Cellular circadian clocks represent ancient anticipatory systems which co‐evolved with the first cells to safeguard their survival. Cyanobacteria represent one of the most ancient cells, having essentially invented photosynthesis together with redox‐based cellular circadian clocks some 2.7 billion years ago. Bioelectricity phenomena, based on redox homeostasis associated electron transfers in membranes and within protein complexes inserted in excitable membranes, play important roles, not only in the cellular circadian clocks and in anesthetics‐sensitive cellular sentience (awareness of (...) environment), but also in the coupling of single cells into tissues and organs of unitary multicellular organisms. This integration of cellular circadian clocks with cellular basis of sentience is an essential feature of the cognitive CBC‐Clock basis of cellular life. (shrink)

The defining principle of evolutionary biology is that all species, extant and extinct, evolved from ancient prokaryotic cells. Their initial appearance and adaptive evolution are proposed to have been accompanied by a cellular sentience, by feelings, subjectivity or, in a word, 'consciousness'. Prokaryotic cells, such as archaea and bacteria, have natural unitary, valence-marked 'mental' representations. They process and evaluate sensory information in a context-dependent manner. They learn, establish memories, and communicate using biophysical fields acting on excitable membranes. Symbiotic (...) eukaryotic cells, which evolved much later, initiated a compound cellular subjectivity utilizing 'senomic' and 'ephaptic' principles that evolved into the varieties of consciousness seen in multicellular species. This Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model provides a novel framework within which to approach fundamental issues such as the origins of life and the emergence of mind. (shrink)

A reductionistic, bottom‐up, cellular‐based concept of the origins of sentience and consciousness has been put forward. Because all life is based on cells, any evolutionary theory of the emergence of sentience and consciousness must be grounded in mechanisms that take place in prokaryotes, the simplest unicellular species. It has been posited that subjective awareness is a fundamental property of cellular life. It emerges as an inherent feature of, and contemporaneously with, the very first life‐forms. All other (...) varieties of mentation are the result of evolutionary mechanisms based on this singular event. Therefore, all forms of sentience and consciousness evolve from this original instantiation in prokaryotes. It has also been identified that three cellular structures and mechanisms that likely play critical roles here are excitable membranes, oscillating cytoskeletal polymers, and structurally flexible proteins. Finally, basic biophysical principles are proposed to guide those processes that underly the emergence of supracellular sentience from cellular sentience in multicellular organisms. (shrink)

We are sympathic with LeDoux’s primary goal here ─ to get a solid scientific grip on what has been dubbed one of the most elusive, important questions in scientific discourse, to identify the underlying biomolecular processes that give rise to consciousness. However, we have issues with the way he goes about it and have tried to present them in a constructive manner. Our commentary is built around our theory of the origins of minds, dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (...) (CBC), and the empirical research that supports it. The CBC is based on the proposition that life and sentience are co-terminous, that life without subjectivity, feeling, without valenced perception, without the capacity to learn and lay down memories would have been an evolutionary dead-end. It could not have survived in the hostile, chaotic world in flux that dominated our planet four billion years ago. The biological sciences operate on the principle that all species, extant and extinct, evolved from the first prokaryotes. The CBC theory is founded on the principle that all expressions of emotion, perception, and cognition did as well. (shrink)

The Cellular Basis of Consciousness theory places the first appearance of sentience at the emergence of life. It makes the radical, and previously unexplored, claim that prokaryotes, like bacteria, possess a primitive form of consciousness. The implications of the theory for the philosophy of mind, cell-biology, and cognitive neurosciences are explored.

