my (...) attention shifts to Deleuze and to showing how he fruitfully demonstrates the intersection of physics and ethics in the Epicurean method of thinking. I am interested in Epicureanism since, as both Nietzsche and Deleuze show, it holds ethics to be central to philosophical inquiry and activity: we study nature not simply as an end in itself but as a way of better understanding how we can promote a flourishing life. Our being in the world is not to be guided by myths and illusions, especially of a supernatural kind, but rather by the affirmation of the positive power of an immanent and multiple nature and by the joy that results from recognizing the diversity of its elements. (shrink)

This essay looks at Nietzsche in relation to the Epicurean tradition. It focuses on his middle period writings of 1878 texts such as Human, all too Human, Dawn, and The Gay Science heroic-idyllic philosophizing’. At the same time, Nietzsche claims to understand Epicurus differently to everybody else. The essay explores the main figurations of Epicurus we find in his middle period and concludes by taking a critical look at his later and more ambivalent reception of Epicurus.

In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the (...) intensification of life and its expansion. In the case of Bergson I show that he also pioneers a novel naturalistic appreciation of morality, one that is keen to demonstrate morality’s two sources and so as to give us a firm grasp of the chances of a moral progress on the part of humanity. I suggest that of the two appreciations of morality Bergson’s is the richer since it contains a set of critical reflections on humanity’s condition that is lacking in Guyau. I conclude by suggesting that Bergson’s idea that modern humanity is confronted with the decision whether it wishes to continue living or not has lost none of its relevance today. (shrink)

An examination of Nietzsche on the passion of knowledge and that then looks at aspects of Foucault's work on this theme or motif.

Nietzsche’s naturalism is a well-rehearsed theme. The latter has become somewhat of an orthodoxy in Anglo-American scholarship, and it is often connected to the rediscovery of Nietzsche’s ethical thought among analytic philosophers. Philosophical naturalism, of course, can mean many different things, and Nietzsche’s rhetoric, his polemical stance and tendency toward hyperbole, are not exactly hallmarks of a philosophical naturalism that situates itself in close proximity to the methods and methodologies of the natural sciences. On the other hand, it is difficult (...) to deny that much of Nietzsche’s work—perhaps even from the early essay on “Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense” onward—speaks to a tradition.. (shrink)

Intent upon letting the reader experience the pleasure and intellectual stimulation in reading these classic authors, the How to Read series provides a context and an explanation that will facilitate and enrich your understanding of texts vital to the canon.

Nietzsche is no longer a marginal figure in the study of philosophy. This collection of specially commissioned essays reflects the emergence of a serious interest amongst philosophers, sociologists and political theorists. By considering Nietzsche's ideas in the context of the modern philosophical tradition from which it emerged, his importance in contemporary thought is refined and reaffirmed. Modern German thought begins with Kant and has rarely escaped his influence. It is with respect to this Kantian heritage that this volume examines Nietzsche. (...) These essays critically consider Nietzsche's relation to Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. In broad terms it is his relation to the domains of knowledge, ethics and aesthetics, that is through the three Kantian critiques, that Nietzsche's thought is illuminated. This allows a surprising variety of areas and questions, both about Nietzsche and about philosophy to be investigated. (shrink)

This volume aims to inspire a return to the energetics of Nietzsche's prose and the critical intensity of his approach to nihilism. For too long contemporary thought has been dominated by a depressed "what is to be done?" All is regarded to be in vain, nothing is deemed real, there is nothing new seen under the sun. Such a "postmodern" lament is easily confounded with an apathetic reluctance to think engagedly. Hence the contributors here draw on a variety of issues--the (...) future of life, the nature of life-forms, the techno-sciences, the body, religions--as a way of tackling the question of nihilism's pertinence to us now. (shrink)

