[Heft 1] Dikaiarchos.--[Heft 2] Aristoxenos.--[Heft 3] Klearchos.--[Heft 4] Demetrios von Phaleron.--[Heft 5] Straton von Lampsakos.--[Heft 6] Lykon und Ariston von Keos.--[Heft 7] Herakleides Pontikos.--[Heft 8] Eudemos von Rhodos.--[Heft 9] Phainias von Eresos. Chamaileon. Praxiphanes.--[Heft 10] Hieronymos von Rhodos.

This study blends together ethical philosophy, neurocognitive-evolutionary studies, and literary theory to explore how imaginative discourse addresses a distinctively human deep sociality, and by doing so helps shape cultural and literary history. Deep sociality, arising from an improbable evolutionary history, both entwines and leaves non-reconciled what is felt to be significant for us and what ethical sense seems to call us to acknowledge as significant, independent of ourselves. Ethical Sense and Literary Significance connects literary and cultural history without reducing the (...) literary to a mere expression of something else. It argues that affective differences between non-egocentric and egocentric registers of significance are integral to the bioculturally evolved deep sociality that verbal art addresses-often in unsettling and socially critical ways. Much imaginative discourse, in early societies as well as recent ones, brings ethical sense and literary significance together in ways that reveal their intricate but non-harmonized internal entwinement. Drawing on contemporary scholarship in the humanities and sciences, Donald R. Wehrs explores the implications of interdisciplinary approaches to topics central to a wide range of fields beyond literary studies, including neuroscience, anthropology, phenomenological philosophy, comparative history, and social psychology. (shrink)

Both patched versions of the Bostrom/Kulczycki simulation argument contain serious objective errors, discovered while attempting to formalize them in predicate logic. The English glosses of both versions involve badly misleading meanings of vague magnitude terms, which their impressiveness benefits from. We fix the errors, prove optimal versions of the arguments, and argue that both are much less impressive than they originally appeared. Finally, we provide a guide for readers to evaluate the simulation argument for themselves, using well-justified settings of the (...) argument parameters that have simple, accurate statements in English, which are easier to understand and critique than the statements in the original paper. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the claim (...) some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you're uncertain about basic normative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order" norm: e.g., "comply with the first-order norm you regard as most probable" or "maximize expected choiceworthiness". But what if you're uncertain about second-order norms too -- must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim (...) to rescue second-order norms from this threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the suggestion some philosophers have entertained that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on agents regardless of their beliefs or evidence concerning that norm. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order (e.g., moral) norms, thus closing off any question of what an agent should do in light of her normative beliefs. Rather, it is more plausible to ascribe external force to a single, second-order rational norm: the enkratic principle, correctly formulated. This modest form of externalism, I argue, is both intrinsically well-motivated and sufficient to head off the threat of regress. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

Levinas and Twentieth-Century Literature considers how the work of the century’s most original ethical thinker may reshape understandings of modernism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, feminism, gender studies, and globalism. Tracing how modernist technique and anti-totalizing ethics enter into relations that, by the turn of the twenty-first century, not only revitalize diverse national literatures but also produce post-national, migrant, or hybrid literatures, the collection illuminates the ethical within literature while disclosing the literary contexts of Levinasian ethics.

Ein anschauliches Porträt des jüdischen Religionsphilosophen - Eine prägnante Darstellung des facettenreichen Lebens und Wirkens Martins Bubers Gerhard Wehr legt hier eine umfassende Darstellung von Leben, Werk und Wirkung Martin Bubers vor. Darin beschreibt er nicht nur den großen Religionsphilosophen und genialen Bibelübersetzer, sondern auch den Anthropologen, der das dialogische Prinzip formulierte, den Vermittler der chassidischen Botschaft, dessen jüdischer Humanismus zwischen Ost und West zu vermitteln suchte und als konkrete Utopie auch für eine israelisch-arabische Völkerverständigung gemeint war. Eine differenzierte (...) Darstellung des jüdischen Religionsphilosophen und zugleich ein anschauliches Stück deutscher und jüdischer Geistesgeschichte. (shrink)

Hermes on Two Wheels shows the dynamic world of the bicycle messenger through a sociological lens, based on a five-year participant observation study. Beginning with the experiences of messengers themselves and moving to describe the structural settings of those experiences, the research shows how messengers work within a political-economic system that devalues semi-skilled labor and strips people of emotional fulfillment. The voluntary risk-taking of messengers becomes a means of achieving such emotional fulfillment as well as making a living, while their (...) stylistic expressions pay dividends in cultural scrip rather than money. Through their work, messengers help to reproduce and maintain the structures of society while also constructing a vibrant, rebellious, politicized subculture that has come to represent the new urban hipster, an image continually under threat of co-optation. (shrink)

The third section considers the relevance of Levinas's work for reassessments of the realist novel through essays on Austen, Dickens, and George Eliot.