Microorganisms demonstrate conscious-like intelligent behaviour, and this form of consciousness may have emerged from a quantum mediated mechanism as observed in cytoskeletal structures like the microtubules present in nerve cells whichapparently have the architecture to quantum compute. This paper hypothesises the emergence of proto-consciousness in primitivecytoskeletal systems found in the microbial kingdoms of archaea, bacteria and eukarya. To explain this, we make use of the Subject–Object Model (SOM) of consciousness which evaluates the rise of the degree of consciousness to conscious (...) behaviourin these systems supporting the hypothesis of emergence and propagation of conscious behaviour during the pre-Cambrian partof Earth’s evolutionary history. Consciousness as proto-consciousness or sentience computed via primitive cytoskeletal structures substantiates as a driver for the intelligence observed in the microbial world during this period ranging from single-cellular to collective intelligence as a means to adapt and survive. The growth in complexity of intelligence, cytoskeletal system and adaptive behaviours are key to evolution, and thus supports the progression of the Lamarckian theory of evolution driven by quantum mediated proto-consciousness to consciousness as described in the SOM of consciousness. (shrink)

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding (...) at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. (shrink)

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for (...) animal sentience. Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned with current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area. (shrink)

The attribution of sentience or consciousness to plants is currently a topic of debate among biologists and philosophers. The claim that plants are conscious is based on three arguments: (i) plants, like all living organisms, are sentient (biopsychism); (ii) there is a strong analogy between the phloem transport system of plants and the nervous system of animals; and (iii) plants are the cognitive equals of sentient animals. On the basis of a model of consciousness that spells out criteria for (...) assigning sentience to a living organism and presents a diagnostic evolutionary marker of consciousness, we argue that these arguments are flawed and discuss some of the ethical issues they raise. (shrink)

This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of (...) class='Hi'>sentience. For phenomenology, sentience includes the capacities for self-awareness and, I will argue, a plural self-awareness; the ‘I’ belongs to a ‘we’, and the ‘we’ is constitutive of the ‘I’. This ‘primordial we’ provides the basis for rethinking the moral relations between human animals and non-human animals. I contend finally we thus have an ontological basis in ‘interanimality’ to explain why we most often do and should care about all sentient beings. (shrink)

This article examines the nature of affective states across biological taxa. It argues that affect constitutes a primary form of consciousness. Creatures capable of affect are sentient of their bodily states and can behave in ways intended to maintain or restore them to a homeostatic range. After reviewing and critiquing neurobiological and philosophical theories of the evolution of consciousness, this article argues that some possible creatures are limited to self‐directed affective states, even if those creatures are capable of exteroception. Such (...) creatures enjoy solipsistic sentience: awareness of their own selves and bodily demands, but unawareness of their exogenous environments. (shrink)

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence (...) of sentience in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use. (shrink)

‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their (...) sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research. (shrink)

The use of nonhuman animals as models in research and drug testing is a key route through which contemporary scientific knowledge is certified. Given ethical concerns, regulation of animal research promotes the use of less “sentient” animals. This paper draws on a documentary analysis of legal documents and qualitative interviews with Named Veterinary Surgeons and others at a commercial laboratory in the UK. Its key claim is that the concept of animal sentience is entangled with a particular imaginary of (...) how the general public or wider society views animals. We call this imaginary societal sentience. Against a backdrop of increasing ethnographic work on care encounters in the laboratory, this concept helps to stress the wider context within which such encounters take place. We conclude that societal sentience has potential purchase beyond the animal research field, in helping to highlight the affective dimension of public imaginaries and their ethical consequences. Researching and critiquing societal sentience, we argue, may ultimately have more impact on the fate of humans and nonhumans in the laboratory than focusing wholly on ethics as situated practice. (shrink)

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may (...) ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness. (shrink)

Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the capacity for the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities grounded (...) in one's nature, and his explanation of why cruelty is wrong. I also argue that sentience is a more plausible candidate for the morally salient capacity than rationality. (shrink)

I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I (...) argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition. (shrink)

Sentience is the capacity to have feelings, such as feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, warmth, joy, comfort and excitement. It is not simply the capacity to feel pain, but feelings of pain, distress or harm, broadly understood, have a special significance for animal welfare law. Drawing on over 300 scientific studies, we evaluate the evidence of sentience in two groups of invertebrate animals: the cephalopod molluscs or, for short, cephalopods (including octopods, squid and cuttlefish) and the decapod (...) crustaceans or, for short, decapods (including crabs, lobsters and crayfish). We also evaluate the potential welfare implications of current commercial practices involving these animals. (shrink)

I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.