Cheerfulness or serenity (Heiterkeit) is one of the most important themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Throughout his writings, from first to last, he can be found wrestling with conceptions of cheerfulness and promoting a cheerful mode of philosophizing. Despite the importance and recurrence of the theme of cheerfulness in Nietzsche’s entire œuvre, there have been relatively few studies specifically devoted to it. An important debate on cheerfulness has recently taken place in the literature on Nietzsche between Robert Pippin and Lanier Anderson (...) and Rachel Cristy. Both sides of the debate have explored Nietzsche’s practice of cheerfulness in direct relation to Montaigne. According to Pippin, Nietzsche never succeeds in writing with the kind of cheerfulness of Montaigne. In contrast, Anderson and Cristy have contended that both Nietzsche and Montaigne conceive of cheerfulness as a complex, non-naïve spiritual state or attitude that is to be cultivated through the practice of philosophy as a way of life. According to Anderson and Cristy, this is a deep form of love of life that both Nietzsche and Montaigne practice and perhaps achieve at least in part by and through writing. In this essay, we aim to contribute to this debate by offering a threefold argument. First, we argue that Nietzsche conceives of cheerfulness not only as a psychological ideal, as a desirable state or attitude of the spirit, but also as an aesthetic ideal, as a desirable quality or style of thinking and writing (sections 1–2). Second, we argue that, in addition to Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson is an equally important but neglected influence on Nietzsche’s conception and practice of cheerfulness (section 2). Third, by reconstructing Nietzsche’s self-presentation as a cheerful thinker and writer in the 1886 prefaces and in Ecce homo (1888), we conclude that it is possible to argue that starting from his middle writings Nietzsche thinks and writes cheerfully in some of his works, including a number of his most significant texts (section 3). (shrink)

Cheerfulness or serenity (Heiterkeit) is one of the most important themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Throughout his writings, from first to last, he can be found wrestling with conceptions of cheerfulness and promoting a cheerful mode of philosophizing. Despite the importance and recurrence of the theme of cheerfulness in Nietzsche’s entire œuvre, there have been relatively few studies specifically devoted to it. An important debate on cheerfulness has recently taken place in the literature on Nietzsche between Robert Pippin and Lanier Anderson (...) and Rachel Cristy. Both sides of the debate have explored Nietzsche’s practice of cheerfulness in direct relation to Montaigne. According to Pippin, Nietzsche never succeeds in writing with the kind of cheerfulness of Montaigne. In contrast, Anderson and Cristy have contended that both Nietzsche and Montaigne conceive of cheerfulness as a complex, non-naïve spiritual state or attitude that is to be cultivated through the practice of philosophy as a way of life. According to Anderson and Cristy, this is a deep form of love of life that both Nietzsche and Montaigne practice and perhaps achieve at least in part by and through writing. In this essay, we aim to contribute to this debate by offering a threefold argument. First, we argue that Nietzsche conceives of cheerfulness not only as a psychological ideal, as a desirable state or attitude of the spirit, but also as an aesthetic ideal, as a desirable quality or style of thinking and writing (sections 1–2). Second, we argue that, in addition to Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson is an equally important but neglected influence on Nietzsche’s conception and practice of cheerfulness (section 2). Third, by reconstructing Nietzsche’s self-presentation as a cheerful thinker and writer in the 1886 prefaces and in Ecce homo (1888), we conclude that it is possible to argue that starting from his middle writings Nietzsche thinks and writes cheerfully in some of his works, including a number of his most significant texts (section 3). (shrink)

This book presents a student-friendly introduction to one of Nietzsche's most widely-read and studied texts. "Beyond Good and Evil" contains Nietzsche's mature philosophy of the free spirit. Although it is one of his most widely read texts, it is a notoriously difficult piece of philosophical writing. The authors demonstrate in clear and precise terms why it is to be regarded as Nietzsche's philosophical masterpiece and the work of a revolutionary genius. This "Reader's Guide" is the ideal companion to study, offering (...) guidance on: philosophical and historical context, key themes, reading the text, reception and influence and further reading. "Continuum Reader's Guides are clear, concise and accessible introductions to key texts in literature and philosophy. Each book explores the themes, context, criticism and influence of key works, providing a practical introduction to close reading, guiding students towards a thorough understanding of the text. They provide an essential, up-to-date resource, ideal for undergraduate students. (shrink)