Recent longitudinal observations show that human menstrual cycles, sleep‐wake cycles and manic‐depressive cycles can become synchronized with lunar cycles, but do so in uniquely complex and heterogeneous ways that are unlikely to have been detected by past studies. Past studies’ negative results have given rise to a scientific consensus that human biology and behavior are unaffected by lunar cycles. The recent observations show that synchrony can be temporary, and can occur with more than one type of lunar cycle, more than (...) one phase of a lunar cycle and more than one resonant frequency of a lunar cycle. Given the variability of human responses to lunar cycles, aggregate analyses used in almost all previous studies would likely have cancelled out individuals’ responses and led to false negative results. In light of these observations, the question of lunar influence should be investigated further, with longitudinal observations and case‐by‐case analyses of individuals’ data. (shrink)

Averageness is purportedly the result of stabilizing selection maintaining the population mean, whereas facial paedomorphosis is a product of directional selection driving the population mean towards an increasingly juvenile appearance. If selection is predominantly stabilizing, intermediate phenotypes reflect high genetic quality and mathematically average faces should be found attractive. If, on the other hand, directional selection is strong enough, extreme phenotypes reflect high genetic quality and juvenilized faces will be found attractive. To compare the effects of stabilizing and directional selection (...) on facial paedomorphosis (juvenilization), graphic morphing and editing techniques were used to alter the appearance of composite faces to make them appear more or less juvenile. Both facial models and judges of attractiveness were from the CSU-Long Beach campus. Although effect sizes for both preferences were large, the effect for averageness was nearly twice that found for juvenilization, an indication that stabilizing selection influences preferences for facial paedomorphosis more so than directional selection in contemporary humans. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Rev. version of the author's Habilitationsschrift, Martin-Luther-Universitèat.

This chapter approaches the hierarchical theory of time from a philosophical point of view. It is based on a critical reading of Fraser's work through Neo-Kantian eyes. The chapter reflects upon the methodological constraints that apply to a natural philosophy of time. At the same time, it attempts to resolve some tensions between this theory's content and its epistemological and ontological foundations as stated by Fraser himself. The chapter begins with a discussion on the essential characteristics of the Neo-Kantian point (...) of view. Next, it enumerates the main points of contention between Fraser's and the Neo-Kantian point of view, but also the logical tensions inherent in Fraser's position. This is followed by a critical review of Fraser's "working concept" of truth and of the extended umwelt principle. Some consequences for the hierarchical theory of time are proposed. (shrink)

Über die weitreichende Bedeutung von Briefwechseln für die Formierung der frühneuzeitlichen Gelehrtenrepublik besteht seit längerem ein für geisteswissenschaftliche Verhältnisse ungewöhnlicher Konsens. Die großen Briefwechsel von Grotius, Leibniz oder Haller machen deutlich, dass die Innovationsdynamik der Gelehrtenkultur im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert im Wesentlichen auf Kommunikationsstrukturen zurückzuführen ist, die durch Korrespondenzen und durch die damit verbundenen Netzwerke etabliert wurden. Obwohl der in Halle lehrende Jurist und Philosoph Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) zu den,,schlechthin zentralen Persönlichkeiten" der deutschen und - über deren Rezeption (...) - auch der europäischen Aufklärung gehört, ist eine Edition seiner Korrespondenz zwar verschiedentlich als Desiderat benannt, tatsächlich aber noch nie in Angriff genommen worden. Die hier vorgelegte Ausgabe will diesem Desiderat abhelfen und bietet eine vollständige und kommentierte Edition der aktiven und passiven Korrespondenz von Christian Thomasius. Damit soll bislang unbekanntes Quellenmaterial erschlossen und über die Kommentierung ausgewertet werden, das einerseits der Erforschung des Oeuvre von Christian Thomasius und seinem Umfeld neue Impulse geben wird und andererseits geeignet ist, wichtige Aufschlüsse über die frühaufklärerische Gelehrtenkultur im Übergang vom 17. zum 18. Jahrhundert zu verschaffen. Hierbei ist sowohl an die Veränderungen innerhalb der Kommunikationsstrukturen der Res publica litteraria zu Beginn der Aufklärung als auch - und zwar in erster Linie - an die Rekonstruktion der Genese und der Lösung von einzelnen theoretischen wie praktischen Problemen im Kontext der im ausgehenden 17. Jahrhundert sich vollziehenden sozialen und politischen Veränderungen zu denken. (shrink)

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...) of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. (shrink)

Die Debatte um den wissenschaftlichen Realismus spielt seit einigen Jahrzehnten eine prominente Rolle in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie. In ihrem Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob die erfolgreichen Theorien der modernen Naturwissenschaften eine mindestens annäherungsweise wahre Beschreibung einer von uns unabhängigen physischen Wirklichkeit liefern. In der vorliegenden Studie wird der Versuch unternommen, eine Strategie zur Verteidigung des wissenschaftlichen Realismus zu entfalten, die einige der gängigen Einwände zu entkräften vermag. Die entscheidende Rolle kommt dabei der Ausarbeitung eines realistischen Beobachtungsbegriffs für die Naturwissenschaften zu. Des (...) weiteren werden empiristische und konstruktivistische Gegenpositionen zum wissenschaftlichen Realismus kritisch untersucht. (shrink)

I argue that Metaphysics H.6 is not an isolated chapter but the conclusion of an argument begun in H.3. This view will provide further and better arguments for the following view about long-standing interpretative debates: first, Aristotle provides a substantive account of the unity of the composite substance (although he also briefly addresses the unity of the form); second, neither Aristotle’s conception of matter nor his account of form changes between H.1–5 and H.6; and third, H does not rely on (...) and is not completed by book Θ in any significant way. (shrink)