In some recent papers (G. ‘t Hooft and others), it has been argued that quantum mechanics can arise from classical cellular automata. Nonetheless, G. Shpenkov has proved that the classical wave equation makes it possible to derive a periodic table of elements, which is very close to Mendeleyev’s one, and describe also other phenomena related to the structure of molecules. Hence the classical wave equation complements Schrödinger’s equation, which implies the appearance of a cellular automaton molecular model starting (...) from classical wave equation. The other studies show that the microworld is constituted as a tessellation of primary topological balls. The tessellattice becomes the origin of a submicrospic mechanics in which a quantum system is subdivided to two subsystems: the particle and its inerton cloud, which appears due to the interaction of the moving particle with oncoming cells of the tessellattice. The particle and its inerton cloud periodically change the momentum and hence move like a wave. The new approach allows us to correlate the Klein-Gordon equation with the deformation coat that is formed in the tessellatice around the particle. The submicroscopic approach shows that the source of any type of wave movements including the Klein-Gordon, Schrödinger, and classical wave equations is hidden in the tessellattice and its basic exciations – inertons, carriers of mass and inert properies of matter. We also discuss possible correspondence with Konrad Zuse’s calculating space. (shrink)

Cellular automata (henceforth: CA) are discrete, abstract computational systems that have proved useful both as general models of complexity and as more specific representations of non-linear dynamics in a variety of scientific fields. Firstly, CA are (typically) spatially and temporally discrete: they are composed of a finite or denumerable set of homogeneous, simple units, the atoms or cells. At each time unit, the cells instantiate one of a finite set of states. They evolve in parallel at discrete time steps, (...) following state update functions or dynamical transition rules: the update of a cell state obtains by taking into account the states of cells in its local neighborhood (there are, therefore, no actions at a distance). Secondly, CA are abstract, as they can be specified in purely mathematical terms and implemented in physical structures. Thirdly, CA are computational systems: they can compute functions and solve algorithmic problems. Despite functioning in a different way from traditional, Turing machine-like devices, CA with suitable rules can emulate a universal Turing machine, and therefore compute, given Turing's Thesis, anything computable.... (shrink)

Depression might be associated with accelerated cellular aging. However, does this result in an irreversible state or is the body able to slow down or recover from such a process? Telomeres are DNA‐protein complexes that protect the ends of chromosomes and generally shorten with age; and therefore index cellular aging. The majority of studies indicate that persons with depression have shorter leukocyte telomeres than similarly aged non‐depressed persons, which may contribute to the observed unfavorable somatic health outcomes in (...) the depressed population. Some small‐scale preliminary studies raise the possibility that behavioral or pharmacological interventions may either slow down or else reverse this accelerated telomere shortening, possibly through increasing the activity of the telomere‐lengthening enzyme telomerase. This paper covers the current state of evidence in the relationship between depression and the telomere‐telomerase system and debates whether depression‐related cellular aging should be considered a reversible process or permanent damage. (shrink)

Unlike eggs and diatoms, most single cells in nature do not have structured shells to provide extensive protection. It is a challenge to artificially confer shell structures on living cells to improve their inherent properties and functions. We discuss four different types of cellular shellizations: man‐made hydrogels, sol‐gels, polyelectrolytes, and mineral shells. We also explore potential applications, such as cell storage, protection, delivery, and therapy. We suggest that shellization could provide another means to regulate and functionalize cells. Specifically, the (...) integration of living cells and non‐living functional shells may be developed as a novel strategy to create “super” or intelligent cells. Unlike biological approaches, this material‐based bio‐interface regulation is inexpensive, effective, and convenient, opening up a novel avenue for cell‐based technologies and practices. (shrink)

The study of plant signaling and behaviour, whose aim is to address the physiological basis for adaptive behaviour in plants, is a growing and thought-provoking field of research. In this review we discuss relevant studies that try to interpret in a neurocognitive fashion cases in which plants seem to behave similarly to animals. By comparing observations and experiments about plants and animals, we propose a framework composed of three axes in which interactions of living organisms with the world can be (...) represented. The first axis refers to adaptiveness, the second to sensitivity, and the third to sentience. This model allows us to interpret the behaviours of living organisms along a continuum capable of giving a smooth transition from simple to complex responses. In light of this, plants show an excellent adaptiveness, a variable level of sensitivity, and a good degree of sentience (restricted to the immediate perception that something is happening to themselves). Only the organisms with a high degree of sentience can have the basis for developing consciousness. However, even though it is necessary for consciousness, sentience is not sufficient, as it must be associated with a complex functional organization of structures that can support a recursive and synchronized processing of information. So far, plants have been found to completely lack this type of organization. Plants appear to be, therefore, sentient but not conscious. (shrink)

We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?