The chapter presents Bergson’s conception of philosophy as a way of life, as a thinking that seeks to make contact with the creativity of life as a whole. This endeavor to alter our vision of the world, and ultimately, our action and sense of being in the world, seeks to operate a “conversion of attention.” For Bergson, such a conversion is tied in with what he calls the “true empiricism” that allows us to experience and think change as that which (...) makes up living reality as a whole. Bergson conceptualizes this move beyond the human in terms of sympathy, a term employed both descriptively, to develop the notion of a sympathetic whole of life in which philosophy as a way of life resituates the self, and prescriptively, as urging us to overcome our estrangement from “the ocean of life” to which we owe our existence. This effort of sympathy takes the form of a spiritual exercise. Not limited to mere contemplation of the world, it transforms the manner in which we perceive the reality of duration and thus opens the path for a different way of living. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how the final aphorism, 575, of Nietszsche's Dawn, presents a positive vision of humanity as future‐oriented and self‐cultivating. It explores how Nietzsche's vision of humanity as future‐oriented and self‐creating is taken up once again by him in his later writings. In the final aphorism Nietzsche's use of the symbolism of flight is significant. This final aphorism is entitled "We aeronauts of the spirit". As Duncan Large has pointed out, the aeronauts in the aphorism are flying an "air‐ship", (...) and their flying out over the sea indicates "how close is their kinship to their more earthbound, or at least sea‐bound mariner‐cousins". In addition to his use of the sea as a metaphor for both the infinity of the future and humanity's orientation toward this future, Nietzsche draws upon the metaphor of flight to elaborate on this continuation of human development. (shrink)

Nietzsche's wider political thinking has been widely recognized as therapeutic in orientation, as part of its connection to the history of psychology. This chapter examines the remarks that Nietzsche does make with respect to the political in Dawn, focusing on his concern with the effects on humanity of capital and industrial development upon Europeans. It explores his remarks on migration as a therapeutic measure for the workers of Europe and considers some of the problematic claims involved in Nietzsche's appeal to (...) migration as a key part of his therapeutic approach. The chapter discusses whether or not Nietzsche's therapeutic politics in Dawn can be defended. Nietzsche contends that money substitutes for truth, and that the same fanaticism that previously drove truth‐seeking now drives people to the increasing, and increasingly rapid, acquisition of wealth. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Half‐Title Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Page Table of Contents Acknowledgments Editions of Nietzsche's Writings Used with Abbreviations.

Many of Nietzsche's texts, particularly those that form part of his later writings, have received significant individual attention within English‐speaking Nietzsche studies. This chapter argues that Nietzsche's core critical innovations in Dawn are in identifying why customary morality is a significant problem for humanity, and in developing a sustained critique of this form of morality in order to motivate critical re‐engagement with the ethical. In Dawn, Nietzsche attacks the view that everything that exists has a connection with morality and thus (...) a moral significance can be projected onto the world. Nietzsche's project in Dawn focuses on addressing the presumptions and prejudices of customary morality. The challenge of understanding the philosophical contribution that Dawn makes is complicated by Nietzsche's writing styles: he combines innovative deployment of aphorism and punctuation with use of multiple voices or characters, and a range of rhetorical devices. (shrink)

This chapter examines the basis of Nietzsche's campaign against customary morality in Dawn. It consider what problems there are with mounting a successful campaign against morality, and to what extent Nietzsche's campaign against morality leaves room for a positive ethics. The chapter shows that Nietzsche's fundamental concern is that morality as it currently stands is bad for humans. The basic problem with the campaign against morality that Nietzsche pursues in the original aphorisms of Dawn can be developed in greater depth (...) by examining evidence from its 1886 Preface, which illustrates Nietzsche's awareness of the challenge that his campaign against morality faces. Aphorism supports Nietzsche's experimental disruption of the social and emotional systemic functioning of customary morality, and allows for exploration of alternatives to the mood of fear that Nietzsche shows to be pervasive to customary morality. (shrink)

This chapter examines Nietzsche's thinking on the concept of Mitleid and discusses the complexities of translating this concept into English in Dawn. It describes how Nietzsche's critical engagement with this concept is importantly dependent on the role of drives in his wider moral psychology. The chapter also examines the role of mood and social transmission of feeling in his critique, arguing that these factors play key roles in Nietzsche's development of a substantial critique of an ethic of compassion, and in (...) his pursuit of an alternative ethic. It shows how Nietzsche's exposure of an ethic of compassion as fundamentally flawed opens up the possibility of a reconfiguration of the concept of moral imagination, and facilitates development of a more robust, creative, and experimental concept of ethical imagination as a part of Nietzsche's broader effort to provide a framework for ongoing moral therapy. (shrink)

This chapter examines Nietzsche's remarks on Epicurus in the earlier middle writings, to provide an interpretative framework through which to clarify Nietzsche's thinking on death in Dawn. It considers some points of continuity between Nietzsche's account of death in Dawn and in his later texts. Nietzsche champions Epicurus as a figure who has sought to show mankind how it can conquer its fears of death. The chapter contends that Nietzsche uses Epicurean thinking as a strategy to do his work in (...) Dawn, picking up the Epicurean doctrine on death and putting it to critical effect. Nietzsche's fundamental aim in writing about death, within the wider context of his project in Dawn, is to counter our socially conditioned yearning for immortality. A careful reading of Epicurus attests to the significance of Epicureanism as a strategy informing Nietzsche's thinking on death in Dawn. (shrink)