Cells live in dynamic environments that necessitate perpetual adaptation. Since cells have limited resources to monitor external inputs, they are required to maximize the information content of perceived signals. This challenge is not unique to microscopic life: Animals use senses to perceive inputs and adequately respond. Research showed that sensory‐perception is actively shaped by learning and expectation allowing internal cognitive models to “fill in the blanks” in face of limited information. We propose that cells employ analogous strategies and use internal (...) models shaped through the long process of evolutionary adaptation. Given this perspective, we postulate that cells are prone to “misperceptions,” analogous to visual illusions, leading them to incorrectly decode patterns of inputs that lie outside of their evolutionary experience. Mapping cellular misperception can serve as a fundamental approach for dissecting regulatory networks and could be harnessed to modulate cell behavior, a potentially new avenue for therapy. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to lay to rest "fruitless controversy over mind and body" by developing a comprehensive theory of mind. The theory Matson argues for is mind-body identity. In developing his position he takes a hard materialist line: "... if sensations are brain processes then they cannot be... anything else." Yet, he asks, "What is the sentience? Why is there any such phenomenon? What difference does it make?" Rejecting dualism, he steers his materialist identity theory between (...) two mires: epiphenomenalism and behaviorism. His contention is that while sensations are brain processes, man is a sentient being and that sentience makes a difference. The difference sentience makes allows us to say that man is not a machine and is free. (shrink)

1 Strange words to come from the father of materialism, a philosophy that might be self-evidently true if only there were no people. ..

Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...) that the aspect of mentality necessary for having interests is more complicated than mere sentience. (shrink)

Recall that for any Boolean algebra (BA) A, the cellularity of A is c(A) = sup{|X| : X is a pairwise-disjoint subset of A}. A pseudo-tree is a partially ordered set (T, ≤) such that for every t in T, the set {r ∊ T : r ≤ t} is a linear order. The pseudo-tree algebra on T, denoted Treealg(T), is the subalgebra of ℘(T) generated by the cones {r ∊ T : r ≥ t}, for t in T. We (...) characterize the cellularity of pseudo-tree algebras in terms of cardinal functions on the underlying pseudo-trees. For T a pseudo-tree, c(Treealg(T)) is the maximum of four cardinals c\sbT, ι\sbT, φ\sbT, and μ\sbT : roughly, c\sbT measures the "tallness" of the pseudo-tree T; ι\sbT the "breadth"; φ\sbT the number of "finite branchings"; and μ\sbT the number of places where T "does not branch." We give examples to demonstrate that all four of these cardinals are needed. (shrink)

This book is about bridging the current deeply-held divide between sentience and reason. It focuses on the pragmatic role of sentient experience and its unceasing and inseparable interplay with the exercise of reason. Part I of the book deals first with the need for synthesizing the hitherto separate "truth-finding" knowledge traditions: the third-personal scientific-technological, and the first-personal humanistic-wisdom tradition. A conceptual framework for a mind reality is then proposed. Drawing from the unifying natural laws in current physical and biological (...) sciences, the mind reality is portrayed in terms of one interlocking open dynamic system with both a manifested and a covert aspect. In this entire system, each individual mind constantly "co-creates" and "co-evolves" with other collective or group minds at various levels. It is also presumed that the basic unit of interaction in the mind reality is thought or intent. Supporting evidence from psychology, parapsychology and the ancient perennial philosophies is presented. The second part of the book addresses the pragmatic consequences of the proposed mind reality. At the individual level, it is argued that sentient experience can serve the function of guiding, affirming and fostering an individual's life's work. A selection of existing first-personal accounts is presented to illustrate this point. At the collective level, the current dominant collective thought of "new capitalism" has the unfortunate consequences for humanity's sense of freedom, education and morality. Such consequences pertain to the "exteriorization" and the "deconstruction" of the intrinsic self and intrinsic values. To avoid this to happen, a collective effort at changing consciousness becomes necessary: the core task lies with the closure of the reason and sentience divide. (shrink)

This article deals with the concept of sentience, and more specifically with the argument from sentience as it is used by utilitarians in the abortion debate and in the advocacy of animal rights. It is argued that sentience is more than feeling pleasure and pain (with empha sis on pain), and that pain is an inborn protection required to fit into the world rather than the substance of evil. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(3) 2004: 292-301.

Recent arguments in plant biology that claim to be uncovering the scientific basis for sentience in plants are grounded on assumptions that have not been sufficiently scrutinized. This paper focuses on two assumptions in particular – the semantic assumption that psychological predicates are non-rigid and hence can be extended to plants, and the assumption that Darwinian gradualism is inconsistent with consciousness emerging at a specific place on the phylogenetic tree. We interrogate both assumptions, advocating that a careful semantic analysis (...) of psychological predicates does not warrant their extension to plants on the available evidence, and that gradualism and emergentism, properly construed, are not inconsistent. (shrink)

Veit suggests that the challenge of coordinating movement in multicellular organisms led to the evolution of a prioritizing value system, which rendered organisms complex enough to be sentient and drove the Cambrian explosion, while the absence of this evaluation system led to the demise of Ediacaran animals. In this commentary we criticize Veit’s terminology and evolutionary proposals, arguing that his terminology and evolutionary scenarios are problematic, and put forward alternative proposals. We suggest that sentience is a system property, and (...) that the evolution of sentience was the outcome of the evolution of open-ended associative learning, which included the coevolution of sensory, motor, memory, and value subsystems. We suggest that these coevolutionary system dynamics were a factor in the Cambrian explosion and contributed to the extinction of the Ediacaran biota. (shrink)

The recognition of animal sentience in law has created high expectations but has not yet lived up to them. In some jurisdictions, the recognition of animal sentience has formed the basis of new legal obligations imposed on humans to protect animal interests. So far, however, its potential has been limited because legal officials have interpreted sentience narrowly, as mainly referring to pain. This article proposes identifying other animal characteristics to better serve animal interests, namely sociability and agency. (...) These animal characteristics could, like sentience, be legally recognized by legislatures and receive normative force from the courts. This article argues that the legal recognition of sociability and agency could address animal exploitation and killing. Animal sociability and agency are already implicitly recognized by the law of most Western states, making it easier for them to be explicitly recognized in the future. Although these characteristics are already found in the law, they have the potential to be more disruptive than sentience because they have never served as the basis for the legal protection of animals. In other words, their potential as protective tools remains underexplored and underexploited. Moreover, sociability and agency more intuitively suggest normative implications because of their demanding nature. Acknowledging that a being is social and agential implies recognizing her need for social relationships and ensuring that her choices are fulfilled. This research article provides antispeciesist scholars and activists with a critical overview of new concepts around which some may wish to rally, particularly since the legal recognition of sentience has shown limits in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the potential of legally recognizing sociability and agency by taking examples from the lives of dogs, cows, cats, horses, northern gannets, and dolphins. (shrink)

We argue that prediction success maximization is a basic objective of cognition and cortex, that it is compatible with but distinct from prediction error minimization, that neither objective requires subtractive coding, that there is clear neurobiological evidence for the amplification of predicted signals, and that we are unconvinced by evidence proposed in support of subtractive coding. We outline recent discoveries showing that pyramidal cells on which our cognitive capabilities depend usually transmit information about input to their basal dendrites and amplify (...) that transmission when input to their distal apical dendrites provides a context that agrees with the feedforward basal input in that both are depolarizing, i.e., both are excitatory rather than inhibitory. Though these intracellular discoveries require a level of technical expertise that is beyond the current abilities of most neuroscience labs, they are not controversial and acclaimed as groundbreaking. We note that this cellular cooperative context-sensitivity greatly enhances the cognitive capabilities of the mammalian neocortex, and that much remains to be discovered concerning its evolution, development, and pathology. (shrink)