In 1881 Nietzsche discovered that he had a precursor: Spinoza. In a letter to Franz Overbeck postmarked July 30—the eve of the experience of the eternal recurrence—he enumerated the points of doctrine that he believed he shared with Spinoza, including the denial of free will, a moral world order, and evil, and he also mentioned the task of "making knowledge the most powerful affect [die Erkenntniß zum mächtigsten Affekt zu machen]". A note of the same year reads, "Spinoza: We are (...) only determined in our actions by desires and affects. Knowledge must be an affect in order to be a motive. I say: it must be a passion to be a motive". Nietzsche's first published reference to the "passion of... (shrink)

Some significant receptions of Epicurean philosophy take place in nineteenth century European thought. For Marx, writing in the 1840s, and in defiance of Hegel’s negative assessment, Epicurus is the ‘greatest representative of the Greek enlightenment’,1 whilst for Jean-Marie Guyau, writing in the 1870s, Epicurus is the original free spirit, ‘Still today it is the spirit of old Epicurus who, combined with new doctrines, works away at and undermines Christianity.’ 2 For Nietzsche, Epicurus is one of the greatest human beings to (...) have graced the earth and the inventor of ‘heroic-idyllic philosophizing’.3 Here my focus is on the reading of Epicureanism to be found in Bergson’s commentary on Lucretius’s remarkable poem, De Rerum Natura. For Bergson the task Lucretius sets himself is a ‘pioneering one’, one that will serve humanity, in particular making the Romans aware of previously unknown or misunderstood truths. In order to demonstrate these truths with precision it was necessary for Lucretius to be acquainted with Greek philosophy, and especially the teaching of Epicurus. (shrink)

This co-authored chapter offers a reconstruction of Bergson's conception of the relationship between the political and religion focusing on "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion". Bergson's claims and arguments are related to those of Nietzsche with a focus on the themes of critique, immanence and affirmation.

_Beyond Good and Evil_ is Nietzsche's first sustained philosophical treatment of issues important to him. Unlike the expository prose of the essayistic period, the stylized forays and jabs of the aphoristic period, and the lyrical-philosophical rhetoric of the Zarathustra-period, _Beyond Good and Evil_ inscribes itself boldly into the history of philosophy, challenging ancient and modern notions of philosophy's achievements and insisting on a new task for "new philosophers." This is a watershed book for Nietzsche and for philosophy in the modern (...) era. _On the Genealogy of Morality_ applies Nietzsche's celebrated genealogical method, honed in the earlier aphoristic writings, to the problem of morality's influence on the human species. In three treatises that strikingly anticipate insights appearing much later in Freud's _Civilization and Its Discontents_, Nietzsche provides an anthropological psychograph of our species, revealing the origins of the concepts of good and evil, the roles played by guilt and bad conscience, and the persistence of ascetic ideals. Manifesting a hopeful yet unsentimental assessment of the human condition, these books resonated throughout the 20th century and continue to exert broad appeal. (shrink)

There is a tradition of modern French philosophy that contains valuable resources for thinking about the nature and limits of obligation and how a higher calling of life beyond obligation might be conceived. This is a tradition of an ethics of generosity whose best exemplar is perhaps Henri Bergson and that extends in our own time to the writing of Gilles Deleuze.

Neste artigo sigo uma sugestão de Pierre Hadot pela qual ele, desde que era um jovem estudante, entendia que “o bergsonismo não era uma filosofia abstrata e conceptual, mas uma nova maneira de ver a si e ao mundo”. A Filosofia para Bergson possui assim dois objetivos principais: ampliar a percepção humana; aprimorar a capacidade humana de agir e de viver. Examino alguns aspectos centrais da reforma bergsoniana da Filosofia, cuja ambição é levar a Filosofia além da academia, inclusive das (...) disputas entre diferentes escolas filosóficas. O novo conhecimento que assim obtivermos nos possibilitará duas coisas: aprimorará a especulação filosófica – o que contribui para uma ampliação de nossa percepção -, estimulará e iluminará a vida cotidiana, inclusive aprimorando a nossa capacidade de agir e de viver. (shrink)