We exhibit a bridge between the theory of cellular categories, used in algebraic topology and homological algebra, and the model-theoretic notion of stable independence. Roughly speaking, we show that the combinatorial cellular categories (those where, in a precise sense, the cellular morphisms are generated by a set) are exactly those that give rise to stable independence notions. We give two applications: on the one hand, we show that the abstract elementary classes of roots of Ext studied by (...) Baldwin–Eklof–Trlifaj are stable and tame. On the other hand, we give a simpler proof (in a special case) that combinatorial categories are closed under 2-limits, a theorem of Makkai and Rosický. (shrink)

Brain arteriovenous malformations (bAVMs) are abnormal vessels that are prone to rupture, causing life-threatening intracranial bleeding. The mechanism of bAVM formation is poorly understood. Nevertheless, animal studies revealed that gene mutation in endothelial cells (ECs) and angiogenic stimulation are necessary for bAVM initiation. Evidence collected through analyzing bAVM specimens of human and mouse models indicate that cells other than ECs also are involved in bAVM pathogenesis. Both human and mouse bAVMs vessels showed lower mural cell-coverage, suggesting a role of pericytes (...) and vascular smooth muscle cells (vSMCs) in bAVM pathogenesis. Perivascular astrocytes also are important in maintaining cerebral vascular function and take part in bAVM development. Furthermore, higher inflammatory cytokines in bAVM tissue and blood demonstrate the contribution of inflammatory cells in bAVM progression, and rupture. The goal of this paper is to provide our current understanding of the roles of different cellular loci in bAVM pathogenesis. (shrink)

The target article on cellular mechanisms of long-term depression appears to have been well received by most authors of the relevant commentaries. This may be due to the fact that this review aimed to give a general account of the topic, rather than just describe previous work of the present author. The present response accordingly only raises questions of major interest for future research.

The study of cellular senescence and proliferative lifespan is becoming increasingly important because of the promises of autologous cell therapy, the need for model systems for tissue disease and the implication of senescent cell phenotypes in organismal disease states such as sarcopenia, diabetes and various cancers, among others. Here, we explain the concepts of proliferative cellular lifespan and cellular senescence, and we present factors that have been shown to mediate cellular lifespan positively or negatively. We review (...) much recent literature and present potential molecular mechanisms by which lifespan mediation occurs, drawing from the fields of telomere biology, metabolism, NAD+ and sirtuin biology, growth factor signaling and oxygen and antioxidants. We conclude that cellular lifespan and senescence are complex concepts that are governed by multiple independent and interdependent pathways, and that greater understanding of these pathways, their interactions and their convergence upon specific cellular phenotypes may lead to viable therapies for tissue regeneration and treatment of age‐related pathologies, which are caused by or exacerbated by senescent cells in vivo. (shrink)

Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness – valenced or affective experience – is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects (...) for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. (shrink)

It has been known for long time that the cosmic sound wave was there since the early epoch of the Universe. Signatures of its existence are abound. However, such a sound wave model of cosmology is rarely developed fully into a complete framework. This paper can be considered as our second attempt towards such a complete description of the Universe based on soliton wave solution of cosmological KdV equation. Then we advance further this KdV equation by virtue of Cellular (...) Automaton method to solve the PDEs. We submit wholeheartedly Robert Kurucz’s hypothesis that Big Bang should be replaced with a finite cellular automaton universe with no expansion. Nonetheless, we are fully aware that our model is far from being complete, but it appears the proposed cellular automaton model of the Universe is very close in spirit to what Konrad Zuse envisaged long time ago. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified with observation data. But we admit that our model is still in its infancy, more researches are needed to fill all the missing details. (shrink)

Cellular Automata (CA) based simulations are widely used in a great variety of domains, fromstatistical physics to social science. They allow for spectacular displays and numerical predictions. Are they forall that a revolutionary modeling tool, allowing for “direct simulation”, or for the simulation of “the phenomenon itself”? Or are they merely models "of a phenomenological nature rather than of a fundamental one”? How do they compareto other modeling techniques? In order to answer these questions, we present a systematic exploration (...) of CA’s various uses. (shrink)

Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these (...) two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly. (shrink)